Free Speech and Russia in Hungary

Free Speech in Hungary

The Hungarian government of Viktor Orban has come under fire for embracing xenophobic, illiberal and authoritarian policies and rhetoric. But while Orban has undoubtedly suppressed political opposition to his left and in civil society more broadly, the Hungarian government retains several key limitations on forms of controversial speech that typically originate from the right – although it has modified these and enforced laws in potentially controversial ways.

Hungary has, at least nominally, embraced EU anti-discrimination and anti-racism priorities. Hungarian law proscribes “incitement to hatred” in general terms, as well as discriminatory actions. These laws are comparable, at least on their face, to countries like France and the United Kingdom, and specifically to the former countries ban on denying the Holocaust and the later’s more specific prohibitions against speech intending to incite hatred against racial groups. These similarities are far from accidental, as both Hungary and the UK derive their laws from common EU directives. However, a key difference exists on the subject of Holocaust denial. Both France and Germany have embraced at least some culpability for the Holocaust, and this is reflected in speech codes, Hungary has a more adversarial relationship with this aspect of its history.

Hungary’s 2010 modification of its Holocaust denial law (by a Fidesz supermajority) creates a clear distinction between the legal codes of most European countries and Hungary’s. These changes removed explicit mention of the Holocaust, instead re-defining the prohibited behavior as denying “genocides committed by national socialist or communist systems.”

Despite the changes to the law, a range of Holocaust deniers have been prosecuted, convicted and punished under the new law. Similar laws against anti-Semitic hate speech have been similarly employed – and have been trumpeted along with renewed funding for the upkeep and restoration of Hungarian synagogues. However, the political implications of the addition of Soviet era crimes to the law remain troublesome. To begin with, the mention of communist-era crimes presents the image of Hungary as a victim (similar tropes have been echoed in Poland) and obfuscates the causes and responsibilities of Holocaust specific remembrance. Similarly,

The enforcement of these laws on behalf of the Hungarian state is particularly interesting in the context of the rhetoric of the Hungarian government itself and of the laws against subtler forms of racial incitement in the rest of Europe. Specifically, it seems likely that government sponsored campaigns targeting George Soros, the Romani minority and Muslim immigrants could all potentially run afoul of the more draconian anti-racist measures of countries like France. The same laws (Bleich) created repeated legal penalties for French actress Bridget Bardot for statements arguably less prejudicial and inflammatory than the rhetoric of Orban himself.

The Kremlin on the Danube

Russia has been immensely, and Hungary’s historical experience, astoundingly, successful in forming alliances with political factions within the country. While Poland, the Eastern European country most commonly compared to Hungary, has retained an intense skepticism of Russia despite the domestic successes of the right populist Law and Justice, Orban’s Fidesz party has retained no such distance.

To begin with, Orban and Putin have demonstrated an ideological and rhetorical affinity – both have opposed the “social progressivism” of the EU, both have employed similar rhetoric surrounding Christianity. The two leaders have been described as forging a “special relationship” based in part on these shared ideological precepts. Hungary has also allied with Russia by pushing a territorial complaint against Ukraine that aligns with Orban and Fidesz’s irredentist policy towards ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries. Orban’s government has provided legal assistance to ethnic Hungarians of Ukrainian descent. Orban has also signed a massive nuclear power deal with Russia and meets with Putin annually.

Russian involvement extends beyond formal diplomatic ties and rhetorical affinity. In 2017, Hungarian prosecutors charged a member of the far-right Jobbik Party with spying. Speculation, admittedly often unfounded, among journalists and pro-democracy observers, suggest Jobbik may be, at least in part, funded by illicit Russian interests. Official Jobbik media has even criticized Orban for insufficient comity with Putin’s regime (Jobbik 2018).

Despite these inroads with various Hungarian parties, historic Russian tensions with Hungary remain salient. Hungary remains a member of NATO, an organization created to counter a previous iteration of the Russian state. Substantial public criticism of Orban’s closeness with Putin remains within Hungary. A clear distinction exists in opinion polling between views of Russia, which is overwhelmingly unpopular (with approximately 20% support), and Putin, who is personally popular on a level on par with Orban among the Hungarian populace. Perhaps pursuant to this discussion, Orban has supported some, though not all, EU measures targeting Russia for various human rights abuses.

Bibliography

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. Oxford University Press, 2011.

https://www.unian.info/politics/10304088-hungary-escalating-tensions-with-ukraine-playing-along-with-russia-media.html

Jobbik. Why Does Viktor Orban Keep Voting for Anti-Russia Sanctions https://www.jobbik.com/why_does_viktor_orban_keep_voting_for_anti_russia_sanctions, 2018

Responding to Racism in Hungary. http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/pdf/hungary_en.pdf. European Network Against Racism.