Month: November 2018 (Page 2 of 2)

Prompt A)

Contemporary Austrian politics is marred by the reemergence of Far Right, ultranationalist politicians who have taken advantage of domestic and international political instability to seize power in the government.  In the past these politicians have been known for their inflammatory rhetoric which has actively demonized muslims, jews, Roma, and other non ethnically Austrian minorities.  Austrian law has sought to curb the influence of Neo-Nazi’s & other supportive movements through strict anti-semitism and holocaust denial laws akin to those in Germany (Foreign Policy, 2016), while working to preserve civil liberties such as the right to assembly (Freedom House, 2018).  In trying to strike a careful balance which preserves basic civil liberties while refusing to give ground for Neo-Nazi behavior, those with fascist and racist sympathies have been finding ways to stretch the boundaries of the law to get away with otherwise obvious acts of hate.  

Since the passing of Holocaust Denial laws in 1992 which expanded on the 1947 framework for denazification, Austria has jailed and fined individuals and organizations which have engaged in anti-Semitic or nazi behavior (JURIST, 2017).    This follows a similar trend taken by other countries that either perpetrated or aided Nazi Germany during the Second World War (Bleich, 2011, 48).  While Austria has punished nazi sympathizers, ironically including the current Vice-Chancellor for organizing a Hitler Youthesque rally as a teenager (Times of Israel, 2017), there is a national narrative of victimhood which deflects association of Austria with Nazi cooperation and rather suggests that they are a victim akin to other European countries and nationalities (Niederacher, 2003).  

The inability for the Austrian government to fully accept its responsibility for the Holocaust and other war crimes under the Third Reich will always leave the country at a disadvantage when it comes to engagement with far right and racist movements.  In a recent legal case surrounding the youth Identitarian movement, courts vindicated 10 members following their arrest for criminal association and hate speech (Vice, 2018).  Many fear that the inability for the Austrian courts to firmly interpret the rule of law and define the boundaries of what is and is not hate speech will embolden the far right to act boldly down the road.  Until Austria can reevaluate its national culture and accept its share of responsibility for the Holocaust, no amount of legal balancing over freedom of association and speech can stop Neo-Nazi’s from pushing their agenda.

Part B:

It is no secret that the Russian Federation has sought to influence politics throughout the western world.  While their actions in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom may be better documented, they have quietly been engaged in a P.R. campaign in Austria over the last several years which has grown to fruition following the election of a coalition government in 2018 between the center right OVP and the ultranationalist FPO.  What has occurred over the years in Austria is the gradual permeation of Russia of soft power which has been manifested in a variety of ways.  Be it the connection between Austrian right wing news sources with Kremlin sponsorship, their support for FPO leader and current vice-chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache, or the infamous Vienna Russian Balls, Moscow’s agents have been hard at work to aid far right movements throughout the country (Shekhovstov, 2017).  

Traditionally, because Austrian politics has been dominated by the center-left SVP and the aforementioned OVP, Russia has been hesitant about getting overly involved with fringe right wing movements in Austria.  However, this began to change as the Austrian public began to be more receptive to FPO politicians and their euroskeptic/anti-immigrant platform.  Since the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, the FPO took a pro-Russia turn, engaging with leading figures in Putin’s government who exported their political, religious, and cultural rhetoric into Austria (Shekhovstov, 204, 2017). 

The connection between the FPO and the Kremlin has given the OVP chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, somewhat of a link to Putin.  The two of them have repeaditely met since the 2018 election and have sought to deepen the interconnectivity between the two countries, with Kurz seeing this as an opportunity to bridge the Euro-Russian divide and Putin viewing this as his opportunity to gain a supportive ally in the E.U. (Politico, 2018).  Given these linkages between the current Austrian government and Putin, it is safe to say that Russia’s gamble with the FPO has paid off thus far as they now have the potential to legitimize their brand of ultranationalism throughout Austria. 

Sources:

“Austria.” Freedom House. March 12, 2018. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/austria.

Large, David Clay. “Germany + Nazi Denial = Austria.” Foreign Policy. December 2, 2016. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/02/germany-nazi-denial-austria/.  

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to

Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Callan, Autumn. “Austria court convicts man for violating anti-nazi laws with Facebook.” JURIST: A Collaboration with the University of Pittsburgh. July 31, 2017.  Accessed November 19, 2018. https://www.jurist.org/news/2017/07/austria-court-convicts-man-for-violating-anti-nazi-laws-with-facebook-post/.  

“Heinz-Christian Strache from neo-Nazi youth to Austrias next vice-chancellor.” The Times of Israel. December 16, 2017. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://www.timesofisrael.com/heinz-christian-strache-from-neo-nazi-youth-to-austrias-next-vice-chancellor/.  

Shekhovstov, Anton. Russia and the Western Far Right. Routledge Press, 2017.   

Turkey:  A Warning for Free Speech Critics

The JDP possesses a fundamentally hostile perspective towards freedom of speech, thought, and assembly, more so than any other European country.  Turkey does not easily compare to the cases Bleich examines in the UK, Netherlands, and other countries which value liberty as an axiom of society.  What certain countries regard as a provocation to violence, such as genocide denial in Germany, Turkey regards as the status quo in the case of the Armenian genocide.  For contrast, the French outlawed Armenian genocide denial in 2007, and the Swiss even tried and convicted a Turkish politician (Dogu Perincek) for his denial. In Turkey, acknowledgment of the genocide could fall under Article 301 of the Turkish constitution which criminalizes “insulting Turkishness.” Additionally, the reasons Bleich provides for preserving free speech in Europe and the US often constitute the same reasons Turkey chooses to eliminate free speech.

Much of the paranoia surrounding free speech limitation in Europe stems from the “slippery slope” argument.  The British Religious Hatred Act, pursued by the Labour Party in 2006, met exactly this challenge in Parliament (Bleich 2011, 25).  Tories feared the generality of an act which restricted hate speech as a blanket category. Answers to the question of who could define hate varied depending upon who gave the answer.  Thus, the UK added a clause which specified that the speech must be “likely” and “intended” to cause acts of racial hatred– a difficult standard to prove, and one which limited use of the act to a maximum of four times per year (Bleich 2011, 25).  The fear of government overreach in defining dangerous or hateful speech has reached its full potential in Turkey, where the government has taken sweeping actions to limit the speech of dissidents.

Since the Ergenekon investigation launched in 2007, Turkey has used flimsy and fabricated evidence of widespread coup conspiracies to crack down on speech (Eligur 2016, 158).  By 2010, 275 academics, politicians, and journalists had been arrested in the Ergenekon case, and the faux investigation only expanded from there (Jenkins 2009, 9). As a weapon against oppositional speech, the investigation targeted several parties from the PKK to the Marxist Revolutionary People’s Liberation party (Jenkins 2009, 9).  

In the Netherlands, the government used state power to dissolve a hateful party as recently as 1998, when it dissolved the Centre Party ‘86 for racism which was “incompatible with public order” (Blech 2011, 88).  Bleich speaks of this extreme as a rare but aggressive tactic, which often results in a “phoenix-like rise of the organization under a different name” (Bleich, 87). Turkey resolves the problem of a rebirth of state-dissolved organizations by cracking down on every aspect of society.  Consequently, the lack of free speech and organizational assembly protects the government’s ability to control opposition. Given the strength of its institutions, the idea of such an abuse of power occurring in the Netherlands seems preposterous. Regardless, Turkey provides a fair warning as to how the state can abuse the power to patrol speech and assembly.

Allies Domestically, Enemies in Foreign Affairs

The JDP’s rejection of liberal democracy and preference for authoritarianism already aligns with the goals of most Russian political intervention.  Turkey’s widening distance from the EU, in which President Erdogan has recently downplayed the importance membership, also reduces Russia’s need to interfere in the country’s politics. Despite their authoritarian similarities, Russia and Turkey have struggled to bridge the divide over the Syrian civil war.  Their support for opposing sides has prevented the countries from maintaining closer relations beyond trade.

In September of this year, Russia, Turkey, and Iran met in Tehran to discuss the imminent humanitarian disaster unfolding in Syria.  The Idlib province, home to approximately 3 million citizens and 1 million children, had become the final rebel stronghold in the country.  Turkey and the United States support the rebels, while Russia and Iran support the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The three states managed to craft a deal in which the Idlib province would contain a demilitarized zone for the citizens.  The rebels removed all heavy weaponry from the demilitarized zone. Their competing interests in Syria may continue to drive the countries apart, however, since the Syrian regime violated the agreement and shelled the demilitarized zone as recently as yesterday, killing a woman and a child.

The conflict in Syria stands in the way of an alliance otherwise well suited for both countries.  They share a democratic facade behind which their authoritarian leaders control the affairs of the country.  While Putin has held control in Russia since 1999, vacillating between Prime Minister and President, Erdogan only recently created competitive authoritarianism in Turkey.  The JDP’s referendum on April 16, 2017, encoded a number of constitutional changes into law which expanded the power of the executive. The changes abolished the Prime Minister position, granted the President the power to dissolve the entire Assembly at will, and contained several similarly authoritarian provisions (Sakurai 2018, 36).  With the rise of an illiberal European regime typically comes closer ties to Russia, as in Orban’s Hungary and Duda’s Poland. Whether the civil war continues to obstruct this development remains to be seen.

Works Cited:

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to

Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Eligür, Banu. “Turkey’s Declining Democracy.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 17 (2014):

151.

Jenkins, Gareth H. Between fact and fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon investigation. Central

Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 2009.

Osseiran, Hashem. “Syrian Army Shells Demilitarised Zone in Idlib, Undermining

Russian-Turkish Deal .” The National. November 18, 2018. Accessed November 18,

2018. https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/syrian-army-shells-demilitarised-zone-in-idlib-undermining-russian-turkish-deal-1.792963.

Yukio Sakurai. 2018. “Turkey’s Possible Future Directions after the 2017 Referendum:

Autocracy or Democracy?” International Journal of Interdisciplinary Civic & Political

Studies 13 (1/2): 33–45. doi:10.18848/2327-0071/CGP/v13i01/33-45.