Category: 2- EU institutions (Page 1 of 2)

When one goes to Vilnius, the Lithuania capital, they are sure to be drawn to one the city`s premier attractions in the “The Genocide Museum.” The museum, which was once the headquarters for Nazi S.S and then taken over by the K.G.B, was a place which was run by members of society who deny the holocaust every happened. One idea that Bleich describes as a reason for holocaust denial was international pressure. In 2011, the museum added one room that payed homage the genocide of the Jews due to international criticism, where 20,000 Lithuanian Jews were killed during Stalinist purges and Siberian Camps. One scholar, David Katz, who is a Jewish scholar of Yiddish and a historian within Lithuanian ancestry called this museum “a 21<sup>st</sup> century-version of holocaust denial.” He believes that by preaching a soviet genocide and not the holocaust is a way to deter holocaust thoughts, while heightening the soviet`s wrongdoings instead of Germany. Lithuanian is the world`s only country who defines the former Soviet Union as a form of genocide, which is one of the museums many themes.

Though many don’t associate Lithuania with the holocaust, that is a false pre conceived notion. According to Efraun Zuroff, the Simon Wiesenthal Center`s chief Nazi Hunter, explained that the museum had 20,000 Lithuanians who participated in the holocaust but only THREE if them were convicted.  Places like Hungary, Poland and the Ukraine have found ways to drive a gap between themselves and holocaust. The mantra of “If everyone`s guilty, no one`s guilty”, is a phrase that is used to lessen the deviance of one country by adding in all the other countries that played a major role.

In 2018, Lithuanian parliament voted on a bill that banned the selling of material that “distorts historical facts” about the nation (JTA,2018). This bill came as a response to the publication of a book about the Holocuast, “Our people”, which was published in 2016. This book broke Lithuanian taboos about Nazi collaboration and the murder of Jews during World War II. Bliech explains a similar case through the Danish Cartoons, as many European States have restrictive laws on books, but do not penalize racism/hatred.

Part B:

Lithuania and Russia have a had long history dating back to 1795, as the Soviet Union and today Russia have been intertwined for decades. One way that these countries were so intertwined was that the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania. During World War II, the Soviet Union invaded Poland, while taking over the Vilnius Region, which was occupied by Poland at the time. Lithuania fought back, but with Russian troops in the region, their military bolstered a stronghold within this region. The Soviet Union held power in this region for 45 years, while killing hundreds of thousands of people, including the entire intellectual elite, through murder, torture or deportation to Siberia. Due to the harsh occupation, this left a deep psychological and economical gap within the Lithuanian nation, as they were left in despair following Soviet rule.

One issue that Lithuania has with Russia is that they fear that Russian propaganda could lead to invasion. Russia has delivered campaigns informing Europe that Lithuania`s capital, Vilnius does not belong to Lithuania because during the two world war`s it was occupied by Poland (Harrison and Boffey, 2017).  Reports from Russia claim that Putin gifted the capital to Lithuania after the war, a statement that is deemed problematic towards Lithuanian governmental integrity.Lithuania has made committed efforts to shut down hostile propaganda from Russia through suspending television stations and educating their citizens on what propaganda is and what it looks like.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/world/europe/lithuania-genocide-museum-jews.html

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/07/lithuania-and-nazis-the-country-wants-to-forget-its-collaborationist-past-by-accusing-jewish-partisans-of-war-crimes.html

http://www.truelithuania.com/topics/history-and-politics-of-lithuania/history-of-lithuania

https://www.timesofisrael.com/lithuanian-bill-would-ban-books-critical-of-the-country/

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/03/lithuania-fears-russian-propaganda-is-prelude-to-eventual-invasion

Romania’s constitution, established in 1991, declares that “Human dignity, civic rights and freedoms, the unhindered development of human personality, justice, and political pluralism are supreme and guaranteed values.” While Romania was once a relatively progressive country at the turn of the 20th century, dictatorship and subsequently communism under the Soviet system tarnished human rights in the country. After the 1991 revolution, Romania adopted their current constitution and transitioned to a market economy and democracy. Despite strong economic growth, all has not been well in Romania in the 21st century. Presidential impeachments and as of more recently, political protests have plagued the country. Freedom of speech has been for the most part upheld in Romania but not without controversy. In 2004, the government was accused by many journalists of being threatened by the government during presidential election season. Freedom House, a U.S. based NGO, rated Romania as “partly free”. Corruption in the government rather than freedom of speech has proved itself to be a much larger deal in contemporary Romania. In cases examined by Bleich, he highlights controversial court decisions on speech and strictness on certain issues (i.e. banning holocaust denial speech). Similarly, on October 7, 2015, the Romanian Senate passed a law that states that anyone accused of ‘social defamation’ can be subject to a financial penalty. This penalty can range between about 200-6000, and go even higher (up to 22,000 Euros) for a group defamation. The law was introduced by one of the more questionable Romanian politicians, Liviu Dragnea, who has shown to favor private interests over Romanian constituents. Many NGOs had criticized the law as a gross violation of freedom of expression. While the law was ultimately not adopted, the fact that it was passed by the senate shows how susceptible the government can be to outside interests, or how sensitive it can be to criticism. Freedom of assembly is guaranteed by the Romanian Constitution and is generally respected by the government and police. However, ongoing protests have grown massive in scale between 2017-2018. These protests are not against injustices involving speech, but government corruption after the newly elected Romanian administration pardoned various criminals, including many former politicians, just weeks after taking office. Police brutality has become a problem in the wake of these mass protests. Holocaust denial is strictly prohibited in Romania, which is similar to many of the cases Bleich examines. A Romanian ordinance passed in 2002 prohibits Holocaust denial as well as xenophobia, racism, and fascist symbols. Starting an organization that is deemed to be associating with any of the three can carry a prison sentence from 5-15 years. Bleich states that he believes limiting controversial speech such of this can weaken democracy. I wouldn’t favor a law like this in the United States, which admittedly could be called protecting the freedom to be racist, but I believe there is an ongoing battle in Europe against fascist and autocratic sentiments. A law like this may be necessary to avoid repeating a history that is all too familiar to Europe but non existent in the United States.

Russia, like much of eastern Europe, has deep historical roots in the governance of Romania. After the revolution of 1991, Romania expressed its desire to join NATO and the EU, which it did both respectively in 2004 and 2007. Relations with the Russian federation were initially nonexistent, before an attempt to sign a bilateral good-neighborly relations treaty went haywire in 1996 after the sitting Romanian president refused to sign the treaty at the last second due to lack of condemnation of certain historical acts. Tension over clauses in the treaty continued in the late 20th century and even though the good relations treaty was eventually signed in 2003, the conflict over the non-condemnation of a WWII era treaty and the rights to the Romanian Treasure went unsolved. The Romanian Treasure is a collection of valuable objects and gold that was sent to Russia for safekeeping during World War I that as of 2018 has not been returned. Russian engagement with Romanian parties has been largely unsuccessful in the 21st century. Tension over the territory rights to neighboring Moldova, as well as the fact that Romania is a part of NATO and has allowed U.S. troops to station at Romanian military bases. Russia has warned Romania that if it becomes central to a confrontation between NATO and Russia that its military bases could be compromised. Russian relations with Romanian parties have so far been neutral at best.

Works Cited

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

“Free Speech under Siege in Romania.” ADF International. February 16, 2016. Accessed November 20, 2018. https://adfinternational.org/news/free-speech-under-siege-in-romania/.

“Russia Warns Romania.” Nine O Clock. February 12, 2015. Accessed November 20, 2018. https://www.nineoclock.ro/2015/02/12/russia-warns-romania/.

Stan, Marius. “Romania’s Threatened Freedom of Speech.” Public Seminar. June 01, 2017. Accessed November 20, 2018. http://www.publicseminar.org/2015/10/romanias-threatened-freedom-of-speech/.

I think it is quite safe to say that Portugal is a relatively free country. In terms of elections, they most recently had a an election in 2015 and Portugal has put a lot of effort into curbing corruption as a whole. Additionally, the assembly that is the legislature in Portugal has 230 and they are elected every four years and the president can serve up to two consecutive five year terms. On the whole, Portugal has done a very good job in terms of maintaining a free country and free for thought.

According to Bleich, the Portuguese have many provisions in their government to combat against the uprising of any fascist type regimes, a consciousness that was acquired after World War 2 in 1945. According to Bleich, in Portugal, like a few other western European countries, have a laws in place to punish any types of Holocaust deniers and any kind of overall Holocaust denial. More specifically, what Portugal aims to do with this type of policy is stop speech that denies war crimes. Overall, Portugal has done an extremely good job to maintain freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and in comparison with Bleich have done a good job in maintaining Holocaust deniers.

In terms of dealing with Russia, Portugal has always had pretty positive relations with Russia. Russia has a full embassy in Lisbon, Portugal and the Portuguese have a full embassy in Moscow, Russia. According to different Russian news sources, the Russians are extremely supportive of the growing relationship between the two countries and they both find it quite valuable. Russia views Portugal as a good partner who has an in with both NATO and the EU. All in all, this relationship is entirely positive and it is hard to find a real negative interaction between the two of them.

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Taylor, Simon. “Portugal Must Sail Closer to Russia’s Wind.” POLITICO, POLITICO, 12 Apr. 2014, www.politico.eu/article/portugal-must-sail-closer-to-russias-wind/.

“Portuguese Foreign Relations.” CEPESE | CENTRO DE ESTUDOS DA POPULAÇÃO, ECONOMIA E SOCIEDADE, 12 Nov. 2017, www.cepese.pt/portal/en/investigacao/grupos/relacoes-externas-de-Portugal.

“Portugal.” Freedom House, 1 Dec. 2016, freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/portugal.

Prompt A)

Contemporary Austrian politics is marred by the reemergence of Far Right, ultranationalist politicians who have taken advantage of domestic and international political instability to seize power in the government.  In the past these politicians have been known for their inflammatory rhetoric which has actively demonized muslims, jews, Roma, and other non ethnically Austrian minorities.  Austrian law has sought to curb the influence of Neo-Nazi’s & other supportive movements through strict anti-semitism and holocaust denial laws akin to those in Germany (Foreign Policy, 2016), while working to preserve civil liberties such as the right to assembly (Freedom House, 2018).  In trying to strike a careful balance which preserves basic civil liberties while refusing to give ground for Neo-Nazi behavior, those with fascist and racist sympathies have been finding ways to stretch the boundaries of the law to get away with otherwise obvious acts of hate.  

Since the passing of Holocaust Denial laws in 1992 which expanded on the 1947 framework for denazification, Austria has jailed and fined individuals and organizations which have engaged in anti-Semitic or nazi behavior (JURIST, 2017).    This follows a similar trend taken by other countries that either perpetrated or aided Nazi Germany during the Second World War (Bleich, 2011, 48).  While Austria has punished nazi sympathizers, ironically including the current Vice-Chancellor for organizing a Hitler Youthesque rally as a teenager (Times of Israel, 2017), there is a national narrative of victimhood which deflects association of Austria with Nazi cooperation and rather suggests that they are a victim akin to other European countries and nationalities (Niederacher, 2003).  

The inability for the Austrian government to fully accept its responsibility for the Holocaust and other war crimes under the Third Reich will always leave the country at a disadvantage when it comes to engagement with far right and racist movements.  In a recent legal case surrounding the youth Identitarian movement, courts vindicated 10 members following their arrest for criminal association and hate speech (Vice, 2018).  Many fear that the inability for the Austrian courts to firmly interpret the rule of law and define the boundaries of what is and is not hate speech will embolden the far right to act boldly down the road.  Until Austria can reevaluate its national culture and accept its share of responsibility for the Holocaust, no amount of legal balancing over freedom of association and speech can stop Neo-Nazi’s from pushing their agenda.

Part B:

It is no secret that the Russian Federation has sought to influence politics throughout the western world.  While their actions in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom may be better documented, they have quietly been engaged in a P.R. campaign in Austria over the last several years which has grown to fruition following the election of a coalition government in 2018 between the center right OVP and the ultranationalist FPO.  What has occurred over the years in Austria is the gradual permeation of Russia of soft power which has been manifested in a variety of ways.  Be it the connection between Austrian right wing news sources with Kremlin sponsorship, their support for FPO leader and current vice-chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache, or the infamous Vienna Russian Balls, Moscow’s agents have been hard at work to aid far right movements throughout the country (Shekhovstov, 2017).  

Traditionally, because Austrian politics has been dominated by the center-left SVP and the aforementioned OVP, Russia has been hesitant about getting overly involved with fringe right wing movements in Austria.  However, this began to change as the Austrian public began to be more receptive to FPO politicians and their euroskeptic/anti-immigrant platform.  Since the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, the FPO took a pro-Russia turn, engaging with leading figures in Putin’s government who exported their political, religious, and cultural rhetoric into Austria (Shekhovstov, 204, 2017). 

The connection between the FPO and the Kremlin has given the OVP chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, somewhat of a link to Putin.  The two of them have repeaditely met since the 2018 election and have sought to deepen the interconnectivity between the two countries, with Kurz seeing this as an opportunity to bridge the Euro-Russian divide and Putin viewing this as his opportunity to gain a supportive ally in the E.U. (Politico, 2018).  Given these linkages between the current Austrian government and Putin, it is safe to say that Russia’s gamble with the FPO has paid off thus far as they now have the potential to legitimize their brand of ultranationalism throughout Austria. 

Sources:

“Austria.” Freedom House. March 12, 2018. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/austria.

Large, David Clay. “Germany + Nazi Denial = Austria.” Foreign Policy. December 2, 2016. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/02/germany-nazi-denial-austria/.  

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to

Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Callan, Autumn. “Austria court convicts man for violating anti-nazi laws with Facebook.” JURIST: A Collaboration with the University of Pittsburgh. July 31, 2017.  Accessed November 19, 2018. https://www.jurist.org/news/2017/07/austria-court-convicts-man-for-violating-anti-nazi-laws-with-facebook-post/.  

“Heinz-Christian Strache from neo-Nazi youth to Austrias next vice-chancellor.” The Times of Israel. December 16, 2017. Accessed November 19, 2018. https://www.timesofisrael.com/heinz-christian-strache-from-neo-nazi-youth-to-austrias-next-vice-chancellor/.  

Shekhovstov, Anton. Russia and the Western Far Right. Routledge Press, 2017.   

Turkey:  A Warning for Free Speech Critics

The JDP possesses a fundamentally hostile perspective towards freedom of speech, thought, and assembly, more so than any other European country.  Turkey does not easily compare to the cases Bleich examines in the UK, Netherlands, and other countries which value liberty as an axiom of society.  What certain countries regard as a provocation to violence, such as genocide denial in Germany, Turkey regards as the status quo in the case of the Armenian genocide.  For contrast, the French outlawed Armenian genocide denial in 2007, and the Swiss even tried and convicted a Turkish politician (Dogu Perincek) for his denial. In Turkey, acknowledgment of the genocide could fall under Article 301 of the Turkish constitution which criminalizes “insulting Turkishness.” Additionally, the reasons Bleich provides for preserving free speech in Europe and the US often constitute the same reasons Turkey chooses to eliminate free speech.

Much of the paranoia surrounding free speech limitation in Europe stems from the “slippery slope” argument.  The British Religious Hatred Act, pursued by the Labour Party in 2006, met exactly this challenge in Parliament (Bleich 2011, 25).  Tories feared the generality of an act which restricted hate speech as a blanket category. Answers to the question of who could define hate varied depending upon who gave the answer.  Thus, the UK added a clause which specified that the speech must be “likely” and “intended” to cause acts of racial hatred– a difficult standard to prove, and one which limited use of the act to a maximum of four times per year (Bleich 2011, 25).  The fear of government overreach in defining dangerous or hateful speech has reached its full potential in Turkey, where the government has taken sweeping actions to limit the speech of dissidents.

Since the Ergenekon investigation launched in 2007, Turkey has used flimsy and fabricated evidence of widespread coup conspiracies to crack down on speech (Eligur 2016, 158).  By 2010, 275 academics, politicians, and journalists had been arrested in the Ergenekon case, and the faux investigation only expanded from there (Jenkins 2009, 9). As a weapon against oppositional speech, the investigation targeted several parties from the PKK to the Marxist Revolutionary People’s Liberation party (Jenkins 2009, 9).  

In the Netherlands, the government used state power to dissolve a hateful party as recently as 1998, when it dissolved the Centre Party ‘86 for racism which was “incompatible with public order” (Blech 2011, 88).  Bleich speaks of this extreme as a rare but aggressive tactic, which often results in a “phoenix-like rise of the organization under a different name” (Bleich, 87). Turkey resolves the problem of a rebirth of state-dissolved organizations by cracking down on every aspect of society.  Consequently, the lack of free speech and organizational assembly protects the government’s ability to control opposition. Given the strength of its institutions, the idea of such an abuse of power occurring in the Netherlands seems preposterous. Regardless, Turkey provides a fair warning as to how the state can abuse the power to patrol speech and assembly.

Allies Domestically, Enemies in Foreign Affairs

The JDP’s rejection of liberal democracy and preference for authoritarianism already aligns with the goals of most Russian political intervention.  Turkey’s widening distance from the EU, in which President Erdogan has recently downplayed the importance membership, also reduces Russia’s need to interfere in the country’s politics. Despite their authoritarian similarities, Russia and Turkey have struggled to bridge the divide over the Syrian civil war.  Their support for opposing sides has prevented the countries from maintaining closer relations beyond trade.

In September of this year, Russia, Turkey, and Iran met in Tehran to discuss the imminent humanitarian disaster unfolding in Syria.  The Idlib province, home to approximately 3 million citizens and 1 million children, had become the final rebel stronghold in the country.  Turkey and the United States support the rebels, while Russia and Iran support the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The three states managed to craft a deal in which the Idlib province would contain a demilitarized zone for the citizens.  The rebels removed all heavy weaponry from the demilitarized zone. Their competing interests in Syria may continue to drive the countries apart, however, since the Syrian regime violated the agreement and shelled the demilitarized zone as recently as yesterday, killing a woman and a child.

The conflict in Syria stands in the way of an alliance otherwise well suited for both countries.  They share a democratic facade behind which their authoritarian leaders control the affairs of the country.  While Putin has held control in Russia since 1999, vacillating between Prime Minister and President, Erdogan only recently created competitive authoritarianism in Turkey.  The JDP’s referendum on April 16, 2017, encoded a number of constitutional changes into law which expanded the power of the executive. The changes abolished the Prime Minister position, granted the President the power to dissolve the entire Assembly at will, and contained several similarly authoritarian provisions (Sakurai 2018, 36).  With the rise of an illiberal European regime typically comes closer ties to Russia, as in Orban’s Hungary and Duda’s Poland. Whether the civil war continues to obstruct this development remains to be seen.

Works Cited:

Bleich, Erik. The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to

Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Eligür, Banu. “Turkey’s Declining Democracy.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 17 (2014):

151.

Jenkins, Gareth H. Between fact and fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon investigation. Central

Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 2009.

Osseiran, Hashem. “Syrian Army Shells Demilitarised Zone in Idlib, Undermining

Russian-Turkish Deal .” The National. November 18, 2018. Accessed November 18,

2018. https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/syrian-army-shells-demilitarised-zone-in-idlib-undermining-russian-turkish-deal-1.792963.

Yukio Sakurai. 2018. “Turkey’s Possible Future Directions after the 2017 Referendum:

Autocracy or Democracy?” International Journal of Interdisciplinary Civic & Political

Studies 13 (1/2): 33–45. doi:10.18848/2327-0071/CGP/v13i01/33-45.

Since Croatia’s independence from Yugoslavia, its foreign policy goal was dominated by gaining  EU membership, and Croatia achieved this goal in 2013. Croatia therefore currently still faces challenges defining its contemporary foreign policy goals today. However, Croatia’s has turned its foreign policy direction to align with the European Union’s foreign policy goals. The Croatian Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs adopted the Strategic Plan 2017-2019 which is its latest strategic document focusing on Croatia’s foreign policy goals. The Strategic plan 2017-2019 states that its mission is to promote stability in its country, promote and protect the interests and safety of Croatians abroad, develop strong economic ties with Croatian and other countries abroad, and preserve and develop procedures for unity and stability within the EU. Croatia is also focused on establishing and maintaining bilateral and multilateral relationships and cooperation in the world. Croatia wishes to strengthen its position in Central Europe in order to keep common values and economic trade relations stable. Additionally, Croatia’s foreign policy aims include the preservation and strengthening of peace between countries including establishing stable relationships with neighbors as well as important countries of the world. Although Croatia is committed to these goals, it continues to fall short of it foreign policy expectations and realities due to its late ascension and the internal struggles it continues to face as a result.

Croatia’s foreign policy most resembles that of Spain’s foreign policy goals. Similar to Croatia, Spain, a medium-sized country, easily becomes overlooked and outbalanced from the rising influences in the EU, such as Germany. Spain foreign policy priorities, following the death of dictator in 1975, also focused on removing itself from diplomatic isolation and entering the European community through the European Union. With Spain’s new administration, and it being granted EU membership, it wishes to represent a total break with its past and move towards having stronger ties and with the EU and its partners. Spain has underperformed on the international scale, just as Croatia, but still wishes to embrace numerous plans to deepen European cooperation, especially on security matters. Its main agenda is to regain economic strength, like Croatia, and work more efficiently alongside EU members. Spain also adopted a multilateral approach to reach international stability. In 2013, through its National Security Strategy, Spain also places national security in a global context to create a national and international safe environment, and sees European integration as providing greater regional security. The new Spanish government also recognizes the central value of European foreign policy coordination that aligns with the EU. Spain, just as Croatia, defends and supports the involvement of the EU in democracy and peace. Both Croatia and Spain recognize the importance of becoming more involved in the EU and its foreign policy goals, but have not successfully found a way to flourish as other EU members have.

Croatia’s foreign policy choices appear as a part of EU-wide negotiations about migration. Migrants from Middle East and central Asia, trying to reach wealthier EU states, typically cross into Croatia from Bosnia undeclared and unidentified. Therefore, Croatia has experienced a 30% increase in unauthorized migrants. As a result, Croatia, like other EU countries, has been working on having stricter flow of migrants and border controls. Previously when crossing Croatia’s borders, only documents and license plate numbers were only for suspicious people. It will now be that all documents and all vehicle license plate number will go through a special scanner for all Croatian citizens, citizens of non EU-countries, and citizens of the Schengen zone. Th The police also warned that the waiting times at the border crossing will begin to take longer. This change will occur due to the increased terrorist attacks in Europe. Croatia is not yet a member of the Schengen crisis, although moving closer to becoming a member, and as a result Croatia citizens and migrants will feel the effects.

The European Commission is also working towards negotiations with Croatia to have it within the Schengen area. Once Croatia meets the technical criteria for the of the EU’s Schengen zone, the European Commission will assess if Croatia is ready to join. Croatia hopes will occur before the next elections for the European Parliament. Croatia hopes to join by 2020 as it is one of the six european union members not part of the passport-free Schengen zone. The free movement of people would benefit Croatia’s economy, specifically in its tourism sector which makes up about 20 percent of Croatia’s GDP. However, the Council of Europe continues to urge for Croatia to launch investigations concerning reports of police violence and theft against migrants. The Commissioner of the Council of Europe addressed a letter to the Croatian Prime Minister revealing the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, has received reports of 2,500 migrants being pushed back from Croatia since the beginning of 2018 and 1,500 people being denied to asylum procedure which includes 100 children. In addition, more than 700 people have experienced violence and theft by Croatian officers. However, Croatian officials have denied such claims. As a result, until Croatia recognizes such claims and implements investigation will the European Commission allow for Croatia to be within the Schengen zone. Despite this, Croatia continues its negotiations with the EU in hopes of achieving its foreign policy goals.   

Al Jazeera. “Council of Europe Urges Croatia to Probe Police Abuse Allegations.” News | Al Jazeera. October 05, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2018/10/council-europe-urges-croatia-probe-police-abuse-allegations-181005104405894.html. Accessed October 21, 2018.

“Contemporary Croatia.” croatia.eu.http://croatia.eu/article.php?lang=2&id=24. Accessed October 21, 2018.

EU Agenda Team. “National Backgrounders – European Foreign Policy Country Profile – Spain.” EU Agenda. December 2015. https://euagenda.eu/publications/national-backgrounders-european-foreign-policy-country-profile-spain. Accessed October 22, 2018.

Knezović, Sandro, and Nani Klepo. “Croatian Foreign Policy in 3D.” IRMO, 2017, 1-42. http://www.irmo.hr/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/3D.pdf. Accessed October 21, 2018.

Pavlic, Vedran. “Stricter Controls Coming to Croatian Border Crossings.” Total Croatia News. April 1, 2017. https://www.total-croatia-news.com/lifestyle/17852-stricter-controls-coming-to-croatian-border-crossings. Accessed October 21, 2018.

Reuters, Tickers. “Croatia on Course for Schengen Zone Entry in 2020 – Government Official.” SWI Swissinfo.ch. October 16, 2018. https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/reuters/croatia-on-course-for-schengen-zone-entry-in-2020—government-official/44478100. Accessed October 21, 2018.

“Spain as a Template for European Foreign Policy?” Carnegie Europe. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/53614. Accessed October 29, 2018.

The Netherlands has always been an active member within the EU.  However, the Dutch have a specific approach to foreign policy within the EU which can be most paralleled with the French approach to the EU.  The two countries are very similar because in the past they have positively benefited from a strong and flourishing EU.  With both countries being founding members, from a historical standpoint they have experience and clout within the organization.  France and The Netherlands have traditionally supported EU policy like the Maastricht Treaty and Schengen Agreement, both encouraging a more integrated and prosperous Europe.   However, The Netherlands is a geographically smaller country naturally limiting the natural resources and population as opposed to larger countries like Germany.  This emphasizes the importance they hold for the EU Council in representing their interest.

However, in the past 20 years, both countries have come to a certain realization that the EU may not be as beneficial today as it was when it was formed.  While France is disheartened with the violent consequences of the immigration crisis, The Netherlands are dissatisfied for their own reasons.  The Dutch have lost a significant amount of faith with the EU council and this is only growing with the new far right party emerging and galvanizing this EU distaste.  The EU council is supposed to promote each countries interest, but according to the Dutch, they see the EU as now a federal body that is trying to expand its power through adding new members and different financial regulations.

The Netherlands has also had a unique relationship to the Brexit movement, and they ae certainly not looking away from the option.  Britain’s precedent to leave the EU was unheard of and previously not seen as an alternative.  However, growing EU distaste spurred on by the Dutch has been on the rise for a variety of reasons.  The EU’s immigration policy has caused quite the stir within the country as anti-Islam sentiment has taken root with the rise of the right wing.  Additionally, The Netherlands had to be a creditor to the countries that suffered economically in the European debt crisis.  This didn’t sit well with the Dutch, who believe strongly in financial security and responsibility.  By taking these factors compounded with the precedent that Britain set, it is not unreasonable to believe that The Netherlands won’t leave the EU.

Works Cited

• Glencross, Andrew. The Politics of European Integration: Political Union or a House Divided?Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
• Kortweg, Kem. “How the Dutch Fell Out of Love With the EU.” Carnegie Europe. March 2, 2017. Accessed October 26, 2018.
• Chopin, Thierry. “European Issues and Interviews.” Emmanuel Macron, France and Europe “France Is Back in Europe”: On Which Terms ?[1]. May 18, 2018. Accessed October 26, 2018.

Lithuania and Germany have a long lasting history, as Germany occupied Lithuania in 1915 during World War II. During this time, Germany saw their occupation of Lithuania as a strategic means, as they could garnish a stronghold in the Baltic Sea, use Lithuania as a source of agriculture, while attempting to cut off Russia. After this occurrence, in 1917 Lithuania wanted to gain their independence from Germany, as these two countries signed a declaration of independence, which allowed the countries to enter into diplomatic relations.

One historic day in both of these countries histories took place during the NATO summit in 2016. This can be seen as a historic day for not only the security of the Lithuania, but for the Baltic region as a whole. On this day, the NATO summit accepted the deployment of a 1000-strong multinational allied battalion to each of the Baltic States and Poland. Lithuania’s Battalion was lead by Germany, to help protect Lithuania through deterrence and defense, while enhancing involvement of NATOs forces in this region. President Dalia Grybauskaitė took this as a strong sign of allied unity as Germany wanted to strengthen relations with Lithaunia. This summit also had a joint EU-NATO declaration signed, which helped Germany and Lithuania as both of these countries are members of these organizations. This is part of the alliance`s deal of “enhanced Forward Presence”, as both countries look continue strong ties.

One way that Lithuania followed the lead of Germany is through their military. According to President Grybauskaitė, she believes that these two countries bilateral relations are at an all time high and through their military cooperation, Germany and Lithuania will continue to seek each other’s best interests to benefit their respected countries. Unlike when the German forces came to Lithuania during World War II when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Lithuania’s welcomed German forces to help protect against an increasingly aggressive Kremlin behavior in 2017. Military cooperation will continue to enhance the bilateral relations between these two countries and with a common goal of pushing back Russia, they have the opportunity to drive their foreign policies.

Lithuania and Brexit:

When analyzing the effects of Brexit on Germany and Lithuania, it is evident that their were two major differences on the impact of the UK to leave the European Union. From an economic standpoint, Lithuania is using this decision to help elevate their economy and grow a global fintech hub, as Germany is being forced to deal with the mess that Brexit has left, as they are expected to pay 15 billion Euros extra a year to fill the void the UK left. Germany already pays 30 Billion to the EU, which is the bloc`s largest contributor

On the other hand, Lithuania sees Brexit as an opportunity to expand and build their economy. Invest Lithuania state that 117 Fintech companies were not operating in Lithuania and in 2017 alone, 35 new businesses were registered. One of the main draws that Lithuania is using to entice businesses to invest in Lithuania is that being in the eurozone gives them the same status at every other big country, but it wont cost their business as much due to the benefits of cheaper living costs.

The European Commission, which is represented by Michel Barnier, who is the Chief Negotiator for the EU countries is responsible for the negotiations that took place between Brexit and the EU. The commission`s job promote what is best for the EU`s general interest and by passing Brexit, allowing the UK to leave the EU was in the EU`s best interest based off the commission. Along with the commission, the Parliament played a major role in determining Brexit, as this group of elected officials vote on legislation. The Parliament is the group that helped pass Brexit and without this group, it would have been unobtainable.

https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/cooperation-between-lithuania-and-germany-the-most-successful-ever-in-the-history-of-bilateral-relations/30861

https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1035684/brexit-news-germany-uk-eu-budget-contribution

https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/eu’s-role-brexit-negotiations

https://www.businessinsider.com/lithuania-fintech-brexit-2018-2

https://www.politico.eu/article/lithuania-nato-russia-baltics-germany-sleep-peacefully-thanks-to-german-troops/

Due to its external position relative to the EU, the foreign policy of Turkey most closely follows that of the post-Brexit United Kingdom.  Since the decision by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, they have reached a negotiation standoff. The tension has manifested itself in the form of the political party UKIP, which led the campaign with a series of populist declarations and sentiments.  UKIP benefitted from the perception of an anti-UK bias within the EU, which persisted despite several concessions, such as the rebate on contributions to the EU budget (Zimmerman and Durs 2016, 251). Turkey and the UK both maintain close trade relationships with the EU, although both have struggled to rationalize and preserve it.

The UK and Turkey experienced slow withdrawals from their relations with the EU, culminating in singular acts of defiance which shook their respective relationships to the core.  The Turkish government slowly embraced authoritarianism beginning with the faux Ergenekon investigation in 2007 (Jenkins 2009, 9). Not long after, the ruling JDP party continued to slide away from democracy with state-influenced elections and voter intimidation, particularly in the snap elections of 2015.  Turkey’s smaller-scale acts of domestic rebellion preceded a decisive split in 2017, when President Erdogan eliminated hopes of joining the EU by destroying the parliamentary system in Turkey and replacing it with a presidential system without checks on his power.

The UK began with small-scale acts of rebellion as well, such as testing the EU’s tolerance for dissent with their opt-outs on banking unions and migration policy (Zimmerman and Durs, 251).  In 1992, they successfully rejected the replacement of the pound for the euro (Zimmerman and Durs, 251). These acts of rebellion culminated in the Brexit campaign of 2016, when rising anti-EU sentiment in rural areas handed a victory to the Leave campaign. Between Brexit and the referendum, the new challenge for the UK and Turkey is to negotiate for the survival of their economic relationships with the EU.

In both cases, the perception of unfair EU policies played a role in the decisions to separate from the EU.  According to The Brookings Institute, “anti-Western sentiment that has risen in Turkey” due to the “perception that the West is continually carrying out operations against Turkey” damaged popular opinion of the EU.  Similarly, the members of the Leave campaign accused the EU of attempting to impose a tax on all financial transactions (Sked, 261). Sked attributed the tax impropriety to the EU’s desire to “undermine the success of the city of London” (Sked, 261).  Turkey and the UK confronted the perception of bias with rebelliousness, which amplified over time into full-scale defiance of EU membership and values.

Institutional Perspective:

As the UK has attempted to negotiate with the European Council regarding the terms of its exit, it has encountered a number of internal and external problems.  The government of Theresa May, perhaps as a result of its diminished strength following the snap elections of 2017, has failed to reach a compromise. Segments of the far right and far left within the UK claim to desire a hard Brexit.  The prospect of no-deal by March 2019 has provoked the UK to begin stockpiling food and supplies. The possibility of no-deal warrants their concern, considering Ottaviano et al. discovered that Brexit would cause anywhere from a 1 to 3% drop in GDP as a minimum, reason enough for 84% of the business community to support UK membership in the EU (Zimmerman and Durs 2016, 257).

For comparison, Turkey regards the EU as an antagonistic but necessary partner for economic relations.  Both Ankara and Brussels have struggled to sustain the pretense of membership negotiations, but according to Al Jazeera, the EU foreign ministers have declared the negotiations “a standstill.”  The European Commission has met with Ankara in Brussels to discuss the terms of their trading relationship. However, the two sides failed to reach an accord with regards to the state of membership in Turkey’s future.  

Turkey stands to lose a large proportion of trade valuation if relations with the EU further plummet; the EU accounted for 36.4% of Turkey’s imports and 47% of its exports in 2017, according to The Independent.  Earlier this month, the European Parliament canceled an earmarked payment of 70 million euros in pre-accession funds to Turkey, due to a scathing report from the European Commission. With such strong economic ties, the slide towards authoritarianism has not deterred Turkey’s desire to remain economically close to the EU, despite charging it with acts against the JDP regime. The UK and Turkey have difficult EU relations in common, as both rely upon them economically, yet carry disdain for the perceived slights against their sovereignty. The question remains: Can the UK negotiate a decent trade relationship with the EU in spite of its internal animosities?  Similarly, can Turkey uphold its trade relationships in the face of increasing political divide between the ideological expectations of the EU and its ruling JDP party?

1. Italy, France, and Spain

In many ways, Italy has followed the lead of Spain and France in foreign policy. Both Spain and Italy’s first measures after emerging from a fascist dictatorship were to rejoin the European Community ie the European Union. Italy and Spain also share similarities in that they are both Catholic countries and are therefore more conservative than other countries in the European Union. Italy, Spain, and France are all a part of the Schengen Agreement which eliminated passport controls between its European member states and mandated rigorous controls for persons arriving from non-member states. But, Italy is most similar in foreign policy to France and their more nationalist take on foreign policy.

Italy is similar to France in foreign policy because France’s foreign policy is more nationalistic and central to the French identity which is what Italy has been following lately, especially with current events surrounding migration. Spain is also located in the Mediterranean region so it shares similar interests of migration with Italy. Spain is not as xenophobic as Italy due to the fact that the fascist dictatorship of Franco is more present in the minds of Spanish than the fascist dictatorship in Italy that ended 20 years earlier than Franco’s. But, Spain could become more nationalist in the future if it continues down a path many European nations are taking. 

Italy has recently been more focused on state sovereignty in terms of migration policy and wants EU policy to benefit their own state needs of migration more than the EU as a whole. This is similar to France’s approach of nationalism in foreign policy and the fact that the country wants to look after its own interest. After Italy democratized in the 1950s, it was mostly focused on the European Community and not as much on foreign policy until quite recently. Until the 1980s, Italy was a country of emigration which then changed by the 1990s when economic growth transformed the country into a host country for migrants. Due to this new status and more migrants arriving in Italy, racism emerged in the country and the Italian government began taking a more nationalistic approach to foreign policy. This recent change in foreign policy also demonstrates how Italy has been working with the EU and it’s institutions recently.

2. Italy and Migration Policy

Italy has always played a role in EU institutions since it has been a member state since the inception of the EU and the European Community. An Italian has been President of the Council of the EU twelve times since 1959 with the most recent presidency being in 2014. So, Italy has always been involved in the functions of the European Union and its institutions.

Italy is located on the Mediterranean so it plays a large part on the frontier aspect in migration, especially as it is part of the Schengen agreement. Italy has recently had many issues with migration especially concerning the European migration crisis that is still ongoing. Italy has been looking out for itself more in foreign policy because they do not want more migrants coming into Italy. Italy has threatened the European Commission to withhold funding from the EU if other member states do no accept migrants. The Commission says. “The EU operates on rules, not threats” (CNN) and that Italy and the EU must work constructively to fix this issue. The migration crisis has hit Italy especially hard so it is making threats instead of working with the institutions to try to get a deal with other member states. This demonstrates how tensions have been rising between Italy and EU institutions, specifically the European Commission in order to come to a consensus. 

The Italian government has also had tensions with the EU and the European Commission over the budget deficit. Italy wants to break the deficit rule to help out poor Italian citizens. This would mean an increase in spending on tax cuts, more benefits spending, and a lower retirement age and would break the 2.4 percent target set by the EU for 2019. The Commission is not exactly willing to budge on this, and have expressed serious concern, and Italy knows that increasing their deficit is against EU rules. The Commission is unlikely to support the Italian increase in their budget which means that Italy will need to re-submit a budget proposal. This ongoing issue of the budget deficit, along with the migration policy issues, demonstrate how Italy is trying to express sovereignty and have the rules bent or benefit their country. But, EU institutions are not willing to let Italy go against EU rules and be an exception to these rules. Threats will not help Italy get what they want but instead, working with the institutions that they have long been a part of could benefit them to come to a consensus and enact a useful migration policy and financial plan.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-22/italy-set-to-tell-eu-it-won-t-back-down-on-2-4-deficit-target

https://www.britannica.com/place/Italy/Immigration-and-foreign-policy

https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-hits-back-hard-at-italys-budget-threat-in-migration-row/

https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/24/europe/eu-italy-migration-intl/index.html

Glencross, Andrew. 2014. “EU Policy-Making in Action.” The Politics of European Integration.