

reliability, and the methods that it employed were all in use in the West earlier and contemporaneously. He concludes that the Okhrana's negative reputation, in Russia and in the West, derived from an unfortunate coincidence in timing. Police in Western Europe had developed their *raison d'être* and techniques well before their Russian counterparts and more gradually, allowing citizens to grow accustomed to them. Because "modern state formation occurred later ... in Russia and the police were at the vanguard of this process ... technophobia (or future shock) was experienced even more intensely in Russia" (p. 72). Or said another way, the "revolution in police methodology occurred at the same time as Russia's most significant period of state formation" (p. 73), leading to a head-on clash of the two processes.

The bulk of *Russian Hide-and-Seek*, chapters 3 through 8, provides details about the structure and operation of the Okhrana, some unavailable elsewhere in English, which are meant to support Lauchlan's interpretation. He explores what offices comprised the secret police, what relationship they had to other parts of the bureaucracy, how they were staffed, how they did their work, and how revolutionaries, liberals, and the political right reacted to and interacted with them. Here and there he provides charts and tables that helpfully summarize and convey much of the information. Not all readers will be riveted by every detail—the description of the duties of every department and section of the police apparatus, for example—but most have their purpose. The book is based on an immense amount of reading in secondary and archival sources. Its inclusiveness will allow *Russian Hide-and-Seek* to serve as a ready reference as well as an analysis of the Okhrana.

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Lohr, Eric. *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I*. Russian Research Center Studies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. xi + 237 pp. \$45.00. ISBN 0-674-01041-8.

Fear not. Though *Nationalizing the Russian Empire* is a revision of Eric Lohr's 1999 Harvard dissertation, it suffers from none of the stereotypical defects of first books. Concise, coherent, and topically important, Lohr's book is a model not only for graduate students and assistant professors but also for anyone interested in defending the historical monograph from its many detractors. Lohr writes fluidly and with easy confidence, ranging across many contested historiographical terrains with equanimity and an admirable lack of defensiveness.

Like many excellent monographs, this one springs from an urge to explain a paradoxical situation. At the turn of the twentieth century the Russian Empire was the world's largest and most diverse realm and was peculiarly dependent on a multinational economy. Furthermore, its political leaders were cosmopolitan Europeans, tied by kinship and intellectual inclination to the elites of its continental neighbors. That same political elite was also deeply afraid of social turmoil, of overthrowing centuries of established property "rights," or of upsetting the fragile domestic apple cart in any way. Yet, the Russian state in the war years embarked on a radical campaign to "nationalize" the empire by launching an aggressive assault against enemy aliens that rapidly expanded to encompass not only foreign citizens but also enormous numbers of its own subjects. Conservative imperialists thereby destroyed the traditional underpinnings of the imperial order. The process Lohr describes is one of self-administered surgery to remove what Russian policymakers believed to be a parasite but instead turned out to be a crucial organ. Painful death was the logical conclusion.

Lohr describes the attack on enemy aliens in four tightly argued chapters. The first discusses the Moscow riot of 1915, which destroyed more property (over 70 million rubles'-worth) than any other urban disturbance in Russian history, was heavily targeted at business owners with

foreign-sounding names, and persuaded the tsar that the depth of popular antagonism toward Germans was such that only strident anti-German policies would prevent even wider unrest. The next two outline the remarkable “nationalization” of the imperial economy, as the state moved first to sequester and then to expropriate enemy alien property. The scale was breathtaking, as landmarks of the Russian commercial world were “liquidated” with tremendous eagerness and enormous tracts of land (by Lohr’s count at least six million *desiatins*) in the west of the empire were marked for transfer to the Peasant Bank for redistribution. The effects of these policies were not hard to see. To take one example, the dismantling of many of the key industrial and trade concerns devastated the already ailing consumer (and military) goods sector. Lohr also notes that embarking upon a massive program to take land away from large landowners and distribute it to peasants was an odd precedent to establish for a government that had fought tooth and nail to oppose similar initiatives in the prewar period. Finally, there is an excellent chapter on forced migrations during the war, which describes the remarkable (and remarkably little known) mass operations undertaken against Germans, Jews, and others during the war. Lohr argues that these operations are an important part of the developing story of “ethnic cleansing” in twentieth-century Europe, and it is a convincing case. Certainly many Russian commanders saw it as such when they called for the *polnoe ochishchenie* (total cleansing) of foreigners, ethnic Germans, and Jews from areas under their control (p. 123). The operations were a bit more haphazard than “total cleansing” might imply, but many hundreds of thousands of people were in fact deported and left to fend for themselves in the decaying railway stations and villages of provincial Russia.

Given the seriousness of these self-inflicted wounds, which certainly contributed to the collapse of the dynasty and the empire, one must ask in the end why the Russian state abandoned tradition, logic, and any sense of humanitarian instinct in order to so vigorously persecute enemy aliens. Lohr’s answer is simple: Russian nationalism. A fear of “German” or “Jewish” dominance was a key feature of wartime nationalism, and it was particularly pronounced among the very conservatives who had ardently defended the old order and had given political support to the tsar’s conservative instincts. After 1915, it now seems, everyone was a radical of some sort.

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Brower, Daniel. *Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire*. New York: Routledge, 2003. xxiv + 213 pp. \$75.00. ISBN 0-415-29744-3.

Crumbling Russian rule in early twentieth-century Central Asia presaged the fall of the tsarist empire, argues Daniel Brower in his compelling study. Focusing on the Imperial administrators of Turkestan, Brower analyzes the difficulties inherent in ruling an autocratic, multiethnic state in the late Imperial period. Complicating Imperial rule was a perpetual division between reformist and conservative elements both on the periphery and in St. Petersburg. Brower contends that progressive functionaries sought to employ Turkestan as a model for a new civic society that could be applied across the empire. Reformers blended several concepts, often uneasily, in their vision of Russian Turkestan, including Catherinian ideals of tolerance toward the local Islamic population, evolving facets of a “civic spirit” or *grazhdanstvennost’*, a *rechtsstaat*, and the larger European ideal of a civilizing mission. A desire to bring a form of Imperial citizenship to the peoples of the region, however, was founded according to Brower on “wishful thinking and cultural conceit” (p. 63). Reformers remained convinced of the inherent superiority of European “civilization.” Local Central Asians remained suspicious of democratizing, educational, and medical initiatives. Continued distance between colonizer and colonized