

ernment for its weak foreign policy—its failure to fulfill the destinies of the national imperial state. While Samarin continued to apply the principles of historicism in works on the national question, Solov'ev found it difficult to combine the deterministic structure of his narrative with the defeat of his own political views during the 1870s.

Thaden's close textual analysis captures the appeal, the intellectual power, and the formative effect of historicism at this key stage of Russian historical writing. But he does not deal at length with its development in later Russian historiography or its relationship to the specific historical context in which it arose. Historicism enabled both Samarin and Solov'ev to reconcile their faith in the Russian imperial state with the goal of civic development and with their conception of Russia's national and imperial identity. Their works placed the Russian empire in the category of world-historical state, subordinating the interests of individuals, classes, and national groups to the greater good of all. The rise of historicism coincided with the rising aspiration to reform in educated society. Solov'ev's portrayal of the seventeenth century as a period of preparation for reforms reflected the belief in the intellectual circles of the 1840s and 1850s that great reforms were necessary and imminent in Russia. Samarin, despite his Slavophile ideals, looked to the baron Heinrich Stein's reform program for Prussia as a model that the Russian state should follow in bringing uniformity and equality to Russian society. The empire provided the basis for a civic identity of a Russian nation, reforming, gaining power and prestige in European politics. When faith in the capacity of Alexander II to reform the state disappeared, the ineluctable force of historical development seemed less clear.

From this perspective, historicism seems less the beginning of modern historical writing than the last phase in the evolution of history as monarchical ideology, the culmination of the heritage of Tatishchev, Boltin, and Karamzin, as the destinies of the monarchy appeared fleetingly to converge with the hopes of educated society. Solov'ev's successors, while drawing on many of the materials and issues set forth in the *History*, hardly embraced the principles of historicism. They no longer regarded the state as the demiurge of progress and, accordingly, sought the dynamic of change in other factors, social, economic, and intellectual. Historians of the Moscow school, such as Vasilii Kliuchevskii and Paul Miliukov, applied positivist conceptions of history that presumed uniformity rather than distinctiveness of national historical experiences and elaborated synchronic historical models rather than narratives of evolutionary change. The "paradigm" of historicism had a rather brief presence in Russia. A more apt title for Thaden's study would be simply *Historicism in Russia*, for the author's close research and careful analysis disclose historicism as one more ephemeral, but highly significant, episode in the effort to use Western thought to understand Russia's political destinies.

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A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I. By *Peter Gatrell*. Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies. Edited by *Alexander Rabinowitch* and *William G. Rosenberg*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv + 317. \$35.00.

On an epigraph page filled with sad and subtle reproaches to Russian politicians and to the historical profession, Peter Gatrell cites an article written in May 1917 by famed historian Sergei Platonov. Platonov urged his fellow Russians to "hold onto everything"

that came into their possession relating to refugees of the Great War so that the “future scholar” (p. vii) would have a basis for his study. Even though the experience of revolution was already beginning to eclipse the experience of war, Platonov was hopeful that future historians would judge the massive population displacement occasioned by World War I to be one of the central events of the era and no doubt expected that some enterprising historian would go mine those sources in the near future.

Until now, no one has. Peter Gatrell’s book is the first substantive treatment of Russian refugees in World War I in any language. The fate of approximately 6 million people has been omitted from the narrative of twentieth-century Russian and European history. Despite the fact that refugees outnumbered the much studied Russian proletariat in 1917 by a wide margin and despite the fact that refugees were ubiquitous in newspapers, archives, and photo essays of the period, one looks in vain for mention of them in most major textbooks on Russian history. The story of Russian refugees gets scarcely more attention in works on the European experience of war. Not only do nations forget many things; historians do too.

The problem with forgetting refugees, as Gatrell makes abundantly clear, is not simply that long-dead victims are denied historical justice. Rather, it is important to remember refugees because the refugee crisis fundamentally transformed Russian politics and society. Gatrell sensitively describes this transformation by drawing on archival and journalistic sources and by appealing to an impressively long list of recent social and political theorists.

Gatrell’s achievement in this book, however, is not in any novel contribution to social theory writ large but in two discrete fields. The first field is the scholarship on World War I in general. Indeed, Gatrell’s title can be read as a sly jab at scholars who neglect the eastern front when writing about the war. The phrase “a whole empire walking” is taken from an American author (F. Scott Fitzgerald) writing about the British army in World War I. But the civilians and soldiers on the eastern front did the lion’s share of the walking in the Great War. As this book shows, the resulting “unsettled” feeling spread quickly from those who had lost their homes to those who hosted them. Furthermore, the rupture occasioned by population displacement was qualitatively different from the human rupture of loss and destruction that was felt by all belligerent countries during the conflict. No longer can historians of the war be content to note parenthetically that the eastern front was not as trench-bound as the western front; now they will have to consult Gatrell to see what that difference meant in practice, and they will have to take his work into account when assessing the social impact of the war as a whole.

The second field to which Gatrell contributes is that of modern Russian history. He conclusively demonstrates that World War I was a multivalent event that rocked Russian life to its core and that deserves study on its own terms. The questions Gatrell asks about the experience of refugees are, refreshingly, not about whether refugees helped bring on the revolution or slowed its course. Instead, the war is the context for his analysis of how refugees and the articulation of “refugeedom” affected Russian politics and society.

The analysis of wartime politics here is informative and suggestive. In the first two chapters, Gatrell describes a triangle of power that emerged at the outbreak of the war and complicated the familiar “state vs. society” dichotomy. The start of hostilities broke the bureaucracy’s stranglehold on power, as the army assumed governance over most of the western districts of the empire while public organizations that centered around the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Towns dealt with the increased demands for social services throughout the empire. The army and the public organizations collab-

orated extensively in dealing with the “rear,” cutting the Ministry of Internal Affairs out of the loop whenever possible. This military-liberal alliance was real but uncomfortable, with refugees as the primary bone of contention between the two. Increasingly, and not unreasonably, liberals accused the army of making the refugee problem worse by deporting “suspect” populations (especially Jews) from war zones. This uneasy triangular configuration would last throughout the war, though the bureaucracy recovered from the initial erosion of its power to reassert its dominance by the end of 1915.

Russian society was likewise thoroughly shaken by the refugee crisis. Gatrell does a beautiful job of showing how the actual experience of the influx of refugees into central Russia was molded into a recognizable phenomenon of “refugeedom.” Refugees were transformed into helpless, feminized, and ethnicized objects of charitable support. In the process of this transformation, new social identities crystallized, especially ethno-national ones. Relief for Jews, Poles, and Ottoman Armenians fleeing genocide was organized by “settled” residents of the same ethnicity, strengthening those ethnic bonds. Similarly, Gatrell argues, “we may look to refugeedom for the crystallization of Russianness” (p. 163), since refugeedom reminded Russians of their own cultural particularities and forced them to recognize their own inadequacy in helping their own ethnic brethren. More generally, the iconic representation of refugees both allowed for the sustained mobilization of aid on their behalf and prevented them from taking a meaningful part in the political and social processes of their new communities. The price of their salvation, as Gatrell poignantly shows, was marginalization.

Any groundbreaking work raises as many questions as it answers. The most obvious one here is, what happened next? Gatrell’s final chapter deals with refugeedom and revolution, arguing cogently that refugees were the real losers of 1917. Marginalized in their new communities, they were shut out of the scramble for land and power that occurred all over Russia. They probably took little consolation in the fact that the subsequent Russian civil war made refugees of many of the people who had hosted and then turned away from them. The end of these twinned wars in 1921 found Russian refugees living not only in the Soviet Union but in an archipelago of European refugee camps as well. In 1923, these European refugees were granted an international passport (the “Nansen passport”), which enabled them to avoid forced repatriation to the Soviet Union provided they did not seek naturalization in their new countries. Thus, from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Balkans to the Baltic, Russian refugees were forced to rebuild their lives in communities that did not usually want them. It seems unlikely that this massive body of displaced people should not have had some effect on the interwar years. I, for one, would like to know what that effect was, and I’m glad that Gatrell’s work has provided a solid basis for that future study.

The refugee experience is one of the most painful and most common of the twentieth-century world. Like so many other aspects of that world, it found expression in Europe during the Great War, would be replicated on a larger scale in World War II, and would haunt the entire globe thereafter. Gatrell’s astute observation that “refugees mocked modernity no less than they ridiculed the social conventions of tsarist Russia” (p. 199) should therefore not be taken as an excuse to write refugees out of “modern” history but as an invitation to reconceptualize “modernity” itself. Plenty of that reconceptualization is now taking place. Peter Gatrell has shown us how we might incorporate the experience of Russian refugees, and perhaps the experience of refugees more broadly, into that narrative.

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