Race, Religion, and Obama in Appalachia

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Objective. Appalachia – historically a culturally and politically unique region of the United States – has been effectively ignored by contemporary political scientists. Using a unique measure of Appalachian residence, this paper analyzes racial attitudes, religion, and Appalachian opposition to the 2008 presidential candidacy of Barack Obama. ***Methods***. I use regression analysis to assess the extent to which Appalachian residents differ in their levels of perceived racial favoritism, identification as born-again Christians, and frequency of church attendance, as well as whether these variables can mediate the seeming regional effect of Appalachia in a standard vote choice model. ***Results***. I first demonstrate higher levels of perceived racial favoritism and, especially, higher levels of a particular type of religiosity in the region. I then assess whether these measures can mediate Appalachian distinctiveness in presidential vote choice. When perceived racial favoritism, church attendance, and born-again Christian status are controlled for in regression models, Appalachian regional opposition to the 2008 Obama candidacy disappears statistically. ***Conclusions***. While race and religion both "matter," I find it is religion that seems to matter more in explaining Appalachian distinctiveness, particularly relative to traditional southern distinctiveness. This provides a new vantage point from which to assess southern politics debates about subregional variation and the relative roles of race and religion, as well as sets the foundation for further analyses of Appalachia and American politics.

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> Mountain Republicanism should give pause to those who speak enthusiastically about imminent party realignments, who spin theories about the rational character of party attachments, and who talk about setting up a two-party system as though it could be made to order like a suit of clothes.
> —V. O. Key, Jr. (1949)

> Two weeks ago 41 percent of Democratic primary voters in West Virginia picked a prison inmate in Texas over Obama; tonight, he's being given a run for his money in Kentucky by "uncommitted."
> —*The New Republic* (2012)

Appalachia "has been seen as both the essence of America and a place apart" (Williams 2002, 8). This is as true of political scientists as anyone else. In his southern politics opus, Key gave the peculiar behavior of these mountain people – who insisted on voting Republican in the middle of the Solid South – only a few short pages of consideration (1949:280-285). In the 2012 American presidential election, Appalachian opposition to Barack Obama provided ample opportunities for political journalists to revisit the region's quirks, with accounts ranging from sympathy to perplexity (Coates 2012; MacGillis 2012; Potts 2012). Political scientists since Key, however, have almost entirely ignored the 25 million residents of Appalachia. Despite the existence of a robust literature on the politics of the American South (Black and Black 1992; Black and Black 2002; Kousser 2010), Appalachia has somehow remained a place apart for scholars of American politics. This paper seeks to at least partially remedy this.

At least part of the problem stems from the simple fact that conventional surveys like the American National Election Studies (ANES) and the General Social Survey (GSS) do not contain an Appalachia variable. Further, issues related to sample size and the common cluster sampling design used by the ANES and GSS prohibit the creation of an Appalachia variable in such datasets. Using a unique measurement of Appalachian residence constructed from restricted county-level identification of respondents in the (large-N, RDD design) 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) dataset, this paper examines white Appalachian opposition to the 2008 presidential candidacy of Barack Obama with attention to two potential contributing factors: racial attitudes and religion. I first demonstrate Appalachian whites hold higher than average levels of what I term perceived racial favoritism, are more likely to attend church frequently, and are more likely

to identify as born-again or Evangelical Christians. While the race results are in many cases weaker than results among southern whites, the religion results are distinctively Appalachian. I then assess whether these factors can mediate the seeming regional effect of Appalachia I find in a standard vote choice model. Ultimately, I find religion to be the strongest mediating variable. When both church attendance and born-again identification are included in the vote choice model, the Appalachia variable is no longer significant at the .05 level. Adding in the perceived racial favoritism measure as well lowers it even further, effectively "explaining away" regionalism. Interactive models show that Appalachian regionalism is strongest among less religious individuals, while the precise link between Appalachian regionalism and racial attitudes is more ambiguous and merits further research.

These results contribute to political science in several ways. First, an examination of Appalachian regionalism makes a novel contribution to the southern politics subfield. Insomuch as questions of the South's continuing distinctiveness merit attention, so, too, should the potential distinctiveness of Appalachia. Not only does it add a new wrinkle to debates about subregional distinctiveness, it also provides a new perspective on debates about the relative roles of racial attitudes and religion in motivating contemporary white conservatism. This paper also provides a new perspective on academic understandings of presidential vote choice during the election of the first black president, including the role of racism in assessments of President Obama (Piston 2010; Tesler 2012), as well as highlighting more centrally the role of religious identity in motivating opposition in this under-studied region. More generally, by demonstrating the feasibility of constructing a reliable Appalachia variable, this paper can serve as a starting point for thinking about Appalachia much more broadly within the discipline.

The paper proceeds as follows: I begin by reviewing academic debates about regionalism in general, and southern regionalism in particular, as a way of thinking about why Appalachian regionalism might merit scholarly examination. I then provide a historical overview of Appalachia and American politics, centered around how the media has framed the region. I next build a theoretical framework for thinking about Appalachian opposition to the Obama candidacy, and turn to a specific set of hypotheses about racial attitudes, religion, and opposition to Obama. I discuss

data and methods, with particular attention to how Appalachia is defined and the difficulty in constructing a measurement of it given the nature of national survey datasets. I then present my results and conclude by reflecting on the findings and looking to future directions in the study of Appalachia and American politics, including its implications for, among other things, the developing literature on the political consequences of "unhyphenated American" ethnic identification.

Appalachian Politics in State and Nation?

Before turning to the particular case of Appalachia, a more general question should be addressed: Does region itself matter as a politically salient category for understanding contemporary American politics? Scholars of southern politics would most certainly say yes. Drawing inspiration from Key's definition of the southern region as defined by political behavior – one party dominance and the existence of a voting bloc in national politics – scholars have long debated the contours of the continuing distinctiveness of the ex-Confederate states in matters ranging from congressional voting behavior to individual-level white attitudes (Key 1949; Black and Black 1987; Lamis 1988; Black and Black 2002; Kousser 2010; Hood et al. 2012; White 2014; McKee and Springer 2015). The persistence of attention by political scientists to the American South suggests that political scientists do think region is at least potentially an important variable to consider.

This paper, then, considers an open question: Does Appalachian regionalism matter in a similar way? If Appalachian regionalism matters – both on its own terms and as an intellectual complement to scholarship on southern politics – it might not seem as self-evident as the distinctiveness of the South.[1] The Appalachian counties did not secede en masse from the United States to preserve slavery. Indeed, many of these areas were far less supportive of the Confederacy, and West Virginia – the only state entirely located in Appalachia – was formed for this very reason.

[1]That said, Appalachia today seems potentially distinctive simply in a descriptive statistical sense. Educational attainment still lags behind the rest of the country, especially college completion rates. Appalachian residents have historically completed high school at lower rates than the national average, although this is starting to converge. College completion rates, however, are still lower, with 21.7 percent of Appalachian residents having completed college, compared to 28.8 percent nationally. See "Education – High School and College Completion Rates, 2009-2013," http://www.arc.gov/reports/custom_report.asp?REPORT_ID=61. The lowest rates are in Appalachian Kentucky, where only 13.3 percent of residents have a college degree. Income follows a similar pattern. Per capita income in Appalachia is $36,608, compared to $44,765 elsewhere. See "Personal income Rates, 2013," http://www.arc.gov/reports/custom_report.asp?REPORT_ID=59

Moving into twentieth century politics, there was no "Appalachian bloc" in Congress to "limit liberalism," as there was with southern members of Congress (Hofstadter 1949; Key 1949; Farhang and Katznelson 2005) Nonetheless, Appalachia has often been the subject of curiosity, and serious academic examination of white attitudes in this region might well contribute to our understanding of American politics more broadly. In this section, I briefly review how this might relate to the literature on southern politics.

Key's *Southern Politics in State and Nation* is the definitive account of the Democratic Solid South in the 1940s. He does, however, dedicate one chapter to the then-fledgling southern Republican Party, and within that provides an interesting discussion of southern Appalachia with which to start. "It scarcely deserves the name of a party," Key wrote of the southern GOP. "It wavers somewhat between an esoteric cult on the order of a lodge and a conspiracy for plunder in accord with the accepted customs of our politics" (1949:277) Along with black Republicans, presidential Republicans, and those individuals actually holding leadership positions within local Republican parties, one of Key's subsets of southern Republicans was the "mountain Republicans," principally concentrated in southwestern Virginia, western North Carolina, and eastern Tennessee (Ibid.:281). Tennessee's easternmost congressional district, for example, was represented by Republican Augustus H. Pettibone – who had fought in the Civil War as part of the Union Army – beginning on March 4, 1881, and has been held by Republicans ever since, even during the years of Democratic dominance.

Yet these Appalachian Republicans in the heart of the "solid" Democratic South were rather distinctive from the national GOP. "Traditional Republicanism in the hills has little in common with the manufacturing financial orientation of the party nationally," Key asserted. "To reflect faithfully its mountain constituencies the party would have to be more Populist than Republican in doctrine." Key also offered this assessment of how these mountain Republicans might complicate then-developing theories of partisan realignment. "Although the great issues of national politics are potent instruments for the formation of divisions among the voters, they meet their match in the inertia of traditional partisan attachments formed generations ago," Key declared. "Present partisan affiliations tend to be as much the fortuitous result of events long past as the produce

of cool calculation of interest in party policies of today" (Ibid.:285). Yet despite his normative commitments to a stronger two-party system (Ibid.) and a rational public (Key 1966), Key never went further than these few pages in explaining how Appalachia might complicate his analysis of southern, as well as national, politics.

While Key at least gave some attention to the region, contemporary political science research generally ignores Appalachia. There is a large literature on southern politics, but such research generally does not devote any attention to southern Appalachia. Kousser (2012), for example, offers a generally excellent overview of the southern politics literature, but in doing so neglects to mention Appalachia a single time. This is not a failure on his part, but rather a largely accurate reflection of work in the discipline (see also Black and Black 1992; Black and Black 2002). Similarly, recent attention to the political ramifications of increasing income inequality has not brought Appalachia to the fore. The *American Political Science Review* has not published an article dealing with Appalachia in a substantive way since 1968.[2]

Historical Background

The media has always played a role in defining Appalachia for those outside the region, beginning in the aftermath of the Civil War. During the war, whites in the Appalachian counties of the South were mixed in their feelings about the Confederacy. The black population of antebellum Appalachia was only about 10 percent, and while one in four white southerners overall owned

[2]Jaros et al. (1968) collected data on almost all school children grades 5-12 in Knox County, Kentucky. They found the students to be more negative in their assessments of the President and more generally cynical in their outlook towards politics than children at the aggregate level, who research had suggested were more positive in their political orientation. Rounding out the other top general journals, the most recent *Journal of Politics* article dealing with Appalachia is from 1981, when Goodsell examined an unspecified Appalachian county welfare office (Goodsell 1981). The *American Journal of Political Science* fares somewhat better by this metric, as a 2000 article by Lublin and Voss explicitly attempts to model Appalachian variation separately in an analysis of state legislative elections in the South. However, this is not the main point of their paper, which is instead about racial redistricting and political realignment as causes for the Democratic Party's electoral woes in the area (Lublin and Voss 2000). It is important to note John Gaventa's *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. Gaventa's book takes Central Appalachia as its object of study, and uses the region and its people to assess broader theoretical debates about the varied faces of power, and in particular why the inequalities of the Central Appalachian valley he studies are largely met with quiescence, rather than rebellion, by the workers who live there (Gaventa 1980). It has become widely known within political science, yet I argue only in a limited way: When Gaventa's book is cited, it is usually cited as a theoretical account of rebellion/quiescence, the faces of power, etc., and not in a manner that is Appalachia-specific. While Gaventa's book is deeply insightful in several ways, it has not spawned a political science literature on Appalachia in its aftermath.

slaves, in Appalachia probably fewer than one in ten did so. Many poorer Appalachian farmers resented wealthy slaveholding plantation owners, which led to pockets of pro-Union sentiment within the Confederate states, particularly in a cluster made up of southwestern Virginia, eastern Tennessee, and western North Carolina. Historical scholarship suggests about one-third of Appalachian whites were pro-Union, one third pro-Confederate, and a final third neutral (Straw 2006:4-7). In the following decades, magazines like *Harper's* and *The Atlantic* began to publish stories of the "strange land and peculiar people" of the Appalachian mountains. The region was depicted by writers as "vastly out of step, culturally and economically, with the progressive trends of industrializing and urbanizing nineteenth-century America" (Billings et al. 1995:1).

However, Appalachia would not rise to the center of national political attention until the 1960s and the War on Poverty. At the start of the decade, slightly more than one in three Appalachian residents had income levels below the poverty line, compared to one in five elsewhere (Shannon 2006:75). The 1960 presidential election "heralded the beginning of an intensive media scrutiny of Appalachia, its economic problems, and its people." This led to news media and television program coverage of Appalachia's problems, which were "accurate in an aggregate economic context," but "resented by thousands of residents who did not like the way the media portrayed them as isolated, backward, ignorant and pathetically impoverished" (Straw 2006:18). This political interest was matched by books like Harry Caudill's *Night Comes to the Cumberlands*, which brought Appalachia into further mainstream attention (Caudill 1962). The Appalachian Regional Commission was created by President Kennedy in 1963 and established by Congress as a federal agency in 1965. Along with programs aimed at economic development in the region, the Commission was also tasked with defining the region in question, an issue I return to later.

Appalachia again drew national political attention during the 2008 Democratic primary. Starting with the primaries of certain Appalachian states, there began to be speculation that Senator Obama was faltering with white Democratic voters in Appalachia, who had seemed to flock to Senator Clinton in suspiciously high numbers. Although an Obama primary victory seemed increasingly unstoppable, Clinton defeated Obama by a 41 percentage point margin in West Virginia on May 13 and a 36 percentage point margin in Kentucky on May 20. In the aftermath of Obama's

general election victory, the *New York Times* highlighted how many of the counties where Obama performed worse than Kerry were in Appalachia.[3] Media coverage again again took up the issue of Obama's perceived difficulties in Appalachia in the run-up to the 2012 general election, suggesting these problems in "Hillary Country" might plague his reelection efforts (*New York Times* 2011).

Why, though, was Obama struggling with white voters in Appalachia? Despite this renewed journalistic interest – which contains within it the seeds of several interesting, and testable, hypotheses about public opinion and voter behavior – political scientists have not been similarly attentive.

Theoretical Expectations

This paper seeks to empirically assess racial attitudes, religion, and opposition to the Obama candidacy in Appalachia in 2008.[4] Many journalistic accounts pointed to race and religious traditionalism as being key factors in motivating such opposition:

> Chalking this up only to race may be an oversimplification, although there was exit poll data in 2008 that indicated it was an explicit factor for a sizable chunk of voters. Perhaps Obama's race is one of several markers (along with his name, his background, the never-ending Muslim rumors, and his status as the 'liberal' candidate in 2008) that low-income white rural voters use to associate him with a national Democratic Party that they believe has been overrun by affluent liberals, feminists, minorities, secularists and gays – people and groups whose interests are being serviced at the expense of their own. (Kornacki 2012)

Although Kornacki points to a confluence of factors, this paper focuses on two particularly important ones – race and religion – for the purpose of manageability.[5] Race, however, is a peculiar factor to focus on from the perspective of the racial threat hypothesis described by Key (1949). Appalachia, after all, is an especially racially homogeneous part of the United States, while the Deep South is among the most racially heterogeneous. Nonetheless, race might still motivate op-

[3] Many were also in the Deep South, but this is more well-understood theoretically.

[4] Of course, there are other plausible factors as well. Anti-Muslim sentiments and anti-foreign biases might be better measures of Obama as "Other." Ultimately, I view these possibilities as complementary to what I present here, and leave them for future work.

[5] For a broader discussion of the role of race in response to Kornacki, see Coates (2012).

position in the region. While scholarship on white racial attitudes has increasingly pointed to implicit prejudice as more explicit forms of racial prejudice have decreased, Tesler (2013) argues such "old-fashioned racism" has returned in theoretically relevant ways in the Obama era. Piston (2010) similarly points to the role of explicit racial prejudice in lowering white support for Obama. Indeed, Stephens-Davidowitz's (2014) study of racist Google searches reveals no shortage of such activity in the Appalachian region. Given this scholarship, it seems plausible that anti-black sentiment might mediate regional distinctiveness.[6]

A second factor of note is religion. Overall, there is a greater tendency than elsewhere in the country towards "a type of religion that is not easily compartmentalized to Sunday mornings" (Wagner 2006:182). There are at least two theoretical mechanisms through which this could affect Appalachian opposition to Obama. First, the "Obama is a Muslim" rumors might operate through this sort of Christian religiosity. While the dataset I am using does not contain a measure of whether the respondent thinks Obama is a Muslim, this is at least a theoretical possibility worth entertaining. A more general way, however, is that a particular combination of religious identity and behavior – operationalized in this paper as identification as a white born-again or Evangelical Christian and weekly church attendance – creates a worldview antithetical to the Obama candidacy that operates at least somewhat independently of conventional racial animus.[7] Looking to voter behavior more particularly, there is evidence white southern regionalism is partially mediated by accounting for the disproportionate concentration of born-again Christians in the region (White 2014), so asking similar questions of Appalachian whites seems reasonable.

To what extent should Appalachia be expected to exert an independent regional effect that persists even after accounting for regional differences related to racial attitudes and religion? Ultimately, this should be seen as an open question. Like southern regionalism, Appalachian re-

[6]One could also apply Bledsoe et al.'s (1995) social density hypothesis to whites as one way of justifying how a racially homogeneous area could exhibit higher levels of anti-black attitudes than expected. Living in largely white areas might increase solidarity with other whites, which is slightly contrary to Key's racial threat hypothesis.

[7]Of course, race and religion are not mutually exclusive. For example, writing about migration out of Appalachia and into industrial centers like Detroit, Fraser refers to "Appalachian migrants raised on fundamentalist religion and racism who, once in Detroit, were sometimes recruited into the ranks of the Black Legion and Ku Klux Klan and evinced a deep, almost racial-religious antipathy to the Polish Catholics of the city's industry" (Fraser 1989, 72). Obermiller et al., by contrast, argue the 1943 Detroit race riot was "popularly, and incorrectly" blamed on these migrants (2006: 244). In the context of southern politics, Wilson (2009) more generally demonstrates how religion and race were intertwined in the aftermath of the Civil War.

gionalism might be to some extent a compositional feature and to some extent a uniquely regional distinction that remains even after compositional differences are accounted for. This is true of both demographic variables (education, size of place, etc.) and attitudinal/behavioral variables related to race and religion. To the extent that Appalachian distinctiveness might just be racially or religiously motivated, controlling for key aspects of these factors can offer a clear empirical assessment of this. If Appalachian regionalism persists even with these factors accounted for, it suggests a much stronger regional effect in itself. However, if Appalachian regionalism disappears after these factors are accounted for, it can be a helpful step in explaining what factors actually make up what seems to be Appalachian distinctiveness.

I formalize this discussion into four testable hypotheses about race, religion, and Appalachian voting behavior. The first two hypotheses deal with Appalachian attitudes in a general sense. The third and fourth hypotheses deal with whether these potential attitudinal differences help explain Appalachian distinctiveness in presidential vote choice:

H1. Appalachian whites will offer more negative sentiments towards African Americans, controlling for other factors.

H2. Appalachian whites will be more religious, controlling for other factors.

H3. Anti-black sentiments will mediate Appalachian opposition to the Obama candidacy.

H4. The religiosity of Appalachian residents will mediate opposition to the Obama candidacy.

I next turn to several definitional, data, and methods points that need to be addressed to adequately assess these hypotheses. I also note what evidence will be taken as evidence in support (or not) of each hypothesis.

Definitions, Data and Methods

A definitional issue must be addressed before proceeding. Despite being "one of the oldest names on North American maps," Appalachia has "no agreed-upon boundaries" (Williams 2002:9); often it seems it "exists as much in the mind and imagination as on the map" (Straw 2006:1).

In this paper, I defer to contemporary specialists on the region working within more traditional political and social history and define Appalachia as the 420 counties covered by the Appalachian Regional Commission (Figure 1). This is "[c]ommonly accepted today as the political definition of Appalachia" (Edwards et al. 2006:xiv). About twenty-five million people live in the area covered by the Appalachian Regional Commission, which begins in northeastern Mississippi and extends through northern Alabama and Georgia, western North and South Carolina, eastern Tennessee and Kentucky, southwestern Virginia, the entire state of West Virginia, eastern Ohio, a small stretch of western Maryland, much of western and central Pennsylvania, and the part of New York state close to the Pennsylvania border.

Some scholars have pointed to alternative forms of defining Appalachian-ness, including other geographical definitions (Campbell 1921; Ford 1962; Williams 2002), self-identification with the region (Cooper et al. 2010), and the number of businesses in a particular area that use "Appalachia" in their name (Cooper et al. 2011). Still others have offered more postmodern approaches to defining the region, "recogniz[ing] that every place is a zone characterized by the interaction of global and local human and environmental forces and that regional boundaries inevitably shift with the perspectives both of subject and object" (Williams 2002:12). This latter approach, however, is somewhat difficult to operationalize in dummy variable form.

This paper does not argue these other definitions are incorrect, but rather that the conventional political definition of Appalachia is valid in its own ways, and indeed might be the most reliable definition for political scientists interested in survey research. It also fits best with conventional definitions of the American South used by southern politics scholars, which tend to rely on rigid lines of geography (state boundaries, in that case), while acknowledging that there still might be degrees of southern-ness (e.g., northern Virginia vs. rural Mississippi). Insomuch as my definition of Appalachia is more expansive than some other suggested definitions, this will bias the results away from finding Appalachian distinctiveness, rather than towards finding it. Thus, any Appalachian distinctiveness should be seen as a conservative estimate of what might be found using a more restricted definition. It can also be more easily compared with southern distinctiveness found in prior public opinion studies.

One of the primary reasons Appalachia is not studied by public opinion scholars is surveys never contain a variable identifying the region. Studying public opinion in Appalachia using national survey data requires a dataset with (1) a sufficiently large number of observations that subnational units as small as counties are observable, and (2) a sampling procedure that is still representative at such subnational units. Standard surveys like the American National Election Studies and General Social Survey are disqualified by these criteria because of their cluster sample design (which leaves the survey representative at the national level, as well as regional units defined by the ANES, but not at smaller units like counties) and relatively small sample sizes.

I use the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) data. The dataset consists of 57,967 interviews conducted between December 2007 and November 2008. The sampling procedure is random digit dialing. Although the NAES dataset does not contain an Appalachia variable, I am able to construct this variable using restricted county-level information requested from the Annenberg Public Policy Center.[8] The new Appalachia variable contains a total of 5,220 white respondents coded as living in Appalachia. The combination of sample size and sampling design means the Appalachia variable should be representative. Although obviously the N of any individual county might be too small for meaningful analysis, aggregation into this larger indicator variable for Appalachia should be much more reliable.

Although the focus is different, this approach is similar to how Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) measure state-level opinion to assess policy responsiveness in the American states. For a discussion of why disaggregating subnational estimates from larger national samples using random digit dialing surveys produces reliable estimates of the geographical subunit in question, see Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993:13-14; see also Waksberg 1978).

To assess Hypothesis 1, I make use of the available questions about race in the NAES dataset. I start with measures of perceived racial favoritism. Respondents were asked whether "black elected officials are more likely to favor blacks for government jobs over white applicants"; "black elected officials are more likely to support government spending that favors blacks"; and "black elected officials are more likely to give special favors to the black community." During a shorter

[8]The county codes themselves are restricted, but available upon approval from Annenberg. I am happy to provide replication files upon receipt of the data.

period of interviewing, respondents were also asked whether they thought "black elected officials are more likely to support policies that could cost whites jobs."[9] These questions are different than traditional measures of "racial resentment" or "symbolic racism," which emphasize adherence to a "colorblind" view of race combined with stereotyped perceptions of African Americans as violating norms of hard-work, independence, etc. (Kellstedt 2003; Hawley 2014). My measures of "racial favoritism," by contrast, are more a measure of perceived race-based advantages. Data permitting, future research might examine whether the patterns I find are distinct from those when a symbolic racism measure is used instead (I return to this point in the conclusion). I also examine a question asking respondents to place African Americans on a 0-10 scale rating their trustworthiness.[10] Finally, I use a question asking respondents whether America is ready for a black president. Positive and statistically significant coefficients for the Appalachia variable in models assessing these dependent variables will be considered evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2 turns to religion. Religion is a complicated manner, involving both behavior and beliefs. Thus, I consider two measures of religion: church attendance and identification as a born-again or Evangelical Christian. The NAES dataset contains a five-category measure of church attendance. Following Presser and Chaves (2007:418), I recode this into a measure of the probability of church attendance in a given week.[11] To measure Evangelical status, I use self-reported identification in response to the question, "Do you consider yourself an evangelical or born-again Christian?" Much like the conception of partisanship articulated by Green et al. (2002), this definition is grounded in emotional attachment. Indeed, Lewis and Huyser de Bernardo refer to Evangelical status as "a foundational social-psychological identity" (2010:124). Positive and statistically significant coefficients for the Appalachia variable in models assessing these dependent

[9]Respondents were also asked whether it would be "good or bad if black elected officials favored blacks." Appalachian residents are not distinctive on assessments of this question – whites overwhelmingly think it would be a bad thing – and this is not included in my analysis (but is available upon request from the author).

[10]Respondents were also asked to do an identical placement for whites, which might serve as a test of whether Appalachian respondents are simply less trusting in general. However, Appalachian residents are not distinguishable on this question (results available upon request).

[11]Church attendance is measured the same everywhere, but might mean different things depending upon geography. Evangelicals in deeply Evangelical parts of the country, such as Appalachia, might experience their religion differently than those in more secular environments. Competing ideas might have a more difficult time penetrating the "sacred canopy." For an early articulation along these lines, see Berger (1967).

variables will be considered evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. The NAES does not contain a wide range of religion questions, so more nuanced questions about specific theological beliefs (e.g., Barker et al., 2008) are unfortunately not possible to assess. However, this at least provides an initial assessment of the role of religious belief in Appalachian attitudes and political behavior.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 are about the mediating possibilities of race and religion on presidential vote choice. For the former, I create an additive scale of the three perceived racial favoritism measures asked for the longest time period (the jobs, spending, and special favors questions; $\alpha = .81$). This is called the "racial favoritism scale" in the tables. To assess presidential vote choice, I start by combining two NAES questions asking about intended vote choice from June 24 (post-primary) to November 3, 2008.[12] I dichotomize the variable so that 1 = McCain and 0 = Obama. This is my main vote choice variable. Because the "costs whites jobs" question was only asked during an earlier period of interviewing, I separately estimate its mediating potential by combining similar questions asked from March 7 to June 23, 2008. Due to space constraints, these models are presented in the appendix. Because the NAES also asked about preferences for McCain vs. Hillary Clinton from March 7 to June 8, I also make use of the distinction between prospect general election match-ups featuring a black candidate (Obama) and a white candidate (Clinton) to assess whether race and religion might differentially mediate any Appalachian distinctiveness in vote choice (see Tesler 2012 for a more general examination of this research strategy). These results, too, are presented in the appendix. If the race and/or religion variables mediate the Appalachian coefficient in these models – that is, the inclusion of such variables decreases the size of the coefficient in a substantive way or, particularly, if the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant – this will be taken as evidence in support of Hypotheses 3 and 4. To further assess the substantive interactive effects, I also estimate interactive models and plot the potentially differential marginal effects of Appalachian residence by the possible values of the theoretically relevant explanatory variables.

I treat the 0-10 scale measuring respondents' perceptions of the trustworthiness of African Americans, as well as the recoded measure of church attendance, as continuous variables, and

[12]From June 24 to September 25, the survey also asked about Ralph Nader and Bob Barr. From September 26 to November 3, it added Cynthia McKinney. These responses are dropped to focus on preferences for Obama vs. McCain.

estimate these models using OLS regression.[13] The remaining binary dependent variables are analyzed using logistic regression. I calculate marginal effects for variables of interest in the logistic regression models. Each marginal effect is the change in probability associated with that variable when all other explanatory variables are held constant. The variable of theoretical interest is a dummy variable for Appalachian residence: the marginal effect is the discrete change from zero to one, making substantive interpretation rather straightforward.

Models are estimated with controls for region (dummy variables for the non-Appalachian South, the Border South, the Northeast, and the West, with the Midwest serving as the base category – see Figure 2 for a map of the regions), ideology, partisanship (dummy variables for Republican and Democratic partisanship, with independents serving as the base category), gender (dummy variable for female), age, household income, education (dummy variables for high school or less and college degree, with some college serving as the base category), union membership, and size of place (dummy variables for rural and urban, with suburban serving as the base category). I restrict the analysis to whites because of Appalachia's relative racial homogeneity and my theoretical interest in white attitudes.[14]

Results: Race and Religion

I first discuss racial attitudes. Table 1 presents the results. The strongest Appalachian distinctiveness comes in response to the question of whether "black elected officials are more likely to support policies that could cost whites jobs." Appalachian whites are 7 percentage points more likely to say yes, compared to 5 percentage points in the non-Appalachian parts of the South (whites in the Border South are not statistically distinguishable from the Midwest). Appalachian whites are also 7 percentage points more likely to say "black elected officials are more likely to favor blacks for government jobs over white applicants," 5 percentage points more likely to say "black elected officials are more likely to support government spending that favors blacks," and 7 percentage

[13]The results are substantively similar to those obtained by estimating ordered probit models, so I refer to the easier to interpret OLS results in the text.

[14]If the analysis is not restricted in this way and black and Latino dummy variables are included in the models, the results are substantively similar.

points more likely to say "black elected officials are more likely to give special favors to the black community." However, in the case of these three measures, whites in the non-Appalachian parts of the South offer stronger sentiments of perceived racial favoritism. There are also some smaller and even null results. Appalachian whites are only 2 percentage points more likely to say the United States is not ready to elect a black president, and they are not distinguishable at all on the question of whether they consider African Americans to be trustworthy or not (nor, for that matter, are southern whites).[15] Overall, then, Hypothesis 1 is supported in many instances. However, the race results are generally weaker in Appalachia than in the South.

I next turn to the religion results, which are presented in Table 2. Religious behavior is operationalized through a measure of weekly church attendance. Appalachian residents are more likely to attend church weekly, controlling for other factors. The OLS coefficient is .06. Notably, non-Appalachian southern whites and whites in the Border South are not distinguishable from the Midwestern base category. While the non-Appalachian South was often comparable to Appalachia on the race measures, it is clearly Appalachian whites that stand out on this measure of religious participation.

Although religious identification is a complex matter, one particularly politically salient dimension of religious belief for white American Christians is whether they identity as born-again or Evangelical Christians. Appalachian whites are also more likely to identify as born-again Christians. Controlling for other factors, Appalachian whites are still 19 percentage points more likely to identify as born-again Christians, which is a quite sizable marginal effect of one variable. Notably, this is much larger than the estimated marginal effects for the non-Appalachian South (13 percentage points) and Border South (11 percentage points). Indeed, it is the largest positive predictor of Evangelical self-identification of any dummy variable in the model.

The difference between Appalachia and the non-Appalachian South coefficients in both reli-

[15]Of course, survey response on questions designed to measure racial attitudes are prone to social desirability bias. Applied to regionalism more specifically, Kuklinksi et al. (1997) argued the seeming decline in white southern exceptionalism in measures of racial prejudice was a methodological artifact driven by the use of traditional measures of prejudice susceptive to social desirability bias. While the questions used in this paper are not measures of "old-fashioned racism" pointing to a desire for social distance, a belief in biological inferiority, or support for formalized segregation and discrimination (Tesler 2012, 114), it is of course possible that respondents under-reported their negative affect towards black politicians or their private assessments of black trustworthiness. Nonetheless, what surveys do reveal still offers an interesting perspective on racial attitudes.

gion models is statistically distinguishable from zero. After conducting a linear combination of estimates test, the null hypothesis of no difference between Appalachia and the non-Appalachian South coefficients can be rejected with t = 5.82 for the church attendance model, and z = 2.55 for the born-again identification model. Hypothesis 2, then, is clearly supported.

These results suggest racial attitudes and religion are both important aspects of Appalachian distinctiveness. However, when compared to southern regionalism, it is the religion results that stand out. The Appalachia coefficient is generally smaller than the southern coefficient in the models assessing the perceived racial favoritism measures, with one exception (whether black elected officials are more likely to support policies that would hurt whites). However, Appalachian whites are clearly more likely to attend church regularly than whites in the non-Appalachian South, and are also more likely to identity as a born-again or Evangelical Christian. I next turn to whether these factors might help explain Appalachian opposition to the Obama candidacy.

Results: Vote Choice

Table 3 presents the results of a series of logistic regression models assessing the determinants of presidential vote choice in the 2008 election. Model 1 represents a baseline model of presidential vote choice in the 2008 presidential election. Controlling for standard correlates of vote choice like ideological self-placement, partisan identification, gender, age, income, education, union membership, and size of place, Appalachian whites remain 7 percentage points more likely to vote against Obama, relative to the Midwestern base category. This provides some basic confirmation of the Appalachian opposition described in media accounts, although notably it is a smaller marginal effect than the one estimated for the non-Appalachian South. Nonetheless, since many major predictors of vote choice are accounted for in the multivariate model, this leftover regional distinctiveness merits examination.

Given this 7 percentage points baseline, can the addition of race and religion measures mediate the seeming Appalachia effect? Model 2 includes the perceived racial favoritism scale. The addition of this variable reduces the marginal effect of Appalachian residence to 5 percentage points. Controlling for racial sentiments has a slight mediating effect, but Appalachian residence still

remains a significant predictor of vote choice.[16] Race, then, has a small mediating effect on Appalachian distinctiveness, but regionalism still very much remains. What about religion? Model 3 includes the church attendance measure. The addition of this variable reduces the marginal effect of Appalachian residence to 6 percentage points. This model is the least successful of all the models in Table 3 in mediating the Appalachia variable. Model 4 includes the born again variable. The addition of this variable reduces the marginal effect of Appalachian residence to 5 percentage points. This is similar to the inclusion of the racial favoritism scale, although in this case the coefficient nearly loses statistical significance at the conventional .05 level.[17] Model 5 includes both the church attendance and born again variables to capture religion more broadly. The inclusion of both religion measures leads to a drop in the statistical significance level of the Appalachia variable to .068, which means the new estimated marginal effect of 4 percentage points is not statistically distinguishable from zero at the .05 level. Although the regional effect should not be totally discounted here, its independent effect is notably weaker. Model 5 provides the first bit of evidence that Appalachian distinctiveness can be substantially mediated by the inclusion of other factors: In this case, through a particular conjunction of religious participation and identification. This provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 4.

Finally, Model 6 includes both religion measures, as well as the perceived racial favoritism scale. The inclusion of all three measures reduces the Appalachia coefficient even further, with the new estimated marginal effect of 3 percentage points being significant at only the .289 level. Here, the marginal effect is not even close to reaching conventional levels of statistical significance, and it is clearly advisable to interpret the Appalachia coefficient as not distinguishable from zero. The AIC value for Model 6 is the lowest, suggesting the inclusion of all three variables results in the best fit of the six models. Notably, this mediating effect is much more substantial among Appalachian whites than it is among whites in the non-Appalachian South or the Border South states.[18]

[16] I also examine another perceived racial favoritism measure with a different part of the sample. The question about black elected officials costing whites jobs is a very strong predictor of anti-Obama sentiments generally, but only reduces the marginal effect of Appalachian residence from 7 percentage points to 6 percentage points. Results provided in the appendix.

[17] The z-score is 2.02 for the marginal effect, and 1.97 for the logit coefficient of .21.

[18] A curious result is the Northeast coefficient, which actually becomes significant in Models 4-6, despite not being

To better quantify the extent to which racial attitudes and religion interact with Appalachian residence, I estimate interactive models. These models start with the same variables as Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4, but add an interaction term between Appalachia and one of the three key explanatory variables (church attendance, born-again Christian identification, and the perceived racial favoritism scale). I plot the various marginal effects of Appalachian residence at each value of these independent variables in Figures 3.[19]

These interactive models help clarify the role of religion. The top left plot in Figure 3 shows the Appalachian marginal effects by the categories of church attendance. Appalachian regionalism persists for lower levels of church attendance, but when the probability of weekly church attendance approaches 100 percent, Appalachian residence no longer predicts vote choice. A similar pattern emerges for born-again Christian identification, plotted in the top right of Figure 3. Among non-born again Christians, the marginal effect of Appalachian residence is 3 percentage points, although it is only statistically significant at the .076 level. However, among born-again Christians, the Appalachian regional term is clearly not statistically significant. The consistent result between these two models is that Appalachian distinctiveness is mediated by religion among the highly religious, but persists among the less religious.

The bottom left of Figure 3 plots the marginal effects of Appalachia by the categories of the perceived racial favoritism scale. The trajectory of the Appalachian marginal effect is positive, such that for higher levels of perceived racial favoritism, the effect of Appalachian regionalism is estimated to be higher. However, there are some issues with statistical significance. The marginal effect of Appalachia when the perceived racial favoritism scale is equal to 1 is significant at the .051 level and when it is equal to 2 it is significant at the .034 level. However, when the scale is equal to 3, it is only significant at the .077 level. To allow for the possibility that the pattern might actually not be linear, the bottom right of Figure 3 shows the marginal effects of Appalachian residence when the perceived racial favoritism scale is treated as a categorical rather than continuous variable. When treated this way (and thus not assuming linearity), for those who score

significant in the earlier models. It is beyond the scope of this paper to meaningfully assess whether this is a statistical artifact or a substantive finding, but it might merit future analysis.

[19]The regression table is presented the appendix due to space constraints.

lowest on the perceived racial favoritism scale, the marginal effect of Appalachian residence is 3 percentage points, although it is only statistically significant at the .081 level. For those in the middle of the scale, the Appalachia marginal effect begins to decline in size and is not statistically significant. However, the linear pattern stops and switches direction for those who are highest on the perceived racial favoritism scale, with the marginal effect of Appalachian residence reaching 6 percentage points. Compared to the religion results, the link between racial attitudes and Appalachian regionalism remains more ambiguous, both because of questions about the linearity of the scale's effects and the difference between the scale and more conventional measures of white racial attitudes.

I also took advantage of the survey's primary-era sample to compare prospective general election preferences for Obama vs. McCain to prospective general election preferences for Clinton vs. McCain – in other words, distinguishing between a plausible black Democratic candidate and a plausible white one (Tesler 2012:115-116). Due to space constraints, these results are presented in the appendix. The basic result is that the perceived racial favoritism scale mediates the Appalachian coefficient in the Obama model, lowering it from a marginal effect of 8 percentage points in the initial model to a statistically insignificant coefficient in these second model. By contrast, the Appalachian coefficient begins as statistically insignificant in the Clinton model, and remains so with the inclusion of the racial favoritism scale. This not only complements Tesler's (2012) finding about race and the Obama candidacy more generally, but adds a new wrinkle: It "explains away" Appalachian distinctiveness in attitudes towards Obama, but not towards Clinton.

Conclusion

This paper examines racial attitudes, religion, and Appalachian opposition to the 2008 presidential candidacy of Barack Obama. Using a unique measure of Appalachian residence, I first demonstrate Appalachian whites exhibit higher than average levels of perceived racial favoritism and a much greater likelihood of being weekly church-goers and born-again or Evangelical Christians. While the perceived racial favoritism results are not as strong as results for southern whites (perhaps in keeping with Key's racial threat hypothesis), Appalachian whites are decidedly more

likely to attend church weekly and identify as Evangelical Christians. I then assess whether these measures of perceived racial favoritism and religiosity can mediate Appalachian opposition to Obama. When perceived racial favoritism, church attendance, and born-again status are included in the vote choice model, Appalachian distinctiveness disappears entirely. This seems to be driven more by religion than race, as controlling for just the religion measures leads to a similar decline of Appalachian distinctiveness, although it is less definitive than the model with the perceived racial favoritism scale included as well.

The results of this paper suggest religion might be a particularly important variable for future research on Appalachia and American politics. The marginal effects in the interactive models indicate the strongest regional effects are among less religious respondents. Scholars might further examine the political behavior of more secular individuals living in the region. While the religion results are more straight-forward, the more ambiguous empirical results related to race in this paper should certainly not be taken to mean race played no role in Appalachian opposition to Obama. Indeed, Table 1 clearly demonstrates evidence of negative racial attitudes in the region, and Table 3 presents a statistically significant relationship between perceived racial favoritism and general opposition to the presidential candidacy of Barack Obama in the 2008 election, which is consistent with previous research (Piston 2010; Tesler 2012). This is true of Appalachia as well as the rest of the country. What is perhaps *unique* about Appalachia, especially in comparison to the South, is more related to forms of religious identity in the region.

The link between racial attitudes and Appalachian regionalism also merits further research. One area for future research would be using different measures of white racial attitudes. While the perceived racial favoritism measures used in this paper are useful for analyzing certain types of racial attitudes, other racial attitudes are neglected. Future research could better assess the link between racial attitudes and Appalachian regionalism by looking at more conventional measures of symbolic racism or more explicit forms of "old-fashioned" racism. The challenge will be finding surveys that have a sample suitable for studying Appalachia, but also ask different types of questions about racial attitudes.

The results of this paper should be of interest to southern politics scholars, as well as Ameri-

can politics scholars more generally. While scholars need not include Appalachian dummy variables in standard regression models (as has become common for southern regionalism), this paper still highlights the complementary value of considering Appalachian regionalism as part of the broader study of southern regionalism. A number of potential venues for research are open. For example, scholars interested in assessing variation in the Deep and Peripheral parts of the South (Key 1949; Black and Black 1987; Black and Black 2002; Shafer and Johnston 2006; White 2014; McKee and Spring 2015) can also ask whether Appalachian parts of the South are different than non-Appalachian parts of the region. Such an approach would build directly on existing work in southern politics, but also offer a novel variation on a classic theme. Comparisons of Appalachia to the non-Appalachian South could also offer new perspectives on classic debates about the relative importance of racism, religion, and other factors in shaping white regional attitudes.

More generally, bringing Appalachia into studies of American politics can be fruitful for an array of scholarly interests. Studying Appalachia presents a number of possible future avenues. Some scholars have started work on how well the SES model of political participation applies in the Appalachian context (Cassese et al. 2012). There are several other possible topics to explore as well. Appalachian counties could be compared with marginalized counties in other contexts: the Ozarks and the rural West, as well as pockets of concentrated poverty in urban centers. American political development scholars could likewise complement historical sociological scholarship by placing Appalachia into debates about the development of the American welfare state and how "policies make citizens" (Campbell 2005). This might be especially fruitful in terms of studying contemporary policy developments like the state-level implementation of the Affordable Care Act and public sentiments towards it in states like Kentucky (*New York Times* 2014).

Some political scientists have started examining the political implications of what sociologists labeled "unhyphenated Americans" – that is, white Americans who identify themselves as ethnically American, rather than European (Lieberson 1985; Lieberson and Waters 1986; Lieberson and Waters 1993). Arbour and Teigen (2011) use aggregate-level data to show that, controlling for other factors, variation in the county-level share of individuals identifying as ethnically "American" is a strong predictor of opposition to the Obama candidacy in 2008. Knoll (2014) complements this by

using individual-level data from a 2012 exit poll of voters in Boyle County, Kentucky, to show that unhyphenated American identity is associated with opposition to Obama, but is mediated by sentiments related to nativism and cultural threat. This study of Appalachian regionalism can serve as a complement to this developing unhyphenated Americans literature. Indeed, the strongest challenge to a study of Appalachian regionalism on its own is provided by Arbour and Teigen. They write, "These unhyphenated Americans are not randomly distributed throughout the nation, but concentrate in the more rural areas of the South and Appalachia" (2011:564). However, they argue the unhyphenated American phenomenon exists even controlling for region and other correlates of anti-Obama sentiments, and thus focus on the ethnic, rather than regional, aspects of white identity. They criticize journalistic accounts of Obama's supposed Appalachian problem by arguing that it was really an unhyphenated American problem not limited to the Appalachian region (Ibid.:581).[20] While I acknowledge the validity of their argument that the unhyphenated American phenomenon extends beyond Appalachia, I argue Appalachian regionalism merits discussion for its own sake, but especially with reference to scholarly literatures on southern regionalism. Taken together, studies of regionalism and ethnic identity can build towards a better understanding of the determinants of white conservatism generally, and opposition to the first black president particularly.

Finally, although the popular image of the region is one of white poverty, developing demographic shifts might complicate this going forward. Appalachia is in fact diversifying, at least in parts. This is especially true in Southern Appalachia, where the Latino population has gone from close to zero in 1990 to closer to 10 percent in some counties today. Although not huge relative to populations elsewhere in the country, the suddenness of the increase had coincided with white resentment towards new economic competitors and changes to the traditional cultural landscape of the region (for anecdotal evidence of this, see *New York Times* [2009] for media coverage of Latino immigration to Appalachian Hamblen County, Tennessee). Paying attention to such developments will be important for scholars of contemporary racial and ethnic politics.

[20] Arbour and Teigen point to King (1996) to make the point that geography, per se, "cannot explain voting habits"(2011:582). They acknowledge, however, that "physical geography can impact political culture patterns," citing Elazar (1972).

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

Figure 1: Counties in Appalachia



Figure 2: Regions



Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Appalachia in Interactive Models

Table 1: Race

	Gov. Jobs	Spending	Cost Whites Jobs	Black Community	Blacks Trustworthy	Black Pres.
Appalachia	0.31***	0.19***	0.39***	0.28***	0.13	0.18*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Non-Appalachian South	0.40***	0.39***	0.30**	0.38***	0.13	0.20*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Border South	0.25***	0.24***	0.20	0.22***	0.14	0.30**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Northeast	-0.04	-0.07	-0.17	-0.02	-0.00	0.14
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.08)
West	-0.14**	-0.14**	-0.19	-0.06	-0.03	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Ideology	0.20***	0.22***	0.26***	0.23***	0.14***	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Democrat	-0.23***	-0.21***	-0.14	-0.26***	-0.08	-0.12
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Republican	0.22***	0.23***	0.06	0.23***	-0.10	0.29***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Female	-0.28***	-0.39***	-0.23**	-0.31***	-0.20**	-0.09
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***	0.02***	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household Income	-0.02	0.01	-0.07***	0.00	-0.05*	-0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High School	0.20***	0.14**	0.38***	0.21***	0.14	0.30***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.07)
College Degree	-0.18***	-0.02	-0.25**	-0.11*	-0.24**	-0.18**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Union	0.01	-0.01	0.06	-0.03	-0.05	-0.11
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Urban	0.01	0.10**	0.05	0.04	0.07	-0.16*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Rural	-0.04	-0.03	0.08	0.02	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Constant	-2.09***	-1.67***	-2.31***	-1.96***	3.33***	-1.50***
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.24)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.19)
Adjusted R^2					.02	
Pseudo R^2	.06	.05	.06	.05		.02
Log lik.	-11113.62	-11761.09	-2670.41	-10255.92	-8255.97	-4513.50
N	17946	17961	5461	15978	3931	10535

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2: Religion

	Church Attendance	Born Again
Appalachia	0.06***	0.80***
	(0.01)	(0.07)
Non-Appalachian South	0.01	0.58***
	(0.01)	(0.06)
Border South	-0.00	0.45***
	(0.01)	(0.08)
Northeast	-0.07***	-0.97***
	(0.01)	(0.08)
West	-0.11***	-0.06
	(0.01)	(0.07)
Ideology	0.09***	0.47***
	(0.00)	(0.03)
Democrat	0.01	-0.05
	(0.01)	(0.06)
Republican	0.09***	0.38***
	(0.01)	(0.06)
Female	0.10***	0.29***
	(0.00)	(0.05)
Age	0.00***	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household Income	-0.01***	-0.12***
	(0.00)	(0.01)
High School	-0.03***	0.17**
	(0.01)	(0.06)
College Degree	0.06***	-0.46***
	(0.01)	(0.06)
Union	0.01*	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.07)
Urban	-0.01	-0.10
	(0.01)	(0.06)
Rural	0.02***	0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.06)
Constant	-0.07***	-1.69***
	(0.02)	(0.17)
Adjusted R^2	.13	
Pseudo R^2		.14
Log lik.	-17890.05	-5400.94
N	33069	9618

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3: Presidential Vote Choice: McCain or Obama

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Appalachia	0.29**	0.23*	0.26*	0.21*	0.19	0.12
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Non-Appalachian South	0.70***	0.60***	0.71***	0.69***	0.72***	0.65***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Border South	0.36**	0.38**	0.35**	0.32**	0.32**	0.34**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Northeast	0.08	0.10	0.12	0.20*	0.22*	0.23*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
West	0.05	0.10	0.11	0.08	0.13	0.18
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Ideology	1.01***	0.99***	0.97***	0.95***	0.93***	0.91***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Democrat	-1.72***	-1.70***	-1.73***	-1.74***	-1.75***	-1.73***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Republican	1.74***	1.75***	1.71***	1.69***	1.67***	1.67***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Female	-0.10	0.02	-0.14*	-0.12	-0.16*	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household Income	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
High School	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
College Degree	-0.27***	-0.26**	-0.29***	-0.21*	-0.24**	-0.27**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Union	-0.17*	-0.22*	-0.18*	-0.17	-0.18	-0.23*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Urban	-0.22**	-0.26**	-0.22**	-0.17*	-0.18*	-0.21*
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Rural	0.15	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Racial Favoritism Scale		0.43***				0.43***
		(0.03)				(0.03)
Church Attendance			0.46***		0.40***	0.43***
			(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Born Again				0.41***	0.32***	0.30***
				(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	-3.46***	-3.69***	-3.43***	-3.39***	-3.34***	-3.58***
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Pseudo R^2	.456	.48	.46	.45	.45	.47
AIC	7143.23	6149.60	7074.70	6269.35	6222.81	5389.59
Log lik.	-3554.62	-3056.80	-3519.35	-3116.67	-3092.40	-2674.80
N	9457	8489	9425	8232	8209	7410

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$