Similarities to UK and France
Montenegro, while not yet being in the EU, transitioned from resembling France in terms of foreign policy to resembling the United Kingdom. Structurally, Montenegro uses a hybrid-parliamentary system that most resembles France. Similar to France, Montenegro has an elected parliament and as a result, a Prime Minister (Duško Marković) that heads the Parliament and dictates foreign policy and the implementation of laws. Meanwhile, there is also an elected President (Milo Đukanović) who represents the Montenegro abroad, calls for parliamentary elections as well as referendums. Yet, in terms of foreign policy they are approaching an improved and open approach to globalization. Historically, the French are known for being very attached to their culture and nationalist identity. While being a member of the EU, this sentiment is still relevant today with the rise of nationalism and anti-immigration feelings. Montenegro holds similar sentiments as they have only recently formed these individual nationalist feelings.
One of the first acknowledgments of Montenegrin nationalism was when “Jagoš Jovanović wrote the History of the Montenegrin Nation and established the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts in Podgorica in the 1970s” (Jagiello-Szostak 105). As a result, the division of Yugoslav nationalism, and more recently Serbian nationalism, has been a recent development. Montenegro’s desire to find their own voice and build lasting strong institutions and regional stability follows the French idea of monoethnicity and nationalism. The influx of immigrants using new West Balkans paths to Europe has created tension in the region and has left many countries scrambling for answers. Montenegro shares a maritime border with Italy across the Adriatic Sea. As a result, they have a responsibility to control the influx of refugees, especially as they vie for an EU bid. Additionally, they have recently formed a plan for a razor-wire fence on the 26-kilometres long borderline with Albania. Additionally, Hungary, a staunch opposer to the influx of refugees, has agreed to help finance the fence. Montenegro is frustrated with Albania’s laid back attitude to letting these refugees through their country and into Montenegro. This is exacerbated by the fact the Tirana refuses to take back these refugees after they are sent back out of Montenegro. This anti-immigration policy follows the lead of the UK as they closed their borders and left the EU, with the refugee crisis being one off the main reasons they decided to leave. The Goodwin and Milazzo reading, backs these claims, concluding that “strong public concerns over immigration, and its perceived effects on the country and on communities, were central to explaining the 2016 vote for Brexit”. As a result, Montenegro follows a hybrid of French nationalism as well as British anti-immigration stances and border control as a result of the refugee crisis.
Relation to EU
Montenegro was recently called a “black hole” by Montenegrin journalist Brazen Zivkovic with regards to the amount of refugees that were entering the country with no route on which to continue to travel. Over 6,700 refugees have entered Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia this past year, causing Zivkovic to place blame on the local authorities for turning a blind eye on the issue (Tomovic 1). According to the Guardian, the EU has had an influx of over 1.8 million migrants since 2014, with over 1 million of them arriving in 2015 alone. This issue, along with the EU’s inability to come to an agreement on widespread reform, could be the downfall of the EU. Blame is being passed around on who should accept these migrants and where to integrate them, if at all. Overall, front line states such as Greece, Spain, and Italy take in an inordinate amount of migrants, with these migrants looking to reach northern, wealthier, destination states. A balance of this distribution will lead to a more cooperative EU. Lastly, hard line no immigrant stances from eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary must be altered in order to come to an agreement. Montenegro has appeared to be anti-immigrant so far during the crisis, committing to building a fence with financial contributions from Hungary. Yet, this must be altered to form a collective approach if Montenegro were to join the EU. Taking an approach such as Hungary’s and Poland’s does not appear to be an realistic option nor one that makes for a friendly introduction when it joins the EU.
Montenegro began EU preliminary talks back in 2010 when “the Commission issued a favourable opinion on Montenegro’s application, identifying 7 key priorities that would need to be addressed for negotiations to begin, and the Council granted it candidate status” (European Commission). Additionally, “In December 2011, the Council launched the accession process with a view to opening negotiations in June 2012. The accession negotiations with Montenegro started on 29 June 2012” (European Commission). Overall, Montenegro must continue to work with EU bodies in order to meet the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria.
Sources
Jagiello-Szostak, Anna. 2013. “Exploring the Roots of Montenegro.” New Eastern Europe, no. 4 (October): 103–9. https://ezproxy.lafayette.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=111391673&site=eds-live
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/what-current-scale-migration-crisis-europe-future-outlook
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/montenegro_en
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/region-on-alert-as-migrants-open-new-balkan-route-06-03-2018
Your description of the Montenegro’s transition from emulating France to emulating the UK is good and detailed with lots of evidence but I think the structure of Monetenegro’s institutions is not necessarily that important to its policy outlook – unless you show that Presidential system facilitates a certain kind of nationalism. Your analysis of the similarities between French and Montegrin visions of nationalism and “monoethnicity” is interesting and you clearly describe the manner in which the refugee crisis and Montenegro’s embrace of Hungarian funding for its border fence pushed Montenegro away from the French embrace of Europe and towards a British style hostility towards the EU’s demands on immigration
Your “black hole” is a great quote to start the second section with. Given Montenegro’s evolving relationship with the EU it is harder to describe its conflicts with existing EU institutions but you do a good job describing with precision the conflict between the Montenegran government and the various elements of the EU over the precise number of refugees it takes in. You also describe the extent to which Montenegro has aligned with the Hungary/Poland block of immigration hostile states even as it seeks accession to the EU. You may want to end with a more explicit discussion of how the transgressions of those two states and the Article 7 implementation against them may affect Montenegro’s putative relationship with the EU.