Prompt A)

Contemporary Austrian politics is marred by the reemergence of Far Right, ultranationalist politicians who have taken advantage of domestic and international political instability to seize power in the government.  In the past these politicians have been known for their inflammatory rhetoric which has actively demonized muslims, jews, Roma, and other non ethnically Austrian minorities.  Austrian law has sought to curb the influence of Neo-Nazi’s & other supportive movements through strict anti-semitism and holocaust denial laws akin to those in Germany (Foreign Policy, 2016), while working to preserve civil liberties such as the right to assembly (Freedom House, 2018).  In trying to strike a careful balance which preserves basic civil liberties while refusing to give ground for Neo-Nazi behavior, those with fascist and racist sympathies have been finding ways to stretch the boundaries of the law to get away with otherwise obvious acts of hate.  

Since the passing of Holocaust Denial laws in 1992 which expanded on the 1947 framework for denazification, Austria has jailed and fined individuals and organizations which have engaged in anti-Semitic or nazi behavior (JURIST, 2017).    This follows a similar trend taken by other countries that either perpetrated or aided Nazi Germany during the Second World War (Bleich, 2011, 48).  While Austria has punished nazi sympathizers, ironically including the current Vice-Chancellor for organizing a Hitler Youthesque rally as a teenager (Times of Israel, 2017), there is a national narrative of victimhood which deflects association of Austria with Nazi cooperation and rather suggests that they are a victim akin to other European countries and nationalities (Niederacher, 2003).  

The inability for the Austrian government to fully accept its responsibility for the Holocaust and other war crimes under the Third Reich will always leave the country at a disadvantage when it comes to engagement with far right and racist movements.  In a recent legal case surrounding the youth Identitarian movement, courts vindicated 10 members following their arrest for criminal association and hate speech (Vice, 2018).  Many fear that the inability for the Austrian courts to firmly interpret the rule of law and define the boundaries of what is and is not hate speech will embolden the far right to act boldly down the road.  Until Austria can reevaluate its national culture and accept its share of responsibility for the Holocaust, no amount of legal balancing over freedom of association and speech can stop Neo-Nazi’s from pushing their agenda.

Part B:

It is no secret that the Russian Federation has sought to influence politics throughout the western world.  While their actions in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom may be better documented, they have quietly been engaged in a P.R. campaign in Austria over the last several years which has grown to fruition following the election of a coalition government in 2018 between the center right OVP and the ultranationalist FPO.  What has occurred over the years in Austria is the gradual permeation of Russia of soft power which has been manifested in a variety of ways.  Be it the connection between Austrian right wing news sources with Kremlin sponsorship, their support for FPO leader and current vice-chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache, or the infamous Vienna Russian Balls, Moscow’s agents have been hard at work to aid far right movements throughout the country (Shekhovstov, 2017).  

Traditionally, because Austrian politics has been dominated by the center-left SVP and the aforementioned OVP, Russia has been hesitant about getting overly involved with fringe right wing movements in Austria.  However, this began to change as the Austrian public began to be more receptive to FPO politicians and their euroskeptic/anti-immigrant platform.  Since the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, the FPO took a pro-Russia turn, engaging with leading figures in Putin’s government who exported their political, religious, and cultural rhetoric into Austria (Shekhovstov, 204, 2017). 

The connection between the FPO and the Kremlin has given the OVP chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, somewhat of a link to Putin.  The two of them have repeaditely met since the 2018 election and have sought to deepen the interconnectivity between the two countries, with Kurz seeing this as an opportunity to bridge the Euro-Russian divide and Putin viewing this as his opportunity to gain a supportive ally in the E.U. (Politico, 2018).  Given these linkages between the current Austrian government and Putin, it is safe to say that Russia’s gamble with the FPO has paid off thus far as they now have the potential to legitimize their brand of ultranationalism throughout Austria. 

Sources:

“Austria.” Freedom House. March 12, 2018. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/austria.

Large, David Clay. “Germany + Nazi Denial = Austria.” Foreign Policy. December 2, 2016. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/02/germany-nazi-denial-austria/.  

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to

Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Callan, Autumn. “Austria court convicts man for violating anti-nazi laws with Facebook.” JURIST: A Collaboration with the University of Pittsburgh. July 31, 2017.  Accessed November 19, 2018. https://www.jurist.org/news/2017/07/austria-court-convicts-man-for-violating-anti-nazi-laws-with-facebook-post/.  

“Heinz-Christian Strache from neo-Nazi youth to Austrias next vice-chancellor.” The Times of Israel. December 16, 2017. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://www.timesofisrael.com/heinz-christian-strache-from-neo-nazi-youth-to-austrias-next-vice-chancellor/.  

Shekhovstov, Anton. Russia and the Western Far Right. Routledge Press, 2017.   

Turkey:  A Warning for Free Speech Critics

The JDP possesses a fundamentally hostile perspective towards freedom of speech, thought, and assembly, more so than any other European country.  Turkey does not easily compare to the cases Bleich examines in the UK, Netherlands, and other countries which value liberty as an axiom of society.  What certain countries regard as a provocation to violence, such as genocide denial in Germany, Turkey regards as the status quo in the case of the Armenian genocide.  For contrast, the French outlawed Armenian genocide denial in 2007, and the Swiss even tried and convicted a Turkish politician (Dogu Perincek) for his denial. In Turkey, acknowledgment of the genocide could fall under Article 301 of the Turkish constitution which criminalizes “insulting Turkishness.” Additionally, the reasons Bleich provides for preserving free speech in Europe and the US often constitute the same reasons Turkey chooses to eliminate free speech.

Much of the paranoia surrounding free speech limitation in Europe stems from the “slippery slope” argument.  The British Religious Hatred Act, pursued by the Labour Party in 2006, met exactly this challenge in Parliament (Bleich 2011, 25).  Tories feared the generality of an act which restricted hate speech as a blanket category. Answers to the question of who could define hate varied depending upon who gave the answer.  Thus, the UK added a clause which specified that the speech must be “likely” and “intended” to cause acts of racial hatred– a difficult standard to prove, and one which limited use of the act to a maximum of four times per year (Bleich 2011, 25).  The fear of government overreach in defining dangerous or hateful speech has reached its full potential in Turkey, where the government has taken sweeping actions to limit the speech of dissidents.

Since the Ergenekon investigation launched in 2007, Turkey has used flimsy and fabricated evidence of widespread coup conspiracies to crack down on speech (Eligur 2016, 158).  By 2010, 275 academics, politicians, and journalists had been arrested in the Ergenekon case, and the faux investigation only expanded from there (Jenkins 2009, 9). As a weapon against oppositional speech, the investigation targeted several parties from the PKK to the Marxist Revolutionary People’s Liberation party (Jenkins 2009, 9).  

In the Netherlands, the government used state power to dissolve a hateful party as recently as 1998, when it dissolved the Centre Party ‘86 for racism which was “incompatible with public order” (Blech 2011, 88).  Bleich speaks of this extreme as a rare but aggressive tactic, which often results in a “phoenix-like rise of the organization under a different name” (Bleich, 87). Turkey resolves the problem of a rebirth of state-dissolved organizations by cracking down on every aspect of society.  Consequently, the lack of free speech and organizational assembly protects the government’s ability to control opposition. Given the strength of its institutions, the idea of such an abuse of power occurring in the Netherlands seems preposterous. Regardless, Turkey provides a fair warning as to how the state can abuse the power to patrol speech and assembly.

Allies Domestically, Enemies in Foreign Affairs

The JDP’s rejection of liberal democracy and preference for authoritarianism already aligns with the goals of most Russian political intervention.  Turkey’s widening distance from the EU, in which President Erdogan has recently downplayed the importance membership, also reduces Russia’s need to interfere in the country’s politics. Despite their authoritarian similarities, Russia and Turkey have struggled to bridge the divide over the Syrian civil war.  Their support for opposing sides has prevented the countries from maintaining closer relations beyond trade.

In September of this year, Russia, Turkey, and Iran met in Tehran to discuss the imminent humanitarian disaster unfolding in Syria.  The Idlib province, home to approximately 3 million citizens and 1 million children, had become the final rebel stronghold in the country.  Turkey and the United States support the rebels, while Russia and Iran support the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The three states managed to craft a deal in which the Idlib province would contain a demilitarized zone for the citizens.  The rebels removed all heavy weaponry from the demilitarized zone. Their competing interests in Syria may continue to drive the countries apart, however, since the Syrian regime violated the agreement and shelled the demilitarized zone as recently as yesterday, killing a woman and a child.

The conflict in Syria stands in the way of an alliance otherwise well suited for both countries.  They share a democratic facade behind which their authoritarian leaders control the affairs of the country.  While Putin has held control in Russia since 1999, vacillating between Prime Minister and President, Erdogan only recently created competitive authoritarianism in Turkey.  The JDP’s referendum on April 16, 2017, encoded a number of constitutional changes into law which expanded the power of the executive. The changes abolished the Prime Minister position, granted the President the power to dissolve the entire Assembly at will, and contained several similarly authoritarian provisions (Sakurai 2018, 36).  With the rise of an illiberal European regime typically comes closer ties to Russia, as in Orban’s Hungary and Duda’s Poland. Whether the civil war continues to obstruct this development remains to be seen.

Works Cited:

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to

Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Eligür, Banu. “Turkey’s Declining Democracy.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 17 (2014):

151.

Jenkins, Gareth H. Between fact and fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon investigation. Central

Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 2009.

Osseiran, Hashem. “Syrian Army Shells Demilitarised Zone in Idlib, Undermining

Russian-Turkish Deal .” The National. November 18, 2018. Accessed November 18,

2018. https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/syrian-army-shells-demilitarised-zone-in-idlib-undermining-russian-turkish-deal-1.792963.

Yukio Sakurai. 2018. “Turkey’s Possible Future Directions after the 2017 Referendum:

Autocracy or Democracy?” International Journal of Interdisciplinary Civic & Political

Studies 13 (1/2): 33–45. doi:10.18848/2327-0071/CGP/v13i01/33-45.

Since Croatia’s independence from Yugoslavia, its foreign policy goal was dominated by gaining  EU membership, and Croatia achieved this goal in 2013. Croatia therefore currently still faces challenges defining its contemporary foreign policy goals today. However, Croatia’s has turned its foreign policy direction to align with the European Union’s foreign policy goals. The Croatian Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs adopted the Strategic Plan 2017-2019 which is its latest strategic document focusing on Croatia’s foreign policy goals. The Strategic plan 2017-2019 states that its mission is to promote stability in its country, promote and protect the interests and safety of Croatians abroad, develop strong economic ties with Croatian and other countries abroad, and preserve and develop procedures for unity and stability within the EU. Croatia is also focused on establishing and maintaining bilateral and multilateral relationships and cooperation in the world. Croatia wishes to strengthen its position in Central Europe in order to keep common values and economic trade relations stable. Additionally, Croatia’s foreign policy aims include the preservation and strengthening of peace between countries including establishing stable relationships with neighbors as well as important countries of the world. Although Croatia is committed to these goals, it continues to fall short of it foreign policy expectations and realities due to its late ascension and the internal struggles it continues to face as a result.

Croatia’s foreign policy most resembles that of Spain’s foreign policy goals. Similar to Croatia, Spain, a medium-sized country, easily becomes overlooked and outbalanced from the rising influences in the EU, such as Germany. Spain foreign policy priorities, following the death of dictator in 1975, also focused on removing itself from diplomatic isolation and entering the European community through the European Union. With Spain’s new administration, and it being granted EU membership, it wishes to represent a total break with its past and move towards having stronger ties and with the EU and its partners. Spain has underperformed on the international scale, just as Croatia, but still wishes to embrace numerous plans to deepen European cooperation, especially on security matters. Its main agenda is to regain economic strength, like Croatia, and work more efficiently alongside EU members. Spain also adopted a multilateral approach to reach international stability. In 2013, through its National Security Strategy, Spain also places national security in a global context to create a national and international safe environment, and sees European integration as providing greater regional security. The new Spanish government also recognizes the central value of European foreign policy coordination that aligns with the EU. Spain, just as Croatia, defends and supports the involvement of the EU in democracy and peace. Both Croatia and Spain recognize the importance of becoming more involved in the EU and its foreign policy goals, but have not successfully found a way to flourish as other EU members have.

Croatia’s foreign policy choices appear as a part of EU-wide negotiations about migration. Migrants from Middle East and central Asia, trying to reach wealthier EU states, typically cross into Croatia from Bosnia undeclared and unidentified. Therefore, Croatia has experienced a 30% increase in unauthorized migrants. As a result, Croatia, like other EU countries, has been working on having stricter flow of migrants and border controls. Previously when crossing Croatia’s borders, only documents and license plate numbers were only for suspicious people. It will now be that all documents and all vehicle license plate number will go through a special scanner for all Croatian citizens, citizens of non EU-countries, and citizens of the Schengen zone. Th The police also warned that the waiting times at the border crossing will begin to take longer. This change will occur due to the increased terrorist attacks in Europe. Croatia is not yet a member of the Schengen crisis, although moving closer to becoming a member, and as a result Croatia citizens and migrants will feel the effects.

The European Commission is also working towards negotiations with Croatia to have it within the Schengen area. Once Croatia meets the technical criteria for the of the EU’s Schengen zone, the European Commission will assess if Croatia is ready to join. Croatia hopes will occur before the next elections for the European Parliament. Croatia hopes to join by 2020 as it is one of the six european union members not part of the passport-free Schengen zone. The free movement of people would benefit Croatia’s economy, specifically in its tourism sector which makes up about 20 percent of Croatia’s GDP. However, the Council of Europe continues to urge for Croatia to launch investigations concerning reports of police violence and theft against migrants. The Commissioner of the Council of Europe addressed a letter to the Croatian Prime Minister revealing the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, has received reports of 2,500 migrants being pushed back from Croatia since the beginning of 2018 and 1,500 people being denied to asylum procedure which includes 100 children. In addition, more than 700 people have experienced violence and theft by Croatian officers. However, Croatian officials have denied such claims. As a result, until Croatia recognizes such claims and implements investigation will the European Commission allow for Croatia to be within the Schengen zone. Despite this, Croatia continues its negotiations with the EU in hopes of achieving its foreign policy goals.   

Al Jazeera. “Council of Europe Urges Croatia to Probe Police Abuse Allegations.” News | Al Jazeera. October 05, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2018/10/council-europe-urges-croatia-probe-police-abuse-allegations-181005104405894.html. Accessed October 21, 2018.

“Contemporary Croatia.” croatia.eu.http://croatia.eu/article.php?lang=2&id=24. Accessed October 21, 2018.

EU Agenda Team. “National Backgrounders – European Foreign Policy Country Profile – Spain.” EU Agenda. December 2015. https://euagenda.eu/publications/national-backgrounders-european-foreign-policy-country-profile-spain. Accessed October 22, 2018.

Knezović, Sandro, and Nani Klepo. “Croatian Foreign Policy in 3D.” IRMO, 2017, 1-42. http://www.irmo.hr/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/3D.pdf. Accessed October 21, 2018.

Pavlic, Vedran. “Stricter Controls Coming to Croatian Border Crossings.” Total Croatia News. April 1, 2017. https://www.total-croatia-news.com/lifestyle/17852-stricter-controls-coming-to-croatian-border-crossings. Accessed October 21, 2018.

Reuters, Tickers. “Croatia on Course for Schengen Zone Entry in 2020 – Government Official.” SWI Swissinfo.ch. October 16, 2018. https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/reuters/croatia-on-course-for-schengen-zone-entry-in-2020—government-official/44478100. Accessed October 21, 2018.

“Spain as a Template for European Foreign Policy?” Carnegie Europe. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/53614. Accessed October 29, 2018.

The Netherlands has always been an active member within the EU.  However, the Dutch have a specific approach to foreign policy within the EU which can be most paralleled with the French approach to the EU.  The two countries are very similar because in the past they have positively benefited from a strong and flourishing EU.  With both countries being founding members, from a historical standpoint they have experience and clout within the organization.  France and The Netherlands have traditionally supported EU policy like the Maastricht Treaty and Schengen Agreement, both encouraging a more integrated and prosperous Europe.   However, The Netherlands is a geographically smaller country naturally limiting the natural resources and population as opposed to larger countries like Germany.  This emphasizes the importance they hold for the EU Council in representing their interest.

However, in the past 20 years, both countries have come to a certain realization that the EU may not be as beneficial today as it was when it was formed.  While France is disheartened with the violent consequences of the immigration crisis, The Netherlands are dissatisfied for their own reasons.  The Dutch have lost a significant amount of faith with the EU council and this is only growing with the new far right party emerging and galvanizing this EU distaste.  The EU council is supposed to promote each countries interest, but according to the Dutch, they see the EU as now a federal body that is trying to expand its power through adding new members and different financial regulations.

The Netherlands has also had a unique relationship to the Brexit movement, and they ae certainly not looking away from the option.  Britain’s precedent to leave the EU was unheard of and previously not seen as an alternative.  However, growing EU distaste spurred on by the Dutch has been on the rise for a variety of reasons.  The EU’s immigration policy has caused quite the stir within the country as anti-Islam sentiment has taken root with the rise of the right wing.  Additionally, The Netherlands had to be a creditor to the countries that suffered economically in the European debt crisis.  This didn’t sit well with the Dutch, who believe strongly in financial security and responsibility.  By taking these factors compounded with the precedent that Britain set, it is not unreasonable to believe that The Netherlands won’t leave the EU.

Works Cited

• Glencross, Andrew. The Politics of European Integration: Political Union or a House Divided?Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
• Kortweg, Kem. “How the Dutch Fell Out of Love With the EU.” Carnegie Europe. March 2, 2017. Accessed October 26, 2018.
• Chopin, Thierry. “European Issues and Interviews.” Emmanuel Macron, France and Europe “France Is Back in Europe”: On Which Terms ?[1]. May 18, 2018. Accessed October 26, 2018.

Lithuania and Germany have a long lasting history, as Germany occupied Lithuania in 1915 during World War II. During this time, Germany saw their occupation of Lithuania as a strategic means, as they could garnish a stronghold in the Baltic Sea, use Lithuania as a source of agriculture, while attempting to cut off Russia. After this occurrence, in 1917 Lithuania wanted to gain their independence from Germany, as these two countries signed a declaration of independence, which allowed the countries to enter into diplomatic relations.

One historic day in both of these countries histories took place during the NATO summit in 2016. This can be seen as a historic day for not only the security of the Lithuania, but for the Baltic region as a whole. On this day, the NATO summit accepted the deployment of a 1000-strong multinational allied battalion to each of the Baltic States and Poland. Lithuania’s Battalion was lead by Germany, to help protect Lithuania through deterrence and defense, while enhancing involvement of NATOs forces in this region. President Dalia Grybauskaitė took this as a strong sign of allied unity as Germany wanted to strengthen relations with Lithaunia. This summit also had a joint EU-NATO declaration signed, which helped Germany and Lithuania as both of these countries are members of these organizations. This is part of the alliance`s deal of “enhanced Forward Presence”, as both countries look continue strong ties.

One way that Lithuania followed the lead of Germany is through their military. According to President Grybauskaitė, she believes that these two countries bilateral relations are at an all time high and through their military cooperation, Germany and Lithuania will continue to seek each other’s best interests to benefit their respected countries. Unlike when the German forces came to Lithuania during World War II when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Lithuania’s welcomed German forces to help protect against an increasingly aggressive Kremlin behavior in 2017. Military cooperation will continue to enhance the bilateral relations between these two countries and with a common goal of pushing back Russia, they have the opportunity to drive their foreign policies.

Lithuania and Brexit:

When analyzing the effects of Brexit on Germany and Lithuania, it is evident that their were two major differences on the impact of the UK to leave the European Union. From an economic standpoint, Lithuania is using this decision to help elevate their economy and grow a global fintech hub, as Germany is being forced to deal with the mess that Brexit has left, as they are expected to pay 15 billion Euros extra a year to fill the void the UK left. Germany already pays 30 Billion to the EU, which is the bloc`s largest contributor

On the other hand, Lithuania sees Brexit as an opportunity to expand and build their economy. Invest Lithuania state that 117 Fintech companies were not operating in Lithuania and in 2017 alone, 35 new businesses were registered. One of the main draws that Lithuania is using to entice businesses to invest in Lithuania is that being in the eurozone gives them the same status at every other big country, but it wont cost their business as much due to the benefits of cheaper living costs.

The European Commission, which is represented by Michel Barnier, who is the Chief Negotiator for the EU countries is responsible for the negotiations that took place between Brexit and the EU. The commission`s job promote what is best for the EU`s general interest and by passing Brexit, allowing the UK to leave the EU was in the EU`s best interest based off the commission. Along with the commission, the Parliament played a major role in determining Brexit, as this group of elected officials vote on legislation. The Parliament is the group that helped pass Brexit and without this group, it would have been unobtainable.

https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/cooperation-between-lithuania-and-germany-the-most-successful-ever-in-the-history-of-bilateral-relations/30861

https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1035684/brexit-news-germany-uk-eu-budget-contribution

https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/eu’s-role-brexit-negotiations

https://www.businessinsider.com/lithuania-fintech-brexit-2018-2

https://www.politico.eu/article/lithuania-nato-russia-baltics-germany-sleep-peacefully-thanks-to-german-troops/

Due to its external position relative to the EU, the foreign policy of Turkey most closely follows that of the post-Brexit United Kingdom.  Since the decision by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, they have reached a negotiation standoff. The tension has manifested itself in the form of the political party UKIP, which led the campaign with a series of populist declarations and sentiments.  UKIP benefitted from the perception of an anti-UK bias within the EU, which persisted despite several concessions, such as the rebate on contributions to the EU budget (Zimmerman and Durs 2016, 251). Turkey and the UK both maintain close trade relationships with the EU, although both have struggled to rationalize and preserve it.

The UK and Turkey experienced slow withdrawals from their relations with the EU, culminating in singular acts of defiance which shook their respective relationships to the core.  The Turkish government slowly embraced authoritarianism beginning with the faux Ergenekon investigation in 2007 (Jenkins 2009, 9). Not long after, the ruling JDP party continued to slide away from democracy with state-influenced elections and voter intimidation, particularly in the snap elections of 2015.  Turkey’s smaller-scale acts of domestic rebellion preceded a decisive split in 2017, when President Erdogan eliminated hopes of joining the EU by destroying the parliamentary system in Turkey and replacing it with a presidential system without checks on his power.

The UK began with small-scale acts of rebellion as well, such as testing the EU’s tolerance for dissent with their opt-outs on banking unions and migration policy (Zimmerman and Durs, 251).  In 1992, they successfully rejected the replacement of the pound for the euro (Zimmerman and Durs, 251). These acts of rebellion culminated in the Brexit campaign of 2016, when rising anti-EU sentiment in rural areas handed a victory to the Leave campaign. Between Brexit and the referendum, the new challenge for the UK and Turkey is to negotiate for the survival of their economic relationships with the EU.

In both cases, the perception of unfair EU policies played a role in the decisions to separate from the EU.  According to The Brookings Institute, “anti-Western sentiment that has risen in Turkey” due to the “perception that the West is continually carrying out operations against Turkey” damaged popular opinion of the EU.  Similarly, the members of the Leave campaign accused the EU of attempting to impose a tax on all financial transactions (Sked, 261). Sked attributed the tax impropriety to the EU’s desire to “undermine the success of the city of London” (Sked, 261).  Turkey and the UK confronted the perception of bias with rebelliousness, which amplified over time into full-scale defiance of EU membership and values.

Institutional Perspective:

As the UK has attempted to negotiate with the European Council regarding the terms of its exit, it has encountered a number of internal and external problems.  The government of Theresa May, perhaps as a result of its diminished strength following the snap elections of 2017, has failed to reach a compromise. Segments of the far right and far left within the UK claim to desire a hard Brexit.  The prospect of no-deal by March 2019 has provoked the UK to begin stockpiling food and supplies. The possibility of no-deal warrants their concern, considering Ottaviano et al. discovered that Brexit would cause anywhere from a 1 to 3% drop in GDP as a minimum, reason enough for 84% of the business community to support UK membership in the EU (Zimmerman and Durs 2016, 257).

For comparison, Turkey regards the EU as an antagonistic but necessary partner for economic relations.  Both Ankara and Brussels have struggled to sustain the pretense of membership negotiations, but according to Al Jazeera, the EU foreign ministers have declared the negotiations “a standstill.”  The European Commission has met with Ankara in Brussels to discuss the terms of their trading relationship. However, the two sides failed to reach an accord with regards to the state of membership in Turkey’s future.  

Turkey stands to lose a large proportion of trade valuation if relations with the EU further plummet; the EU accounted for 36.4% of Turkey’s imports and 47% of its exports in 2017, according to The Independent.  Earlier this month, the European Parliament canceled an earmarked payment of 70 million euros in pre-accession funds to Turkey, due to a scathing report from the European Commission. With such strong economic ties, the slide towards authoritarianism has not deterred Turkey’s desire to remain economically close to the EU, despite charging it with acts against the JDP regime. The UK and Turkey have difficult EU relations in common, as both rely upon them economically, yet carry disdain for the perceived slights against their sovereignty. The question remains: Can the UK negotiate a decent trade relationship with the EU in spite of its internal animosities?  Similarly, can Turkey uphold its trade relationships in the face of increasing political divide between the ideological expectations of the EU and its ruling JDP party?

1. Italy, France, and Spain

In many ways, Italy has followed the lead of Spain and France in foreign policy. Both Spain and Italy’s first measures after emerging from a fascist dictatorship were to rejoin the European Community ie the European Union. Italy and Spain also share similarities in that they are both Catholic countries and are therefore more conservative than other countries in the European Union. Italy, Spain, and France are all a part of the Schengen Agreement which eliminated passport controls between its European member states and mandated rigorous controls for persons arriving from non-member states. But, Italy is most similar in foreign policy to France and their more nationalist take on foreign policy.

Italy is similar to France in foreign policy because France’s foreign policy is more nationalistic and central to the French identity which is what Italy has been following lately, especially with current events surrounding migration. Spain is also located in the Mediterranean region so it shares similar interests of migration with Italy. Spain is not as xenophobic as Italy due to the fact that the fascist dictatorship of Franco is more present in the minds of Spanish than the fascist dictatorship in Italy that ended 20 years earlier than Franco’s. But, Spain could become more nationalist in the future if it continues down a path many European nations are taking. 

Italy has recently been more focused on state sovereignty in terms of migration policy and wants EU policy to benefit their own state needs of migration more than the EU as a whole. This is similar to France’s approach of nationalism in foreign policy and the fact that the country wants to look after its own interest. After Italy democratized in the 1950s, it was mostly focused on the European Community and not as much on foreign policy until quite recently. Until the 1980s, Italy was a country of emigration which then changed by the 1990s when economic growth transformed the country into a host country for migrants. Due to this new status and more migrants arriving in Italy, racism emerged in the country and the Italian government began taking a more nationalistic approach to foreign policy. This recent change in foreign policy also demonstrates how Italy has been working with the EU and it’s institutions recently.

2. Italy and Migration Policy

Italy has always played a role in EU institutions since it has been a member state since the inception of the EU and the European Community. An Italian has been President of the Council of the EU twelve times since 1959 with the most recent presidency being in 2014. So, Italy has always been involved in the functions of the European Union and its institutions.

Italy is located on the Mediterranean so it plays a large part on the frontier aspect in migration, especially as it is part of the Schengen agreement. Italy has recently had many issues with migration especially concerning the European migration crisis that is still ongoing. Italy has been looking out for itself more in foreign policy because they do not want more migrants coming into Italy. Italy has threatened the European Commission to withhold funding from the EU if other member states do no accept migrants. The Commission says. “The EU operates on rules, not threats” (CNN) and that Italy and the EU must work constructively to fix this issue. The migration crisis has hit Italy especially hard so it is making threats instead of working with the institutions to try to get a deal with other member states. This demonstrates how tensions have been rising between Italy and EU institutions, specifically the European Commission in order to come to a consensus. 

The Italian government has also had tensions with the EU and the European Commission over the budget deficit. Italy wants to break the deficit rule to help out poor Italian citizens. This would mean an increase in spending on tax cuts, more benefits spending, and a lower retirement age and would break the 2.4 percent target set by the EU for 2019. The Commission is not exactly willing to budge on this, and have expressed serious concern, and Italy knows that increasing their deficit is against EU rules. The Commission is unlikely to support the Italian increase in their budget which means that Italy will need to re-submit a budget proposal. This ongoing issue of the budget deficit, along with the migration policy issues, demonstrate how Italy is trying to express sovereignty and have the rules bent or benefit their country. But, EU institutions are not willing to let Italy go against EU rules and be an exception to these rules. Threats will not help Italy get what they want but instead, working with the institutions that they have long been a part of could benefit them to come to a consensus and enact a useful migration policy and financial plan.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-22/italy-set-to-tell-eu-it-won-t-back-down-on-2-4-deficit-target

https://www.britannica.com/place/Italy/Immigration-and-foreign-policy

https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-hits-back-hard-at-italys-budget-threat-in-migration-row/

https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/24/europe/eu-italy-migration-intl/index.html

Glencross, Andrew. 2014. “EU Policy-Making in Action.” The Politics of European Integration.

In the broader view, Hungarian foreign policy follows the centers of European power in Germany and France. Over the course of several decades, Hungary has embraced European integration, the NATO alliance and Atlanticism. However, the government of Viktor Orban has diverged from these goals and has embraced the politics of another country on the European periphery: the United Kingdom. Hungary has followed the practice of England in one key paradigm: wanting benefits from membership in the European Union without accepting the costs and responsibilities inherent to membership in the block. Both England and Hungary exist on the physical periphery of Europe (albeit on opposite ends) but they also share an ideological distance from the heart of the European project and a recalcitrance to either fully accept or fully reject European integration, an embrace, in other words, of “selective integration” (Zimmerman and Durs 208)

Britain’s embrace of “a la carte” EU membership, in which it not only rejects the holistic package of traditional membership, but rejects the specific costs associated with specific benefits has caused friction during EU negotiations over Brexit. The referendum itself, at least as fought by the ultimately victorious Leave campaign, was replete with this incoherent view of obligations and benefits. The infamous bus adverts that promised “£350 million a week for the NHS” in diverted EU funds is emblematic of this misunderstanding. Current British policy is premised on taking for granted the benefits, subsidies and trade advantages of EU membership while viewing the costs obligations and loss of sovereignty resulting from the EU’s pooled sovereignty model. Both British politics more broadly and the Brexit fight involved chafing at the perception that the EU was subsuming Britain’s once vaunted role on the world stage. This combined one-sided acceptance of integration and feared loss of sovereignty is mirrored by Hungary.

Hungary follows England in the general premise of this policy outlook and sometimes in specific policy conflicts. The Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó declared his government’s deep regrets about Britain’s exit from the European Union because he contended that the UK was a natural ally for Hungary’s resistance to aspects of the European Union’s policy consensus. In addition to this direct alignment in rejecting further integration, Hungary has mirrored the UK’s opposition to accepting EU membership as a holistic unit.

The Hungarian economy is substantially dependent on EU subsidies, in fact to an even greater extent than England’s. The Hungarian government in particular has dispensed subsidies to political allies (likely corruptly). Yet Hungary has chafed at EU attempts to dictate Hungarian policy on a range of issues. Hungary has strongly resisted attempts by the European Commission and European Court of Justice to reign in potentially anti-democratic abuses of the country’s recent re-writes of its constitution. Similarly, it has resisted EU attempts to force Hungary into accepting (relatively minute) quotas of refugees and asylum seekers.

Walls and Moats

There is a surprising and unique symmetry in Britain and Hungary’s position on immigration: their reliance of physical barriers over more traditional tools of immigration policy; this reliance has led to similar conflicts with the institutions of the European Union and fellow European nations. The barrier employed by the UK is natural, the English Channel, and has long been an important feature of European immigration policy. Refugee and migrant camps across the channel in Calais, France have long featured as a humanitarian crisis in Europe, the Channel, which can only be crossed by the Chunnel trains or ferry, provides a clear blockage point for migrants trying to enter the United Kingdom. Hungary, on the other hand, has constructed its barrier, a 500-kilometer long, 4 meter tall border fence on its southern border. This fence has, according the Hungarian government, contributed to a 99% drop in illegal immigration to Hungary.

The conflicts that this has caused Hungary with the institutions of the European Union are sharp and clear. The most direct confrontation on this issue area has been with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the subject of migrant rights and Hungary’s obligations to asylum seekers. The ECJ process is the final stage of a process initiated by the European Commission in 2015. The formal complaint argued that Hungary kept migrants in “transition zones” for excessively long periods and failed to provide proper legal representation.

Hungary’s confrontation with ECJ is mirrored by ideologically parallel conflicts with the European Commission. The commission has complained  (Furedi 2017) that Hungary has not met its obligations under the various EU treaties which govern member states. Specifically, Hungary has refused to honor EU requests for it to take its quota of asylum seekers – a measure developed to relieve border state like Italy and Greece of a disproportionate burden in resettling refugees (especially given the standard in international law that asylum seekers must be processed in the country where they first arrive).

These dual conflicts with two of the key institutions of the EU provide a mirror image of Britain’s conflicts during the Brexit negotiations. While Hungary conflicts with the EU from within, and Britain will so do so from outside the block, they both share a politicized and conditional acceptance of European integration. Both countries have also embodied the dual legacies of “technocracy (from the EU) and populism (in reaction to it) (Zimmerman and Durs 218).

Bibliography

Szijjártó, Peter. ‘Migration Is Not a Fundamental Human Right’ Interview by Amanda House. Breitbart, July 2nd of 2018

Zimmermann, Hubert, and Andreas Dür, eds. Key controversies in European integration. Macmillan International Higher Education, 2016.

Furedi, Frank. Populism and the European Culture Wars: The Conflict of Values Between Hungary and the EU. Routledge, 2017.