

Imperial Eclipse

JAPAN'S STRATEGIC
THINKING ABOUT
CONTINENTAL ASIA
BEFORE AUGUST 1945



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The Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute of Columbia University were inaugurated in 1962 to bring to a wider public the results of significant new research on modern and contemporary East Asia.

History Department, ed., War history series—Preparation for mainland battle, vol. 1 [Defense of Kanto] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbun Sha, 1971).

WHS-PMB, vol. 2

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WHS-PPW

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WIC

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Introduction

THE WORLD OF JAPAN'S EURASIAN-PACIFIC WAR

This book is about Japanese thinking before, during, and especially at the end of World War II, based on Japanese documents, many of which have not previously been used or explored for that purpose. All history is written backward. Since the US military occupation, Japan's defeat has been told almost entirely from the framework known as the "Pacific War" narrative, as if everyone at the end of the war knew how Japan's military losses to the United States alone would lead to its postwar recovery and reentry into the American-centered world order. This US-fostered public memory elides Japan's war in China and the fall of Japan's colonial empire, and many of the lessons of these events have been neglected in the nation's "regeneration" since August 1945. To restore the comprehensive landscape of Japan's war, which was continental before becoming Pacific, this study returns the Soviet Union to the scene and renames the conflict the Eurasian-Pacific War. It investigates the world the Japanese once possessed, fought for, and relinquished.

In envisioning its empire, prewar Japan had an intense awareness of and focus on Eurasia and reckoned with the formidable presence of Russia and then the Soviet Union as intermediaries of Western culture and communist ideology. Only toward the war's end, in seeking to secure the nation's survival, did Japanese planners begin including the United States as a factor in the changing geopolitics of the Eurasian and Pacific convergence. Under the US military occupation, the Pacific War narrative eclipsed Japan's Eurasian worldview and produced Japan's postwar amnesia about its colonial empire.

In spite of the extensive study of World War II and the Pacific War, our knowledge of the geopolitical thinking and strategy of Japan's leaders, especially in the

last stage of the war, remains murky. Little has been written about how, by the fall of 1944, various members of the Japanese government and the Imperial General Headquarters had concluded that the Soviet Union would eventually enter the war against Japan. Japanese leaders knew that Moscow needed neutrality with Japan in order to devote its resources to the European front; once Germany was defeated, neutrality with Japan would become immaterial. During diplomatic negotiations with Moscow for possible peace mediation with the United States, Japanese leaders closely watched Soviet preparations for launching a war against Japan. Monitoring political factions within China and Korea and their networks with the United States and the Soviet Union, Japanese war planners concluded that the Soviet Union had significant connections with regional nationalists that could help check US hegemonic ambitions in East Asia. They hoped that Soviet presence in the region would achieve a desirable balance of power in the power vacuum created by the fall of Japan's empire.

The timing for such a strategic shift coincides with a fundamental restructuring of the command system within Japan's wartime government that took place when Japan's defeat by the United States in the Pacific seemed unavoidable. In July 1944, following the fall of Saipan, Koiso Kuniaki, then governor-general of Korea, was chosen to serve as prime minister of Japan to replace the Tōjō cabinet, which for most of World War II had governed Japan under Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō. Koiso was not a favorite choice of the Imperial Army. Neither did Emperor Hirohito, nor Kido Kōichi, lord keeper of the privy seal, prefer him due to his connection to the March Incident of 1931, the abortive coup d'état attempt by members of the Sakura-kai (Cherry Society) within the Imperial Army. With no consensus on a more suitable alternative, however, Koiso assumed the position. A token prime minister, Koiso nonetheless succeeded in establishing on August 4, 1944, the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (Saikō Sensō Shidō Kaigi) and in securing a unified command system for facilitating decision making about war operations and strategies, allowing both the prime minister and the foreign minister to participate in deliberations by the supreme command.¹

This was a breakthrough in wartime decision making, since previously the Imperial General Headquarters (Daihon'ei) alone had coordinated wartime efforts between the army and navy. The Imperial General Headquarters' wide scope of command prerogatives excluded the prime minister and his government from

1. In the English literature, the "Supreme Council for the Direction of the War (Saikō Sensō Shidō Kaigi)" has often been abbreviated simply as the "Supreme War Council." This is confusing since the English name "Supreme War Council" also refers to the Liaison Conference and this convention blurs significant changes in decision making. In this book, therefore, the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War appears without abbreviation.

operational and strategic planning. By November 1937, a few months after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Imperial General Headquarters and Government Liaison Conference (Daihon'ei Seifu Renraku Kaigi) had been established within a newly structured Imperial General Headquarters with an aim of bringing the chiefs of army and navy General Staff into closer consultation with the government. Not only did facilitating agreement on strategic planning between army and navy prove difficult, the Liaison Conference also found it hard to affect military autonomy and to coordinate decisions and needs of the army and navy with the resources and policies of other government branches.

Koiso's term in office began on July 22, 1944, and coincided with multiple defeats and predicaments faced by the Japanese on all fronts. With a sense of urgency, the military leaders endorsed Koiso's proposal for the new command system and agreed to share power with representatives from the civilian branches.² The core members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War included the chief of army staff (sanbō sōchō), the chief of naval staff (gunrei-bu sōchō), the prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of war (riku-gun daijin), and the minister of the navy (kai-gun daijin)—Japan's "Big Six," as they were known to the Allied nations. Other high-ranking officers were invited to attend as necessary. Unlike the Liaison Conference, the new council, sitting together with the emperor, would have ultimate power and as such could aim to better orchestrate political and military strategies when it set war policies. Because of this wider involvement of members of the government and the Imperial General Headquarters, Japan's new leaders began to give increasing weight to the Soviet Union as they considered how to dissolve Japan's empire.

After the war, the United States, the sole occupier of Japan, chose to diminish the significance of Eurasia in Japan's world by fostering a US-centric vision of Japan's war among the Japanese people through media and education. This process reduced Japanese war planners and their thinking to traces in the historical record. The complexity of the geopolitical, ideological, racial, and cultural dimensions of Japan's war gave way to a simplistic image of Japan's "irrational and reckless" defiance of the United States in the Pacific. Japan's capitulations to the Allied Forces in China, Manchuria, Korea, and other parts of Asia were funneled into a vision of surrender to the United States alone. The Soviet Union faded from occupied Japan's war memory. Under the US-Japanese security alliance, a myth emerged that the United States since the time of Commodore Perry had inspired and supported the Japanese people; Japan's aggression against the United States was consequently a senseless betrayal. This nurtured another postwar myth

2. Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 178.

that the Japanese were grateful that the United States had protected the nation from the Soviet Union, now understood only as a threat and not as a potential countervailing force to American hegemony.

The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (1946–48) reinforced the perception that Japanese wartime leaders, in chaotic disarray, were incapable of devising and pursuing coherent war goals. The characterization of these leaders as disoriented and powerless has led scholars to read Japanese actions almost exclusively in the non-Japanese context of President Truman's decision to use the atomic bombs. Their premise is that only a form of "shock therapy," either the two atomic bombs, the Soviet entry into the war against Japan, or both, could have compelled the leaders in Tokyo to surrender. In the debates over the orthodox theory (that the United States deployed the atomic bombs to end the war without invading the mainland) and the revisionist theory (that the United States used the atomic bombs to intimidate the Soviet Union and to secure advantage in leadership in postwar world), Japanese strategic thinking has been largely left out of the scholarly purview.³ However much external forces—the shock of the atomic bombs, the Soviet entry into the war—contributed to the end of the war, they alone cannot account for Japan's ability to adapt to, or even to prosper in, the postwar world. In forming exit strategies, Japan's war planners had an eye on reorienting the country after the war.

Japanese wartime leaders erased their deliberations by destroying many wartime records. Shortly after the Japanese government decided to accept the Potsdam Proclamation, cabinet members incinerated large numbers of official documents in expectation of an impending war crimes trial, in which the United States was expected to play a leading role. On August 7, 1945, only one day after Hiroshima and one day before the Soviet entry in the war against Japan, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided on the expeditious destruction of classified documents related to wartime diplomacy. Coming earlier and much more swiftly than the Imperial General Headquarters' similar decision about military documents, this course of action slated for destruction a range of documents more extensive than that of the military. Diplomatic documents concerning China were the first to be destroyed; next, the Soviet papers; and finally, Axis diplomacy papers. The documents—especially diplomatic ones—that survived destruction and became widely known were those wartime leaders deemed safe and appropriate to a presumed yardstick of postwar American justice.⁴ These surviving documents

3. For overviews of the current state of the discussion, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed., *The End of the Pacific War—Reappraisals* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), and Samuel Walker, "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision," *Diplomatic History* 29, no. 2 (April 2005): 311–34.

4. Yoshida Yutaaka, *Genidai rekishigaku to sensō sekinin* (Contemporary history studies and Japan's war responsibilities) (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1997): 127–34; Usui Katsumi, Yoshimura Michio, and

validated "correct" narratives of the war by affirming that Japanese leaders were uninformed, disorganized, and even irrational in their resolve to fight until the last soldier.

While there is no knowing how many wartime documents on strategic planning for postdefeat survival were destroyed, considerable evidence of such planning remains preserved in little-known documents of the government, the military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a number of colonial agents, long excluded from the standard list of official sources on Japan's war. Geopolitical analyses conducted in the effort to chart a survival strategy can be found in archival documents marked "Top secret" or "Confidential." They have also been catalogued under innocuous subjects such as "communism," "intelligence," the "war in Europe," and the "Chōsen Army (Chōsen-gun)" at the archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo. These documents quietly but firmly show that the Japanese government and military harbored no hope that Moscow would remain neutral. Unlike postwar retrospective accounts that vilify the Soviet Union for its "surprise attack" on August 8, 1945, the documents reveal that the Japanese not only anticipated that attack but calculated its probable impact on East Asia.

The records of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War reveal regular discussions about the Soviet entry into the war. The Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, otherwise known as the "inner cabinet," met at the Imperial Palace and played a distinctive role in unifying military strategy and diplomacy. It consistently evaluated the significance of the Soviet factor in Japan's war. Meetings usually involved reviewing drafts of diplomatic and military strategies as well as comprehensive reports evaluating and predicting war conditions.⁵ When discussing crucial issues, the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War requested Emperor Hirohito's attendance and, in his presence, it met as the Imperial Conference (Gozen Kaigi). The council's records indicate that by June 1945 even Emperor Hirohito had learned that the Soviet Union would most likely soon enter the war against Japan, because Japan had no means to prevent it.⁶

The strategic assumption that the Soviets would enter the war permeated the Continental Orders (Tairiku-Mei), a series of highest-level military orders issued in the name of the emperor directly to the Imperial Army, as well as the Continental

Hosoya Chihoro, *Gaikō Shiriyō-kan no nijū-nen to shōrai (zadankai)* (Roundtable) The past and future of the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in *Gaikō Shiriyō Kāmpō* (the Diplomatic Record Office Newsletter), vol. 5 (Tokyo: 1992): 43–45.

5. Robert Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954), 16 and 81–82.

6. "Kongo torubeki sensō shidō no kihon taikō ni kanshi Gozen Kaigi keika gaiyō" (Summary report of the Imperial Conference concerning the basic instruction on the war), in RID, 263 and 272–273.

Instructions (Tairiku-Shi), specific instructions issued by the chief of army staff regarding the execution of Continental Orders.⁷ From 1937 through the war's end in August 1945, the Imperial General Headquarters (and after August 1944 the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, to be specific) issued 1,392 such orders. Top leaders including Umezu Yoshijirō, Itagaki Seishirō, Prince Higashikuni, Doihara Kenji, Yamada Otomi (of the Kwantung Army), Hata Shunroku, and Sugiyama Gen cosigned these imperial orders. Soviet-related orders reveal that military plans covering battlefields from Korea and China to Manchuria anticipated the eventual Soviet entry into the war in Asia.⁸ More significantly these orders instructed the Japanese military not to launch all-out counteroffensives but rather to take up passive defenses against Soviet assaults.

Some of the same strategic principles were also manifest in *Kimitsui sensō nissshi* (Top secret war journal), one of the most comprehensive classified documents produced at the Imperial General Headquarters. The Army War Operations Plans Division of the Imperial General Headquarters recorded its day-to-day activities and planning in a handwritten journal, which had long been hidden by its keepers in obscure locations. This allowed it to escape confiscation by the US occupation government. Today it offers insight into how staff officers viewed the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States in the period between June 1940 and July 1945.⁹ This journal sometimes has been deemed insignificant because its keepers arbitrarily injected their personal opinions and also because the Army War Operations Plans Division allegedly had limited access to critical information on the war's progress.¹⁰ Such criticism needs to be reevaluated since the Army War Operations Plans Division's strategies are congruent with the Continental Orders and the Continental Instructions in establishing the Soviet entry into the war against Japan as a trigger for further action. Evidence of Japan's Soviet strategy lies in these top-level military documents.

7. The original minutes of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War have been available in print in Japanese since 1967 and should be investigated for what they might reveal about Japan's war planning. For this record, see RJD.

8. For this ten-volume compilation of all orders in print, see CCCC.

9. The entire document is now available in published form: TSWJ.

10. TSWJ, vol. 1, vii-xiv. This two-volume record should not be confused with *Daitōri'ei kinisshu nissshi* (The Imperial General Headquarters secret journal), published in 1952 by Colonel Tanemura Sakō, a central member of the Army War Operations Plans Division since December 1939. Based on his own personal diary he kept during the war, Tanemura brought to light daily activities within the Imperial General Headquarters on the eve of a birth of independent Japan, a decision hailed by Shigemitsu Mamoru, wartime foreign minister (1-4). In contrast to Tanemura's book, or memoir, which is imbued with his opinions and also marred by his postwar hindsight, this two-volume record is the official business log of the Army War Operations Plans Division. Tanemura Sakō, *Daitōri'ei kinisshu nissshi* (The Imperial General Headquarters secret journal) (Tokyo: Daiya-mondo Sha, 1952).

Wartime popular journals and newspapers reveal that government censorship did not necessarily quell open discussions of how Japan should best cope with the progress of various aspects of the Eurasian-Pacific War in rapidly changing international conditions. Memoirs published after the war and collections of handpicked documents from Japan's war require careful scrutiny about whether they exclude, re-create, or invent the facts. During the war the Japanese public was better informed of the intricacies of world politics than conventionally believed. They read daily newspaper coverage of China's civil war as well as of discord among the Allies, particularly between Washington and Moscow, and mulled over the manner of Japan's survival in the reconstruction of a postwar world flanked by the United States and the Soviet Union. For the Japanese people, the "conclusion" of Japan's war was never about a resolution as simple as "ichioku gyokusai" (honorary deaths of 100 million imperial subjects)—a fanatic slogan soliciting national suicide in the event of an American invasion of Japanese mainland. Herein lies one of the core arguments of the book: war cannot only be understood exclusively as a phenomenon of elites who are responsible for policymaking. The opinions and experiences of ordinary Japanese people as well as elites during this war demonstrate the exciting of considerations about how the war would be concluded from the orthodox accounts of the Pacific conflict between the United States and Japan.

Japan's war must be placed in the context of the rise and fall of the Japanese colonial empire. Initially, Western powers endorsed and celebrated Japan's rise to imperial power. After entering the Western-centered world order in the late nineteenth century bound by the unequal treaty system, Japan had to prove that it had the aptitude to be an imperialist power, a prerequisite for a modern and industrialized state. The United States and Britain, two leading Western powers with stakes in the Pacific and China respectively, interpreted Japan's victories in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 as proof of Japan's successful modernization, not as the beginning of Japan's overseas aggression. They moved to abolish the unequal treaties with Japan and recognized Japan as the first and only Westernized (modernized) nation in Asia. Japan subsequently acquired Taiwan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the southern half of Sakhalin in the Treaty of Portsmouth, the latter mediated by US president Theodore Roosevelt. Following the tenets of international law, China, Russia, and the United States recognized Japan's acquisition of Korea as its colony. After World War I, the League of Nations awarded Japan the mandate to administer German colonies in the southern Pacific—the Caroline, Mariana, and Marshall islands. Japan's territorial expansion did not bring equal status with the Anglo-American powers. Conflicts with the United States over immigration laws and the failure to incorporate a racial equality clause in the preamble to the Covenant of the League

of Nations led Japan's leaders to realize that because of racism it could not fit into the legal and cultural norms of the Anglo-American-centered world. Japan's unilateralism and military aggression were attempts to defy Anglo-American supremacy. This misguided pride led Japan to force on other Asian peoples Japanese-style modernization and rule. Japan's ostensible goal was cultural and racial: to remove the Anglo-American influence from Asia and to restore Asia for the Asians. Japan, like its Western rivals, had no intention of recognizing the sovereignty and self-rule of other Asians. Japan found itself increasingly isolated from both the West and Asia.

The road to ruin began with the Manchurian Incident in 1931, which alienated Japan from the League of Nations. The state of Manchukuo was meant to secure for Japan "Lebensraum": additional territory to protect and further Japanese interests in China, to buffer against the military and communist threat of the Soviet Union, and to procure sufficient resources for the Japanese military in the event of war against the United States. After a brief cease-fire following the Tangu Truce with Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang (GMD) regime in 1933, full-scale war eventually broke out in July 1937. Japan's attack on the Nationalists expanded into a separate campaign against guerrilla forces led by Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Meanwhile Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations drew the nation into a new alliance with Germany. The Tripartite Pact of September 1940 effectively integrated Japan's efforts to build a Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere with World War II in Europe. When Japan eyed European colonies in Southeast Asia as a source of more natural resources to invest in the war dragging on in China, German aggression in France facilitated Japan's military advance into the French colony of Indochina. Upon Britain's request, the United States demanded that Japan withdraw from French Indochina as well as China, which in turn led Japan to open another front against the United States and Britain.

Once the Pacific War began, the United States and Britain resolved to dismantle the Japanese empire. Although Japan's possession of the colonies (except for Manchukuo) was not illegal under contemporary international law, the Allied Powers now regarded Japan's rise as a colonial power as integral to Japan's war crimes against its neighbors as well as the Western nations. In the Cairo Declaration of November 1943, the United States and Britain, along with China, located the beginning of Japan's imperialist war against China in the Sino-Japanese War, between 1894 and 1895, and accordingly demanded the restoration of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Chiang Kai-shek's China. By the summer of 1944, US forces had taken all the former Japanese territories of the South Sea Mandate. In the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed that the Soviet Union would recover Japan's spoils from the Russo-Japanese

War of 1904–5. The Allies did not necessarily aim to accord independence to those people whom they intended to "liberate" from Japan. After occupying Saipan and Tinian, the jewels of Japan's South Sea Mandate, the United States did not "return" the islands to the native Chamorros and Carolinians but quickly set up a military administration on the islands. Likewise the Allies considered the Koreans too politically immature for self-rule, so they pondered the next "guardian" of Korea.

The Japanese government and the Imperial General Headquarters monitored the plans of the Allies for the disposition of Japan's colonies, began to anticipate insightfully how postcolonial East Asia would emerge, and built exit strategies around them. Japanese observers studied China's civil war and the competing Korean nationalist movements, with particular attention to US and Soviet interference, and Chinese and Korean responses to them. Extensive intelligence activities began with Japan's North China Area Army, which was created after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937 from units of the Kwantung Army and soon became a law unto itself, and after December 1941 controlled Japanese Army units in north China. The North China Area Army predicted that the CCP's greater popular appeal over the GMD would lead it to emerge as the victor in this civil conflict and ultimately to unify China. They also noted Mao's growing resolve to secure China's independence from both Washington and Moscow. Japanese authorities caught early signs of a split between Chinese communists and the Soviet Union and considered their delicate rivalry conducive to creating a desirable postwar balance of power.

The Governor-General's Office in Korea had studied the various Korean nationalist movements and noticed that communists, while dominant, were still weak and manipulated by the Soviets. This assessment was shared by the Chosen Army, a garrison force of the Imperial Japanese Army in Korea whose primary tasks were to guard the peninsula against the Soviet threats and also to suppress anti-Japanese uprisings within Korea itself. Since its commander in chief possessed power equal to that of the governor-general, the army's parallel investigation produced a penetrating analysis of political inclinations among Koreans and their links to foreign powers. In particular, the Japanese authority suspected the Soviet Union's growing ambitions for the peninsula and predicted that the peninsula would become a contested stage for US-Soviet struggle for power even before the war's end.

While they did not necessarily prefer the Soviets to the Americans as Japan's successor as the "leader of Asia," Japanese war planners understood that the Soviet Union could influence the regional settlement. Ideologically and geopolitically Japan's relationship with the Soviet Union was replete with ironies and contradictions. As a communist state, the Soviet Union's open opposition to imperialism

and colonialism appealed to nationalists all over East Asia, especially those engaged in anti-Japanese and anticolonial activities. Less well known is that culturally and racially the Soviet Union was understood to possess "Asian" qualities absent in Anglo-American allies. The Eurasian Soviet Union shared borders with China and Korea and had native Asian populations. Anti-Bolshevik refugees pouring into Japan and Manchukuo brought Russian culture. In Manchukuo the government granted Russian residents the right to coexist with Japanese, Chinese, Manchu, Koreans, and Mongols under the state slogan of racial harmony.

Burdened with ambiguous goals, missions, and self-identities, Japan's war grew to be a loosely interwoven sequence of battles fought with disparate opponents and alliances in diverse geographical, ideological, and cultural landscapes. The various facets of Japanese military action in Asia and the Pacific bear diverse names, each charged with often incommensurable meaning: the "Greater East Asia War," the "Sino-Japanese War," the "Pacific War," the "Fifteen Years War," "World War II," the "US-Japanese War," the "Far Eastern War," the "Anglo-American-Japanese War," the "Soviet-Japanese War," and the latest, the "Asian-Pacific War," invented in the 1990s. The absence of a commonly agreed-on name for the war points to the nation's torn memories and allegiances and to the difficulties of achieving a comprehensive world-historical narrative of Japan's war.

The "Fifteen Years War" focuses on the long-term nature of Japan's aggression in Asia and emphasizes its tragic scale. "World War II" focuses on Japan's relations with the Axis powers and posits Japan's war in a European context. The "Pacific War" zeroes in on Japan's focus on the United States as a foe during the war and as an ally afterward. The "Sino-Japanese War" criticizes the criminality of Japan's militarism against Asian peoples and calls for Japanese reconciliation with Asia and Asianness. "Asian-Pacific War" was coined in the 1990s to reflect the multiplicity of Japan's war.¹¹ Yet this name still omits Japan's European front and, more importantly, fails to include the Soviet Union in such a way as to reflect its wartime diplomatic and military engagements with Japan. A better denomination for Japan's war would be the "Eurasian-Pacific War."

With the exception of the "Soviet-Japanese War" narrative that emerged in Japan only after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Soviet Union is not a key figure in most of these narratives. The elision of the Soviet Union from the memory and narrative of Japan's war conveniently facilitated the simplification of Japan's war into a one-dimensional narrative focused on a single enemy and war goal. Precisely because the Soviet Union had provided a critical nexus to the wars in Asia and the Pacific, its erasure helped sever the comprehensive whole of

Japan's war into two separate pieces, each unrelated to the other. Its erasure thus obscured the geopolitical and ideological factors that sustained Japan's colonial empire.

Under the US military occupation, these dimensions of Japan's war vanished from the official history and the Japanese began living in *seigo*, a state of postwar reflection on the nation's "humbling" defeat by the United States alone. Although the Japanese government announced the end of *sengo* in 1956, the state of reflection continues. Even the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989 did not end *sengo*. Japan's exclusive surrender to the United States never brought closure to the history of Japan's colonial empire. On the contrary, the incompleteness of the history of Japan's war has impeded this closure. The Japanese people still live with the aftermath of their war precisely because contemporary East Asia—the two Chinas and the two Koreas, for example—reflects remnants of their wartime strategic thinking. The constraint of the Pacific War narrative has led Japan to avoid reckoning with its colonial past. To move on, Japan needs first to unearth the legacy of its wartime strategic thinking and planning in the comprehensive landscapes of Eurasia and the Pacific.

11. Kisaoka Jun'ichirō, "Ajia-Taiheiyō Sensō no koshō to seikaku" (The name and the character of the Asian-Pacific War), *Ryūkokū Hōgaku* (Ryūkokū Law Review) 25 (March 1993): 28–76.

Part I

**THE PLACE OF RUSSIA
IN PREWAR JAPAN**

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND ALLIANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The Japanese government claims today that in "the history of the world it would be difficult to find two other nations who once engaged in war and have so rapidly established such a strong partnership as Japan and the United States."¹ The US government agrees, saying that after World War II Japan became an anchor of US security in East Asia and also one of its most important economic partners.² So strong and self-evident do these bonds appear that other strategic configurations for postwar Japan seem implausible. This chapter recovers the plausibility, among Japanese government planners and the educated public alike during the Eurasian-Pacific War, of a postwar Japan oriented toward, even allied with, its closest geographic neighbor, the Soviet Union, America's cold-war nemesis.

A handful of observers late in World War II insisted that a defeated Japan would decisively turn away from Asia and the Soviet Union toward the United States. John Emmerson, a member of the Dixie Mission (the US Army Observer Group) that met with Mao Zedong at Yan'an in 1944, asserted with no elaboration, "The Japanese fundamentally like us [Americans] more than they do the Russians."³ With years of experience as a political attaché at the Tokyo Embassy,

1. See "Overview of Japan-U.S. Relationship (February 2009)" on the Embassy of Japan in the United States of America's homepage, available online at <http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/japanus/japanusoverview2009.htm>, accessed June 2012.

2. "Summary" in Congressional Research Service's "Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress" (September 23, 2011), RL33436, available online at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf>.

3. "Secret: the Japanese Communist Party, a Memorandum from John K. Emmerson, Chungking, China, January 5, 1945," RG 226, M1642, Roll 62, Frames 46-54 [Microfilm Collection], NARA.

he was confident that Japan, once defeated, would never side with Russia again. If by "the Japanese" Emmerson meant a small exclusive group of Japanese businessmen, bankers, financiers, and traders who had had high stakes in the American market, he might have been right. In his famous memorandum of February 14, 1945, Prince Konoe Fumimaro signaled the danger of Japan's reliance on the Soviet Union to Emperor Hirohito: Moscow's ultimate interest was to turn Japan communist. The prospect of communist revolution, Konoe claimed, was ubiquitous across East Asia, from Yan'an, Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan to Japan, and even within the Japanese Army. Emperor Hirohito should make peace with the United States before the Soviet Union joined the war against Japan in order to preclude a communist takeover of East Asia.

Emmerson and Konoe were no clairvoyants. During the war, their contentious observations represented two of many possible envisioned strategic organizations for postwar Japan. After the war, their observations became self-evident truths within the historical narrative fostered during the US occupation of Japan. The manufactured historical memory of the postwar period radically simplifies wartime Japan's complex, diverse, and nuanced relations with, and visions of, the wider world. Through the war, Japanese leadership and the broader population alike viewed Russian and the Soviet Union with respect, and even though the relationship between the two countries was well known for competition and animosity, many Japanese also hoped to cultivate cooperation with the Soviets. Failing to recognize this complexity precludes understanding the nature of Japan's Eurasian-Pacific War.

Japan and Russia first clashed over Korea and Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. In 1907 the Kwantung Army, a one-division force, was assigned to guard the South Manchuria Railway and the Liaotung Peninsula. After receiving independent status in 1920, the Kwantung Army increasingly assumed a politicized role in determining policy in Manchuria. From that point on the Kwantung Army monitored Russian and then Soviet forces across the Manchurian border.

When the Bolshevik Revolution challenged the ideological legitimacy of Japan's capitalist and colonial pursuits within the imperial system, the Japanese government joined the anti-Bolshevik war at the invitation of President Woodrow Wilson and fought in Siberia from 1918 to 1920. By the early 1930s, the Japanese government had extirpated the Japanese Communist Party and battled communists across the colonial empire while denouncing the Moscow-based Comintern for aiding and instructing them.

In realpolitik terms the Soviet Union posed a double menace of military force and ideology to the Japanese empire. Despite all this, the two neighboring countries shared a pragmatism that facilitated coexistence. In establishing diplomatic

relations with the Soviet Union in 1925, Japan declared that its domestic crack-down on communism and its friendship with the Soviet Union were two separate matters. The Soviet government concurred that its amity with Japan rested on mutual respect for their respective sociopolitical systems and the principle of nonintervention in each other's domestic politics. In this spirit the Soviet embassy in Tokyo expressed uneasiness about Japanese media coverage of alleged financial ties between the Japanese Communist Party and the Soviet government, which the Japanese government identified closely with the Comintern, or the Third International.⁴

The establishment in 1932 of Manchukuo, whose northern border was set directly against Soviet territory, forced further compromises in Japan's strategy concerning the Soviet Union. After two large-scale military confrontations at Changkufeng (at the convergence of the Soviet, Korean, and Manchukuo borders) in July 1938 and Nomonhan (on the Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian border) in May 1939, in both of which the Kwantung Army suffered devastating losses, the Japanese government chose not to provoke the Soviets any further and adopted a policy of "keeping peace and status quo" (*seihitsu hoji*). Backed up by the neutrality pact, this policy remained Japan's strategic stance with the Soviet Union until the last stage of World War II.⁵

Eliminating communist influence in East Asia was Japan's self-imposed task, as manifest in the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany that Japan concluded in November 1936. The Japanese government situated itself as a third political force that was both anticommunist and anticapitalist. It aimed to create a self-sufficient colonial empire independent of both Soviet and Anglo-American influences. Japan's parallel battles in China against both Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist regime and Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) testified to its dual push against communism and capitalism. Strategically Japan could not wage a two-front war against the United States and the Soviet Union and, therefore, concluded in April 1941 the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, which became a critical precondition for the war against the United States. Amid the quagmire of war in

4. "Gokuhi: Zai-Ro Tanaka Tokichi Taishi hatsu Shidehara Gaimu Daijin ate" (Top secret: a telegram from Tanaka Tokichi, Ambassador to Russia, to Foreign Minister Shidehara) (February 1, 1930); "Nihon Kyōsan-tō jiken happyō ni taisuru Sobieto gawa no taido ni kansuru ken" (Soviet reaction to the revelation of the Japanese Communist Party incident) (November 9, 1929); all in "Nihon Kyōsan-tō kankei zakken: Kyōsan-tō to Sorēpō to no kankei" (Miscellaneous data on the Japanese Communist Party: relationship between the JCP and the Soviet Union) [1-4-5-2-3-3], DRG.

5. "Tai-Bei-Ei-Ran-Shou sensō shūmatsu sokushin ni kansuru fuku-an" (A draft proposal for expediting the end of the war against the United States, Britain, Netherlands, and Chiang's China) (November 15, 1941), in Sanbō Honbu (The Imperial General Headquarters), ed., *Sugiyama memo* (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1967), vol. 1, 523–24, quoted in Nakayama Takashi, "Nihon no sensō sakusen shidō ni okeru Soren yōin, 1941–45" (The Soviet factor on Japan's conduct of war and military operations in 1941–45), *Seiji Keizai Shugaku* (Journal of historical studies), no. 333 (March 1994), 43.

China, Japan allied itself with the Soviet Union. While maintaining peace and the status quo, Japanese leaders constantly evaluated probable Soviet influence on the revolutionary future of East Asia.

Within the Japanese government, differences about the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact existed. Not merely an exclusive product of military and geopolitical calculations, the neutrality pact also reflected Japan's strategic goal of creating a revolutionary East Asian bloc. This inclination had its roots in wide-ranging discussions that occurred before the 1930s about Japan and communist ideas. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, a number of political and intellectual leaders sought a link between communist ideology and Japan's revolution under its East Asian new order. The Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Shōwa Research Association), an informal organization of intellectuals engaged in discussing reforms of political and economic structures in the 1930s, envisioned a new world order that included the Soviet Union as a challenge to the Anglo-American political and economic systems. Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke shared this view when he signed the neutrality pact. By tracing the historical process of how the Japanese turned to the Soviet Union as a model and ally, this chapter demonstrates how the years 1938–40 became a watershed in Japan's relations with the Soviet Union that led to the 1941 Neutrality Pact.

Allures of Utopia

Like their leaders, everyday Japanese had a spectrum of nuanced views about the Soviet Union and the Russians. Many people, especially those in radical anti-government, anti-imperialistic movements, long had been inspired by their Eurasian neighbor. Some even engaged directly with Moscow. Their activities made Japan's relationship with the Soviet Union all the more multifaceted and protean.

The Japanese people's modern search for a utopian society began when the Meiji government launched an oppressive national project of industrialization and imperialism in the late nineteenth century. Members of anti-government movements looked to model societies outside Japan. The Japanese looked to the revolutionary experiences of both America and Russia (and later the Soviet Union). To ask whether Japanese people had historically preferred the United States over Russia (or the Soviet Union) or vice versa is misleading. In envisioning changes suited to Japanese society, Japanese freely synthesized the two nations' traditions as they saw fit. In this process, Japan became the junction of trans-Siberian and trans-Pacific routes on a global circuit of radical thoughts and movements.

The "opening" of Japan has been celebrated as the achievement of American Commodore Matthew Perry.⁶ As George Samson argues, however, "American and English historians sometime overlook the important part played by Russia in bringing about the opening of Japan."⁷ Japan and Russia's history of interactions dates back to the seventeenth century.⁸ The Eurasian empire situated across the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, Russia was long the closest geographic and cultural Western nation to Japan. After the Russian empire reached the Pacific Ocean in 1638, Russian explorers and maritime hunters in the Sea of Okhotsk crossed paths with Japanese castaways, shipwrecked merchants, fishermen, and tourists. They were rescued and taken to St. Petersburg because the Russian tsarist government, interested in opening trade with Japan, wanted to learn about their country, customs, and practices, and language. The first written record of such a case documents a Japanese trader from Osaka named Denbei, who was shipwrecked in 1695, rescued in 1697 in Kamchatka by a troop of Cosacks, and taken to meet with Peter I in 1702. Denbei spent the rest of his life in St. Petersburg as an expert on Japan. The first Japanese language school opened in 1735 as part of the Academy of Sciences and another opened in 1786 in Irkutsk, both with Japanese castaways as language instructors. The most celebrated Japanese castaway, Daikokuya Kōdayū, returned to Japan in 1793 ten years after his shipwreck and provided the Edo Bakufu, Japan's samurai regime, with comprehensive knowledge about Russia.

Tsarist Russia continued to expand its sphere of influence beyond central Asia. In 1689 it established diplomatic contact with Qing China through the Treaty of Nerchinsk, which established a border between the two nations. Some limited trade, primarily by caravan followed. By the early nineteenth century, Russia, with growing ambitions for the Pacific Ocean, was competing against the

6. The Bakufu leaders knew the schedule of Perry's squadron. Shortly after the Perry's squadron left Norfolk, Virginia, the friendly Dutch king had advised the Bakufu not to resist but to comply with American demands so as to avoid repeating the recent tragedy of China in the Opium War of 1840–42. The Japanese leaders got the message.

7. George Sansom, *The Western World and Japan: A Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures* (1949; reprinted Tokyo: Charles Tuttle, 1950), 245.

8. Japan's relations with the West began before the Edo period. In 1543 shipwrecked Portuguese en route to Canton accidentally reached a small island off the southern tip of Kyūshū and subsequently opened trade relations with the islanders. Spanish, Italian, British, and Dutch traders and missionaries followed. On two separate occasions, in 1585 and 1615, Japanese Catholic converts traveled to Rome and had papal audiences. A group of Japanese merchants crossed the Pacific Ocean to reach Mexico for trade negotiations in 1610. Even after the Tokugawa Shogunate prohibited in 1641 any contact with the Christian West, the Dutch were given special dispensation and continued to trade with Japan for almost two centuries; they thus provided considerable influence on Japan's scientific and technological developments.

United States and Britain to be the first nation to use Japanese ports for trade. The Russian mission occurred almost simultaneously with Perry's expedition, but with fewer weapons. Merely a month after Commodore Perry arrived at Uraga with his gunboat tactics, Admiral Efmii Putiatin entered the port of Nagasaki in August 1853 for diplomatic negotiations. Refusing to negotiate with the Bakufu, Perry issued an ultimatum that Japan sign an agreement to open several Japanese ports for American use one year later. In contrast, Putiatin's mission anchored at the port of Nagasaki, the only port formally open for limited foreign trade, and began full diplomatic negotiations with the Bakufu in December 1853. After the negotiation deadlocked over a territorial dispute over the Sakhalin and Kurile islands, Putiatin temporarily left Nagasaki in early January 1854 on the condition that Russia would be given the same rights should Japan conclude a commercial treaty with another nation in Russia's absence. In February Perry returned to Kanagawa with a more threatening force of nine ships and pressed the Bakufu to sign a treaty on March 31, 1854. In December 1854 Putiatin secured a treaty of friendship similar to the one Perry had concluded.

Russia and the United States thus provided Japanese intellectuals with two portals through which they could study the outside world and think about Japan's future. Yoshida Shōin (1830–59), a samurai revolutionary who attempted to stow away in a ship of Perry's squadron, embodied an early Japanese desire to learn about America. Robert Louis Stevenson commemorated his heroic action in an essay about Yoshida under his popular name, Torajiro.⁹ His apparent preference for America over Russia was, however, in part an accident. Yoshida had originally planned to go to Russia by similar means. Only after he missed the Russian squadron at Nagasaki did Yoshida seek to capitalize on Perry's return to the Bay of Edo in 1854.

Given Yoshida's familiarity with both the United States and Russia, he may well have known Mitsukuri Shōgo's 1845 work, *Kon'yo zushiki* (Annotated maps of the world), which depicted George Washington as the hero who expelled the British and led the American colonies to independence.¹⁰ Meanwhile his samurai mentor Sakuma Shōzan was impressed by how Russia's Peter I had turned an "obstinately backward country" into an honorable nation in a short period of time by importing technology from Europe.¹¹ Even though Yoshida saw the United

9. Robert Louis Stevenson, *Familiar Studies of Men and Books* (New York: Scribner, 1896).

10. The first Japanese reports about America were provided by Mitsukuri Shōgo, geographer in the school of Dutch Studies, in his 18475 *Kon'yo zushiki* (Annotated maps of the world) in three volumes. For the English text, see Peter Duus, *Japanese Discovery of America: A Brief Biography with Documents* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin, 1997).

11. Shinobu Seizaburō, *Shōzan to Shōin: kaikoku to jōi no ronri* (Shōzan and Shoin: arguments concerning ending the seclusion and expelling foreigners) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1975), 101–2.

States and Russia as imperialist threats to Japan, he and Sakuma agreed that Russia's rapid growth into a modern and powerful nation provided the better model for Japan. This judgment had led Yoshida to his initial attempt to gain passage on the Russian ship.¹²

Japan carried out the Meiji Restoration of 1868—an abolition of the samurai regime—and began rapidly building a modern (Westernized and industrialized) nation-state with the immediate purpose of revising the unequal treaty system with the West and defending itself from further encroachments of Western imperialism. By then the United States was preoccupied with the Civil War and Britain was Japan's most dominant trading partner. As the new Japanese government and people learned of the desolate poverty in Russia under tsarist corruption, largely from the British accounts, the reputation of tsarist Russia declined quickly. When the Japanese government dispatched students and officials to study abroad in the various Western nations, only 9 students headed for Russia while 149 students went to the United States, 126 to Britain, 66 to Germany, and 42 to France.¹³ The United States assisted Japan's modernization in the fields of primary education, agricultural science, and even colonial enterprise. American general Charles LeGendre served as an adviser to the Japanese government and instructed military operations against Taiwan in the early 1870s. From Russia the Japanese government anticipated learning the Russian language, for diplomatic and-commercial negotiations, but little else.¹⁴

Some renowned Japanese intellectuals preferred the American system to the Russian system. Fukuzawa Yukichi, an intellectual, educator, and a champion of the popular rights movement in the 1880s, admired Anglo-American republicanism and disdained Imperial Russia's constitutional absolutism (*rikken dokusai*). Fukuzawa viewed poverty in Russia as a seed for antiauthoritarian insurrections that would in turn invite more repression.¹⁵ In contrast Fukuzawa highly regarded Americans for the "advanced" standard of living he observed during inspection tours in the 1860s. He admired well-to-do American families on the East Coast for their independent spirit and he even claimed that these "enlightened" citizens kept the nation moving forward in accordance with its founding

12. Terao Gorō, *Kakumeika Yoshida Shōin* (Yoshida Shoin: a revolutionary life) (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1973), 213–20; Shinobu Seizaburō, *Shōzan to Shōin*, 9–10, 98–101, 150–53.

13. Togawa Tsuguo, "Meiji ishin zengo no Nihonjin no Roshia-kan" (Japanese views of Russia around the time of the Meiji Restoration), in Nakamura Yoshikazu and Thomas Rimer, eds., *Roshia bunka to Nihon* (Russian culture and Japan) (Tokyo: Sairyū Sha, 1995), 44.

14. Miyanaga Takashi, *Bakumatsu Oroshiyu ryōgakusei* (Japanese students in Russia in the last phase of the Edo period) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1991), 6–10, 223–31.

15. Togawa Tsuguo, "Meiji ishin zengo no Nihonjin no Roshia-kan," in Nakamura and Rimer, eds., *Roshia bunka to Nihon*, 48–50.

unfolding before the eyes of Japanese activists. In 1861, merely eight years after Perry and Putiatin first reached Japan, Russian anarchist leader Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bakunin, an opponent of Marx's theory of centralization, showed up in Yokohama after escaping from a Siberian prison. From there Bakunin set sail to the United States, crossed the Atlantic Ocean, and eventually met with Karl Marx in London.

Japanese dissidents in the Popular Rights Movement of the 1880s did not share Fukuzawa's assessment of Russian unrest. They learned of revolutionary concepts through people like Russian anarchist and journalist Lev Mechnikov, who began teaching Russian at the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages (Tokyo Gaikokugo Gakkō) in its founding year 1873. To them Russia's *Narōdnik* movement embodied the voice of an oppressed people yearning for freedom.²⁰ These Japanese learned of the latest political developments in Russia often through English language newspapers published in Japan.²¹ They read Sergei Stepniak's *Underground Russia* and other accounts of terrorist activities, political assassinations, and treason trials.²² Their fascination with Russia's revolutionary movement found expression in the political novella *Kyōmu-tō jitsuden-ki kishūshū* (A true story of the Nihilist Party, 1885), which tells the story of Sophia Perovskaya and her struggles against the tsarist government officials.²³ Uchida Ryōhei, a "patriotic" politician with imperialistic ambitions, published *Roshia bōkoku-ron* (Doomed Russia) in 1901 and predicted, based on his observations during his trip to Russia in 1898, that a revolution to abolish the tsarist system and remedy social injustices was inevitable.

During the Russo-Japanese War, Russian political exiles tried to mobilize Russian prisoners of war in Japan through antisarist propaganda. George Kennan, an American war correspondent stationed in Japan, believed in the antisarist revolution and attempted to aid the exiles. Kennan arranged to invite Nikolai Sudzilovsky (alias Nicholas Russel), a Russian exile who had become a politician in Hawaii, to Japan. With approval from the Japanese Army general Terauchi Masatake, Sudzilovsky visited camps for Russian prisoners of war and disseminated

20. For the latest English language study of Mechnikov and his contribution to the contemporary Japanese intellectual and cultural life, see Sho Konishi, "Reopening the 'Opening of Japan': A Russian-Japanese Revolutionary Encounter and the Vision of Anarchist Progress," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 1 (February 2007): 101–30.

21. Wada Haruki, "Nichi-Ro kankai to Amerika" (Japanese-Russian relations and America), in Nakamura and Rimer, eds., *Roshia bunka to Nihon*, 20–21.

22. George Sansom, *The Western World and Japan: A Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures* (New York: Vintage, 1973), 401.

23. Wada Haruki, "Nichi-Ro Kankai to America," 21–22. The Russian struggle for freedom and liberty was often symbolized by an attractive female for romantic effect, just as the American struggle was in *Kajiri no kigū*.

principles. Fukuzawa respected the stabilizing effect of America's abundant wealth on the nation's democracy.¹⁶

Antiestablishment intellectuals also found inspiration in American democracy. By the 1880s the new Westernized government in Tokyo had already prioritized building infrastructure and military strength over improving people's welfare. Japanese dissidents began the "liberty and popular rights" movement and called for popular sovereignty and freedom of speech. The introduction of Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (in two different translations published in 1873 and 1881–82), as well as Francis Lieber's *On Civil Liberty and Self-Government* (in two different translations published in 1876 and 1880), energized Japanese dissidents in their fight against the oppressive Japanese government. They also regarded the United States as an ideal place for political exile. A student of Fukuzawa's, Baba Tatsui (1850–88) founded the Liberal Party (Jiyū-tō) in 1881, went to the United States in 1886, and eventually died in Philadelphia. On January 7, 1888, about thirty Japanese political exiles, mostly student-laborers, established the Patriotic League in San Francisco to promote their antigovernment movement abroad.¹⁷ Ueki Emori (1857–92), cofounder of the Liberal Party, praised the United States and France as places where the people had heroically fought for and won rights. He wrote a version of the Bill of Rights in 1881 with an emphasis on the right to bear arms and to rebel.¹⁸

Komuro Shigehiro, a journalist and classical poet, thematized the American political struggle for freedom in a poem of 1882. The poem celebrated those who left Europe for the unknown land of America in the quest to be free, who fought for seven years against British oppression for independence, and who ultimately built a prosperous nation.¹⁹ Similar romantic notions appeared in a vernacular political novella, *Kajiri no kigū* (Chance encounters with Western belles), published in 1885. In Philadelphia, the Japanese protagonist learns from two Western belles about the American War of Independence. As he learns of other recent revolutionary movements around the world, the protagonist becomes deeply sympathetic to the universal fight for justice.

Meanwhile the intensifying radical intellectual discourse against the tsarist government attracted Japanese interest. Unlike the American War of Independence of a century earlier, the Russian movement was a contemporary process,

16. For the English translation of Fukuzawa's views of America, see Peter Duus, *Japanese Discovery of America: A Brief Biography with Documents*, 145–50 and 185–90.

17. Yuji Ichioka, *The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–1924* (New York: Free Press, 1988), 14–16.

18. Matsunaga Shōzō, *Jiyū byōdō o mezashite—Nakae Chōmin to Ueki Emori* (Toward freedom and equality: Nakae Chōmin and Ueki Emori) (Tokyo: Shimizu Shoin, 1984), 92–95.

19. Komuro Shigehiro, "Jiyū no uta" (Song of liberty), in Sangū Makoto, ed., *Nihon gendai-shi taikō* (Anthology of modern Japanese poems) (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1974), vol. 1, 60–61.

revolutionary ideas. The first Red Flag came to fly on Japanese soil thanks to this peculiar Russo-American collaboration. Toward the end of the war, the tsarist government suspected that some forty-six thousand Russian prisoners of war held by Japanese authorities had become a formidable revolutionary force, and it requested that the Japanese government not send them back en masse to Vladivostok.²⁴

A confluence of global intellectual currents led Japanese socialists, communists, and anarchists to develop under American influence. Dwight Whitney Learned, an American economist, was the first university professor to lecture on communism and socialism in Japan. A protégé of Theodore Woolsey—president of Yale University from 1846 to 1871 and author of *Communism and Socialism in Their History and Theory*—Learned came to Kyoto in 1878 by arrangement with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. He encouraged his Japanese students at Doshisha University, the elite Protestant institution, to translate his mentor's work. Although the work was poorly translated, the Japanese preface praised Learned's ambition, hoping that these new ideas on communism and socialism, which were spreading rapidly across Western Europe though not in America, had a better chance at taking root in Japan.²⁵

Japan's early labor movement, which progressed into socialist and communist movements, developed with an American flair. In 1886 Takano Fusatarō (1869–1904), a young Japanese entrepreneur, arrived in San Francisco determined to create a successful business career. His encounter with George McNeill's works awoke him to the issue of the welfare of laborers. In 1891 along with several other Japanese immigrants, Takano organized Shokko Giyū-kai (The Fraternal Society of Laborers and Artisans), primarily in order to conduct research on American labor unions for possible adoption in Japanese society. He returned to Japan in 1896 and the following year, along with Katayama Sen, started organizing iron workers and railway employees in much the same spirit as the American Federation of Labor (AFL).²⁶ Kōtoku Shūsui (1871–1911) participated in Japan's early socialist movement and, in search of the shortest path toward socialism, became increasingly attracted to Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin as well as American syndicalism. Kōtoku corresponded with Albert Johnson, a veteran anarchist in

24. Kimura Takeshi, "Nichi-Bei shakai undō kōryū-shi" (History of interactions of Japanese and American social movements), in Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jigyō-kai, ed., *Nichi-Bei bunka kōshō shi* (History of US-Japanese cultural relations) (Tokyo: Yōyō Sha, 1955), vol. 4, 551–60. Also see Wada Haruki, "Nichi-Ro kankei to America," 22–23.

25. Kimura Takeshi, "Nichi-Bei shakai undō kōryū-shi," 487–92.

26. Takano Fusatarō, *Meiji Nihon Rōdō Tsūshin* (Reports of Meiji Japanese laborers), reprint, with introduction by Ōshima Kiyoshi and Nimura Kazuo (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 1997). Also see Kimura, "Nichi-Bei shakai undō kōryū-shi," 501.

California, to whom he confided his desire to attack the Japanese government from overseas. In June 1906 Kōtoku established the Social Revolutionary Party, which attracted some forty Japanese members from the Berkeley area. The party also called for international brotherhood with Chinese immigrant workers through the elimination of national and racial prejudices. He made San Francisco a logistical base for Japanese socialism, much as the Russian revolutionaries did with Switzerland.²⁷

Katayama Sen (1860–1933) exemplifies some of the linkages Japanese communists developed with both Russia and America. Born to a farming family in Japan, Katayama from 1884 to 1896 studied at Grinnell College, Andover Theological Seminary, and Yale Divinity School. Upon his return to Japan he became a leader of the labor union movement as a Christian socialist. In 1901 Katayama—along with Kōtoku, Abe Isoo, and Kawakami Kiyoshi, and two others—founded the Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshu-tō). The party's eight fundamental principles were the abolition of racial discrimination, demilitarization for world peace, abolition of the class system, public ownership of land and capital, public ownership of the transportation system, equal distribution of wealth, equal participation in politics, and full state subsidies for education.²⁸ In 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War, Katayama attended the Sixth Congress of the Second International held in Amsterdam as the Japanese representative. He shook hands with the Russian delegate, and they affirmed a mutual antiwar standpoint. In 1906 he cofounded the short-lived Japan Socialist Party (Nippon Shakai-tō).

After a series of imprisonments by the Japanese government, he returned to San Francisco in 1914. In the fall of 1916, S. J. Rutgers, one of the earliest American Marxist-Leninists, offered to finance his relocation to New York City and Katayama subsequently moved to the East Coast. Making the acquaintance of Trotsky, Bukharin, Madame Kollontai, and exiled Russian revolutionaries, he became a Marxist-Leninist. His small apartment on West 56th Street became a salon for young Japanese radicals. In July 1919 Katayama published a small English book, *The Labor Movement in Japan*, and the following year he joined the newly formed independent Communist Party of America and established the Association of Japanese Socialists in America, a forerunner of Japan's Communist Party. Until 1921 when he departed for Moscow to serve as chairman of the Far Eastern People's Congress, Katayama helped unify the American Communist Party and even went to Mexico to help organize communist activities. In

27. Yuji Ichioka, *The Issei*, 105; Germaine A. Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 22.

28. Sumiya Mikio, *Nihon no rekishi: Dai Nihon Teikoku no shiren* (A history of Japan: challenges of Imperial Japan) (Tokyo: Chūko Bunko, 1974).

1922 the Japanese Communist Party (Nihon Kyōsan-tō) was founded by Comintern directive, on which Katayama had worked considerably. Katayama was the only Asian in his lifetime to be appointed to the presidium of the Third International.²⁹

With the birth of the Soviet Union, the Japanese and US governments both affirmed their official anticommunist position. In August 1918 at Washington's invitation, the Japanese government sent troops to Siberia in a joint military action with the United States, Britain, France, and Canada to foil the revolution. The Japanese government endorsed aspects of Wilsonianism as a desirable approach to world order, specifically its emphasis on a world market and capitalist-industrialist activities.

As Japan's economic and financial systems became more integrated into the global market, Japanese business leaders praised the American (Puritan) emphasis on hard work, frugality, competition, and meritocracy. They took an interest in the generation of harmony between capitalists and society through charitable works, and an interest in scientific management, and they attempted to introduce these concepts to Japan. Like Fukuzawa Yukichi, Japanese with experience studying business and management at elite American institutions celebrated American wealth because it allowed for an upward social mobility that made American society classless.³⁰ Yet proponents of the American economic system did not necessarily endorse the American political system. Yoshino Sakuzō, a champion of Japan's liberalism in the 1920s, denounced democracy as mobocracy: democracy was synonymous with anarchism and socialism, preludes to chaos and the collapse of the Japanese empire.

Having already experienced an early split in the Japan Socialist Party between "moderates," who supported parliamentarianism, and "radicals," who demanded direct action, some Japanese socialists continued to value ties with the United States. After the massive arrest of socialists and subsequent execution of twelve anarchists in January 1911, Japan's Yūai-kai (Friendly Society), a Christian-based social reform organization, adopted a moderate-conservative tactic of compromising with businesses and grew rapidly under the slogan of harmony between business owners and labor. The organization also helped female workers to unionize. In 1915 two representatives of the Japan Friendly Society headed for

the United States to meet with representatives of the AFL and the California State Federation of Labor, including Samuel Gompers. The AFL's policy of Asian racial exclusion did not discourage them from learning from American labor unions.³¹

Around World War I, Japanese in search of an ideal society looked worldwide—not just to the American or Russian context—for leaders who were attempting to put the concepts of emancipation, liberty, and equality into practice. In 1918 students at Tokyo Imperial University organized Shinjin-Kai (New Men's Association) to promote a democracy of cultural and civilized people. They also sought pragmatic reform for Japan. Their journal *Demokurashī* (Democracy) discussed thinkers from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emma Goldman, Karl Liebknecht, Leo Tolstoy (commonly known as "the father of emancipation"), Peter Kropotkin, Karl Marx, Abraham Lincoln, and Vladimir Lenin. Japanese feminists also looked all over the world for inspiration. From the 1880s on, upper- and working-class women explored the ideas of Swede Ellen Key, Brits Olive Schreiner and M. G. Fawcett, and American Charlotte Perkins Gilman, among others. Although some sympathized with the Western feminist movement in the Christian context, others identified with proletarian, socialist, and communist goals and claimed liberation from capitalist oppression. Japanese liberals and radicals freely synthesized American and Russian political ideas.

A proletarian cultural movement was in full bloom in the late 1920s. In the academic and literary realm, Soviet and Russian studies enjoyed a rich and vibrant following of Japanese students. Historians, economists, and other social scientists engaged with the Japanese Communist Party and its Trotskyist opponents in a historic controversy over the nature of Japanese society, modernization, capitalism, and the mechanism of a projected revolution. Out of this debate emerged *Tanemaku Hito* (The sowers of seeds), a journal founded in 1921 dedicated to proletarian literature, which shared thematic overlaps with the earlier naturalist movement.

Some Japanese Marxists and leftists believed that American society, in its fight for liberty and equality, was primed for a proletarian revolution. A number of Japanese Marxists also imagined and defined an alliance with black Americans in their anti-imperialist and anticolonialist fight. Like some American socialists and communists, they saw oppressed black people as the vanguard of the world's proletarian movement. In 1923 critic Akamatsu Katsumaro predicted in *Kaizō* (Reconstruction)—a highly regarded monthly journal founded in 1919 that became a forum on all aspects of national and world affairs—that black Americans would eventually help overthrow Japan's imperialism as part of their

29. Robert Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 6–7.

30. Kimura Masato, "Senzen no jitsugyō-kai" (Prewar business community in Japan), in National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), ed., *Amerika kenkōku no rittien to Nichi-Bei kankei* (The founding of the United States and US-Japan relations) NIRA Report no. 940051 (Tokyo: NIRA, 1995), 103–8.

31. Yuji Ichioka, *The Issei*, 128–45.

in 1905, joined his father on the West Coast in 1919 to pursue a career in painting. The racism Miyagi encountered led him to turn to Marxist studies and to become a member of the Japanese branch of the American Communist Party. In 1933 on a Comintern directive, he departed for Japan to play a role in the Sorge spy ring.³⁶

This particular political movement of Japanese émigrés was not unchallenged by the American and Japanese governments. Between 1931 and 1934 seventeen Japanese communists were expelled from America under the Criminal Syndicalism Act. In January 1932 the so-called Long Beach Incident led to the mass arrest by the Los Angeles Police Red Squad of more than a hundred communists, nine of whom were Japanese.³⁷ Facing deportation, which would result in their arrest by the Japanese authorities, they opted to go to Moscow with the help of the American Communist Party. The Japanese government by then had discovered that trans-Pacific communist networks, with a wide range of bases across the United States, were smuggling antigovernment, antiwar pamphlets and publications into Japan. By the summer of 1938, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs agents in the United States had identified at least four hundred suspected Japanese (and a few Chinese and Korean) communists.³⁸ In southern California alone, there were approximately two hundred Japanese communists.

Many Japanese émigrés on the East Coast developed an idiosyncratic love for both communism and America. After the passage of the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924, some two thousand Japanese remained in America, most without US citizenship. Half were diplomats, military attachés, bankers, businessmen, and journalists; the rest were students, artists, restaurant cooks, waiters, servants, and other menial workers. In 1929 members of the latter group organized the Japanese Workers Club and joined the Japanese section of the American Communist Party. Encouraged by the New Deal culture of the 1930s, they developed distinct views of peace, democracy, and freedom by blending American and Soviet ideals. Most of them cultivated close ties with the John Reed Club of New York City and were dubbed by other Japanese as “daun taun aka” (down-town reds).

36. Chalmers Johnson, *An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring*, expanded ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 92–94.

37. Yuji Ichioka, “Beyond National Boundaries: The Complexity of Japanese-American History,” *Amerasia Journal* 23, no. 3 (winter 1997–98): vii. Instead of being deported back to Japan, they chose to be sent to the Soviet Union. They were all executed during Stalin’s Purification Campaign. The number of Japanese arrests is from Katō Tetsurō, “Rongu Bichi jiken (the Long Beach incident),” May 2000, <http://homepage3.nifty.com/katote/longbeech.html>.

38. Swearingen and Langer, *Red Flag in Japan*, 61–65.

racial-proletarian movement.³² When *Amerika Sentan Bungaku Sōsho* (Collection of avant-garde American literature) was published in 1930, its editors imbued the work with a Marxist mission by including several selections by black American writers, introducing them as a beacon of the American struggle for the liberation of the oppressed.³³

The political activities of a subset of Japanese émigrés in America underlined the global fight against Japanese imperialism on American turf. Katayama Sen helped the American Communist Party recruit and organize a network of Japanese laborers in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle. One of their early anti-imperialist, antifascist, and antiwar campaigns targeted elite cadets of the Japanese Naval Academy who were annually dispatched by the Japanese Navy on goodwill squadrons to the United States, Europe, and Australia. Japanese communists in America distributed leaflets to the young Japanese cadets, reminding them of the Battleship Potemkin uprising, the 1905 mutiny of Russian crew members recognized as the beginning of the Russian Revolution of 1917.³⁴ They also shipped periodicals, news sheets, and pamphlets to Japan and obtained crucial collaboration from sailors and other people engaged in trans-Pacific traffic. Up until the outbreak of the Pacific War, more than a hundred different communist periodicals, newsletters, and pamphlets disguised as mundane publications were smuggled into Japan from the United States and circulated in Japanese towns. These publications called on Japanese workers to collaborate with American workers on strikes and other actions in an effort to improve their working and living conditions. Sometimes Japanese readers would write letters to the editor that would appear in American communist publications.³⁵

The Japanese émigré community on the West Coast was led by people like Nishiiji Tsunejirō, Joe Koide, and Karl Yoneda who developed ties with Nosaka Sanzō, a founder of the Japanese Communist Party and a member of the executive committee of the Comintern. Karl Yoneda, born in California in 1906, went to Japan to study between 1913 and 1926 and after returning to the United States joined the American Communist Party. Yoneda edited the *Rōdō Shinbun* (Japanese labor news), a publication of the American Communist Party, while also serving in the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) and the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union. Miyagi Yotoku, born in Okinawa

32. Akamatsu Katsumaro, “Kokujuin kaihō undō no gensai to sono keikō—jinshu tōsō to kairyū tōsō” (The current status and trend of the black liberation movement—a race struggle and a class struggle), *Kaizō* 5, no. 8 (August 1923): 76–85.

33. Yukiko Koshiro, “Beyond an Alliance of Color: The African American Impact on Modern Japan,” *positions: east asia cultures critique* 11, no. 1 (spring 2003): 192–95.

34. DCI, vol. 1, 315–20.

35. Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, *Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919–1951* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), 64.

The Soviet Union as Radical Hope

Setting differences in state ideology aside, the Japanese and Soviet governments actively engaged in strengthening ties between the two peoples. Yet the Soviet Union did not forsake its revolutionary goals. Without the legal consent of the Japanese government, the Soviet Union solicited working-class Japanese to study at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV). In 1928 the Japanese Foreign Ministry estimated some 1,000 foreign students, ranging in age from twenty to thirty-two, studied at KUTV: 400 Chinese students comprised the majority, followed by 350 ethnic minorities within the Soviet Union. Between 30 and 40 were Japanese, 21 of whom were identifiable. They lived in a dormitory and studied under Japanese communists Takahashi Sadaki and Yamamoto Keizō and several Russian instructors. Vasilii Erochenko, the blind poet who sojourned in Japan between 1916 and 1921 while attending a school for the blind, taught Russian. These Japanese students also studied economics, the history of world revolution, Leninism, philosophy, labor union theory, and Japanese studies. Except for two farmers, all of the Japanese students had been factory workers: metalworkers, lathe machinists, printers, seamen, celluloid workers, and shoemakers.³⁹ Japanese Communist Party member Tokuda Kyūichi was instrumental in recruiting and sending these Japanese workers to KUTV via Shanghai and Vladivostok.⁴⁰

In the wake of Lenin's death in 1924, the controversy between Stalin and Trotsky signaled that the Soviet Union after Lenin was divided over the interpretation of world revolution. Stalin's victory legitimized his theory of "socialism in one country" and ended Trotsky's call for the Communist International to adopt a more global revolutionary agenda. Japanese observers understood that Stalin prioritized domestic economic and industrial development over world communist revolution.

Supporting evidence for this development came from Moscow even amid the Japanese government's mass arrests of communists between 1928 and 1930.

39. "Tokyo Chihō Saibansho Kenji-kyoku Kūtoke ni tsuite" ("The Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office Report on the KUTV" (September 1928), in *Nihon Kyōsan-tō kankai zakken—Honpōjin shugisha no zai-Ro Tōhō Kinrō-sha Kyōsan Daigaku ryūgaku kankai* (Miscellaneous data on the Japanese Communist Party—on Japanese communists studying at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East [KUTV] in the Soviet Union) [1-4-5-2-3-7], DRO.

40. "Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho Kenji-kyoku Shisō-bu Nakagawa Seizō chōshū-sho" ("The Osaka District Public Prosecutors Office Thought Department report on the case of Nakagawa Seizo) in *Nihon Kyōsan-tō kankai zakken—Honpōjin shugisha no zai-Ro Tōhō Kinrō-sha Kyōsan Daigaku ryūgaku kankai* (Miscellaneous data on the Japanese Communist Party—on Japanese communists studying at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East [KUTV] in the Soviet Union) [1-4-5-2-3-7], DRO.

Responding to the Japanese government's suspicions that it channeled financial aid to the Japanese Communist Party, the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo called these claims unsubstantiated. The Soviet Embassy in Tokyo declared that the Soviet government had dutifully observed the agreement between Moscow and Tokyo to respect each other's political and social systems so it could not possibly financially aid a political organization such as the Japanese Communist Party that would challenge Japan's status quo. In a written statement, the Soviet Embassy argued that the Third International had learned a hard lesson in Shanghai, where it had wasted a substantial sum of money on those who looked like communist comrades but proved to be alien vagabonds with no sense of commitment or skill. A Russian-language newspaper published in Harbin quipped that since Moscow would not confess to its ties with the Japanese Communist Party, Japan might as well accept Moscow's story just for the sake of better diplomacy.⁴¹ The Japanese government did just that and chose pragmatic diplomacy.

As soon as Japan recognized the sovereignty of the Soviet Union in 1925, the Japanese government helped found the Russo-Japanese Association (Nichi-Ro Kyōkai), with enthusiastic support from Japanese businessmen who hoped to improve the interactions of Russians and Japanese and to help boost trade. Only a year before, the United States had antagonized the Japanese by passing legislation banning Japanese immigration. With headquarters in Tokyo and several branches across Japan, the Russo-Japanese Association began promoting the two nations' understanding through high-profile members. The inaugural president was Prince Kan'in-no-miya Kotohito (later chief of the General Staff), and council members included prominent figures such as Viscount Ishii Kikujiro (former foreign minister and a member of the Privy Council), Viscount Shibusawa Eiichi (international businessman and philanthropist), Viscount Takahashi Korekiyo (minister of agriculture and commerce), Yasuda Zenzaburō (head of the Yasuda zaibatsu), Asano Sōchirō (the "cement king"), and Matsuoka Yōsuke (then director of the South Manchuria Railway).

The association's most important achievement was the establishment of the Institute of the Russo-Japanese Association (Nichi-Ro Kyōkai Gakkō), later known as the Harbin Institute in Manchuria, which aimed to promote Russian and Soviet area studies. Very similar in concept, organization, and operation to the TōA Dōbun Shoin (East Asia Common Culture Academy) in Shanghai, this institute trained Japanese to be experts on the Soviet Union through a three-year curriculum of Russian language, Soviet business and commercial practices,

41. "Nihon Kyōsan-tō jiken happyō ni taisuru Sobieto gawa no taido ni kansuru ken" (November 9, 1929), in *Nihon Kyōsan-tō kankai zakken—Kyōsan-tō to Soranpō to no kankei* (Miscellaneous data on the Japanese Communist Party—on the relationship between the Japanese Communist Party and the Soviet Union) [1-4-5-2-(3-3)], DRO.

Russian history, geography, customs, and culture. As of 1929, ninety-one students were enrolled, all but two of them government fellowship recipients. Nine Japanese, one Chinese, and eight Russian instructors offered courses, while one Russian and three Japanese staff members assisted the institute's administration. Sugihara Chiune, a Japanese diplomat later known as a savior of Lithuanian Jews escaping Nazi persecution, taught Russian at this institute.⁴²

While some Japanese feared Moscow's intentions, others had a more optimistic outlook. One Japanese analyst later argued that behind Moscow's early pacifist stance with Japan lay two factors: continuing reliance on capitalist nations for trade and technological transfer, and the domestic political instability that culminated in the Great Purge. He pointed to improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as another indicator of the Soviet Union's desire for coexistence with capitalism (and imperialism) for the sake of economic growth.⁴³ In the aftermath of the Nomonhan Incident, the *Hōchi* newspaper's editorial argued on October 28, 1939: "Even when Japan and the Soviet Union differ in the *professed intention for the state* [*kokka-teki itatemaie*], we have to keep in mind that we have to observe our mutual interests as neighbors" (emphasis added). *Tatemaie* (professed intention) in the Japanese language often cynically implies the total opposite of *honi'ne* (real intention). The editorial was suggesting that calls for a worldwide communist revolution could only be a façade of the Soviet state and that its pursuit of national interest could not be much different from Japan's own.

The Soviet Union captured popular Japanese interest with its state-sponsored cultures just as imperial Russia had. The closest exemplar of Western civilization to Japan, Russia had since the late nineteenth century offered Japan romantic visions of cultural modernity very different from those inspired by the United States. Russian Orthodox missionaries taught villagers in impoverished northern regions of Japan, whereas American Protestant missionaries focused on urban, educated, upper-class Japanese. After the success of the Japanese translation of Ivan Turgenev's *Hunter's Sketches* in 1888–89, Russian literature became perhaps the most loved and revered foreign literature for Japanese people of all backgrounds, male and female, urban and rural, intellectual and working class. In the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet Union became a lodestar for Japanese writers, artists, critics, and intellectuals. These Japanese keenly followed the avant-garde art, music, poetry, literature, and theater emerging from the transition to the Soviet

42. "Nichi-Ro Kyōkai kiyaku (revised in October 1925)" and "Nichi-Ro Kyōkai gakkō kisoku" in "Honpō ni okeru kyōkai oyobi bunka dantai kankai—Nichi-Ro Kyōkai kankai," vol. 2 [1-1-10-0-2-1], DRO.

43. Sonobe Shirō, "Soren taigai seisaku no kihon-teki kōsatsu" (Basic observations of Soviet foreign policy), *Kuizō* 20, no. 9 (September 1938): 173–81.

system. Futuristic arts, illustration, and architectural designs in Japan in the 1920s reveal considerable influence from Soviet artists.⁴⁴ Sergei Eisenstein's cinematography had a lasting, visible impact on Japan's cinematography bolstered by his explanation that traditional expressions of Japanese art, such as haiku, resembled his montage theory.⁴⁵

Japanese readers seeking information about the Soviet Union, its society, culture, and people, fueled a demand for publications concerning the topic. Bookstores in Japan as well as Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan, and China sold a popular monthly journal *Gekkan Roshuya* (Russia monthly), first published in 1935 by Nisso Tsūshin Sha (Japanese-Soviet Communications Company).⁴⁶ The *Asahi* newspaper carried advertisements for this journal on its front page until the last phase of World War II, which suggests both the popularity of this journal and the acceptability of its vision in wartime Japan.

The Soviet Union portrayed and analyzed in *Gekkan Roshuya* was both a culturally attractive neighbor and a major diplomatic and military concern. The journal carried scholarly analyses of contemporary issues such as Soviet wartime economic planning, its military strength, its strategies toward Asia (including the CCP), and even the delicate matter of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. The arts and entertainment section projected a vibrant and affable society through its coverage of Soviet lifestyles of society, women, factory workers, and peasants, and its reportage of the differences between city and country living. It also reported on theatrical arts, music, cuisine, and travel. The journal's publication of translations of Russian poetry, short stories, drama, and excerpts from novels underscored the range of its readership.

In contrast the Japanese only had a vague and fragmented sense of the United States. On one hand America symbolized a stern and aloof American Protestantism embodied in the small, influential community of missionaries and their prominent Japanese converts. They led social reform movements such as temperance, abolition of prostitution, and special education for orphans and disabled children. Though they championed worthy causes, Japanese converts hardly seemed eager to tackle the larger problem of the nation's poverty. On the other hand, America represented flamboyance and hedonism, manifested in Hollywood films and jazz music. In the Japanese imagination, ordinary American men and

44. Okumura Katsuzō, "Shinkō geijutsu undō to Roshia-Soren" (Russian and Soviet influences on Japan's avant-garde arts) in Okumura Katsuzō and Sakon Takeshi, eds., *Roshia bunka to kindai Nihon* (Russian culture and modern Japan) (Tokyo: Sekai Shisō Sha, 1998), 134–37. For detailed analysis of Russian-Japanese cultural interactions, see chapter 2.

45. Ohira Yōichi, "Nihon eiga-kai ni ataetai Roshia eiga (riton) no eikyō" (The impact of Russian cinematographic theory on Japanese film making) in *Roshia bunka to kindai Nihon*.

46. After April 1943 the journals were available only through subscription, due to governmental restrictions on paper supply.

the very reason for the current conflict with Japan, was to ensure the expansion of the American system in the region.⁴⁹

As an alternative to the image of an avaricious United States, Soviet communism became alluring to Japanese, even to disillusioned soldiers. Prince Konoe Fumimaro had concerns that military officers might be tempted to lead a communist insurrection because most of them came from lower-middle-class families with considerable exposure to hunger and poverty and thus were susceptible to communist ideology.⁵⁰ In fact significant numbers of officers and enlisted personnel felt betrayed by the perpetual policy of expansion that had originally promised to save their families from poverty. The tide of revolutionary sentiment among soldiers began to surge in November 1929, when a group of communists within the Imperial Army organized a Japanese branch of the Anti-Imperialist Alliance (Hantei Domei Nihon Shibu) and attempted to overthrow the military. Although most leaders had been arrested by 1933, new draftees secretly promoted sabotage and propaganda among fellow soldiers. In one legend of March 1933, unsubstantiated by military records, Japanese Communist Party member and Kwantung Army soldier Ida Sukeo donated 100,000 bullets to the Chinese Liberation Army and then committed suicide.⁵¹ Between 1931 and 1942, ninety-nine Japanese soldiers escaped and joined either the Soviet Army or the CCP Army. In the same period Japan's secret police subverted at least sixteen communist plots led by officers in the Imperial Army.⁵² The most sensational arrest of a communist with a military background was that of Kodai Yoshinobu, member of the Sorge international spy ring. After graduating from Meiji University's Department of Law in 1935, he joined the army and did garrison duty in Manchuria and Korea. From his army discharge in 1939 until his arrest in 1942, he supplied information on the Japanese Army to Richard Sorge.

Japanese citizens in cities and villages swapped rumors of Soviet victory in World War II. Secret police investigation records reveal that Japanese from peasants and working-class people to intellectuals espoused Marxist interpretations of the war in criticizing the Japanese government. In 1937 a social science teacher at a primary school in Osaka was imprisoned for teaching his fourth- and fifth-grade students communist values: "In a communist nation, the state controls all the means of production and takes charge of equal distribution of goods. There

49. Mantetsu Chōsa-bu Sekai Jōsei Chōsa-kai, *Hi: Amerika no sekai seisaku ni okeru Kyōkūitō seisaku no jijō* (Confidential: the place of Far Eastern policy in the US world strategy) (May 1941), NDL.

50. See "Konoe-kō no jōsō bun" (Konoe Memorandum), reprinted in IC, vol. 1: 259-63.

51. For the collection of records of antimilitary and antiwar movements within the Japanese Army, see DCJ.

52. DCJ, vol. 1, chapters 3-4.

women owned automobiles, enjoyed going to the movies, danced, drank, smoked, and indulged in sensual adventures. Ordinary Japanese must have had a hard time understanding how these activities could symbolize individual and societal freedom and embody American progress and democracy.

A dictionary of US-Japanese cultural exchange published in 1983 required little space to list elements of American culture that penetrated and affected Japanese society before 1945: flour, potatoes, Ford motor cars, household electric appliances, ballroom dance, radio broadcasts, tennis, baseball, and the "flappers" of the 1920s.⁴⁷ The United States and Japan had been important trade partners since even before World War II; however, business was in the hands of a few affluent Japanese, and contacts with American and other Western cultures were limited for most Japanese. In the prewar period, more than 80 percent of Japanese lived away from westernized cities. Peasants, who constituted more than 40 percent of the population, barely subsisted and had no exposure to Western luxuries.⁴⁸

Wartime Japanese studies of the United States maintained that the generation of American wealth motivated US policy toward Japan and East Asia. In May 1941 the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR) Research Department (Mantetsu Chōsa-bu) published a ninety-one page confidential report on US Far Eastern policy, the first in a series on geopolitics. The report repeatedly emphasized that America's highly developed monopolistic capitalism and unprecedented accumulation of wealth had enabled it to influence world politics to the benefit of American capitalism. United States foreign policy had traditionally justified capitalist expansion on the basis of ideological rationality rather than economic necessity. America's self-righteousness had led its own people to believe that the Anglo-Saxons (the core American population) were the chosen people and that their democracy and humanism should be the ideal for the entire human race. On the basis of that exceptionalism, they aimed to secure American hegemony by establishing an international political and economic system most favorable to US interests. The United States had increased its interference in the Far East with the conviction that the American people were obliged to supervise the backward and barbaric people of the Far East. Since the United States had occupied and annexed Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam primarily for military reasons, the report suggested, the purpose of American intervention in the Far East,

47. Kamei Shunsuke et al., eds., *Nichi-Bei burika no kōryū shō-jūen* (A mini-dictionary of US-Japanese cultural exchange) (Tokyo: Esso Sekiyū Kōhō-bu, 1983).

48. Yukiko Koshino, "Japan's World and World War II," *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 3 (summer 2001): 439.

are no rich or poor. Laborers and peasants are not oppressed. On the contrary, they govern the nation. When citizens fall sick or become aged, the state takes care of them free of charge."⁵³

A shoemaker was arrested for commenting to neighbors that Japan should emulate the Soviet-style planned economy to feed everyone in the country. In the event of Japan's final defeat, he continued, his senior comrade (*aniki*) would come from the north and make him and others happy. An accountant at a Buddhist temple told priests that Japan's surrender to the United States would not much improve the status of laborers anyway.⁵⁴ A tinker was interrogated by the military when he was caught telling his neighbor about the invincibility of the Soviet Union: "Japan can in no way beat the Soviets—as they are firmly upheld by the Communist Party, which takes care of laborers and the poor, something our government never does." A shopkeeper told his fellow villagers that the current war was a war of aggression, a war to defend only Japanese capitalists' concessions and to benefit military-industrial conglomerates. In another part of Japan, a bus driver told his co-workers how the war exploited the working-class people and only benefited the capitalist class. In a village of northern Japan, military police picked up a soldier's cap along a railway track and discovered a handwritten statement inside: "I am an Internationalist. . . . Long Live Communism. . . . I am not afraid of death. . . . A true peace is possible only with the International." The military tracked down the cap's owner, who had just been drafted and sent to the war front in northern China.⁵⁵

On the war fronts, student draftees from elite universities were allowed to read works by Dostoevsky, Gorky, Marx, and Lenin. An economics major at Tokyo Imperial University, who eventually died a kamikaze pilot in Okinawa, wrote, "My stomach turns over when I see the lifestyles of the very rich, as I did in Karuizawa [Japan's premier resort community], just like the conduct of soldiers—as if they owned the world!—which I have recently witnessed, and even the way in which bureaucrats and capitalists carry out their existence. In the long run, however, I guess that things will take their own course."⁵⁶ Another student from the university wrote, "After all, most students at the Imperial Universities are conservative, caring only for their success by catering to the capitalist class." A physics student wrote that, amid the war's chaos, he discovered the contradictions of class

society, sympathizing with the proletarian class that could afford neither the luxury of culture nor the philosophy of suffering.⁵⁷ One soldier wrote to his friend that he was reading Nikolay Bukharin, the Russian communist leader and theoretician, out of intellectual hunger. Disgusted by a killing rampage by Japanese soldiers in the past four months, he hoped to work for the have-not class when he returned home.⁵⁸

Graffiti praising communism appeared on walls at public lavatories, shrines and temples, on blackboards at schools, and even bulletin boards at train stations. Sometimes letters in support of communism were delivered to high-ranking military officials and even the military police. "Have faith in communism," "Make friends with the Soviet Union for our own happiness," "Join the Soviet Union for international communist revolution," "Down with Japanese imperialism, defend our Soviet," chanted these graffiti. "Refuse the draft paper in the name of Lenin," "Rise, all the Proletarians," "Give up arms, return home, and start the revolution," "Turn this war into the communist revolution!" One young technician at a film theater was arrested for a writing on a lavatory wall: "Give us freedom / Emancipate means of production / Abolish capitalism and establish Republican communism / New society and new culture / Where women participate in building socialism / And receive the same wage / Without taking away men's jobs / Men and women side by side / Work to build socialism."⁵⁹

Pro-American Japanese intellectuals had failed to persuade Japanese society. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, a journalist who went to America at the age of seventeen and worked his way through Whitworth College, was an expert on US affairs and US-Japanese relations and was posthumously celebrated for his liberal views even during the war. His wartime diary *Ankoku nikki* (Diary of darkness), kept between 1942 and 1945, expressed his resolve to support neither capitalism nor Marxism, but instead advocated absolute freedom to occupy a middle ground as a matter of individual conscience. For this kind of "free and independent thinking," he credited the American educational system. This was, however, the extent of his praise for the American way. He wrote only two diary entries celebrating the virtue of American education: once when an acquaintance, a Harvard-educated Japanese youth, tended his garden at his cottage in Karuizawa; and, on another occasion, when this same youth fixed his waffle maker, refrigerator, and other

53. Inagaki Masami, *Mou hitotsu no hansen fu—senchi no rakugaki kaeta ni miru* (Different kinds of anti-war music—graffiti and parodied songs) (Tokyo: Nihon Toshō Center, 1994), 104.

54. "Sankō tsuzuri, Keiho-kyoku Hoan-ka, 1943–1944," MJ-144 "Japanese Rarities," Reel 8, 3.15 thru 3.25 (Microfilm Collection), LOC.

55. Inagaki, *Mou hitotsu no hansen fu*, 17–23.

56. Karuizawa is Japan's exclusive resort community originally developed by and for Westerners in the late nineteenth century and inhabited by upper-class Japanese sojourners. See chapter 2 for Karuizawa's place in Japan's sociocultural history.

57. Nihon Senbetsu Gakusei Kinen-kai, ed., *Kike wadatsumi no koe* (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 1982), 17, 139, 157, and 164. For the English translation, see Midori Yamanouchi and Joseph Quinn, trans., *Listen to the Voices from the Sea—Writings of the Fallen Japanese Students* (Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press, 2000). The selections cited above can be found in pages 95, 99, and 123 of the English translation. The English version is not a full translation of the original. The criticism of Tokyo Imperial students, for example, is truncated in the English translation.

58. Inagaki, *Mou hitotsu no hansen fu*, 24.

59. Inagaki, *Mou hitotsu no hansen fu*, 41–48, 65–82.

check the Anglo-American establishment and allow Japan room in a new world order.

Matsuoka Yosuke, signatory to the Tripartite Pact of September 1940, and who concluded the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in April 1941, promoted the Soviet Union as a potential buffer. Matsuoka, who experienced American racism as a young immigrant on the West Coast, resided in St. Petersburg from late 1912 to late 1913, during which time he found the Russian people to be friendly and welcoming even as he predicted the demise of the Romanov dynasty.⁶²

From the beginning of his career, Matsuoka showed interest in the potential of leveraging Russia as a force that could protect Japan's continental interests. In 1894, only a year after his arrival in the United States as a young student-labor immigrant, the Sino-Japanese War broke out. He observed the Triple Intervention and hoped the Anglo-Japanese alliance would check the threat of Russia. A decade later when Japan won the Russo-Japanese War and obtained the Kwantung region (southern Manchuria) among its spoils of war, the young diplomat Matsuoka envisioned alliance with Russia as a measure to thwart the United States' continental ambitions and to safeguard Japan's interests. In the fall of 1907, Matsuoka is said to have discussed with Yamagata Aritomo, president of the Privy Council, a scheme for forming an alliance with Russia in the manner of the aforementioned Gotō Shinpei's plan. By that time, the United States had shown a growing interest in purchasing the South Manchurian Railway and "neutralizing" Manchuria through an open door policy for "equal" trade and commercial opportunities in Manchuria. Matsuoka advocated the alliance for Great Asianism (*dai Ajia shugi*) consisting of Britain, Japan, Russia, France, and Germany as a way to ward off the United States on the Asian continent.⁶³

Matsuoka kept this vision alive as Russia was reborn as the Soviet Union and he became a director and then vice president of the South Manchurian Railway Company with a greater responsibility in defending Japan's continental interests. In early November 1932, as he headed Japan's delegation to the League of Nations following the issuance of the Lytton Report, Matsuoka stopped in Moscow and met with Maxim Litvinov, people's commissar for foreign affairs, and Lev Karahan, the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs. According to Matsuoka's memoir, during a five-day stay in Moscow, Matsuoka, Litvinov, and Karahan discussed a possible Soviet-Japanese nonaggression pact. From Matsuoka's perspective, the Soviet Union was an outsider in the world led by the League of Nations and thus could tolerate Japan's Manchukuo as the challenge to such a world order.

62. Toyoda Iō, *Matsuoka Yosuke: higeiki no gaikōkan* (Matsuoka Yosuke: a tragic diplomat) (Tokyo: Shinchō Sha, 1979), vol. 1, 105–10.

63. Toyoda, *Matsuoka Yosuke*, vol. 1, 87–92.

home appliances. Kiyosawa asserted that only recipients of an American-style education were pragmatic, sincere, courteous, and dutiful. Otherwise, his affinity for the American way remained limited.

In spite of his background as a labor migrant in America, Kiyosawa disparaged lower-class Japanese. He despised crass menial laborers in Karuizawa, pitied intellectuals without servants, derided military officers for their lack of sophistication arising from their lower-middle-class background, and despised the ignorant masses who failed to see golf as an important activity of rest and relaxation for intellectuals even during wartime. Kiyosawa worried about a "feudalistic" communist revolution—a "theft" from the "haves"—should these uneducated peasants and blue-collar workers continue to defy authorities and speak up against the government.⁶⁰ When he expressed such spiteful class consciousness, his "American-inspired liberalism" exhibited the arrogance of the materially affluent and morally superior Japanese elites.

Japan's wartime government was as concerned about plots by pro-US elites as it was about possible communist plots, but the authorities did not consider a pro-American grassroots revolt likely. American freedom and democracy were not propagated in prewar Japan as solutions to poverty and hunger. The appeal of American values as expressed by elites like Kiyosawa most likely escaped ordinary Japanese.

Alliance with the Soviet Union

The vision of allying with the Soviet Union as a buffer against Anglo-America's advance into Asia had roots in Japan's continental policy. Shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, Itō Hirobumi and Gotō Shinpei, the patriarchs of Japan's colonialism in Korea, put forward a plan for a Eurasian continental alliance including Russia to prevent the United States from interfering with Japan's pan-Asianism.⁶¹ Tracing the evolution of the idea of an alignment with the Soviet Union shows that the neutrality pact Japan concluded with the Soviets in 1941 was not necessarily an aberration from Japan's diplomacy but its understandable outcome. Particularly important was the Japanese expectation that the revolutionary ambitions of the Soviet Union, however harmful in the domestic context, would

60. Kiyosawa Kiyoshii, *Ankoku nikki* (Diary in darkness) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1960), 55, 59, 77–78, 113–14, 164–65. For the English translation, see Eugene Sowiak, ed., *A Diary of Darkness: The Wartime Diary of Darkness* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 48, 51, 63, 112, and 169–70. The English translation omits portions of the entries at the translators' discretion.

61. Saitō Yoshie, *Azamikareia rokishi* (Betrayed history) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbun Sha, 1955), 89; quoted in Minowa Kimitada, *Matsuoka Yosuke* (Tokyo: Chūkyō Shinsho, 1971), 49.

While never affirming the tenets of communism, Matsuoka praised the Soviet Union for "conducting a great experiment for human beings, whereas western civilization is in decline."⁶⁴

In March 1933 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in protest of the league's condemnation of Japan's illegal occupation of Manchuria. Merely eight months later the Soviet Union received Washington's diplomatic recognition and in September 1934 it joined the league. Having observed how quickly Japan and the Soviet Union switched positions on the world stage, Japanese officials doubted that the Soviet Union's "assimilation" into the "family of nations" was real and were skeptical about Anglo-American sincerity in accepting the communist state into their circle. In spite of its military might, the Soviet Union, much like Japan previously, had a peripheral existence in the Anglo-American world and this marginality continued to draw Japanese attention.

The year 1939 was a turning point for Japanese-Soviet relations. Once World War II broke out in Europe in September, Japanese analysts predicted that the Soviets would shift their focus to the European front and attempt to avoid confrontation with Japan. An agreement in April resolved the heated Russo-Japanese dispute over fishing rights. The Nomonhan Incident of May-August ended in September with a Soviet-Japanese armistice. On December 31 of that year, the Russo-Japanese Fishing Accord formally renewed fishing rights in adjacent territorial waters and settled Soviet debt claims in Manchukuo.

Tokyo began pondering a "radical" alliance with the Soviet Union. The Shōwa Research Association supported such an alliance. After the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in 1937 the association shifted its focus to Japan's foreign policy and influenced Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro's November 1938 "New Order in East Asia" declaration. Konoe believed a New Order in East Asia would insure permanent stability of the region built on a relationship of mutual political, economic, and cultural aid and cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. Japan had failed to win Anglo-American recognition as military, politico-economic, and racial equals. To the Japanese, this rejection added "moral" legitimacy to its pan-Asianism, which sought to rid Asia of Anglo-American imperialism and to redefine Asian modernity under its leadership.

To achieve regional stability, the association devised a plan of multiple tactics against the powers. Their plan notably did not conceive of the Soviet Union as a force to be kept out of East Asia. The plan first called for expelling Britain and neutralizing the United States and France in Asia. Then while strengthening ties with Germany, Japan should try its best to avoid war with the Soviet Union. Rōyama Masamichi, a leading proponent of democratic socialism, welcomed the

German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, because he regarded it as a step toward the creation of regional blocs. Not only did Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union share radically new political and economic orders, they also despised the Wilsonian world order created after World War I. Given these shared interests, Rōyama anticipated that Germany and the Soviet Union could together form the "new imperialism" against the "old imperialism," which hopefully could coexist with Japan's pan-Asianism.⁶⁵

The plan to invite the Soviets to join the "New Order" of the Axis powers emerged from the belief that the Soviets would support, rather than oppose, Japan's "revolutionary" challenge to Anglo-American world dominance. On the eve of signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany, Matsuoka confessed that the accord was a prelude to shaking hands with the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ Matsuoka proposed to establish a Eurasian bloc of Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union as a deterrent against the Anglo-American alliance. Its Asian component would curb the US intervention in China.⁶⁷

By July 1939 a wider spectrum of Japanese leaders had endorsed this idea. Former prime minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro, ambassador to Italy Shiratori Toshio, and ambassador to Germany Ōshima Hiroshi all supported a Japanese-German-Italian-Soviet alliance.⁶⁸ Takagi Sōkichi, the Imperial Navy's leading planner, inspired by the signing of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, examined several options for multilateral diplomacy and recommended this particular four-nation alliance as the most beneficial to Japan's interests.⁶⁹ In November 1940, the monthly journal *Kaizō* echoed this sentiment in an article that predicted a Soviet-Japanese nonaggression pact as the natural sequel to the Tripartite Pact. The May 1941 issue of *Kaizō* featured four articles on the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union, two of which stressed its linkage to the Tripartite

65. William Miles Fletcher III, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 109, 139.

66. Minowa Kimitada, *Matsuoka Yōsuke—sono ningen to gaikō* (Matsuoka Yosuke—personality and diplomacy) (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 1971), 173; Matsuoka Yōsuke Denki Kankō-kai (Matsuoka Yosuke Biography Editing Committee), ed., *Matsuoka Yōsuke—sono hito to shōgai* (Matsuoka Yosuke—his Life and Personality) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1974), 783, 799.

67. Hosoya Chūhito, "The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact," in James Morley, ed., *The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 47 and 50; Miyazaki Yoshiyuki, "Saikō Matsuoka gaikō—sono kokunai seiji-teki yōin" (Matsuoka diplomacy reconsidered—a remedy for national consensus), *Gunji Shigaku* (The Journal of Military History) 27, nos. 2 & 3 (December 1991): 34; Minowa Kimitada, *Matsuoka Yōsuke* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Sha, 1989), 173.

68. Torii Tami, *Shōwa 20-nen* (1945), vol. 1, no. 1 (Tokyo: Sōshi Sha, 1985), 335-39.

69. Nomura Minoru, "Nichi-Doku-I. So rengo shiso no hōga to hōkai" (Rise and decline of the concept of Japanese-German-Italian-Soviet alliance), *Gunji shigaku* (The Journal of Military History) 11, no. 4 (March 1976): 2-14, especially 6-9.

Pact.⁷⁰ Because of the *Kaizō* articles and other news sources, the public knew there were ambitions to use the Soviet Union to contain Anglo-American global domination.

Stalin seemed to take an interest in neutrality with Japan. Matsuoka visited Moscow in late March 1941 on his way to Berlin and Rome to reaffirm the Axis alliance. Stalin is said to have been amused by Matsuoka's invitation to join the Tripartite Pact as an effort to challenge Anglo-American capitalism. Stalin first tested Matsuoka, directing him to tell the German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop that "the Anglo-Saxons had never been Russia's 'friends.'" After visiting Germany and Italy, Matsuoka stopped in Moscow on his way home via the Trans-Siberian Railway. He detailed how Russia would be integrated into the tripartite arrangement through a Soviet-Japanese nonaggression pact regarding sovereign territories, including Outer Mongolia (for the Soviets) and Manchukuo (for Japan). Supplementing the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact with a similar treaty with Japan would avoid war on the Soviet European and Asian fronts. Stalin decided to sign the neutrality pact.⁷¹

After the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the Japanese government abided by the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and declined Germany's request to attack the Soviet Union. Instead the Japanese Army advanced southward into French Indochina, a decision that led to direct confrontation with the United States. In the course of the Nomura-Hull talks that began informally in the spring of 1941 between Japanese ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō and United States secretary of state Cordell Hull, the prospect of American intervention in East Asian affairs became real when the US government, using the threat of an oil embargo, demanded Japan's withdrawal from not only French Indochina, but China as well. Matsuoka had hoped to pressure the United States with the four-nation alliance, in addition to the Axis alliance, so that it would agree to sit at the negotiation table with Japan.

Though Matsuoka is said to have been devastated by the news of Pearl Harbor, because it destroyed any hope for rapprochement with the United States, the plan for a German-Japanese-Soviet alliance stayed afloat for some time through the support of the Imperial Army and the Foreign Ministry. From Japan's perspective the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union dampened the antifascist spirit

of the Grand Alliance. At a more subtle level, rapprochement between Japanese fascism and Soviet communism undermined the ideological legitimacy of Asian communist movements against the Japanese empire.

Evidence suggests that the Japanese public believed throughout the Pacific War that Moscow and Washington shared little under the Grand Alliance. Nakano Gorō, a communist and a former immigrant to the United States who had been deported as an enemy national in the summer of 1942, explained his skepticism about the Grand Alliance in a June 1944 journal article about the enigma of wartime American-Russian cultural relations. Americans saw Russians as filthy workers and peasant revolutionaries. When Germany attacked Russia, Russians became transformed in American eyes to the harmless and pitiful prey of Nazism. Their popularity soared. Yet this newfound embrace of Russians still revealed underlying divisions. Nakano cited the Warner Brothers film *Mission to Moscow* (1943), which portrayed real political figures such as Stalin and Churchill. *Life* magazine acknowledged that the Russians looked so Americanized that they might be living in Kansas City. Producing a commercial film out of the somber business of American-Russian diplomacy was itself so American in taste and style; reproducing Russia in the American image demonstrated typical American vanity and self-satisfaction. The American public would never accept any narrative but one that showed the American way of life triumphant over the Soviet. Nakano thus contended that the many cultural and ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union would make it difficult to cement an alliance.⁷²

Even after the Pacific War began, the Japanese press, especially the progressive monthly journal *Kaizō*, discussed the Soviet Union and communism in a positive light. The relative freedom of public debate on communism was possible due to a lack of any unified regulation of the media. Different agencies such as the Home Ministry, the Japanese Cabinet Information Bureau (Naikaku Jōhō-bu), and the Information Department of the War Ministry adopted different codes of censorship. An article that received approval from the Home Ministry and went into print might still receive postpublication censorship by the War Ministry.⁷³ In this way Japanese readers had opportunities to learn about current world conditions of "imperialism" (*teikoku-shugi*) and "communism" (*kyōsan-shugi*).

72. Nakano Gorō, "Bei-So kankei no bunka-teki kōsatsu" (Cultural observations of American-Russian relations), *Gekkan Roshijya* (Russia monthly) 10, no. 6 (June, 1944): 2-10.

73. Hōsei Daigaku Ōhara Shūkai-mondai Kenkyū-jo, "Nihon rōdō nenkan tokubetsu-ban: Tai-heiyō Sensō-ka no rōdō undō," dai-5-hen "Genron tōsei to bunka undō," dai-6-shō "Shuppan kat-sudō" (Ōhara Institute for Social Research, Hosen University, "The labor year book of Japan, special edition," Section 5, "Speech control and cultural movement," chapter 6, "Publication activities") (October 1965), available online at <http://oohara.mt.tama.hosei.ac.jp/rn/senji2/rnsenji2-223.html>.

70. Gushima Kenesaburō, "Sangoku Dōmei to NiSso kankei" (The Tripartite Pact and Japanese-Soviet relations), *Kaizō* 22, no. 20 (November 1940): 288-95. The two articles that appeared in the May 1941 issue of *Kaizō* (23, no. 9) were Baba Hideo, "NiSso Chūritsu Jōyaku no seiritsu to igi" (Conclusion and significance of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty), 102-4; and Ōkubo Tetsuo, "Sangoku Dōmei yori NiSso Chūritsu Jōyaku e" (From the Tripartite Alliance to the Japanese-Soviet neutrality treaty), 105-9.

71. Gabriel Gorodetsky, *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 8, 193, and 197.

A crackdown on the procommunist press went into effect with the Yokohama Incident, in which dozens of journalists and researchers were arrested and tortured by the Special Higher Police of Yokohama. In September 1942 *Kaizō* published, with permission from both the Interior Ministry and the Japanese Cabinet Information Bureau, "Sekaiishi no dōkō to Nihonshi" (Japanese history and a trend in world history). Its author, Hosokawa Karoku, called on Japan to learn from the Soviet Union and to endorse the principles of freedom and independence for all people in order to make the East Asian new order a true success. The Army Press Section openly questioned the discretion of the *Kaizō* editorial board in printing such a procommunist article. The subsequent arrest and investigation of Hosokawa converged with a completely separate investigation of the SMR Research Department; together the two investigations suggested that communist sympathizers, including Hosokawa, were plotting to rebuild the Japanese Communist Party.

Stalin openly renounced any ties with Japanese communists. Confronting an acute need to reaffirm his alliance with Roosevelt and Churchill, Stalin declared in May 1943 that the Soviet Union was focusing on the anti-Hitler coalition and not fomenting world revolution. Acknowledging that each country had particular societal contradictions that could complicate how it addressed labor movements, Stalin said the Soviet Union could not possibly coordinate all communists around the world. He dissolved the Comintern because it would only hinder the further strengthening of national workers' parties. This gave the Japanese government, after the Yokohama Incident, room to continue the policy of neutrality with the Soviet Union. Communist ideology, as Japan's multifaceted wartime interactions with the Soviet Union illustrated, did not impede their relationship.

The Soviet Union was more than a double-edged sword for Japan. While the Japanese government considered communist ideology harmful to Japan's national polity (*kokutai*), the Japanese also found its revolutionary vision of progress appealing. If Japan could harness the power of its potential enemy across the border, they could perhaps work together as gatekeepers of Asia. To regard prewar Japan simply as anticommunist and anti-Soviet obfuscates the nature of Japan's Eurasian-Pacific War.

CULTURE AND RACE

Russians in the Japanese Empire

Before the war, many Japanese people had a sense of belonging to Eurasia, physically, psychologically, and culturally. Moscow and Berlin were closer to Japan than New York and Washington, DC. The intricate railway networks built across Korea and Manchuria under Japan's colonial rule connected with trans-Siberian rail routes so Japanese could travel to Europe by train, which was three times faster than a voyage by sea. Trans-Siberian railway tickets had been sold in Japan since 1911. Starting in 1927 Japanese travelers could purchase international train tickets to European cities at major train stations within the colonial empire, including Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Pusan, Pyongyang, and Dalian. For prewar Japanese, Moscow served as a gateway to Europe. In 1937, a Japanese tourist could travel from Tokyo to Moscow in ten to eleven days, and via Moscow, Berlin in thirteen days, and Paris in fourteen days.¹ A voyage from Yokohama to major port cities of the West Coast of the United States via Honolulu took about two weeks; a transcontinental train ride from the West Coast to the East Coast via Chicago took another two days or more.

1. Sōda Hideo, *Maboroshi no jikoku-hyō* (Short-lived train timetables) (Tokyo: Kobun Sha, 2005), chapter 1. According to Sōda (pp. 20–76), the trans-Eurasian train travel in 1937 took place as follows. Depart Tokyo on super express train Fuji at 15:00, arrive at Shimonoseki at 9:30 the following day and take a ferry departing there at 10:30 and reach Pusan at 18:00. Depart Pusan on express train Hikari at 18:55 and arrive at Hsinking (Changchun), the capital of Manchukuo, at 23:06 on the following (third) day, and Harbin at 7:20 on the fourth day. After twenty-six hour ride from Harbin, reach Manzhouli on the sixth day and transfer to the trans-Siberian railway. Arrive at Moscow at 11:30 on the eleventh day, Berlin at 10:23 on the thirteenth day and Paris at 6:43 on the fourteenth day.

At both popular and governmental levels, the sense of cultural proximity to Russia further enhanced the vision of Russia as a member of the East Asian order. The paucity of Japanese-American cultural and social contacts made it difficult for the Japanese to envision a trans-Pacific alliance that could enrich Japan's colonial empire. In contrast the Japanese celebrated compatibility of Japanese and Russian cultures even during the war and never attempted to rid Russian culture from their empire in the name of pan-Asianism.

Popular perceptions as well as scholarly studies defined Russia's demographic and cultural character as multiethnic and multiracial, which helped the Japanese to develop a sense of affinity with the Russians and to celebrate the two peoples as members of Eurasia. In contrast to Japan's postwar image, the Japanese empire was fairly tolerant of racial and ethnic diversity, including intermarriage between Japanese masters and colonial subjects, most of which took place between Japanese women and colonial men.² The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, signed on April 13, 1941, was much more than a military pact: to the Japanese it was also a means to cosmopolitanism in Japan's colonial empire. After signing the neutrality pact, Stalin is said to have embraced Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke in celebration of their common Asian roots. Stalin's reference to his Georgian background emphasized the notion of Russians as "Asians" to the Japanese public. Some Japanese leaders, notably Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko, repeatedly reiterated the Asian unity of Russians and Japanese against the Anglo-American invasion of China.³ This racial view had an ironic manifestation in Nazi propaganda that condemned Russians as "Asiatics" and "Mongols" whose "innate barbarism" augmented their fanaticism for communism, just like another group of "subhumans," the Jews.⁴ The lesser "whiteness" of the Russians facilitated their inclusion in Japan's Pan-Asian rhetoric.

Under the neutrality pact, the Japanese government praised the Soviet Union as a nation of diverse racial, ethnic, and national groups that did not sanction discriminatory racism against outsiders. In contrast, even when experimenting with multiethnic and multiracial state building in Manchuria, Tokyo never appreciated the United States as a nation of immigrants. Ordinary Japanese people saw blacks, Jews, American Indians, and above all Asians as permanent outcasts


2. Yukiko Koshiro, "East Asia's 'Melting-Pot': Reevaluating Race Relations in Japan's Colonial Empire," in Walter Demele and Rotem Kowner, eds., *Race and Racism in Modern East Asia: Western and Eastern Constructions* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

3. Higashikuni Naruhiko, *Ichii kōzoku no sensō nikki* (A war diary of one member of the Imperial Family) (Tokyo: Nihon Shūhō Sha, 1957).

4. Omer Bartov, "Germany's Unforgettable War: The Twisted Road from Berlin to Moscow and Back," *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 3 (summer 2001): 413. The four-nation alliance of Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union existed briefly, from the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941, until the outbreak of the German-Russian war in June that year.

MAP 2.1 The Trans-Eurasian Continental Railway Network via Western Siberia, 1927. Three broken lines indicate ferry routes that connected Japan to the Eurasian continent at the ports of Dalian, Pusan, and Vladivostok, respectively. From Moscow, one could continue by train to Paris, Berlin, and Rome, as well as Stockholm, Vienna, London (via ferry ride from Calais, France), and even to Constantinople.

圖 歐亞大陸鐵路網經由西伯利亞，1927年



Source: Uemura Tomohiko, *Ohitai ryokō an'rai* (Guide to Travel to Europe) (Tokyo: Shinko Sha, 1927; reprint Yumani Shobo, 2000).

of American society and believed this racial and ethnic schism weakened America.⁵ The perception of Russia's historical connections to Asian peoples, and America's lack of one, drove these divergent characterizations. The Intelligence Bureau (Jōhō-kyoku) of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs positively reported on the Asian flavor of Moscow in its monthly analysis of international relations.⁶ After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the journal *Gekkan Roshiya* (Russia monthly) occasionally covered issues of ethnic diversity within the Soviet Union. With a strong emphasis on Russia's historical interactions with Asia, these articles described how Russia, a Mongol tributary in the thirteenth century, defeated and absorbed the Khanate of the Golden Horde in the fourteenth century and began the great thrust across Siberia in the sixteenth century. They asserted that Turkic peoples—Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz—constituted the historical, ethnic, and emotional foundation of the Soviet Union. The racial and ethnic amalgamation of nation building, these articles claimed, meant that Soviet citizens possessed certain Asian characteristics.⁷

Ono Nobuzō, a professor at Chūō University argued that the Soviets were tolerant of non-Western peoples and less chauvinistic compared to other Europeans because the Slavs had long lived in a conglomerate Eurasia. This tradition of emotional and cultural egalitarianism among races (*minzoku*) was further reinforced under the communist system.⁸ Imaoka Juichirō, a linguist specializing in Hungarian and Finnish, acknowledged that the Soviet Union had internal nationalist and ethnic conflicts. Persecution of and discrimination against Asian minorities existed because the Russian empire and the Soviet Union had developed side by side with Asian (non-Slavic and non-Russian) peoples. An expert also on Pan-Turanism, Imaoka claimed that the Soviets' dealings with Asian demands to preserve their own languages, culture, customs, and lifestyles had let it, more than any other European government, to be cognizant of Asian aspira-

5. On wartime Japanese understanding of Americans and their society, see John Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), which focuses on the slogan "Kichiku BeiEi (Demonic and beastly Anglo-America)." The difficulty of finding Japanese records on America may be attributed to the censorship that prohibited any reference to the enemy. In *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), I discuss popular Japanese understandings of American racism immediately after the war, which allows a glimpse into their wartime mindset. See pp. 63–64, for example.

6. Jyōhō-kyoku, *Kokusai Jijū* (23) "Mosukuwa no hanashi" (The Bureau of Information, International Affairs (23) "A story of Moscow"), May 25, 1942.

7. Hasegawa Shun, "Roshiyajin kishitsu" (The Russian characteristics), *Gekkan Roshiya* 9, no. 5 (May 1943): 34–38; Chiba Ryō, "Surabu minzoku-shi kan to Sekai Taisen" (The historic view of the Slavs and World War II), *Gekkan Roshiya* 9, no. 9 (September 1943): 4–12.

8. Ono Nobuzō, "Sobietto Renpo no senso shidō hōshin (2)" (The Soviet Union and its war planning and principle (2)), *Gaikō Jihō*, no. 953 (January 1, 1945): 27.

tions for liberation and self-rule. This history, Imaoka concluded, inspired hope that the Soviet Union would understand Japan's pan-Asianism.⁹

Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko, along with Ishiwaro Kanji, Koiso Kuniaki, Kuahara Fusanosuke, and Gotō Ryūnosuke, set a goal of sensitizing Russians to their Asian identity.¹⁰ Expressing enthusiasm for this proposal throughout the war, Prince Higashikuni wrote in his private journal, "Japan has to give the Soviet Union a keen awareness of being a member of Asia so that it will never stand on the side of the whites" (April 14, 1942); "Stalin is aware of and proud of being Asian, so it's necessary to have the Soviet people feel the same way" (September 27, 1944); and "We have to try to help Soviet people develop an Asian identity so we can stand together against Anglo-America" (May 15, 1945).¹¹

An anonymous essay in *Gaikō Jihō* (Diplomatic review) in May 1944 argued that the Soviet Union was a dualistic nation (*ryōmen-teki kokka*) that embodied the geographical and racial essences of Europe and Asia. Since modern Japan had also acquired a dualistic national character by assimilating Western civilization while retaining its distinctive Asianness, this would allow the two nations' diplomacy to move along the progression of equality and mutuality.¹²

Positive perceptions of Russian tolerance of Asians had been confirmed by increasing contact between Japanese and Russians during Japan's continental expansion in the early twentieth century. After the Bolshevik Revolution, thousands of Russian political refugees settled in Japan and across the Japanese empire. Whereas Japanese immigrants to the United States triggered diplomatic tension, Russian émigrés in Japan, though far fewer in number than Japanese in America, rarely created cultural friction, even in wartime. In the shift from cosmopolitanism in the Taishō period to isolationism in the 1930s, Russian cultural imports continued to be appreciated. After the creation of Manchukuo, the presence of Russians in the Japanese empire was regarded as a precious link to the West. Under the state slogan of racial harmony, the government even granted the Russian residents full legitimacy to coexist with the Japanese, Chinese, Manchus, Koreans and Mongols.

Comparative surveys of personal interactions Japanese had with Americans and Russians in Japan imply that Americans in general did not attempt to break

9. Imaoka Juichirō, "Sorenpo no minzoku mondai" (The ethnic and national problems within the Soviet Union), *Gekkan Roshiya* 8, no. 9 (September 1942): 20–24.

10. Higashikuni Naruhiko, *Ichii kōzoku no sensō nikki* (A war diary of one member of the Imperial Family) (Tokyo: Nihon Shinhō Sha, 1957), 103, 107, 138–39, 147, 184.

11. Higashikuni, *Ichii kōzoku no sensō nikki*, 103, 107, 147, 184.

12. Jiron—"NiSso kankai yurugazu" (My opinion—Soviet-Japanese relations will not change), *Gaikō Jihō*, no. 945 (May 1, 1944): 4.

racial barriers. In contrast, various records from the prewar period affirm that Russia was a far closer neighbor to Japan than America. Wartime Japan had reasons to retain its Eurasian neighbor to the north as an ally and to regard its presence in East Asia as a natural consequence, not as an invasion by an outsider.

Americans in Japan: The Most Isolated

Sergei G. Elisseeff (1889–1975), son of a wealthy businessman in St. Petersburg, Russia, was the first Western (white) student ever enrolled full-time in Tokyo Imperial University and later became a founder of Japanese studies in the United States. Majoring in classical Japanese literature, Elisseeff completed his bachelor's degree with honors in 1912, and his master's degree in 1914, before returning to Russia. Soon afterward in 1921 he fled the Bolshevik Revolution to France, where he taught Japanese literature at the Sorbonne. In 1932 he was invited to teach at Harvard University. From then until 1955, when he returned to Paris, he was a driving force behind the development of Japanese studies in the United States.

Although Elisseeff served as an agent of rich and flourishing cultural exchanges between Japan, Russia, and America, distinctive differences marked the cultural and racial relationship between Russians and Japanese and that between Americans and Japanese, which provided a nuanced psychological backbone of Japan's Eurasian-Pacific War. Elisseeff immersed himself in Japanese culture; he studied and played with Japanese classmates; he lived in a traditional Japanese-style house; and he mingled with members of a literary circle. Like him, thousands of Russian émigrés lived among the Japanese, even as Japanese immigrants on the West Coast faced discrimination. Worse, Americans in Japan did not assimilate but lived in an upscale community isolated from ordinary Japanese people. The aloof lifestyle of Americans in Japan only affirmed the Japanese conception of white racism or racism by white people against others.

The enactment in the United States of a series of anti-Oriental immigration and naturalization laws—originally aimed at Chinese laborers but quickly expanded to target other Asians at the turn of the twentieth century—severely hurt Japanese pride by conveying that the Japanese, too, were inferior. The Japanese became intensely aware of how Americans distinguished between them on the basis of America's "whiteness" and Japan's "nonwhiteness."¹³

As a rising imperial power, Japan found it inappropriate and humiliating to be treated by Western nations as just another Asian nation. The particular circum-

TABLE 2.1 Alien population in Japan by nationality, 1876–1937

YEAR	NATIONALITY						TOTAL
	CHINA	US	UK	GERMANY	RUSSIA	FRANCE	
1876	2449	274	1279	231	51	260	4972
1895	3642	1022	1878	493	222	391	8246
1905	10388	1612	2114	616	58	531	16558
1911	8145	1762	2633	815	112	530	14970
1924	16902	1870	1848	930	818	398	24122
1932	17819	2015	1969	1040	1537	462	26885
1937	15526	2347	2360	1959	1590	583	30838

Source: Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai (Japan Statistical Association), *Nihon chōkei (cōkei sōran)*, vol. 1 (Historical statistics of Japan) (Tokyo: Japan Statistics Bureau, 1987), 52–53.

stances of Japanese immigration to the United States and the political stature of the United States in the world community forced the Americans to confront the dual racial identity Japan had created for itself.¹⁴ Japan felt the US government should, and did, treat the Japanese nation as a symbolic "honorary white" race in the international community. Treating individual Japanese immigrants as honorary whites, however, proved impossible in American society where human interactions across color lines were controlled by rigidly constructed antimiscegenation, immigration, and naturalization laws. The US government ultimately chose to brand Japanese immigrants undesirable members of a nonwhite race—a designation the Japanese government had attempted to avoid at all cost since the late nineteenth century. The anti-Japanese Immigration Act of 1924 was America's final refusal to address the disjunction between how it dealt with Japan as a nation diplomatically (as an honorary white nation) and how it dealt with Japanese as individuals (as nonwhites). This action prompted Japanese nationalists to justify severing any psychological affinity with the United States and, in turn, to promote Japan's road to pan-Asianism.¹⁵

American sojourners in prewar Japan had steadily grown in number since the late nineteenth century and had always outnumbered German residents, even after Germany became Japan's ally through the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. Nonetheless, these Americans alienated ordinary Japanese people from America. With a self-important sense of mission and superior wealth, these American residents kept themselves apart from ordinary Japanese as no other Westerners

14. In *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan*, I explain that modern Japan developed a contradictory self-identity that fused a demand for the diplomatic status of an honorary white with an insistence on the fact that the Japanese were an oppressed colored race. I call this complex racial awareness Japan's "dual racial identity."

15. Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms*, 9–12.

13. Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 3.

TABLE 2.2 Occupations of US, British, German, and French residents in Japan, 1924

US RESIDENTS (TOTAL POP: 1870/POP WITH JOBS: 922)	BRITISH RESIDENTS (TOTAL POP: 1949/POP WITH JOBS: 810)
Christian missionaries	359 (38.9%)
Traders and businessmen	432 (53.3%)
Teachers and professors	243 (26.3%)
Christian missionaries	150 (18.5%)
Traders and businessmen	220 (23.9%)
Teachers and professors	124 (15.3%)
Engineers	60 (7.4%)
US government officials	33 (4.1%)
British government officials	33 (4.1%)
Journalists	8 (1%)
Medical doctors	3 (0.4%)

GERMAN RESIDENTS (TOTAL POP: 930/POP WITH JOBS: 434)	FRENCH RESIDENTS (TOTAL POP: 398/POP WITH JOBS: 289)
Traders and businessmen	230 (53%)
Christian missionaries	118 (43.9%)
Teachers and professors	74 (17.1%)
Teachers and professors	101 (37.5%)
Engineers	66 (15.2%)
Traders and businessmen	34 (12.6%)
Christian missionaries	49 (11.3%)
French government officials	11 (4.1%)
German government officials	11 (2.5%)
Engineers	5 (1.9%)
Journalists	2 (0.5%)
Journalists	0 (0%)
Medical doctors	2 (0.5%)
Medical doctors	0 (0%)

Source: "Naichi zairyū gaikokujin shokugyō betsu jin'in hyō" (Statistical chart of foreign residents and their occupations in Japan proper) (December 1924), in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 1 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO.

did. American whiteness was a peculiar racial and cultural phenomenon even in Japan. Demographically, American residents were the most "isolated" of Westerners in Japan.¹⁶ American residents in Japan had a very narrow range of occupations. The American population was characterized by extremely high percentages of missionaries and teachers. In contrast businessmen formed the largest occupational group among British residents. Although French residents had even higher concentrations of missionaries and teachers, Americans exceeded the French in number.

In 1924, 775 Christian missionaries worked in Japan: 359 of them Americans (46.3 percent), followed by 150 British (19.3 percent) and 118 French (15.2 percent). The overall presence of the American missionaries in Japan was amplified because they mostly lived with spouses and children, whereas most of the French missionaries were Catholic priests. In the same year, there were 661 foreign

16. Naimu-shō Keiho-kyoku, "Zairyū gaikokujin gaikyo" (Summary reports of foreign residents in Japan) (December 1921), in Ogino Fujio, ed. *Tokkō keisatsu kankei shiryō shūsei* (Anthology of documents concerning the Japanese Special Higher Police) (Tokyo: Fujii Shuppan, 1992), vol. 15, 29.

TABLE 2.3 Foreign residents in various occupations, 1924

CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES (TOT. 775)	EDUCATORS (TOT. 661)	TRADERS AND BUSINESSMEN (TOT. 3399)			
United States	359	United States	243	China	2060
Britain	150	Britain	124	Britain	432
France	118	France	101	Germany	230
Canada	49	Germany	74	United States	220
Germany	49	China	38	India	114
		Russia	26	Switzerland	46
		Portugal		Portugal	37
		France		France	34

Source: "Naichi zairyū gaikokujin shokugyō betsu jin'in hyō" (Statistical chart of foreign residents and their occupations in Japan proper) (December, 1924), in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 1 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO.

teachers and professors: 243 were Americans (36.8 percent), followed by 124 British (18.8 percent), and 101 French (15.3 percent). The same occupational trends by nationality continued into the 1930s. In 1932 out of 2,015 American residents, 734 had jobs and 1,281 were family members. Of those with occupations, 246 (33.5 percent) were missionaries and 255 (34.7 percent) were educators, while 171 (23.3 percent) were traders and businessmen and 39 (5.3 percent) were engineers. That year American missionaries comprised 27.9 percent of all foreign missionaries residing in Japan (881), followed by British (163, or 18.5 percent) and Canadian (117, or 13.3 percent) missionaries. American educators also comprised 33.6 percent of all foreign teachers in Japan (759), followed by British (149, or 19.6 percent) and French (112, or 14.8 percent).¹⁷

The autobiography of Edwin Reischauer (1910–90), a distinguished scholar of Japanese studies at Harvard University and later US ambassador to Japan in the early 1960s, illustrates the segregated lifestyle of American missionaries and their families. Born in Japan in 1910 to missionary parents, Reischauer grew up close to two Japanese maids, both daughters of Christian families. The Japanese maids had a habit of calling him "little master" (*kodan'na sama*) and his older brother "young master" (*waka dai'na sama*). He claimed that his family treated these Japanese girls with respect and as equals—or perhaps "with an excess of American egalitarianism" in his own words. He admitted that these two Japanese maids were the most influential Japanese presence in his life, because he had few

17. Naimu-shō Keiho-kyoku, "Naichi kyojyū gaikokujin shoku-betsu jin'in hyō" (July 1932), in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 1 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO.

to no contacts with ordinary Japanese people. During his commute to an international school, he and his Western classmates enjoyed playing pranks on train conductors. He wrote that Western children enjoyed immunity from official reprimand without speculating why the Japanese officials did not, or could not, punish them. Reischauer did not play with Japanese children. He wrote in his autobiography that it was because the Japanese people tended to discriminate against whites, but he also confessed his parents were class-conscious and did not want their children to mingle with unsophisticated Japanese children from a lower echelon of society. As a result Reischauer had limited contact only with the children of Japanese colleagues of his parents, Japanese students who attended his English-speaking school, and children of the upper-class Japanese families whom he met on the tennis court in the exclusive summer resort of Karuizawa. He once agreed to teach English to one such boy when he was twelve, but with his ability to teach understandably limited he confessed that no genuine friendship emerged out of these unexciting lessons.¹⁸

Japanese Protestants also contributed to Japanese perceptions of America as distant and aloof. In the late nineteenth century, Japanese Protestant converts enjoyed privileged contact with the American establishment through American missionaries in Japan and formed a small but influential community bridging the Pacific. Japanese Protestants acquired a degree of American patriotism enshrined with religious fervor and adopted the American missionary sentiment toward heathen Japanese. They were trained to envision that remaking Japan in the image of Protestant America would make Japan a superior land of democracy and freedom.

In his early years, the Protestant Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930) believed that America was blessed with unprecedented levels of freedom and humanism and that America's republicanism nurtured great arts and literatures.¹⁹ Nitobe Inazō (1862–1933) saw Perry's expedition to Japan as a manifestation of God's will that the spirit of the United States should spread across the world. Nitobe believed Japan should be the first Asian nation to embrace the American mission and to help realize the American dream in Asia.²⁰ Takagi Yasaka, a protégé of Nitobe, strongly believed that the American Protestant tradition, especially manifest in conscientious individualism, provided the fundamental pillar of American

18. Edwin Reischauer, *My Life between Japan and America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 9–11, 20–21. See also the Japanese version, Tokuoka Takao, trans., *Reishkawā jiden* (Autobiography of Reischauer) (Tokyo: Bungai Shunjū Sha, 1987), 29–33, 46.

19. Kamei Shunsuke, *Uchimura Kanzō* (Tokyo: Chūko Shinsho, 1977), 53.

20. Furuya Jun, "Amerika kenkoku no rinen zou no hen'yō," in National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), ed., *Amerika kenkoku no rinen to Nichi-Bei kankei* (The founding of the United States and US-Japan relations) NIRA Report no. 940051 (Tokyo: NIRA, 1995), 89.

democracy. In order for Japan to develop liberal democracy, he felt the Japanese first had to adopt the Puritan spirit. This was a problematic thesis, because it assigned a moral precondition to the adoption of American democracy: the Japanese were not "good" enough to understand American democracy unless they accepted Protestantism. By adhering to this line of thinking, the leading Japanese Protestants separated themselves from their fellow Japanese and further contributed to the image of America's exclusivity.

The sense of oneness with the United States cultivated by Japanese Protestants was shattered when the American government moved to prohibit all Japanese immigrants based on their racial inability to assimilate into American civilization. Japanese Protestant leaders realized that under American racism all Japanese were alike, regardless of whether they were Protestant (civilized) or not (heathen). Nitobe was determined never to visit the United States again until the Immigration Act of 1924, known in Japan as the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924, was abolished. He argued that the corrupt America of his day had no redemptive Lincoln figure and insisted from this point forward that Japan alone should provide Asia, and the world, with spiritual guidance. Uchimura declared that racism was a sign of moral decline among American people, who were no longer the true scions of Puritans who built America on a belief in God, justice, and humanity for all. Uchimura stated that it was time for Japanese Christians to sever ties with corrupt American Christians and to become independent in their faith in God. Toward that goal Uchimura suggested five anti-American actions: do not migrate to the United States, do not use American-made products, do not receive American aid, do not read works published by Americans, and do not attend American churches.²¹ Such extreme proposals suggest how Uchimura's early commitment to the American ideal had a fragile foundation in his vain desire to be "equal" with the "superior" Americans.

Efforts to salvage a trans-Pacific friendship were made by Christians such as Sydney Gulick, Kagawa Toyohiko, and even Nitobe Inazō, but the limit of such attempts is embodied in the figure of Takagi Yasaka, a student of Uchimura and the founding father of American studies in Japan during this critical moment in US-Japanese relations. As a child Takagi learned about the United States from his father, a former samurai-scholar who studied at Amherst College and who became a professor of English at Gakushūin University, the exclusive institution for aristocratic and wealthy students. Takagi believed in the American Protestant tradition, especially its privileging of the individual consciousness, which provided the spiritual basis for American democracy.

21. Furuya Jun, "Amerika kenkoku no rinen zou no hen'yō," 93–95.

In 1916, on graduating from Tokyo Imperial University with a law degree, Takagi started a career at the Ministry of Finance. When A. Barton Hepburn, the American legislator and banker, offered donations in 1918 to create a professorship of American studies at Tokyo Imperial University, the school recruited Takagi to inaugurate the Hepburn professorship. The university sent him to Harvard University to earn a master's degree in American history. At Harvard he studied topics from Thomas Jefferson and Turner's frontier thesis to American economic history. Upon returning to Tokyo Imperial University in 1924 at the age of thirty-five, Takagi began teaching courses on the US constitution, history, and foreign relations. In the 1930s he wrote on the Japanese exclusion law as well as American progressivism and also became a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, serving as an ambassador of goodwill between the two nations. Impressive and expansive as his friendships with leading scholars, politicians, and businessmen in both Japan and the United States were, his scholarly works were never consistent in theme and theory and his focus on America was too diffuse to give a clear indication of his views on American-Japanese relations. Should the trans-Pacific relationship only belong to people with power and prestige? Who would define and shape the nature of such a relationship? Should it belong to Japanese Protestant converts like him? In spite of his commitment to US-Japanese friendship, Takagi's scholarly works did not answer any of these questions.

After the passage of the Japanese Exclusion Act in 1924, American-Japanese friendship ironically turned into a fashionable topic for high society, both old and new money, interested in promoting good business relationships in spite of America's anti-Japanese immigration policy. Capitalist interests (which also embraced the imperialist venture) replaced Protestant missionary zeal in the pursuit of trans-Pacific friendship. As John Dower has argued, Joseph Grew, the US ambassador to Japan from 1932 to 1942, aimed to improve friendship with Japan, but he did so by equating high society with "real" Japan and gourmet dining with democracy. Grew, with his clubbish propensity, particularly favored a circle of aristocratic, moderate, and westernized Japanese, which included the emperor, the old court, "old liberals," and "pacifists." Their upper-class tastes allowed them to bond well with their American friends.²² United States-Japanese friendship seemed to be the domain of increasingly selective groups.

The American residents' association with powerful and wealthy Japanese was most apparent in Karuizawa, Japan's premier resort town. In the late nineteenth century, American and Canadian missionaries built their own village in this serene mountain region and turned Karuizawa into their summer camp. By the

22. John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 111.

1890s Karuizawa, now a small replica of an immaculate Western community, began attracting a select group of wealthy Japanese, who hoped to emulate the Western lifestyle available there and who also enjoyed socializing with the Western residents. By the early twentieth century, Karuizawa was the Mecca of an exclusive circle of upper-class Japanese, including aristocrats and even members of the Imperial family and high-ranking government officials.

American sojourners dominated the community of Karuizawa. In 1932 foreigners owned a total of 1,096 vacation houses there: Americans owned the most (525, or 47.9 percent), followed by the British (236, or 21.5 percent) and Germans (116, or 10.6 percent). Of 217 houses in Karuizawa owned by foreigners, 116 (53.5 percent) belonged to Americans, while 51 (23.5 percent) belonged to British and 25 (11.5 percent) to Germans. Of the 525 American residents in Karuizawa, 101 were missionaries who comprised 56.1 percent of the total population of Western missionaries in Karuizawa. Sixty-one of these Americans were educators, representing 54.5 percent of the population of foreign educators in Karuizawa.²³ In Karuizawa American spirituality was juxtaposed with American wealth.

American alienation from the Japanese public is further witnessed in the life of William Merrell Vories (1881-1964), the foremost pro-Japanese American living in prewar Japanese society. A Christian missionary who came to Japan in 1905 as an English teacher at a public high school in Shiga Prefecture, Vories married a daughter of a Japanese viscount and became a naturalized Japanese citizen in January 1941. Yet he never settled into a typical Japanese life. After being fired by the school for what it called his Christian propaganda during his two-year teaching stint, Vories launched a missionary-commercial enterprise. Called "the Yankee of all Yankees" by his Christian missionary friend Kagawa Toyohiko, Vories founded the Ōmi Mission (later renamed as the Ōmi Brotherhood, Inc.), a self-sufficient community in the American colonial style on Lake Biwa, on the outskirts of the ancient capital city of Kyoto. The community contained an office for his architectural firm, a trading office to import and sell American goods, a pharmaceutical plant, a sanatorium, a hospital, schools, and a YMCA hall, among other institutions. The mission had no visible social or cultural integration with surrounding Japanese communities. Even more so than Karuizawa, the community was a transplant of America onto Japanese soil.

Vories designed such prominent buildings as the Yama-no-ue Hotel, Karuizawa Tennis Court Club House, Tōyō Eiwa Girls' High School, Meiji Gakuin, and Doshisha University (both schools founded by American Protestant missionaries

23. Tokkō-hi (Confidential: the Japanese Special Higher Police), "Karuizawa hisho gaikokujin ni kansuru ken" (Reports of foreign residents vacationing in Karuizawa) (August 16, 1932), in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 4 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO.

and that catered to upper-middle-class Japanese). He also designed more than four hundred Western-style houses—mansions, summer cottages, and ultramodern residences—for his Japanese clientele. His prominent clients included the Mitsui family (one of the *zaibatsu*); Marquis Tokugawa Yorisada, one of the great patrons of Western music in Japan; and Asabuki Tsunekichi, president of Imperial Life Insurance, the first president of the Tennis Association of Japan, and a charter member of the Tokyo Rotary Club.

As the most pro-Japanese American in the prewar period, Vories was celebrated for teaching "humanism" through his architectural styles. His humanism, blended with American pragmatism, emphasized family and individualism, sunlight and ventilation, and above all modesty in design.²⁴ All these values were meant for Japan's high society; Vories did not preach his American gospel to Japanese families who did not have the luxury of owning a mansion.

American attitudes to and practice of intermarriage made their racial isolation stand out further among the foreign Westerners. A 1927 survey conducted among 400 American and other European missionaries in Japan disclosed racial prejudice. Although 20 percent of them stated that "categorically the white race is superior to all others," a large number of them expressed opposition to interracial marriage because it resulted in biological degeneration.²⁵ Commensurate with rigid miscegenation laws in the United States, American intermarriage with Japanese citizens occurred at a much lower rate compared to other Westerners. In 1938 there were 7,577 alien residents in the Prefecture of Hyōgo, which contained the international port city of Kobe. The largest group was Chinese, (3,384 or 44.7 percent), trailed by the British (843, or 11.1 percent), German (620, or 8.2 percent), Russians/Soviet (425, or 5.6 percent), American (420, or 5.5 percent), French (137, or 1.8 percent), Canadian (90, or 1.2 percent), and Italian (69, or 0.9 percent).²⁶ According to the 1935 census of intermarriage, 16.5 percent of French (16), 13.3 percent of Swiss (13), and 11.6 percent of British (93) residents married Japanese. In contrast only 3.4 percent (13) of all American residents had Japanese spouses, only slightly higher than Chinese (2.4 percent [132]), but much

24. Yamagata Masaaki, *Bōrizu no jūitaku—denidō sareta Amerikan sutairu* (Houses Vories built—the gospel of American style) (Tokyo: Sumai no Toshokan, 1988); Yamagata Masaaki, *Bōrizu no kenchiku—Yūtopia to toshi no hana* (The architectural style of Vories—utopia and urban flowers) (Tokyo: Sōgen Sha, 1989).

25. A. Jørgensen, "Missionary Opinion on Race," *Japan Christian Quarterly* (January 1927), quoted in Carlo Caldarola, *Christianity: The Japanese Way* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979), 39. Also see Yukiko Koshiro, "Introduction—Bridging an Ocean: American Missionaries and Asian Converts Reexamined," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 5, nos. 3-4 (fall-winter 1996): 221-22.

26. "Kyojū gaikokujin kokuseki betsu jin'in hyō," in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tokai chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 1 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO.

TABLE 2.4 Percentage of intermarriages with Japanese citizens in Hyōgo Prefecture, 1935

NATIONALITY	TOTAL POPULATION	POPULATION WITH JAPANESE SPOUSES	PERCENTAGE OF INTERNATIONAL MARRIAGE
Philippines	36	9	25
France	97	16	16.5
Switzerland	98	13	13.3
Britain	805	93	11.6
Germany	508	41	8.1
India	328	15	4.6
Netherlands	177	8	4.5
US	381	13	3.4
China	5443	132	2.4
Russia/USSR	406	8	2.0

Sources: "Kyojū gaikokujin kokuseki betsu jin'in hyō," in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tokai chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 1 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO; "Gaikokujin to kekkon seru Honpōjin narabi ni konketsuji chōsa ni kansuru ken" (Reports on Japanese nationals with foreign spouses and their mixed-blood offspring) (July 22, 1935), in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tokai chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 4 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO.

lower than Germans (8.1 percent [41]). There were no marriages between American women and Japanese men, whereas 37.5 percent of French and 17 percent of German intermarriages occurred with Japanese men. There were 626 mixed-race children at the time of this census: 342 of them had Chinese, 75 British, 61 German, 20 American, 18 French, 14 Swiss, 12 Dutch, and 2 Italian heritages. No further details about their living conditions were recorded.²⁷

Robert Crowder, an English teacher from Illinois who taught at an elite Japanese high school in Kyūshū until the day of Pearl Harbor, wrote about the American tendency to establish isolated communities abroad. In Pyongyang, Korea, where he first taught English before he moved to Japan, he observed:

[In] a quiet, beautiful little city where I performed my educational duties, [t]he school buildings and staff were complete American transplants. Even the students, for the most part, were Americans—the children of missionaries and businessmen. Life within the school compound was quite pleasant, with everyone's energies concentrated on teaching the children and converting the natives. There seemed to be no interest in,

27. "Gaikokujin to kekkon seru Honpōjin narabi ni konketsuji chōsa ni kansuru ken" (Reports on Japanese nationals with foreign spouses and their mixed-blood offspring) (July 22, 1935), in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tokai chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 4 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO.

or recognition of, the art and culture of Korea. At times, I felt as though I might just as well have been living back in Bethany, Illinois, my small home town.²⁸

According to his autobiography, Crowder had good rapport with Japanese colleagues, students, and neighbors in Kyūshū. On the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as police officers escorted him down the street, shopkeepers stood at their entrances bowing and saying good-bye. A few months later when he was interned in a defunct leprosarium, a Japanese colleague from the high school passed to him through the fence a box containing his cherished gold cuff links. He shared but a few examples of his friendship with Japanese. After he returned to the United States in 1943, he never visited Japan again.

Prewar Japan did not establish its own American studies. During the Pacific War a limited readership had access to publications on American studies, but the works were neither cohesive as a field, nor were they generally of high quality.²⁹ One book that appears to have had appeal to lay readers was *Amerika seishin to Amerika Kirisuto-kyō* (The American spirit and American Christianity) by the Christian philosopher Abe Kōzō. He expressed that America's self-identification as the chosen ones drove its global expansion. While every people possess exceptionalist awareness, Abe argued, the American case had a Messianic message. Americans had a Puritan concept of themselves as the chosen people saved by God's grace and they regarded all others as sinners destined to perish, unless saved by the Americans. In other words, the Americans saw themselves as saviors of the world. Americans rationalized interactions with other peoples in politics, diplomacy, and culture as a part of a mission to rescue the sinful and to achieve God's

28. Robert Crowder, "An American's Life in Japan before and after Pearl Harbor," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 3, no. 3 (fall 1994): 260.

29. *Amerika no sekai seisha-shugi kaibō* (Dissection of the American principle of global conquest) is a collection of four scholarly essays. "Amerika ryōdo kakuchō no rinen to teikoku-shugi no dōkō" (Trends in the American principle of territorial expansionism and imperialism) by Hosoi Fujitarō, a professor at Rikkyō University, introduces three leading historians Samuel F. Bemis, Charles A. Beard, and Fred A. Shannon and their critical views of American expansionism. See *Taihei'yō Kyōkai* (The Pacific Association), ed., *Amerika no sekai seisha-shugi kaibō* (Dissection of the American principle of global conquest) (Tokyo: Taihei'yō Kyōkai Shuppan, 1944), 236–38, NDL. Also see the five-volume series on the contemporary American affairs published by Taihei'yō Kyōkai Amerika Kenkyū-shitsu (The Pacific Association, Division of American Studies) between January and June 1944. The topics covered in the series were the profiles of leading American newspaper columnists and broadcasting journalists; Wendell Willkie and his worldview reflected in his highly popular 1943 book *One World*; Field Marshal Ian Christiaan Smuts, prominent South African military leader, his worldview and its comparison with that of the United States; the summary of *Journey among Warriors*, the book of war reportage by Eve Denise Curie, the French-American journalist and also the younger daughter of Marie Curie; and the book review of Nicholas Spykman's *America's Strategy in World Politics*. See *Taihei'yō Kyōkai Amerika kenkyū-shitsu*, "Beikoku jikyoku chōsa shiryō" (Documents related to research on the US current state of affairs), in five volumes, NDL.

will. Abe claimed that this sense of "chosenness" had long since lost its religious purity and had degenerated into the Anglo-Saxon supremacist ideology that justified America's materialistic global expansion.³⁰

The Americans' exclusive and isolated lifestyle reinforced such views. American sojourners showed that they were incapable of living with the Japanese, a situation already the case on the West Coast of the United States. The popularity of Hollywood movies, musicals, jazz, and baseball among urban Japanese failed to narrow the distance between the two peoples.

Russians in Japan: The Blue-eyed Neighbors

Tanizaki Jun'ichirō, a leading writer of modern Japanese literature known for his sensual aestheticism, saw the Russians as a white people distinct from the Americans. In his early works he depicted the figure of a white Westerner as a sensual poison for Japanese culture and civilization. By the time of his *Makioka Sisters* series in 1943, he no longer characterized the friendships of Japanese protagonists with Russian residents of Kobe in this way. These Russians were no longer deviant seducers who charmed Japanese into unconditional capitulation and worship. The Japanese protagonists freely interacted with the Russians as equals.³¹ Russian whiteness did not impose psychological and physical distance on the Japanese. Russian whiteness did not preclude moral imperfection, which made Russians more accessible to Japanese.

Russians were not free of anti-Japanese racism: the concept of the Yellow Peril originated in communications between the German kaiser Wilhelm II and the Russian tsar Nicholas II in the late nineteenth century. Russian literature written around the Russo-Japanese War portrayed Japanese as simian cowards with slanted eyes and buckteeth. These portrayals, however, coincided with more complex images of Japanese people being aesthetic, spiritual, hardworking, and above all, "just like Russians."³²

30. Abe Yukizō, "Amerika seishin to Amerika Kirisuto-kyō" (The American spirit and American protestantism), in *Taihei'yō Kyōkai*, ed., *Amerika kokuminsei no kenkyū* (Studies on American national characters) (Tokyo: Taihei'yō Kyōkai Shuppan, 1944), 53–109, NDL.

31. Nakamura Yoshikazu, "Mottomo mijika na Seiyōjin" (The most intimate Westerners) in Naganawa Mitsuo and Sawada Kazuhiro, eds., *Ikyō ni ikiru—raiNichii Roshijin no sokuseki* (Living in the strange land: stories of Russians in Japan) (Yokohama: Seibun Sha, 2001), vol. 1, 8–11.

32. Barbara Heldt, "Roshia bungaku ni egakareta Nihonjin—hen'yō suru aidentiti" (Images of Japanese in Russian literature: ever-changing identities) in Nakamura Yoshikazu and Thomas Rimer, eds., *Roshia bunka to Nihon* (Russian culture and Japan) (Tokyo: Sairyū Sha, 1995), 202–22. The English version of her work appeared in Kin'ya Tsuruta, ed., *The Walls Within* (Vancouver: Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1989).

The Japanese derogatory term *Rosuke* evoked an image of the cowardly Russians beaten in the Russo-Japanese War. Yet race never became an issue in the Russo-Japanese relationship as it did in US-Japanese relations. Russian émigrés, with no residential segregations imposed on them, integrated into Japanese society with relative ease; they freely practiced Christianity and their children attended Japanese schools with local children.

Japan's continental expansion into Manchuria in the early twentieth century increased direct contacts between Japanese and Russian settlers. Between 1917 and 1921 when approximately 2 million Russians left the country due to the Bolshevik Revolution (600,000 to Germany; 400,000 to France; and the rest to the Baltic nations, the Balkans, the United States, Canada, and Australia), thousands of Russians chose to settle in the Japanese empire. The first recorded asylum seekers in Japan were five naval cadets who in December 1917 escaped from a cruiser anchored at the port of Nagasaki and in disguise took a train to Tokyo.³³ In 1922 when the League of Nations issued the Nansen Passport, an internationally recognized identity card given as emergency relief for Russian refugees unable to get ordinary passports, the Japanese government, along with thirty other governments in the world, moved to honor the cards.

By 1924 there were 1,167 "white" (anti-Bolshevik) Russian settlers in Japan proper, according to Foreign Ministry records. At the Russian immigration peak in 1930, 1,666 Russian refugees resided in Japan proper. Since there were probably more Russians than indicated by the official figure, some 2,000 Russians were thought to have been living in Japan before World War II.³⁴ Another 1,500 Russians, including those of Slavic, Ukrainian, Belarus, Tatar, Serbian, Polish, Romanian, and Jewish descents, spread across the Japanese empire, from Korea and southern Sakhalin to Manchuria. In addition to these political refugees, approximately 200 Russians chose to remain in the southern half of Sakhalin when that part of the island became a Japanese colony after the Russo-Japanese War.

Russian émigrés arrived in Japan amid the high tide of Taishō culture. It was a fortunate coincidence that by then the Japanese people had cultivated a positive image of Russia from a successful theatrical adoption of Tolstoy's play *Resurrection* and its theme song "Kachūsha no uta" (Song of Katyusha), which became a national hit.³⁵ The Russian émigrés brought a medley of Western culture and

quickly won for themselves the affectionate phrase "*noi me no*" (blue-eyed), establishing their unique place in Japan. The early wave of Russian refugees (1917–23) came largely from a bourgeois background in Imperial Russia, some even from aristocratic families. The second wave of the refugees (1923–45) consisted largely of commoners—peasants, retail store owners, peddlers—who subsequently took up similar occupations in Japan. These heterogeneous groups of emigrants brought to Japan two different, yet commensurable, worlds of Russia: the dazzling aristocratic cultures of Saint Petersburg and Moscow, best represented in ballet, opera, and classical music and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, the humble ethos of hard-working Russian laborers and peasants. Compared with the relatively homogenous community of American residents in Japan, these Russians presented far wider and richer aspects of the West through their interactions with Japanese from different social and economic strata.

In Japan Russians became renowned artists and entertainers. Russian pianists and violinists performed for Japanese audiences, and trained future Japanese artists. Emmanuel Metter became conductor of the Osaka Philharmonic Orchestra and trained future conductors and composers such as Asahina Takashi and Hattori Ryōichi. The Takarazuka Revue Company (Takarazuka Kagekidan), an all-female musical theater troupe founded in 1914, hired Russian émigré musicians and dancers as both performers and instructors.

Not all Russians in Japan were refugees. Anna Slavina and her daughters Ekaterina and Nina, all with theatrical backgrounds in Tsarist Russia, contributed to the birth of modern theater and film in Japan. Anna Slavina was originally discovered and recruited in Pusan, Korea, in 1917 by Shōkyokusai Tenkatsu, the celebrated Japanese magician, during her international tour. Arriving in Japan as new members of Tenkatsu's troupe, she and her daughter Ekaterina (Kitty) subsequently founded the Slavina Theatrical Company (Slavina Gekidan) and traveled across Japan, performing Western dramas and dances.

Ekaterina Slavina began a career as a white (Western) film star in the pioneering era of Japanese cinema. Ekaterina's lead performance as a Westerner was epoch-making in an age when Japanese actors and actresses played Westerners by using false big noses and light-colored wigs. A fluent Japanese speaker, Ekaterina played leads in films that celebrated international (and interracial) friendship and romance. *Hikari ni tatsu on'na* (A woman standing in light, 1920) is a melodrama about a refugee actress from Russia; *Kōzan no himitsu* (Secret of a mining mountain, 1920) is an action film about a labor dispute in the vicinity of Tokyo; and *Kyōkkō no kanata e* (Beyond the aurora, 1921) is a romance between a young

33. Petr E. Podalko, "Roshiyujin wa ikani shite rai-Nichi shitaka" (How the Russians came to live in Japan), in Nakamura Yoshikazu, Nagatsuma Mitsuo and Nagayo Susumu, eds., *Ikyō ni ikiru—rai-Nichi Roshiyujin no sakuseki* (Yokohama: Seibun Sha, 2003), vol. 2, 38–39.

34. Sawada Kazuhiko, "Nihon ni okeru Hakkei Roshiyujin no bunka-teki eikyō" (Cultural influence of the White Russians in Japan), *Ikyō ni ikiru*, vol. 1, 31.

35. Okumura Katsuzō, "Nichi-Ro no bunka kōryū" (Russo-Japanese cultural interactions), in *Roshia bunka to kindai Nihon* (Russian culture and modern Japan) (Tokyo: Sekai Shisō Sha, 1998),

10–12. Note this song, composed by a Japanese musician, is unrelated to "Katyusha," a famous Russian wartime song composed in 1938.

Japanese pioneer and a Western woman in snow-buried Kamchatka. The third film ends with Ekaterina and her Japanese lover (played by Moroguchi Tsuzuya, Japan's most popular actor of the time) kissing and celebrating their love and future together. Though this closing scene featured only silhouettes on snow, this film was among the first Japanese films to have a kissing scene. According to post-1945 mythology, the US military occupation introduced kissing scenes to Japanese films to emancipate the Japanese people from oppressive social mores.³⁶ This Russian actress took a step in that direction long before World War II. In 1923 Ekaterina and her sister Nina played leads in *Otenba musume* (Tomboys), a comedy about the clash between wild Japanese sisters who always play pranks and Western sisters who behave like traditional upper-class Japanese ladies. The film critics praised the Slavina sisters for perfectly performing the role of *yamato nadeshiko* (quintessential Japanese ladies, both spiritually and in appearance).

In 1926 after receiving legal permission to live in Japan, Ekaterina learned traditional Japanese dance and eventually became the first Westerner to receive an official license to teach Japanese apprentices.³⁷ Meanwhile, when the Shōchiku Kinema, Japan's leading motion-picture studio, opened an acting school in 1920, Anna, mother of Ekaterina, was invited to be the school director and to teach Japanese actors and actresses how to act with more sophisticated-looking Western mannerisms, from walking and eating to moving around in Western clothes. In 1921 and 1922 she produced, directed, and performed *Salome* at the prestigious Meiji Theater, inspiring the team of Shimamura Hōgetsu and Matsui Sumako, who later revised the work and performed it to national acclaim at the Teikoku Theater in 1931.

Russian émigrés also introduced Western foods. Nakamura-Ya, a high-profile bakery in Shinjuku, the bustling commercial district in Tokyo whose owners were known for their patronage of writers and artists and even political refugees from abroad, hired Russian émigré bakers, including one pâtissier who had once served at the tsarist court. They introduced Russian cakes, bread, and piroshki to urban Japanese families. Fuji-Ya, a nationwide chain of Western confectionery stores and restaurants founded in 1910, also flourished thanks to the skill of a Russian pâtissier it hired. A pâtissier who had once served the Romanovs, Makarov

36. Kyoko Hirano, *Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo: Japanese Cinema under the American Occupation, 1945-1952* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), 154-65. Also see John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 149-50.

37. Sawada Kazuhiko, "Nihon ni okeru Hakkei Roshiajin no bunka-teki eikyō," *Ikyō ni ikiru*, vol. 1, 37-38. Sawada Kazuhiko, "Joyū Surabina oyako no tabiji—rat-Nichi Hakkei Roshiajin kenkyū" (Journey of the Slavinas—a study of the White Russians in Japan), *Saitama Daigaku Kiyō* (Saitama University Review) 32, no. 1 (1996): 77-95.

Goncharoff, fled the Bolshevik Revolution, settled in Japan, and opened his sweets shop in Kobe in 1923. He eventually expanded his business to the Tokyo area. After a failed attempt to relocate to Seattle, the Morozoff family also arrived in Kobe in 1925. Valentine Morozoff popularized chocolates, candies, and other Western-style confections as part of Japan's new urban culture. Their "baby bars," a chocolate with a concocted filling of peanuts, honey, egg whites, millet jelly and sugar, remained popular with Japanese consumers through the 1930s.³⁸ The Goncharoff and the Cosmopolitan (of Valentine Morozoff) Confectionaries remain highly regarded establishments in Japan today.

In sports the most famous blue-eyed professional athlete in prewar Japan was Victor Starffin (1918-57), a pitcher for Japan's top baseball team the Tokyo Giants. He arrived in Japan with his family in 1925 and attended Japanese schools from elementary to high school. In spite of the strong desire of his school and local fans to see him play for elite Waseda University, Starffin joined the Tokyo Giants and turned professional. He became one of the best and most popular professional baseball players of the time. In 1935 he went to the United States as a member of the Tokyo Giants and played a total of 110 games against AA, AAA teams, and even amateur teams, with a result of 75 wins, 34 losses, and 1 tie. Starffin, a tall blond who spoke native Japanese with Japanese mannerisms, drew attention from the American media and curious spectators alike. The San Francisco Missions of the Pacific Coast League unsuccessfully tried to recruit Starffin as a potential star pitcher in the major leagues. In 1939 and 1940 he received consecutive MVPs of the year and kept playing baseball until 1944.³⁹ Another son of Russian refugees in Hokkaidō, A. Vorobyov became a star wrestler at Waseda University and eventually won Japan's middleweight championship in 1936.⁴⁰

The socioeconomic status of Russians in Japan contrasted starkly with that of other Westerners. The majority of Russian émigrés were of modest to low socioeconomic status, some even held menial jobs, an unlikely phenomenon among other Westerners, especially Americans. Only twenty-five Russians regularly summered in Karuizawa in three shared cottages. If the Russians could afford summer

38. Kawamata Kazuhide, *Kosmopolitan monogatari: since 1926* (A story of the cosmopolitan: since 1926) (Hyōgo: Cosmopolitan Seika, 1990).

39. After World War II, he temporarily worked for the office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) but returned to professional baseball in 1947. In 1955 he won 300 games as a pitcher, setting the all-time record in Japan's baseball history. Today in Asahikawa, Hokkaidō a baseball stadium is named "Starffin Stadium," the first one in Japan named after an individual player. Natasha Starffin, *Roshia kara kira ōsu* (An ace pitcher from Russia) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 1986); Ushijima Hidechiko, *Fūsetsu Nihon yakūi—V. Starffin* (V. Starffin—stormy years of Japanese baseball) (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbun, 1978).

40. Sawada Kazuhiko, "Nihon ni okeru Hakkei Roshiajin no bunka-teki eikyō," 40-41.

houses at all, they tended to be in Japanese residential areas near Tokyo such as Kamakura, Miura, Hayama, Odawara, and Ashigara, affordable excursions for ordinary Japanese.⁴¹

This modest image dovetailed with the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Since the first Russian missionary arrived in Japan in 1861, the Russian Orthodox Church and the missionaries had been especially active in impoverished villages in northern Japan. They recruited about 30,000 Japanese converts, another sharp contrast to the association of American Protestant churches with upper-middle-class Japanese in large cities. As of 1907 the ratio of financial contributions made by individual Japanese members of the American Methodist Church and the Russian Orthodox Church was approximately nine to one.⁴² While schools run by American churches emphasized English education, the first Russian Orthodox theological school in Japan, founded by Nicholas (1836–1912), offered courses on Japanese history and classical Chinese, demonstrating sensitivity to its Japanese surroundings.⁴³

A statistical look at Russians living in Japan confirms their diverse and relatively humble lifestyles. In 1924, 818 Russians legally worked in Japan, most as heads of families. Only 26 of them (3.2 percent) were educators, followed by 8 engineers, and 14 traders and businessmen. The rest, scattered across Japan, worked in low-paying jobs as bakers, peddlers, dressmakers, shopkeepers, ranchers, fishermen, entertainers, musicians, and servants. A typical occupation for Russian émigrés was peddling. Carrying on their backs textiles, including kimono, they went door to door in towns and villages, even in Tokyo. They most commonly carried *rashia*, a woolen fabric used for winter clothes such as jackets, coats, shawls, and throws. The Russian peddlers were good at charming Japanese clients with their exotic appearance and their spoken Japanese. They looked like *connoisseurs*, even when they were not, especially when they sold modern (Western) items such as fabrics, watches, and cosmetics.⁴⁴ In southern Sakhalin writers and journalists were drawn to the Russians because they made the otherwise indifferent environment cosmopolitan. Renowned literary figures such as Kitahara Hakushū and Iwano Hōmei

41. "Gai-hi dai-1366-gō, Shōwa 7-nen 8-gatsu 15-nichi Kanagawa-Ken-Chiji Yokoyama Suke-nari, 'Hisho gaikokujin jōkyō (dai-3-pō),' " (Confidential foreign affairs report, no. 1366, August 15, 1932, Yokoyama Suke-nari, the Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture, "A survey of foreign residents on summer vacations [the 3rd Report]" in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 4 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO.

42. Naganawa Mitsuo, "Meiji no Seikyōkai" (The Russian Orthodox Church in Meiji Japan) in Nakamura and Rimer, eds., *Roshia bunka to Nihon*, 257.

43. Douglas Weiner, "Sogo Imēji no henka" (Changes in mutual images) in Nakamura and Rimer, eds., *Roshia bunka to Nihon*, 287.

44. Pett E. Podalko, "Roshijajin wa ikani shite raiNichi shitaka," in Nakamura, Naganawa and Nagayo, eds., *Ikyō ni ikiru* vol. 2, 42.

wrote about Russian children peddling sweet breads in baskets at train stations as if these were scenes from Hans Christian Andersen's tales, which were very popular among Japanese, young and old.⁴⁵

The Russians' predominantly working-class employment pattern continued during the Pacific War. Statistics of the foreign population of Tokyo in 1942 and 1943 listed some fifty-seven Russian tailors, beauticians, fur traders, factory workers, bakers at the Imperial Hotel, a janitor at the TōA Kenkyūjo, and their families. Four Russians attended Tokyo Imperial University, the Nippon Dental University (Nihon Shika Daigaku), Waseda University, and the Jikei University School of Medicine (Tokyo Jikei Kai Ika Daigaku).⁴⁶

The rich diversity of their lifestyles could be seen in Hakodate. Hokkaidō, one of the earliest ports opened to Western trade in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1917 only 10 or so Russians resided in this port city; by 1925 the official figure had increased to 157. Hakodate served as a port of entry for asylum seekers who smuggled themselves on board fishing and cannery ships. At the peak approximately 300 Russians lived in and around Hakodate. Most Russians who settled in Hakodate were engaged in the fishing industry. Some Russian women became spouses of Japanese traders and fishermen. In the nearby villages of Yugawa and Zenjamezawa settled the Russian Old Believers, who followed the rituals predating the reform of the Russian Orthodox Church in the seventeenth century. Harshly persecuted under the tsars, many fled into the Far East in the eighteenth century and lived in isolation for centuries. Some of them eventually reached Hakodate. They settled there as self-sufficient farmers and apiculturists and sold homemade bread and raspberry jam to Japanese locals.⁴⁷

Russian residents were not free from Japanese government surveillance. A governor of Gifu Prefecture sent the Special Higher Police (Tokkō) a report of a thirty-seven-year-old white Russian émigré, a peddler of pots and pans, who had on November 29, 1934, arrived in Nakatsugawa, a post town and an important local market and retail center during the Edo period. The official record introduced his detailed background as follows: born in Kazan, the capital city of Tatarstan, this Russian émigré had once served in the tsar's army. Losing his family in the Bolshevik Revolution, he had escaped to Manchuria where he began peddling pots and pans. After he arrived in Japan in 1927, he made his living traveling

45. Shimizu Megumi, "Saharin kara Nihon e no bōmeisha" (Exiles from Sakhalin to Japan), in Naganawa and Sawada, eds., *Ikyō ni ikiru*, vol. 1, 79.

46. "Zairyū gaikokujin meibo (1942 and 1943)," in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 4 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO.

47. Shimizu Megumi, "Roshia Kakumei-go Hakodate ni kita Roshijin," in Shimizu Megumi, *Hakodate Roshia sono kōryū no kiseki* (History of interactions between Hakodate and Russia) (Hakodate: Hakodate Nichi-Ro Kōryū-shi Kenkyū-kai, 2005), 323.

around the nation. On this particular tour he had left Tokyo two months before, peddled in Nagano, and come to Gifu via Kiso, a region he had visited twice the previous year as well. The report concluded that there was nothing particularly suspicious about his identity and activities.⁴⁸

Even other Westerners thought the Russian émigrés were different. Edwin Reischauer reminisced about his childhood days in Tokyo: "I remember at the age of five looking down from the deck of our ship docking in San Francisco and being astounded at the sight of white men working as stevedores and black men mixed among them. At that time almost the only Westerners in Japan were missionaries, teachers, diplomats, businessmen, and occasional tourists. I had never seen a white man doing manual labor, unless one counts the occasional forlorn Russian refugee who would trudge the streets of Tokyo selling cloth from a large pack on his shoulder."⁴⁹

The contrast between the Russians and other Westerners also existed in Japan's colonies. Korea as of 1936 had 698 Western residents with jobs, the largest group being the Americans (322), the second the British (122), both far more than the white Russians and Soviet citizens combined (112). Of these Americans in Korea, 166 (51.6 percent) were Christian missionaries, accounting for 47.7 percent of all the Western Christian missionaries combined. The remaining Americans in Korea were teachers (66), businessmen (44), medical doctors (22) and nurses (12), engineers (11), and a government official (1). The British residents shared a similar pattern of occupations.⁵⁰ In Taiwan as of 1936 there were 203 aliens (excluding the Chinese) with jobs, 108 of them British, 16 Americans, and 12 Russians.⁵¹ All British and American residents in Taiwan were missionaries, teachers, bankers, traders and businessmen, doctors and nurses, or government officials. None was a menial laborer.

Russian settlers, male and female, held a diverse array of jobs across the Japanese colonies. In 1937 the Kwantung leased territory (Kantō-shū) had a total of 1,808 foreigners. 1,197 of them were white Russians and 136 Soviets, together comprising 73.7 percent of all foreigners. Of white-collar workers, there were Russian Orthodox Church missionaries (17), bankers and businessmen (65), engineers (18), and employees of the Manchurian Railway (22). Beyond these

48. "Tokkō hi hatsu dai-1850-gō" (The Special Higher Police, undisclosed origin, no. 1850) (December 6, 1934), in "Sorenpo naisei kankei zaissan—Hakkai Rokokujin no seiji katsudō" (Miscellaneous data on Soviet politics—political activities of White Russians), vol. 3 [A-6-5-0-1-2], DRO.

49. Reischauer, *My Life between Japan and America*, 3-4. See also the Japanese version, Tokutaka Takao, trans., *Raishawā jiden*, 22.

50. The Chinese population was 12,510 (86.4 percent), comprising the majority of foreigners in Korea.

51. "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 1 [K-3-7-0-15]. Also see vol. 2 [K-3-7-0-15-1], DRO.

TABLE 25 Employment patterns of Russian émigrés in Japan proper, 1924-38*

1924		1932		1937-38	
Category	Count	Category	Count	Category	Count
Educators	26	Missionaries	17	Nurse	2
Students	4	Educators	17	Entertainers	8
Engineers	8	Traders/bankers	50	Dressmaker	11
Merchants	50	Engineers	4	Tanner	3
Traders/bankers	14	Musicians	15	Fur trader	1
Kimono peddlers	32	Dress peddlers	133	Dress shop clerks	1
Textile peddlers	209	Kimono peddlers	55	Grocery store clerks	9
Ranchers	10	Textile peddlers	81	Bakers	1
Fishermen	5	Dress makers	29	Cosmetics clerks	2
Entertainers	5	Bakers	5	Jewelry store clerk	2
Dancers	3	Typists	5	Dress peddlers	1
Musicians	15	Baseball player	1	Cosmetics peddlers	12
Servants	17	Musicians	2	Textile peddlers	6
		Masseurs	2	Food peddler	1
		Blanket peddlers	2	Servants	2
		Dressmakers	5		

Sources: "Naiichi zairyū gaikokujin shokugyō betsu jin'in hyō" (Statistical chart of foreign residents and their occupations in Japan proper) (1924) (1932), both in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 1 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO; "Zairyū gaikokujin kokuseki betsu shokugyō-hyō no ken" (Chart of foreign residents sorted by nationality and occupation) (April 1937), in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 2 [K-3-7-0-15-1], DRO.

* Job categories are not comprehensive; figures exclude the employees' families and dependents.

categories, there were music and language teachers (17), musicians (6), dancers (18), shop clerks (84), waiters and waitresses (24), security guards (41), barber (1) and manicurists (5), touts and barkers (*kyakuhiki*) (24), confectioners (9), food dealers (7), restaurant owners (6), cooks (3), landlords and innkeepers (40), peddlers (5), poultry farmers (6), milk farmers (5), tailors and seamstresses (29), rasha traders (3) and leather traders (24).⁵² Of the 58 American citizens living in the Kwantung leased territory, 31 were white-collar workers, 8 Christian missionaries, and 4 government officials. In the southern part of Sakhalin in 1937, 167 out of 327 foreigners were Russians, 50 were peasants, 9 merchants, 7 day laborers, 6 fox farmers, 5 clothing retailers, and the rest peddlers, shoemakers, bakers, students and unemployed.⁵³ Even in Saipan, a Japanese mandate since 1919, several Russian émigrés peddled razors, hair clippers, cosmetics, and clothes. One of them was a former police chief in Tsarist Russia who had come to Kobe with his family after the Bolshevik Revolution but moved to Saipan alone. He sublet a room from the local Chamorro family, frequented a Japanese owned café and bakery, and enjoyed chatting with the locals.⁵⁴

In Manchukuo, the Russian population was on the rise. In 1933, out of 85,044 Westerners living in Manchukuo including the Kwantung region, 43,050 were Russians. After the Soviet Union recognized Manchukuo in 1935 and pledged nonintervention, Japanese officials in Manchukuo welcomed more Russian émigrés, some stateless and some with Chinese citizenship, to enrich the social and cultural life of Manchukuo with Western flair. In 1936, while the number of Western residents dropped to 67,355, the Russian population increased to 53,603. Soviet citizens resided alongside Russian émigrés: in 1933 there were 38,396 and in 1936 there were 10,168.⁵⁵

American visitors to Manchukuo were both shocked and impressed by such Japanese-Russian interactions, which upset their concepts of race relations. In Manchukuo white men worked for less than yellow men. In Harbin hotels white Russian boys worked as elevator boys and courteously greeted Japanese guests.⁵⁶ In the 1930s a growing number of Japanese-Americans in the mainland United

52. "Zairyū gaikokujin kokuseki betsu shokugyō hyō (Showa 12-nen 12-gatsu matsu genzai)" (A table of a number of foreign residents in Japan in various occupations, tabulated by nationality [December 1937]), vol. 2 [K-3-7-0-15-1], DRO.

53. "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 1 [K-3-7-0-15], DRO.

54. Nomura Shin, *Nihon-ryō Saipan no ichinan-nichii* (Ten thousand days in the Japanese mandated Island of Saipan) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), 136–37.

55. Kajii Yoshihiro, "Igrisu kara mita Nihon no Manshū shihai: senkan-ki gaikō hōkoku o chūshin ni (1)" (Japan's control of Manchukuo observed by Britain, with an analytical focus on the interwar annual reports), *Ritsumeikan Hōgaku* (Ritsumeikan Law Review) 290 (2003): 48–49.

56. John Stephan, "Hijacked by Utopia: American Nikkei in Manchuria," *Amerasia Journal* 23, no. 3 (winter 1997–98): 9.

States and Hawaii regarded emigration to Manchukuo as providing better career prospects. There they could live not just free from white domination but also as the master race.

In Manchuria sexual liaisons between Japanese males and Russian females were not taboo. The city of Harbin was known for "hospitable" blond and blue-eyed Russian girls who welcomed Japanese clients in fluent Japanese.⁵⁷ In *Modern Gāru* (Modern girl), a collection of essays published in 1926, American-educated journalist Kiyosawa Kiyoshi in one essay portrayed the lifestyle of American women with due deference to feminism. In another he wrote of accompanying his male Japanese friends to a Harbin club where fair-skinned Russian dancers, hostesses, and café waitresses—as well as Jewish, Japanese, and Chinese women—entertained guests. While reiterating his opposition to prostitution (Kiyosawa had gone to the United States under the influence of Uchimura Kanzō, Japan's pioneering Protestant), Kiyosawa nonetheless admitted that he felt an inexplicable freedom in Harbin, where there was no stifling Anglo-Saxon morality, but only easy interactions among Russians, Japanese, and Chinese.⁵⁸

Russian intermarriage with Japanese was not forbidden, but in Japan proper almost no Russians married Japanese citizens, because most Russian émigrés came to Japan as families. According to the 1935 statistics of Hyōgo Prefecture, only 8 of 406 Russian residents were married to Japanese.⁵⁹ In Manchukuo interracial marriage existed between Japanese (and Japanese-Americans) and white Russians, at the time prohibited in California and many other states.⁶⁰ The author of a 1942 Japanese travelogue on northern Manchuria speculated that the more distinctly Russian character of these interracial households could be attributed to the Japanese command of Russian language and culture, which he called a sure sign of Japanese continental expansion. The author also explained that Russian families welcomed interracial marriages because of the prospect of social and economic security. Although the author raised concerns about the hybridization of Japanese race and culture, he affectionately portrayed Russian-Japanese children playing with Manchu children, wishing them a better future.⁶¹

57. Bungei Shunjū, ed., *Sarezo waga "Manshū"* (My Manchuria nonetheless) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū Sha, 1984). See, for example, "Harubin no on'na" (Women of Harbin), 45–46.

58. Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, "Modern gāru" (Modern girl) reprinted in Yamamoto Yoshihiko, ed., *Kiyosawa Kiyoshi senishū* (Tokyo: Nihon Toshō Center, 1998), vol. 1.

59. "Gaikokujin to kekkon seru Honpōjin narabi ni konketsuji chōsa ni kansuru ken" (Reports on Japanese nationals with foreign spouses and their mixed-blood offspring) (July 22, 1935), in "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken" (Miscellaneous statistical data on foreign residents in Japan), vol. 4 [K-3-7-0-15]; "Zai Honpō gaikokujin ni kansuru tōkei chōsa zakken zairyū gaikokujin kokuseki betsu jin'in hyō," vol. 1 [K-3-7-0-15-1], DRO.

60. John Stephan, "Hijacked by Utopia," 22.
61. Fukuda Shinsai, *Hoku-Man no Roshia buraku* (The Russian village in northern Manchuria) (Tokyo: Tama Shobō, 1942), 208–17.

Russians in Japan's Pan-Asianism

Japan's anti-Americanism, epitomized in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the suicidal kamikaze attacks, has been mistaken for Japan's absolute anti-Western and antiwhite stance in the war. Japan's Greater East Asia War was waged against Anglo-America as a racial and cultural clash (*jinsū-teki shōtotsu*), a nationalistic competition (*minizoku taikō*) between the Yamato and Anglo-American races (*minizoku*). Only in 1944 did the Japanese government ban steel guitars, banjos and ukuleles—all uniquely American (and Hawaiian) instruments. In October of the same year, the Greater East Asia Symphonic Orchestra (DaiTōA Kōkyō Gakudan) of Japan performed Bach's violin concerto and excerpts from Bizet's *Carmen* and *L'Arlésienne* at the Hibiya Public Auditorium in central Tokyo. The Japanese did not have a problem with Western culture per se.

The axis alliance with Germany, and to a lesser extent with Italy, testified to Japan's cultural resilience during the war. The Japanese government emphasized that Japan's European allies—the Teutonic (Germans) and Latins (Italians)—shared an enthusiasm for totalitarianism, which challenged the Anglo-American claim that Western civilization fought in unison for democracy.⁶² Far from hoping to build a new "pure" Asia by excluding the West, Japan aspired to demonstrate that their Eurasian empire could fuse East and West.

Russian collaboration would add credibility to such aspirations and help authenticate Japan's pan-Asianism. Valentine Morozoff, the owner of the confectory shop in Kobe, gave a patriotic speech shortly after Pearl Harbor and was quoted by a Japanese police report: "I feel as if I am bathed in the brilliant Japanese sunshine now that Japan is finally ready to wage war after the gloom of economic sanctions and psychological warfare. Anglo-America had long told us about the invincibility of Singapore and Pearl Harbor. But only yesterday we heard the news that their bases bowed to the superior naval force of Japan, so we are overjoyed."⁶³ Whether this was a sincere expression or a carefully crafted political comment to demonstrate his loyalty to the Japanese government is unknown. As soon as the Pacific War began, Japanese authorities suspected the Russian émigrés in Hokkaidō of betraying Japan and committing espionage for other nations because of the island's strategic location in relation to the Soviet

Union and the United States (via Alaska).⁶⁴ Some Russians in Nagasaki were interrogated and imprisoned by the police simply because they hosted Russians visiting from Harbin.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, during the war Russian émigrés in Japan were a valuable asset that gave Japan's pan-Asianism the luster of universalism and cosmopolitanism. Their whiteness was not dissonant with Japan's professed goal in the war. In fact, Japanese officials elicited significant contributions from Russian artists to the cause of Japan's pan-Asianism.

Two Russian ballerinas, Elena Pavlova and Olga Sapphire, incorporated Japan's pan-Asianism into their work. Elena Pavlova, the "mother of Japanese ballet," was born to an aristocratic family in present-day Tbilisi, Georgia, and arrived in Japan in 1919 with her family. She instantly became a star through her performance of Camille Saint-Saens' *Dying Swan*. Having performed at the Kiev Opera House and also the Mariinsky Theater in St. Petersburg, she opened Japan's first classical ballet school near Kamakura, and trained future Japanese principal dancers while remaining active as both a dancer and a choreographer.⁶⁶ When not teaching at her school, Elena toured Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. In public appearances she preferred to wear a kimono to accentuate her assimilation into Japanese culture. Devoted to the Russian tsar, Elena respected the Japanese emperor and applied for Japanese citizenship in 1931. In 1937 when all the members of her family also became naturalized in Japan, Elena adopted a Japanese name, Kirishima Eriko. On November 2, 1937, when Elena gave a ballet recital at the Soldiers Hall (Gunjin Kaikan) near the Imperial Palace to celebrate her family acquiring Japanese nationality, she pledged to the audience that she would continue to devote all of her talent to imperial Japan. Around this time she began to experiment with blending Western and Japanese dance. In November 1938 she choreographed and danced an original work *Ume* (Plum), a Japanese-style expression performed to Japanese and Western musical instruments. In January and November 1940 Elena danced two other new works *Oriental Fantasy* and *Goddess of Justice*. In March 1941 at the request of the Japanese Army, Elena began a northern China tour with a troupe of twelve Japanese ballerinas, musicians, and entertainers. Elena danced standard works of classical Western ballet and also improvised dances to Japanese folk songs and children's songs. It was reported that Japanese soldiers were moved

64. Shimizu Megumi, "Saharin kara Nihon e no bōmei—Shūetsu-ke o chūshin ni" ("The Shvets family's exile from Sakhalin to Japan), in *Ikyō ni ikiru*, vol. 1, 83–84.

65. "Lyubōfi Semyōnobuna Shūetsu san ni kiku" (Interview with Lyubov Semyonova Shvets, conducted by Shimizu Megumi), in *Ikyō ni ikiru*, vol. 2, 19.

66. Akiko Tachiki, "Living with Japanese Ballet History: An interview with Asami Maki, artistic director of Asami Maki Ballet Company and the New National Theatre Ballet, Tokyo," available online at www.pcah.us/m/dance/living-with-japanese-ballet-history.pdf.

62. Suzuki Norihisa, "Gen-Taisen no hongon kentō" (Examination of the fundamental cause of the current world war), *Gaiikō Jihō* (Diplomatic review) 940 (February 1, 1944): 12.

63. Shimizu Megumi, "Dai-Niji Sekai Taisen-ki no Hakket Roshajin no dōkō" (Conditions of the White Russians during World War II), in Namamura Yoshikazu, Yasui Ryōhei, Nagawanwa Mitsuo and Nagayo Susumu, eds., *Ikyō ni ikiru* (Yokohama: Seibun Sha, 2005), vol. 3, 71–80.

to tears, in particular by her forte *Dying Swan*. On May 2, 1941, she suddenly died of tetanus at forty-four. As a civilian employee of the Imperial Army, she received posthumous honors from the Japanese government.⁶⁷

Olga Sapphire, who studied and danced lead at the Leningrad National Ballet Academy, came to Japan in 1936 as the wife of a Japanese diplomat she met in Moscow. While her husband quit the Japanese Foreign Ministry after they married and began a two-year teaching position at the Harbin Institute, Olga, now a naturalized Japanese citizen through marriage, began a promising career as a ballet instructor in Japan and became the only Western performer at the renowned Nihon Theater (Nichigeki) in Tokyo. As Japan's prima donna she specialized in the Russian classical repertoire but also performed Japanese dances. In May 1938 she choreographed and directed a new two-act program, *Tōyō no inshō* (Impressions of the Orient). She announced this new production would raise Japan's artistic standards to the Western level so that Japan could prove a worthy leader of the Orient. Throughout the Pacific War she regularly performed classical ballet programs at the Nichigeki. In October 1942 she danced the lead in *Scheherazade* at the sold-out Takarazuka Theater, seating capacity 2,810. In the fall of 1943, in what would be her last wartime stage appearance, she danced a new production, *Burmese Peacock*, celebrating the independence Japan had "awarded" Burma.⁶⁸

In Manchukuo, where the national policy rhetorically upheld the cosmopolitan ideal of harmonious cooperation among the five races—the Manchu, Han Chinese, Mongol, Korean, and Japanese peoples—the Japanese officials hoped that the Russian émigrés would play a role as the sixth racial group in the state. Japanese officials and settlers appreciated the Eurasian dimension of Manchukuo provided by Russians in social, cultural, literary, and racial enterprises. Since Russian settlers in the late nineteenth century had developed the regions along the Chinese Eastern Railway (also known as the North Manchuria Railway), Russian influences in architecture and city planning were prominent. Harbin in particular had the ambiance of a European town. The colonial authority of Manchukuo welcomed Russians with its rhetoric of racial harmony and actively promoted the presence of Russians as evidence of its cosmopolitanism. Tourist pamphlets published by the South Manchuria Railway Company presented Harbin for its charming and rich Russian influences.⁶⁹ Postcards of Harbin depicted

67. Sorada Harumitsu, *Hiakuchō no shūshū Elena Pavlova* (Elena Pavlova, the Swan) (Tokyo: Yuri-kago Sha, 1997), 95ff; Shirahama Ken'ichirō, *Shichirigahama Pavlova Kan* (The Pavlova Mansion at Shichirigahama) (Tokyo: Bun'en Sha, 1986), 186ff.

68. Satō Toshiko, *Kitaguni kara no barerina—Origa Sapphire* (Olga Sapphire: The Ballerina from the northern country) (Tokyo: Kasumigaseki Shuppan, 1987).

69. Institute of Developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO), Library Digital Archives, Special Internet Exhibition "Kin-gendan Ajia no naka no Nihon (Japan in

Russian churches, stores, hotels, Russian festivals, Russians enjoying parks and rivers, and Japanese people merrily shopping with Russians and dining with Russians at a posh Western-style restaurant.⁷⁰ These scenes were chosen to show the Japanese empire happily blending with the West.

Japanese settlers and city planners in these regions actively preserved distinctive Russian tastes. The *pechka*, a Russian-style fireplace, was commonly adopted in Japanese homes as a reminder of Russian influence. Postwar memoirs of Japanese settlers in Manchukuo reflect on their friendships with Russian neighbors with affection. One Japanese woman remembered an elderly Russian couple who served her tea from a samovar whenever she slipped into their kitchen by the backdoor. Another former Japanese settler cherished the memory of two young Russian brothers whose father owned a Russian restaurant in Hsinking (Changchun): they were enrolled in a Japanese school and were very popular with their Japanese classmates. A former Japanese resident in Dalian fondly remembered a Russian family whose Easter celebration was the most anticipated event among her Japanese neighbors.⁷¹

Japanese authorities in Manchukuo welcomed and encouraged Russian musical talents, manifested in sacred chants, Kazak choirs, and symphonic orchestras, as enrichments of Manchukuo's cultural and ethnic diversity. The Harbin Organization (Harubin Kikan), one of the special service organizations under the auspices of the Kwantung Army, aimed to strengthen nostalgia for the old Russia and to encourage Russian residents to hope for a reconstruction of anti-Bolshevik Russia. They coordinated various arts and entertainment programs for émigré theaters and philharmonic orchestras and helped advertise them in newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts.

In addition, Manchukuo also invited some 8,000 Russian peasants to the Sanga (Transbaikal) region. The most distinctive group among them was the Stavroery, or the Russian Old Believers. In the early 1930s some of them had left the Primorsky Region in opposition to the Soviet collectivization of farmlands, crossed the

Modern and Contemporary Asia). See "Harubin (1927)," "Harubin (1937)," and "Harubin An'nai (1942)." Available online at http://d-arch.ide.go.jp/asia_archive/rare/travel.html.

70. See the collection of postcards of "Harubin," "Harubin sono 2," "Harubin sono 3," and "Harubin sono 4," in "Manshū Shashin-kan (Photo Studio of Manchuria)," available online at <http://www.geocities.jp/ramopcommand/page035.html>. Also see the Nara Prefectural Library Information Center, "Ehagaki Harubin (Postcards of Harbin)," available online at http://www.library.pref.nara.jp/event/booklist/W_2008_04/hitosyo09.html. Nihon University College of Humanities and Sciences Museum is building a digital archive of visual images of Harbin—ranging from postcards, posters and flyers, pamphlets and books to photos and motion pictures. For updated information, log on to http://www.chs.nihon-u.ac.jp/museum/exhibition/schedule/post_15.html.

71. Bungei Shunjū, ed., *Saredo waga "Manshū"* (My Manchuria nonetheless). See personal memoirs in chapter 1, "Manshū no haru—Ōdō Rakudō no yume" (Spring of Manchuria—dream of a peaceful land governed by the Kingly Way), 30–96.

Ussuri River, and moved into Manchuria. The Romanovka Village, one of the communities they built, was a fairytale success. In November 1936 preparations began amid the wilderness of the northern part of Manchukuo to bring in a community of 122 refugees who possessed next to nothing. By the spring of 1945, the population had increased to more than 200 residents and the village enjoyed pastoral tranquility and a modest living, with each household owning a minimum of three horses and two cows.

Since it preserved medieval Russian folk culture with traditionally built houses, costumes, ceremonies, music, and rituals, Romanovka Village gave that Manchurian region an ethereal quality that led Japanese authorities to advertise it as "the Shangri-La of Asia."⁷² The Old Believer men hunted and otherwise adhered to a distinctive agrarian-community life, which was praised by the officials of Manchukuo as appropriate to the ideology of harmony. Even a book about military conflict on the Soviet-Manchurian border, published in 1939, referred to peasants living in log cabins made of birch trees, Russian wenches milking cows, boys chasing home cows and horses, and the echoes of a church bell in the village.⁷³ Famous journalists, painters, photographers, and writers were encouraged to visit Romanovka Village to report what they saw to the Japanese people. Ishibashi Tanzan, a liberal economist and journalist, praised Russian agrarian villages for their knowledge of herding domestic animals in hygienic, odor-free conditions, and recommended to Japanese colonizers that they emulate these Russians who kept their modest houses clean and pleasant within limited means.⁷⁴

Once the Sino-Japanese War began, new efforts were made actively to assimilate Russian residents into the Japanese way. In 1937 the Imperial Army's Special Service Organization (Tokumu Kikan) founded the Office of the White Russians (Hakkei Rojin Jimu-kyoku), as a quasi-autonomous agency headed by former Russian military generals, which supervised their assimilation and also the improvement of their living conditions in Manchukuo. Later renamed the Russian division of the Concordia Association (Kyōwa-kai), this office took charge of all administrative matters such as residential registration, issuance of identification and passports, and distribution of rations. More important, it promoted awareness of Russians as being harmonious members of Manchukuo through education, programs, and publications. The Russian division of the Concordia Association administered Russian

72. Nakamura Yoshikazu, *Seinaru Roshia no rurou* (The sacred vagrancy of Russia) (Tokyo: Heibon Sha, 1997), 120–34.

73. Nakamura Satoshi, *Man'ei kokkyō jūnsō-shi* (A history of the Soviet-Manchurian border conflicts) (Tokyo: Keizō Sha, 1939), 381.

74. Ishibashi Tanzan, *Man'ei sangyo no inshō* (My impressions of industries in Manchuria-Korea) (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpō Sha, 1941), reprinted in *Ishibashi Tanzan zenshū* (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpō Sha, 1972), vol. 12, 424–27.

schools, where the use of the Russian language was tolerated on the condition that in other subjects they adopted the same curriculum as Manchurian, Mongolian, and Korean schools. Russian pupils, for example, were obliged to write compositions in Russian on the theme of the racial harmony of Manchukuo.⁷⁵

Some Russian students chose to pursue higher education in Japanese. The Nation-Building University (Kenkoku Daigaku) at Hsinking, the capital of Manchukuo, was created to train future leaders of Manchukuo: it allowed a quota of five Russian students each year. Japanese martial arts such as judo and kendo were part of the physical education curriculum. In 1938 the Harbin Medical College (Harubin Ika Daigaku) invited applications from Russian students and accepted ten students for full-time enrollment. They obtained Russian medical textbooks from the Soviet Union, with all references to communist propaganda deleted by Japanese censors, and used them as back-up references in preparing for examinations in Japanese. Between 1944 and 1945 six Russian students graduated and obtained medical licenses.⁷⁶

Among them was Dr. Eugene (Evgeny) Aksenoff. Born in a suburb of Harbin in 1924, he attended school when Japanese language courses became mandatory after the creation of Manchukuo. While enrolled in a boarding school run by Jesuit priests, he received a private fellowship (with approval from the Manchukuo government) to attend a medical school in Tokyo. After a year at Waseda University polishing his Japanese, he entered the Jikei University School of Medicine in 1944, stayed there during the war and through the US occupation, and eventually obtained a medical license to practice in Japan. During the war the Japanese secret police asked Aksenoff to help broadcast Russian radio programs aimed at Soviet citizens. After he turned down this lucrative offer in the conviction that Japan and Germany would soon lose the war, he experimented with a stint in entertainment and played Caucasian foreigners—usually a spy—for the famed Enoken Roppa comic company. While attending medical school, he also had small roles in films such as *Harimao of Malay* and *A Man from Shanghai*.⁷⁷

The poet Hasegawa Shun believed that Manchurian literature, as cosmopolitan as Manchukuo itself, should make a radical departure from the Western-centric norm and nurture the spirit of the Asia-centered world (*Ajia teki sekai seishin*).

75. Manshūkoku-shi hensan kanō-kai, ed., *Manshūkoku-shi* (A history of Manchukuo) (Tokyo: Manmō Dōhō Engo-kai, 1970), 42, 128–29, 933, 1102, 1145–46, 1243–47.

76. Matsumura Miyako, "Shinbun 'Manshū no oka nite,' ni keisai sareta Nihon kanren kiji o megutte" (Japan-related articles printed in the newspaper *On the Manchurian Hill*), *Ikyō ni ikiru*, vol. 1, 162–64.

77. "Eifugeni Nikoraebicchi Akushonofu shi ni kiku" (Interview with Evgeny N. Akushonov), *Ikyō ni ikiru*, vol. 2, 3–12. He still practices today at the Azabu Clinic in Roppongi, just a few blocks away from the Russian Embassy. Available online at <http://www.medtokyo.com>, accessed May 2012.

Hasegawa embraced as Manchurian literary motifs such as Cossack villages in the Sanhe region, howling wolves in the primeval forests of Siberia, and the taste of vodka, all of which he declared founding elements of the Manchukuo utopia.⁷⁸ The literary journal *Manshū Rōman* (Manchurian romance), inaugurated in 1938, aimed to nurture a distinctive Manchurian literature. Russian writers, along with Chinese and Manchu writers, were all encouraged to contribute to the journal. Nikolai A. Baikov was celebrated among Japanese readers for his depictions of wild animals and hunters in the setting of Siberia's wilderness. His most popular works were *The Great Wang: Story of an Amur Tiger* (1936), a novel about the life of a tiger king ruling the Siberian taiga, and "The Tigress" (1943), a story about Natasha, a Siberian hunter who, after her husband is killed by a tiger, decides to raise a tiger cub. His translated works became so popular in Japan that he was invited to attend the Greater East Asia Literary Conference (DaiTōA Bungakusha Taikai) held in Tokyo in November 1942.

Anthologies reflecting the cosmopolitan character of Manchukuo began to be published in Japanese. A 1940 anthology of works by Manchurian residents included two Russian works. Three years later nine short stories by white Russian émigré writers in Manchukuo were published as an anthology. Their stories depicted émigré nostalgia for Imperial Russia and their despair, loneliness, and anxiety in the foreign land. Russian writers wrote about their lives in Manchukuo in tranquil seclusion, with close contact with only a few Koreans, Manchus, or Chinese.⁷⁹ Russians seldom wrote of any Japanese presence in their lives, contradicting an official report that determined the Russians were opportunistic in associating with the Japanese. This same report noted Russians, because of their intelligence and higher living standards, had an air of superiority when dealing with Koreans and Manchus.⁸⁰

Japanese writers, both visitors and settlers in Manchukuo, used the Russians to portray the positive attributes of cosmopolitanism. Future Nobel Prize laureate in literature Kawabata Yasunari praised Kitamura Kenji's 1942 novel *Shuuren* as the best product of Manchurian literature.⁸¹ The story portrays a Japanese

78. Ozaki Hotsuki, *Kinidai bungaku no shōkon—kyū shokuminchi bungaku ron* (Scars of modern Japanese literature: the colonial literature) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), 232.

79. See Viktoriya Yankovskaya, "Without God, without law" (Kami mo naku okite mo nashi), and Arnesiy Nesmeirov, "Akage no Renka" (Renka, the Red-Haired) in Yamada Seizaburō, ed., *Nichi-Man-Ro zar-Man sakka tanpen-shū* (Anthology of short stories by Japanese, Manchurian, and Russian writers in Manchuria) (Tokyo: Shun'yō Do, 1942).

80. "Hi: dai-52-gō: Bolankō fukan ni okeru zai-Man Rojin saikin no dōkō ni kansuru ken" (Confidential: no. 52: Recent activities of the Manchurian Russians in Mudanjiang) (March 6, 1942) [A-7-0-0-9-9-8], DRO.

81. *Shuuren* is a translation of the Chinese *chūnlíán*, a special type of couplet used only during the Chinese New Year.

settler and his romantic struggles in building the state of Manchukuo. It chronicles his fight with Manchu rebels, escape from them, rescue by a Russian rancher and his maid called Natasha, and eventual return to safety. The protagonist, moved by the Russians' kindness, raises interest in the welfare of Russian émigrés and launches a project to build a pioneering village for them.⁸²

Other Japanese writers depicted Russians coping with the hardships of living in Manchuria. Hinata Nobuo's *Dai-hachi-gō tentetsu ki* (The railroad switch number eight, 1941), which won the first Manchurian Literature Prize (Manshū Bunwa-Kai Shō), tells the story of a Manchu man who works for the South Manchuria Railway. With great difficulty he adjusts from the Russian way to the Japanese way after the transfer of control of the railway. His Russian wife is the widow of a former Russian colleague. Her determination to live in spite of all her difficult experiences makes her the ultimate survivor.⁸³ Takeuchi Shōichi in *Ryūri* (Dissipation) traces the fall of a Russian Jewish family, which gives up not only bourgeois living but family altogether in the face of Japanese takeover of Harbin. Yoshino Sadao's *Iwan no Ie* (House of Ivan) portrays the dire straits of a Russian man, a former employee of the North Manchuria Railway, and his family, through the eyes of a Japanese settler who rents a bedroom in their house.

Yokota Fumiko looked into a darker side of the Russian-Japanese relationship. *Kaze* (Wind) is about Russian and Japanese boys engaging in sinister play in a field. The story ends when a physically handicapped Russian boy experiences euphoria while holding a dead sparrow that had been toyed with and abandoned by the other boys. *Aru Kurisumasu no monogatari* (A Christmas story) portrays the inability of a young Japanese woman to understand an elderly Russian woman living in solitude in Hsinking (Changchun). Out of curiosity, she celebrates Christmas with this casual acquaintance. As they talk over candlelight, the old woman, unable to restrain herself, begins to cry. After watching the Russian woman doze off in tears, the young Japanese woman leaves, aware that the Russian's solitude is the common destiny of all émigrés in Manchuria.⁸⁴

The Japanese authorities in Manchukuo tended to view Russian émigrés as compliant and collaborative.⁸⁵ A report from the Japanese military police (Kenpei-tai)

82. Kitamura Kenji, *Shuuren* (Tokyo: Shinchō Sha, March 1942). Kawamura Minato, *Ikyō no Shōwa bungaku—'Manshū' to kindai Nihon* (Shōwa literature in the foreign land: Manchuria and Modern Japan) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), 125–26.

83. Hinata Nobuo, "Dai-hachi-gō tentetsu ki" (The railroad switch number eight), in *Shōwa sensō bungaku zenshū* (Tokyo: Shūci Sha, 1964), vol. 1.

84. Kawamura Minato, *Bungaku kara miru 'Manshū'* (Manchuria in the Japanese literature) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1998), 57–59, 66–69.

85. The best samples of such views can be found in the following archival collection: "DaiTōA Sensō kankei ikken jōhō shūshū kankei Bolankō jōhō" (The Greater East Asia War: intelligence gatherings: Information on Mudanjiang) [A-7-0-0-9-9-8], DRO.

in Manchukuo, issued in March 1942, confirmed the good fit between Russian émigrés and Japan's pan-Asianism. The report asserted the Russian émigrés seemed to be working in accordance with the goal of pan-Asianism: they attended Shinto ceremonies and even donated to related causes. Yet the report acknowledged that the Russians longed for a true motherland and remained uncompelled by the idea of complete assimilation. Whether they liked it or not, they collaborated with Japan's Manchukuo because that was the only institution they could rely on for survival, at that moment.⁸⁶

As the prospect of Japan's eventual defeat loomed larger, the vision of cultural coexistence with Russia under Japan's pan-Asianism gradually lost its luster. The Japanese authorities worried that Russian émigrés across the Japanese empire might betray Japan should the Soviets attack. In Tokyo in March 1944, the Japanese police brokered jobs for financially struggling Russians in an attempt to prevent them from engaging in espionage for the Soviet Union. Eighteen former peddlers of clothes, six former peddlers of tins and cosmetics, and six other Russians were all referred to new jobs at a small machine factory in Tokyo for modest daily wages of four to five yen. This way the Japanese police could keep them under surveillance.⁸⁷

Some Russian émigrés had divided allegiances. Some in Manchuria tried to obtain Soviet citizenship because they anticipated Japan's ever deteriorating condition and eventual defeat in World War II. Some made financial donations to Japan's war cause. Others even encouraged their sons to join the Japanese Army. In this milieu Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru made a last-ditch effort to invite the Soviet Union to join Japan's Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. At the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War in mid-September 1944, Shigemitsu proposed investigating what principles Japan most likely shared with the Soviet Union and how the two could work together to achieve a Eurasian principle, similar to the Pacific Charter, toward building a new order in East Asia. Shigemitsu argued that by promoting the Asian membership of the Soviet Union, Japan could and should emphasize the congruence of the Japanese and Soviet principles of "national liberation and independence for the peoples of East Asia" (*Tōa minzoku no kaihō to dokuritsū*). The spirit of Japan's Greater East Asia was a mirror image of the Soviet communist principle of nationalism for Asian peoples.⁸⁸

86. "Hi: dai-52-go: Botan-kō fukin ni okeru zai-Man Rojin saikin no dōkō ni kansuru ken," (Confidential: no. 52: Recent activities of the Manchurian Russians in Mudanjiang) (March 6, 1942) [A-7-0-0-9-9-8], DRO.

87. Shimizu Megumi, "Dai-Niji Sekai Taisen-ki no Hakkei Roshiajin no dōkō," in Nakamura, Yasui, Nagawara and Nagayo, eds., *Ikyō ni ikiru*, vol. 3, 71–80.

88. Hatano Sumio, "Shigemitsu Mamoru to Dai-Tōa Kyōdō Sengen—senji gaikō to sengo kōsō" (Shigemitsu Mamoru and the Greater East Asia Declaration—his war diplomacy and postwar planning), *Kokusai Seiji* 109 (May 1995): 47–50.

Even as the vision of cultural coexistence dimmed when Stalin labeled Japan an aggressor in November 1944, Japan's strategic thinking regarding China and Korea demonstrated that the Soviet Union continued to be an integral part of Japan's blueprint for Asian reconstruction. Japanese policymakers evaluated the appeal of communist ideology to Chinese and Korean nationalists and anticipated considerable Soviet interference in China and Korea especially after the demise of Japanese empire. At a more subtle level, the undeniable Russian affinity with Asia must have made it difficult for both Japanese and Russians to envision an Asia without the Russians.

Toward the final phase of the war, diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Moscow became strained, with each side less given to expressing the truth about its intentions, particularly those relating to military planning aimed at the other. As Japan's war planners had anticipated, the Soviet Union eventually invaded the Japanese empire, and that action led to a series of events that effectively suppressed memories of Japan's interactions with Russian people and culture. The loss of Japan's cultural connection to the Eurasian world is another forgotten legacy of Japan's Eurasian-Pacific War.