Category: 3- freedoms

Part A:

Italy is a relatively free country in regards to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. When Italy rewrote their constitution in the 1940s after Mussolini’s fascist dictatorship, those in charge made sure that censorship would have no place in the media in Italy. Although Italy guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the country is still scarred from Mussolini’s rise and immediately after fascism ended the piazza that Mussolini used to hold rallies in became deserted and turned into a parking lot. Now the piazza, Piazza Venezia, is a roundabout so that no rallies may ever take place there again. Clearly, the Italian people were impacted by Mussolini and the fascist period so although they constitutionally allow free speech, there are rules in place to ensure a Mussolini-esque leader never rises in Italy again.

Italy has followed France and Germany recently and implemented a law to combat Holocaust denial. This law was adopted in 2016, a lot later than many of the other countries that have come up with laws to punish those who deny the Holocaust but it is still a historical law to come about in Italian politics. During World War II, Italy was allied with Germany and allowed for thousands of Jewish people to be rounded up all over the country. So, Italy played a part in the Holocaust under Mussolini and therefore has taken a stricter stance on hate speech than other countries. This new legislation modifies an existing law that already punishes propaganda and incitement to violence on racist, ethnic or religious grounds. The old law also targets those who deny the existence of genocide or crimes against humanity as defined by the International Court of Justice. The law passed in 2016 adds to this law and will give prison sentences of up to six years for spreading Holocaust-denial propaganda. This law is a huge step in the right direction for Italy and helps to curb hate speech. Although some may think it is too heavy on censorship, many also believe this new legislation will help to prevent neo-fascist groups from popping up in Italy. Because this law is fairly recent, there is not a lot of data so far on its effectiveness but nonetheless, it is a step in the right direction.

Part B:

Italy’s relationship with Russia goes back to Mussolini and Stalin and has continued to evolve since these leaders were in power. After World War II, Italy and Russia, then the USSR, restored full diplomatic relations in October of 1944. Russia and Italy have always had a close relationship, as Italy is one of Russia’s most important economic partners.

Recently, Italy has become a lot closer with Russia especially with the current political climate in Italy that has been leaning more conservative since the recent election. Silvio Berlusconi was Prime Minister multiple times in Italy and his government in the 2000s heightened the relationship between Italy and Russia due to personal ties between Berlusconi and Putin. Due to this relationship, Russia has had a privileged relationship with Italy.

Italy has clashed with the EU recently by vetoing to renew the sanctions against Russia. Matteo Salvini, Italy’s deputy prime minister, is pro-Moscow and believes that the sanctions against Russia are economically and socially hurting Italy and costing Italians billions of euros. Salvini is the head of the Northern League, the part that won the last election in Italy and although Italy may have been against the sanctions towards Russia for a long time this staunchly pro-Russian leader demonstrates yet another change in Italian politics in recent years. The Northern League won the majority in Italy’s most recent elections and it is not a coincidence that in 2017, Putin’s party signed a deal with the Northern League in order to strengthen political cooperation. Many worry that Russia used fake news to impede in Italy’s last election and political leaders such as the former Prime Minister and Joe Biden called Russia out on potentially helping the Northern League and Five Star Movement and influencing electoral outcomes. Whatever the case may be, Italy has become increasingly closer to Russia and that includes Russia’s role in Italian politics.

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. Oxford University Press, 2011.

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/italy

https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/holocaust-denial-law-adopted-in-italy-1.5393802

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1036518/russia-news-italy-guiseppe-conte-vladimir-putin-US-sanctions

https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Italy-Responding-to-%E2%80%98hate-speech%E2%80%99_3.4.pdf

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/10/17/italy-risks-clash-britain-eu-threatens-veto-renewal-russia-sanctions/

Part A

While Bulgaria’s constitution protects freedom of expression and freedom of the press, according to Reporters Without Borders, Bulgaria continues to fall in the World Press Freedom Index. For several years now Bulgaria has rated lower than any other member of the European Union. In 2018 it received a rating of 111 out of 180 countries for its media freedoms, dropping two places from last year and eleven places since 2014. This low rating is a result of the widespread corruption between politicians, media, and powerful business elites. As an example, a former head of Bulgaria’s intelligence agency, Delyan Peevski, now owns the New Bulgarian Media Group which controls 80% of print media distribution. Furthermore, EU funding is being used to nourish corruption by distributing funds only to media which positively portray the government. There have even been a number of instances in which journalists have been harassed for revealing any sort of irregularities, or instances of corruption, within Bulgaria’s government. Similarly, while NGO’s operate freely, they face hostility from politicians, funding shortages, and nontransparent procedures.

In his book, Bleich discusses the “slippery slope” involved in the balance between guaranteeing democracy through preserving freedoms while also limiting discrimination. Unlike countries Bleich examines such as France and Germany, Bulgaria protects Holocaust denial as freedom of expression. While the Bulgarian government officially acknowledged its role in the Holocaust over seventy years after the end of the war and is now a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, certain groups within the country have taken a revisionist outlook on history. In 2017 the Club of Bulgarian and Jewish Friends protested a monument commemorating Bulgaria’s role in saving 48,000 Jews from deportation to Nazi extermination camps during the war. What they found objectionable was an inscription on the monument which acknowledges Bulgaria’s role in deporting 11,343 Jews residing in its territories of Greece and Macedonia. The Club felt that such statements defamed Bulgaria’s memory and its people and thus it freely utilized its freedoms of expression and assembly.

Part B

Bleich discusses the soft power Russia has been utilizing through media distributed throughout Europe. While we primarily discussed in class Russia’s connection to far-right groups in countries such as France, this soft power has perhaps had an even more significant impact on countries like Bulgaria which already have strong diplomatic relations. Bulgaria and Romania have maintained a strong relationship for decades. During World War II, when Bulgaria joined the Axis alliance in 1941, it opted out of the war against the Soviet Union and maintained diplomatic relations with Moscow until 1944. During the Cold War, Bulgaria was part of the Soviet bloc and, as such, was a major trading partner with Russia. Bulgaria was even considered Russia’s most loyal ally. In recent years, Bulgaria has been torn between its alliance with the West as a member of NATO and the European Union and with its alliance with Russia. Putin has pushed to strengthen alliances with Sofia as Bulgaria is seen as a means to keep the Black Sea under Russian dominance and as an energy linkage from Russia to the west. As an example, an investment agreement was signed between Russia and Bulgaria in 2011 for the construction of the South Stream Pipeline, which put Bulgaria at odds with the European Union. While this project was ultimately not carried out, Russian influences continue to grow within Bulgaria.

According to a study conducted by the HSS Foundation on anti-democratic propaganda in Bulgaria, Eurosceptic, anti-US, and anti-NATO publications increased drastically between the years 2013 and 2017 while pro-Russia publications increased between 42 and 144 times. Further studies show that the number of publications supporting Russia’s actions in Crimea rose from 56 in 2013 to 6,109 in 2016. A common theme of these pro-Russian publications is projecting Russia as a victim of Western aggression.

While in power, the Bulgarian Socialist Party has maintained friendly relations with Russia while also maintaining a pro-EU stance. However, in the 2017 elections, the BSP called for an end of EU sanctions against Russia and took a more Eurosceptic stance. Populist parties, such as Volya, have also emerged in recent years and have taken a strong pro-Moscow stance.

https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/bulgaria

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/controversy-sparks-over-bulgaria-holocaust-commemoration-03-09-2017

https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/bulgaria-is-last-on-media-freedom-in-eu-and-in-the-balkans/

https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/sep/23/press-freedom-bulgaria

http://hssfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/REPORT_PART1_EN.pdf

Co-opting discontent: Russian propaganda in the Bulgarian media

The Czech Republic’s constitution aligns with many of the other liberal democracies that Blithe wrote about like France and the Netherlands. However, many will argue that the current government in power in the Czech Republic is certainty pushing the boundaries when it comes to preserving freedoms. The Czech Republic constitution provides “The law provides for freedom of expression. The law provides for some limitations to this freedom, including in cases of hate speech, Holocaust denial, and denial of communist-era crimes” (Human Rights Report, 2017). Much like the other countries mentioned in the reading the Czech Republic promotes free speech but does have limitations in place against certain speech.

As the Czech Republic continues to become more right winged there are very serious threats to free speech and expression. In 2017, 64 members of the Czech Parliament introduced a bill that would make it illegal for people to defame the President (Tamkin, 2016). While some European countries did have law that restricted speech about the government back in the early 20^th century, it is rare to see today. The Czech President also just made what some would call racist remarks about Roma.  He said that “a 90% unemployment rate among the country’s Roma, earning a rebuke from campaigners and rights activists” (Euractiv, 2018).  Not only has the president called out this group of people but the prime minister as well. Many are calling that European judiciary take control and prosecute him on the counts of hate speech. Bleich highlights that courts can make decisions that not everyone agrees with, he states that the French courts have been strict and have sometimes punished speech that should have been protected. In the case of the Czech Republic, the Prime minister and president carry a lot of power, it would be rare to see their courts do anything about it.

The migrant problem has presented the Czech Republic with a very interesting problem regarding speech. Like Blithe points out liberal democracies have had a hard time drawing the line when it comes to freedom of expression and hate speech.  Czech Republic officials have been some of the most outspoken when it comes to allowing migrants into the country. The president has said it’s a “road to hell for Europe”, they have declined the EU quota for migrants.  It will be very interesting to see if the EU courts or other countries start to condemn the speech of these officials.

The Czech Republic and Russia have had. Very interesting relationship since the 20^th century.  In 1968, Alexander Dubeck lead the Communist party of Czechoslovakia to overthrow the rule of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union sent almost a half a million soldiers from Russia nd Warsaw and was able to put down the rebellion unitl the Velvet revolution in 1989. As of recent have had very strong political connections.  The far-right party of the Czech Republic, known as the ANO, has gained significant power in the Czech parliament as of recent.  The leader of the party is Andrej Babis, and many feels that he will depart from the pro-western ideals instilled in the Prague Spring and be the latest causality in Putin’s campaign to weaken the west.  The relationship between Putin and Babis is especially important because of the connection the ANO party has to the Czech President, Milos Zenman. “Zeman has supported Putin’s intervention in Syria and endorsed Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine. He defined the Ukrainian conflict as a civil war between rebels and the state, effectively denying any Russian aggression or military presence on Ukrainian soil” (Ereli, 2017).   The president has also made remarks that he disagrees with the sanctions placed on Russia by the EU.

However, most Czech citizens resent Russia, for the dissolution of the Prague Spring. They still feel resentment towards Russia.  But again, there are many Czech politicians that are in favor or an improved relationship.  Czech Republic there are those on both the far left and the far right who favour improved relations with Russia and dismiss the historical grievances as irrelevant. “Think of our history with the Germans, and now we are friends, said Jaroslav Doubrava, 70, a senator in the Czech parliament” (Walker, 2018). The research shows that there are very important people in the Czech government that support Putin and want to strengthen the relations between the countries.  However, it seems that many citizens are having a hard time fading from the strained history between the two countries.  It will be really interesting to see how public opinion will be able to influence governments decisions.

“Czech President Defends Assertion That Most Roma Don’t Work.” Euractiv.com. October 08, 2018. Accessed November 18, 2018.

“CZECH REPUBLIC 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.” State.gov. 2017. Accessed November 18, 2018.

Ereli, Adam. “Is the Czech Republic Falling Under Putin’s Shadow?” Foreign Policy. October 10, 2017. Accessed November 19, 2018.

Tamkin, Emily. “The Czech Republic May Dodge a Bullet to Free Speech This Year. But Will It in 2017?” Foreign Policy. December 01, 2016. Accessed November 19, 2018.

Walker, Shaun. “Russian Presence Divides Czechs 50 Years after Prague Spring.” The Guardian. August 20, 2018. Accessed November 19, 2018.

In the 1990s, the development of a democratic media system in Croatia was slow as many media were under direct state influence and hate speech was very prevalent and supported by the state. This contrast the number of laws enacted across Europe that have gradually extended provision against racist expression in the 1990s  (Bleich 22). Croatia did not experience such provisions and media regulation until the 2000s when Croatia tried to further harmonize its media legislation with European standards. However, in 2016, when a new right-wing party the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) entered the government and elected Zlatko Hasanbegovic as culture minister responsible for media policy, the media legislation that guaranteed freedom of expression during the 2000s began to worsen with political purges, such as Hasanbegovic firing 70 journalists, managers and technicians of HDZ in less than two months, and hate speech back on the rise again especially against minorities or diverse groups as a result of nationalist sentiment that has been provoked by the HDZ. This is similar to Jean-Marie Le Pen, a far-right nationalist, asserting his belief that races are unequal and promoting the use of hate and racist speeches against minorities and diverse groups. HDZ turning a blind eye to hate speech and neo-fascist nostalgia and its support for freedom of speech, resembles France’s minimizing the Holocaust and expressing sympathy for the Nazi regime that has sparked due to Le Pen (Bleich 33).

Croatia’s, since Croatia’s EU accession in 2013, has enacted laws against the denial or diminishment of genocide crimes. This resembles Bleich’s assertion that some countries have extended the logic of of Holocaust denial laws by instituting provisions against denying any genocide, war crime (Bleich 44). However, the HDZ have turned a blind eye to neo-fascist nostalgia, allowing hate speech to thrive and has failed to enforce legislation prohibiting public denial, belittlement or condoning of genocide crimes. This also resembles Bleich’s assertion that freedom of speech that is not compatible with the core principle of liberal democracy allows for the laws goals to diminish Holocaust denial, minimization, and justification to be acceptable (Bleich 44-45).  The Croatian Jewish Community in Croatia has gone so far as to the boycotted Holocaust Remembrance Day in protest due to the government’s failure to fight the lack of regulation of past and modern-day Nazism.

Freedom of assembly in Croatia is recognized as human right to every person in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. However, with the far-right rising in Croatia, there has been a rise of radical right groups, such as HDZ, supporting the Holocaust denial and glorification of its fascist past. This group still remain in Croatia’s political life similarly to how Neo-Nazi parties and white supremacist groups cannot be banned, restricted, or forced to accept unwanted members on the grounds of their racism in the US (Bleich 103).   

Croatia and Russia established diplomatic relationships in 1992. Croatia has an embassy in Moscow just as Russia has an embassy in Zagreb. Croatia’s right of center president Grabar-Kitarovic has been accused of Croatian ultranationalism. Grabar-Kitarovic has accordingly openly associated herself with Utasha sympathizers and has engaged with hard-right voters. However, she has declared the far-right in her country as marginal. Grabar-Kitarvoic has also created warm relations with Putin, in which she has defended. The Croatian far-right parties such as HDZ and the President have begun to create and experience deeper ties with  through deals with Russian companies such as Gazpom and Sberbank and a call for the expansion of cooperation between Moscow and Zagreb. Grabar-Kitarvoic has stated, “”It is necessary to continue political dialogue. Our economic interests are another important part of cooperation. We support the development of new markets for Croatia’s economy and Croatian companies. Of course, Croatia adheres to all European regulations as well as the sanctions system but we are working on a broad field and Russia is a strong player in particular in south-eastern Europe.” Many Croatians also sympathize with Ukraine from their similar experiences of the Yugoslav wars. With Russia establishing peaceful ties with Croatia, it so far has been successful in its engagement with Croatia’s parties and politics.

Work Cited

Blakemore, Erin. “Why Croatian Jews Boycotted This Year’s Holocaust Remembrance Day.” Smithsonian.com. January 27, 2017. Accessed November 17, 2018. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/why-croatian-jews-boycotted-years-holocaust-remembrance-day-180961958/.

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

MacDowall, Andrew. “Croatia’s President Says Country’s Far-right Presence Is ‘exception, Not Rule’.” The Guardian. August 26, 2018. Accessed November 17, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/26/croatias-president-says-far-right-presence-there-is-exception-not-rule.

Pastor, Ana. “Croatia’s Press Freedom in Danger.” CIVIC IDEAS. December 03, 2017. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://civicidea.com/2017/02/23/croatias-press-freedom-in-danger/.

“Press Freedom in Croatia: Hate Speech and Hope for Change.” Croatia Report Final, May 2018, 1-32. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/croatia-report-final_0.pdf.

Part A:

Highlighted as a fundamental freedom within the Irish Constitution is the freedom of speech. Like many other countries around the world, this right is seen as inalienable. Unlike other countries, there is a caveat to this law in Ireland. This right is “subject to public order and morality,” which can bring the interpretation that hate speech is not allowed. Moreover, the Irish Constitution states that “publication or utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter is an offense.” This prevents many groups from inciting violence or riots with their words, and allows for the limiting of speech. Interestingly, the Irish have a blasphemy law that has been on the books since the 1930s which outlaws impious or profane speaking of God or sacred things. Not only is it an article of their Constitution, but also the second of the Ten Commandments. In late October, Ireland held a referendum and citizens voted to remove this word from the Constitution and further reduced the restrictions on freedom of the speech in the country.

Similarly defined is the freedom of assembly. The Irish Constitution protects the right to assemble peaceably and without weapons. The way this law is outlined, protects against both riots and other events which might disturb the peace. The Irish Constitution is outlined in a manner which safeguards the republic and protects the people, from both riotous acts, hate speech, and hateful acts.

Following in the footsteps of France and Germany, Ireland implemented the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act of 1989, which criminalized threatening, abusive or insulting words, images, or sounds with the intention of stirring hatred against a group of persons on account of a manner of their characteristics. This law has come under fire due to the limited scope of prosecutions since its enactment. As of 2011, there were only 18 prosecutions for hate speech in general under this law, which raised the question among many citizens what the laws intention actually is. This law certainly did not go as far as the French and German laws, but it was a step in the right direction, curbing the freedoms which allowed for racism and other forms of hateful rhetoric to prevail. Unlike France which enacted a law specifically sanctioning a denial of the Holocaust, Ireland has no such laws. However, its hate speech prevention laws would most certainly allow for Holocaust deniers to be prosecuted.

Part B:

Russia has been very successful with its engagement with Ireland. Russia was the first country to recognize the independence of the Republic of Ireland from Great Britain and as such, they formed a positive relationship. Ireland began by establishing an economic relationship with Russia. Most recently, the Irish government has focused on introducing and strengthening its trade ties with Russia, increasing trade between the two nations by over 40 percent within the last year. From this strong economic relationship grew a political alliance of sorts. This connection, however, was demolished after a nerve agent attack in Salisbury, England in March 2018. Great Britain accused Russia of chemically attacking a man residing in the UK, despite there being limited evidence pointing to this. Ireland, on account of the relationship it had spurred with Russia denied this, and were hesitant to demand that the Russian ambassador to Ireland leave the country, something which many other countries across Europe were doing.

Great Britain gathered a coalition of countries who sided with them, and eventually Ireland along with 16 other European Union countries placed the blame on Moscow. Ireland only agreed to expel the Russian Ambassador to Ireland from the country, to appease Great Britain and keep the peace between the two countries during this divisive time. This choosing of sides decimated the positive and fruitful relationship that Ireland and Russia had once enjoyed. Expelling a Russian diplomat from Ireland destroyed their economic and political ties, making it harder for the two countries to enjoy the relationship they once had. Many Irish political leaders have denounced the decision to expel this minister, calling it the wrong decision and that it would move to destroy the Irish-Russian relationship. However, many within the European Union and European Council have stated this was the correct decision and it shows Russia that there are clear repercussions to their actions. Up until this past year, Ireland and Russia enjoyed a high-yielding relationship, the future of which is unknown.

Sources:

Ireland. Constitution of Ireland. Dublin, 1945.

http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/government_in_ireland/irish_constitution_1/constitution_fundamental_rights.html

McGary, Patsy. “Ireland Votes as One to Remove Blasphemy from Constitution.” The Irish Times. 28 October 2018.

https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/religion-and-beliefs/ireland-votes-as-one-to-remove-blasphemy-from-constitution-1.3678935

O’Brien, Cormac. “Ireland Pressed to Introduce Hate Crime Laws After LGBT Attacks.” Reuters. 25 July 2018.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ireland-lawmaking-lgbt/ireland-pressed-to-introduce-hate-crime-laws-after-lgbt-attacks-idUSKBN1KF2EW

Ryan, Danielle. “Russian Diplomat Expulsion.” The Irish Journal. 28 March 2018.

https://www.thejournal.ie/readme/russian-diplomat-expulsion-ireland-should-have-avoided-jumping-on-this-bandwagon-3926276-Mar2018/

Hurley, Sandra. “Expulsion of Russian Diplomat Will Not Go Unanswered.” RTE. 27 March 2018.

https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2018/0327/950312-salisbury/

1. Montenegro has progressed moderately in freedom indicators since the Yugoslav split. While Milo Dukanovic’s political party DPS has been in power since 1991, freedoms of speech and assembly are rated favorably by third party observers. According to the Freedom House, freedom of expression and speech is rated as a two out of four. Media coverage is described as “combative” and “partisan” while publicly owned outlets dominate coverage. Opposition media is denied access and often banned entirely in some cases. Additionally, journalists often self censor themselves in order to avoid job loss, political pressures, and even death threats. For example, investigative journalist Jovo Martinović was falsely imprisoned for allegations that he was involved in a criminal gang that he was investigating, yet later released. Additionally, while freedom of speech is generally supported in a public setting, there are fears that speaking against the current government would hurt employment opportunities not only in the public sector, but also in the private sector where politicians have their influence on businesses. This partial speech freedom would not be supported by Bleich’s core message yet the censorship surrounds political opposition and not a divide amongst racial or ethnic groups. Freedom of assembly is rated as a three out of four on freedom house as protests have been known to take place. According to Freedom House, one  example occured in 2015 as, “anti government demonstrators in Podgorica clashed with police who tried to disperse them, with police on one occasion firing tear gas and stun grenades at protesters” As a result, “the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit was implicated in misbehavior, and a suit was lodged against its commander in 2016 for failing to punish his offers for the improper use of force. He was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment in January 2017.” While there is a history of anti-semitism and holocaust denial in Serbia, Montenegro has no such public manifestations. Montenegro has one of the smallest and newest jewish populations in Europe and main religious clashes center around the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which is not recognized by other Eastern Orthodox Churches. While Bleich argues that limiting free speech in the forum of controversy limits democracy, there seems to be little relation between hate speech and censorship in Montenegro. Censorship seems to stem from political opposition and efforts from Russia to prevent westernization.
2. Russia’s involvement in Montenegrin politics stems from historical connections between Yugoslavia and the USSR and present day connections between Serbia and Russia. Serbia and Montenegro finally split in 2006, ending the final union of Yugoslav countries. Yet, despite the split, Serbia’s influence over Montenegro is rooted in the presence of ethnic Serbs and traditionalists that still remain in the country. Progressive Montenegrins desire westward integration and a commitment towards globalization. Yet, Russia’s select isolationism and their economic stronghold on the region is dependent on the involvement of old satellite and communist states in the region. Montenegro joined NATO in 2017 in a very calculated attempt to prove to the west that they desired globalization. Additionally, this signaled to the EU that Montenegro was ready to take the next step in EU membership  Montenegro’s desire to join NATO did not come without controversy as pro-Russian supporters had direct involvement in the backlash. On October 16, 2016, the day of the Montenegrin Parliamentary elections, 20 people were arrested and later charged for their involvement in an attempted coup d’etat. This was in direct response to Montenegro’s stated desire for NATO ascension. Montenegrin special investigative committees determined that a group of 500 people consisting of Russians, Serbians, and Montenegrins that had Russian state backing were behind the plot that aimed to attack parliament and assassinate Prime Minister Milo Dukanovic. While Russia’s government denied involvement, the ensuing trial determined that Russian involvement was extremely likely. Following the failed coup d’etat, Parliament voted to join NATO with the final vote being 46-0 as the rest of parliament boycotted the vote. Russia will most likely continue to meddle in the politics of countries such as Montenegro as they are slowly losing old communist states to western influence. While they were not successful in preventing NATO membership, their presence in the country is felt. If Serbia were to join the NATO or the EU, this would be a big loss for the Russian government. Serbia’s history with NATO is rocky after the bombings in 1999 during the Kosovo War. Unlike other former Yugoslav nations, Serbia has been averse to joining NATO. Yet, talks between Serbia and the EU have begun. Serbia’s position is different to that of Montenegro as Serbian allegiance is an important one to Russia. Overall, Russia’s ideological influence on Montenegro slipping away and in order to prevent this, future intervention may occur.

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/montenegro

Free Speech in Hungary

The Hungarian government of Viktor Orban has come under fire for embracing xenophobic, illiberal and authoritarian policies and rhetoric. But while Orban has undoubtedly suppressed political opposition to his left and in civil society more broadly, the Hungarian government retains several key limitations on forms of controversial speech that typically originate from the right – although it has modified these and enforced laws in potentially controversial ways.

Hungary has, at least nominally, embraced EU anti-discrimination and anti-racism priorities. Hungarian law proscribes “incitement to hatred” in general terms, as well as discriminatory actions. These laws are comparable, at least on their face, to countries like France and the United Kingdom, and specifically to the former countries ban on denying the Holocaust and the later’s more specific prohibitions against speech intending to incite hatred against racial groups. These similarities are far from accidental, as both Hungary and the UK derive their laws from common EU directives. However, a key difference exists on the subject of Holocaust denial. Both France and Germany have embraced at least some culpability for the Holocaust, and this is reflected in speech codes, Hungary has a more adversarial relationship with this aspect of its history.

Hungary’s 2010 modification of its Holocaust denial law (by a Fidesz supermajority) creates a clear distinction between the legal codes of most European countries and Hungary’s. These changes removed explicit mention of the Holocaust, instead re-defining the prohibited behavior as denying “genocides committed by national socialist or communist systems.”

Despite the changes to the law, a range of Holocaust deniers have been prosecuted, convicted and punished under the new law. Similar laws against anti-Semitic hate speech have been similarly employed – and have been trumpeted along with renewed funding for the upkeep and restoration of Hungarian synagogues. However, the political implications of the addition of Soviet era crimes to the law remain troublesome. To begin with, the mention of communist-era crimes presents the image of Hungary as a victim (similar tropes have been echoed in Poland) and obfuscates the causes and responsibilities of Holocaust specific remembrance. Similarly,

The enforcement of these laws on behalf of the Hungarian state is particularly interesting in the context of the rhetoric of the Hungarian government itself and of the laws against subtler forms of racial incitement in the rest of Europe. Specifically, it seems likely that government sponsored campaigns targeting George Soros, the Romani minority and Muslim immigrants could all potentially run afoul of the more draconian anti-racist measures of countries like France. The same laws (Bleich) created repeated legal penalties for French actress Bridget Bardot for statements arguably less prejudicial and inflammatory than the rhetoric of Orban himself.

The Kremlin on the Danube

Russia has been immensely, and Hungary’s historical experience, astoundingly, successful in forming alliances with political factions within the country. While Poland, the Eastern European country most commonly compared to Hungary, has retained an intense skepticism of Russia despite the domestic successes of the right populist Law and Justice, Orban’s Fidesz party has retained no such distance.

To begin with, Orban and Putin have demonstrated an ideological and rhetorical affinity – both have opposed the “social progressivism” of the EU, both have employed similar rhetoric surrounding Christianity. The two leaders have been described as forging a “special relationship” based in part on these shared ideological precepts. Hungary has also allied with Russia by pushing a territorial complaint against Ukraine that aligns with Orban and Fidesz’s irredentist policy towards ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries. Orban’s government has provided legal assistance to ethnic Hungarians of Ukrainian descent. Orban has also signed a massive nuclear power deal with Russia and meets with Putin annually.

Russian involvement extends beyond formal diplomatic ties and rhetorical affinity. In 2017, Hungarian prosecutors charged a member of the far-right Jobbik Party with spying. Speculation, admittedly often unfounded, among journalists and pro-democracy observers, suggest Jobbik may be, at least in part, funded by illicit Russian interests. Official Jobbik media has even criticized Orban for insufficient comity with Putin’s regime (Jobbik 2018).

Despite these inroads with various Hungarian parties, historic Russian tensions with Hungary remain salient. Hungary remains a member of NATO, an organization created to counter a previous iteration of the Russian state. Substantial public criticism of Orban’s closeness with Putin remains within Hungary. A clear distinction exists in opinion polling between views of Russia, which is overwhelmingly unpopular (with approximately 20% support), and Putin, who is personally popular on a level on par with Orban among the Hungarian populace. Perhaps pursuant to this discussion, Orban has supported some, though not all, EU measures targeting Russia for various human rights abuses.

Bibliography

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. Oxford University Press, 2011.

https://www.unian.info/politics/10304088-hungary-escalating-tensions-with-ukraine-playing-along-with-russia-media.html

Jobbik. Why Does Viktor Orban Keep Voting for Anti-Russia Sanctions https://www.jobbik.com/why_does_viktor_orban_keep_voting_for_anti_russia_sanctions, 2018

Responding to Racism in Hungary. http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/pdf/hungary_en.pdf. European Network Against Racism.

Part A: Albania and Basic Human Rights

Albania is a relatively new democracy and one that is currently in the process of reforming itself to be in line with the Copenhagen Criteria. Despite the fact that the country was a communist regime for nearly 45 years, the citizens of Albania have experienced some version of free speech since the 1960s. The concept was called “flete- rufe” and the process by which one could criticize public officials was done so by posting a comment on a town bulletin board. The official had three days to respond to the comment and would face consequences if the critique was removed. Eventually, the dictator Hoxha stripped away these rights that were previously granted as his paranoia about maintaining power increased (Crossan, 2016). The current constitution of Albania grants citizens free speech, press, and assembly and the government generally respects these rights (US Department of State, 2017). Hate speech and propaganda is explicitly prohibited in the constitution. The media in Albania is reportedly influenced and pressured by political parties and business interests but balanced reporting does exist, such as with the Radio Televizioni Shqiptar (RTSH) (Freedom House, 2018). The Democratic Party is a center right party and its beliefs are extremely polarized against those of the other major party, the Socialist Party. The far-right Albanian National Front Party currently holds no seats in parliament and is therefore not very influential in shaping the politics of the nation.

While denial of the Holocaust is not technically illegal in Albania, there are few reports of anti-Semitic sentiments and hate speech. Albania prides itself on being the only occupied European country to end with a higher Jewish population than it began with. The country has been recognized for its efforts in taking in hundreds of Jewish refugees during WW2 (Mashbaum, 2018). Another reason for the limited incidents around hate speech is that the country has experienced very high ratings of religious tolerance. This is the result of the ban on religion that the country experienced during the communist regime. In addition, throughout the nation’s history there has been extreme religious persecution of  its people by various foreign oppressors.

Part B: Russian Engagement in Albania’s Politics 

The history between Russia and Albania is ever-changing. During the cold war, the Soviet Union had significant influence in the Balkan region and used Albania to bring materials to communist troops fighting in Greece. Albania did have a good relationship with Yugoslavia but was never fully under the influence of the Soviets. The biggest divide between these two states came after the ideological split between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union, in which Albania sided with PRC. Yugoslavia and other Eastern European nations remained under complete control by the Soviets and therefore Russia still has more influence in these nations.

Today, Albania (aside from Kosovo) is the most pro-west/ pro- EU nation in the Balkan region. Russia does not want Albania and other Balkan states to integrate into the European project as that would strengthen the continent against them (MacShane, 2018). Albania sees Russia “not as a threat but is worried about disruptive activities for democratic state building in the region” (Gotev, 2018). The Prime Minister Edi Rama is currently in talks with the European Commission about the timeline for Albania’s accession into the European Union. He has been attempting to fast track membership by arguing that Russia is trying to radicalize the country’s Muslim population as a means to disrupt cohesion and therefore the EU needs to step in and defend them before this is possible. Russia does own some online information space in which it promotes its own political and cultural agenda. They also use these sources to promote the right- wing sentiments of a Greater Albania as a means to weaken the trust that the country has in European Integration (Tlis, 2018). During the recent election PM Edi Rama accused the Democratic Party (PD) of using a USA lobbyist group funded by a Russian company to set up a meeting with the party leader and President Trump to show his support for the party, therefore meddling in the election and future of the nation (Semini, 2018).

As a result of the history between the Soviet Union and Albania, Russia does not have as much influence in Albania as it does in other nations of the region and therefore has been relatively unsuccessful in interfering in political affairs within Albania.

Works Cited:

“Albania.” Freedom House. May 04, 2018. Accessed November 18, 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/albania.

“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 18, 2018. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper.

Crossan, Antonia. “Albania.” Free Speech and Free Press Around the World. April 28, 2016. Accessed November 18, 2018.https://freespeechfreepress.wordpress.com/albania/.

Gotev, Georgi. “We Are Aware of ‘Europeisation Fatigue’, Warns Albanian Minister.” Euractiv.com. April 27, 2018. Accessed November 18, 2018. https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/albanian-minister-we-are               aware-of-the-europeisation-fatigue/.

MacShane, Denis. “Opinion: Why It’s Such a Big Problem for Putin If the Balkan Countries Enter the EU.” The Independent. May 17, 2018. Accessed November 18, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/putin-balkan-countries-eu-join-russia-problem-serbia-albania-a8355866.html.

Mashbaum, Yael. “Jews In Albania.” Yad Vashem. Accessed November 18, 2018. https://www.yadvashem.org/articles/general/jews-in-albania.html.

Semini, Llazar. “Albania Opposition Denies Links to Russian Election Meddling.” U.S. News & World Report. March 07, 2018. Accessed November 18, 2018. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-03-07/albania-oppositiondenies-links-to-russian-election-meddling.

Tlis, Fatima. “Russian Ambassador’s Claim to Albania: No “Aggressive Plans” – Belied by Actions.” POLYGRAPH.info. June 27, 2018. Accessed November 18, 2018. https://www.polygraph.info/a/fact-check-russia-nato-balkans-albania/29324087.html.

Find information on your case study country’s processes regarding a) freedom of speech, b) freedom of assembly, c) Holocaust deniers and compare with the information provided by Bleich.
Part A: Explain the most important differences and similarities from the cases Bleich examines.
Part B: How successful was Russia in its engagement with parties and politics in your case study country?
Please post by midnight Tuesday, Nov. 20. Peer review due: Midnight, Monday, Nov. 26, final: Nov. 29.