

Worse yet, the responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the agreements was passed to the nascent League of Nations. This meant that protection would be only as potent as the league itself. Although assigned responsibility for 25 million people in seven states, rising in 1924 to twice as many in fifteen countries, its Minorities Section was poorly resourced. The first director did little for fear of annoying the major international players. Ironically, it was Germany, which had seen much of its population reduced to minority status, that pressed for effective enforcement. The manipulation of minority rights by countries, like Germany, that lost territory and population in the peace treaties, would ultimately discredit the principles on which they rested.

Ultimately, the protection of minorities was vitiated by the hypocrisy of the victorious powers in 1919, who denied the universality of minority rights and lacked the resolve to enforce such rights even where they deemed them applicable. The mechanism by which minorities could appeal to the League of Nations was flawed, and there was no system for obtaining compliance. These failings were evident to Jewish activists in Paris, but they never mustered enough influence to achieve anything better. Fink notes that the success of the Zionist movement gutted the activists' argument. After all, why should the Jews receive protection in Europe if they were getting their own state in Palestine?

Fink has identified a significant gap in the historiography, and she deserves applause for wading through a sea of material in several languages in order to fill it. However, the three strands of her analysis are never quite integrated. When dealing with the great powers, she slips into dense diplomatic history detailing too many "dreary squabbles" (303). She handles Jewish diplomacy well, but the Jews seem to operate in a vacuum, because we learn little of how other minorities fared. It is sometimes hard to see where the sections on Zionism and Palestine connect with the main argument. In addition, she has little to say about the Communist variant of minorities rights or its impact in the Soviet Union and beyond. Notwithstanding these reservations, this book is sure to become the standard work on a subject that Fink notes ruefully is becoming ever more topical.

Royal Holloway, University of London

DAVID CESARANI

Bloody Good: Chivalry, Sacrifice, and the Great War. By Allen J. Frantzen.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. Pp. xvi + 335. \$35.00.

Anyone who has studied the public culture of the World War I era knows that there sure were a lot of posters with knights on them then. Nonetheless, despite their proliferation, the degree to which chivalric themes were important to either the conduct or the understanding of the war has been more in doubt. Plenty of historians have ventured explanations based on their knowledge of soldiers' motivations, propaganda strategies, and the contours of European masculinity. Allen Frantzen, however, approaches the topic from the perspective of a scholar trained in medieval literary criticism. The result is an ambitious attempt to fuse not only cultural history and literary criticism but also medieval studies and modern war studies. The result is a work that, despite its significant flaws, thoughtfully accords a topic of considerable importance the scope it deserves.

Frantzen argues that chivalry emerged in the Middle Ages as a specific cultural solution to the common human problem of how to discipline violence. He relies heavily on René Girard here to stress the importance of sacrificial killing in this disciplinary structure. For Girard, human culture is largely "based upon the mythic process of conjuring away man's violence by endlessly projecting it upon new victims" (quoted on 41) and must therefore have some aspect of sacrificial violence within it. This sacrifice, when practiced, then serves as the foundation for retributive violence on the part of those who are allied with the victim of the sacrifice. This cycle of mutual community building through violent acts of vengeance is taken by Frantzen to be more or less the natural state of affairs, a point

he makes with his detailed analysis of early medieval tales of vanquished kings in northern Europe. One may quibble here with the universal claim that culture is based on sacrifice, but Frantzen is entirely convincing when arguing that European medieval culture had a strong sacrificial strand.

The consolidation of Christian religious authority in the same place at the same time posed a problem, however. The tale of the Passion was, given Frantzen's precise usage of the term "sacrifice" to denote a transitive process with overtones of vengeance, "antisacrificial." Since Christ did not intend for his death to inspire a new round of vengeance killings but quite the opposite, it cut against a deep cultural grain. Chivalry, in essence, emerged to resolve this contradiction. Chivalric knights assumed their role, first of all, by ignoring Christ's intent and claiming the duty to avenge his death. But they also acknowledged the need for uncommon self-discipline. The result was the concentration of the duty for vengeance in the hands of a few good men, bound in principle to Christ and to their native society. This cultural reconciliation was not without its tensions, as Frantzen is careful to point out. Antisacrificial strands were always present, even during the Crusades, the paradigmatic moment of Christian sacrifice of the infidel. In addition, chivalric restraint was not always observed in deed, as Frantzen's description of medieval military atrocity makes clear. Nevertheless, by the fifteenth century, when the knight on horseback was already becoming an anachronism, chivalry had become "a way of life for a few and a way of looking at life for many more" (99).

The most significant way that chivalry became a "way of looking at life" was through its association with heroic masculinity. Frantzen introduces this theme of heroic masculinity in his treatment of the medieval period, and he stresses it with increasing regularity when he picks the story of chivalry up again in an effective chapter on the way antiquarian interest in knights and heraldry intersected with the Victorian discourse on duty and eventually with the new nineteenth-century public organizations intended to civilize young men, such as the YMCA and the Boy Scouts. In the seventh chapter (of nine), Frantzen at last gets to the Great War, which he examines first through the use of postcards, then, in chapter 8, through the study of war memorials, and, finally, in chapter 9, through discussion of grief.

These final three chapters are quite up and down. On the one hand, Frantzen is admirably restrained about the flood of chivalric images in the war years. He argues that English artists generally "used chivalry as an unimaginative backdrop for modern warfare, seldom more" (152), that the armored knight was a "trite image" (158), and, finally, that "the language of chivalry and the rhetoric of sacrifice" held little purchase on the deep grief felt by those who mourned for the dead in the war (234). He is sufficiently confident that chivalry did matter that he is also able to show when it did not. About the thorny but crucial question of how much these ideas of chivalry resonated with regular soldiers, on the other hand, he is less restrained. Just as he leaned heavily, probably too heavily, on Girard for his discussion of violence and culture, so too does he lean too heavily on Tony Ashworth for his discussion of the attitudes of soldiers. Indeed, aside from Ashworth, he adduces few other scholars and only one soldier's letter as evidence (the broad base of World War I soldiers had never read a manual on chivalry). This defect, I should add, would have been considerably less noticeable had Frantzen not called attention to it at the end of his book by aiming a rather ill-advised broadside at Joanna Bourke and Niall Ferguson, which reveals less about the shortcomings of those two historians than it does about Frantzen's relative unfamiliarity with the literature on men in combat. More generally, many historians of the war will be suspicious of the wide-ranging claims Frantzen makes on the basis of sources largely (but not wholly) restricted to visual artifacts like postcards and gravestones.

The thesis that Frantzen wants to prove is best encapsulated in his claim that "it was the work of medieval chivalry to turn the warrior into a gentleman. It was the work of World War I to turn the gentlemen of the nineteenth century into warriors. Chivalry worked as well for the second purpose as for the first. . . . [It was] a bloody but bracing discipline

that ennobled and even glorified many of those who practiced it, including the lowborn, even as it led to their deaths" (118). It is a thesis that has serious problems when looked at closely. In the first place, Frantzen largely skips over the four-hundred-year gap between his discussion of medieval chivalry and his chapter on the Victorian era, so it is hard to see how the chivalric ideal maintained its consistency over that long period of time. Second, the artifacts of public culture that Frantzen examines from the Great War era, although illuminating, don't quite show how the gentlemen became warriors or even what part chivalry played in the new warriors' experience of modern warfare. If this is true for gentlemen, it is even more true for the "lowborn." Finally, Frantzen extends his analysis beyond England and Germany (where most of his sources come from) all the way to Russia. While it is true that Russian public culture was also suffused with chivalric images in the war years, it is fair to ask whether Russian chivalry was the same as English chivalry. In my view, a plausible connection might be made, but Frantzen does not undertake this sort of critical comparison.

Still, it is possible for an argument to be flawed in its parts but correct as a whole. In tackling such a large topic over such a long period of time, Frantzen is in a bit over his head, but his ambitious scope does bring benefits too. These benefits in the end outweigh the costs. Frantzen reached down to feel the vibrations of one of the bass strings of European civilization, where Christianity, manhood, violence, and vengeance meet. His exploration of that tone is both deep and revealing, far more so than can be indicated in this review. The note has played more loudly at some times than at others, and part of Frantzen's argument is that it was especially noticeable during the Great War. But it still plays today, as any viewer of military recruitment advertisements on American television can attest. For better or worse, chivalry is not dead.

Lafayette College

JOSHUA SANBORN

Fascists. By Michael Mann.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. x + 429. \$65.00 (cloth); \$23.99 (paper).

Fascism, that most elusive of political ideologies, continues to attract the attention of scholars almost sixty years after the major fascist regimes perished in the Second World War. Michael Mann's *Fascists* is an important contribution to this crowded field. His starting point is a map that shows Central and southeastern Europe as having embraced various forms of right-wing authoritarianism, while the northwestern half of Europe remained faithful to liberal democracy. The authoritarian bloc was divided into two parts, Latin-Mediterranean Europe and Slavic-Eastern Europe, and ranged from traditional authoritarians to Fascists and Nazis. Mann's map shows a "swing" zone of states—which includes Germany, France, Austria, and Spain—that might have gone either toward liberal democracy or toward authoritarianism. Within this authoritarian Europe, Mann sees five countries—Italy, Germany, Hungary, Austria, and Romania—in which fascism developed into a mass movement. By looking at the core constituencies that were drawn to those mass movements, Mann's book seeks to determine why these particular countries opted for the fascist variety of authoritarian statism.

The obvious implication is that a certain kind of core constituency is more common in certain parts and certain countries of Europe. Mann notes three key ingredients in fascist ideology: paramilitarism, transcendence, and nation-statism. He then seeks to identify those groups—by profession, religion, age, gender, and geographic position within the state—who might be attracted to these fascist values. For instance, Mann argues that the fascists came from professions that created special attachments to nation-statism (civil servants, engineers, doctors, architects, teachers, public sector manual workers). Mann