

non-factive versus factive interpretation is effortlessly resolved by context.

As a linguistic semanticist myself, I cannot take NTV seriously. And, in general, I doubt that any very interesting linguistic facts can be explained by appeal to probability theory; I doubt that the Equation thesis in particular is even *prima facie* true (*Real Conditionals*, pp. 89–90).

These remarks are meant neither to refute NTV nor to diminish Bennett's own impressive case for it. I have made them only to illustrate the foregoing general point and to indicate the difficulty of adjudicating between all interested parties in respect of NTV. In the meantime, I can only applaud and highly recommend Bennett's immensely valuable opus.

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Art and Morality, edited by José Luis Bermúdez and Sebastian Gardner. London and New York: Routledge, 2003. Pp. viii + 303. H/b £55.00.

This book adds a new set of interesting essays to the recently revived debate on points of contact between aesthetics and ethics. The fourteen essays here are assembled in honour of Michael Tanner, who contributes the opening essay ('Ethics and Aesthetics Are – ?') as well as his 1977 paper on 'Sentimentality' (the only reprint in this collection).

In his new essay, Tanner addresses the apparently different role for principles in artistic and ethical evaluation. He first draws a number of contrasts between aesthetic and ethical judgement, aimed in particular at substantiating the claim, originally introduced by Richard Wollheim, that the aesthetic judgement requires an *acquaintance* with its object, while no such acquaintance is needed to utter or understand a moral claim. Yet he then points out how there are in fact ethical judgements that, in that respect, appear to be on a par with aesthetic ones: those judgements having as their object someone's life, and ascribing to it properties such as 'depth', 'sincerity', 'integrity', 'purity', and so on—that is, terms that at least sometimes refer to expressive states. Such properties refer to a moral ideal of life and can be correctly ascribed and understood only by direct acquaintance. The corresponding ethical judgements are not principle-based, and indeed they have an aesthetic dimension.

By combining this conclusion with one of the theses Tanner holds on sentimentality—that the ideal life (which is, amongst other things, a life of 'emotional vitality') may be out of reach for most people (we are all, to some extent, sentimentalists, Tanner suggests)—one sees emerging a number of themes, in Tanner's work, that have had an obvious influence on some of the contributors to this collection: an interest in 'ethico-aesthetic' concepts ('senti-

mental' being one of them) and in the relationship between the form and the expressive power of an artwork; an emphasis on the notion of an 'ideal of life', which may be embodied in certain works of art; and a certain cautiousness regarding generalizations on the ethical place that art has in the lives of individuals, without denying the ethical relevance of some encounters with art.

José Luis Bermúdez (author also, with Sebastian Gardner, of a helpful introduction) explores *decadence* as one of those concepts that straddle the divide between aesthetics and ethics. After detailing the history of the different applications of 'decadent', Bermúdez proposes that, in its art criticism applications, the concept be analysed in terms of a work's failing in its 'expressive form', that is, in how its formal elements express emotions and ideas. In particular, with a decadent work there is a specific lack of 'self-discipline', one deriving from self-indulgence and self-absorption ('The decadent work is autistic,' says Bermúdez, p. 129). This characterization shows how the concept is indeed an ethico-aesthetic one, for 'decadent' in this sense can be applied to people, actions, and character traits, as well as to works of art.

The idea that certain terms apply in both the ethical and the aesthetic realms resonates also in Anthony Savile's contribution, entitled 'Kant and the Ideal of Beauty'. Savile interprets Kant—mostly with reference to an insufficiently noticed section of his third *Critique*—as identifying the *ideal of beauty* with the *moral person*. Aesthetic judgements, whether of nature or of artworks, consider their objects as exemplars of the same qualities that we appreciate in good individuals.

That the relationship with art can be quite personal seems to be relevant to the approach of several of the authors in this collection. Hence, the question that could be called that of *authenticity* in one's aesthetic judgements naturally arises: the issue of when and under what conditions an aesthetic judgement can be said to be one's own, a judgement to which one is 'entitled'. Aaron Ridley ('Critical Conversions'), with skill and elegance, makes a good case for a sort of *pluralism* with regard to admissible experiences, interpretations, and evaluations of a work, and shows how aesthetic evaluation sometimes involves 'negotiating' between competing values. Hence, there is sometimes the risk of uttering aesthetic judgements that just mimic critical judgements that are not our own, and that fail to be the products of our own experience and values and negotiations.

Precisely because one's aesthetic judgements and experiences seem to involve one's held systems of beliefs and values, lately theorists have been discussing an issue dubbed 'imaginative resistance', specifically that of the asymmetry in the ease with which, in fictional contexts, we seem to accept epistemic deviances as opposed to moral deviances. Mary Mothersill's 'Make-Believe Morality and Fictional Worlds' is a commentary on the famous 1994 exchange between Kendall Walton and Michael Tanner on this issue.

Art's involvement with other values, and the effects, cognitive and emotional, that artworks may have on those who encounter them, also pose ques-

tions on the relationship between art and philosophy. Friedrich Nietzsche and Richard Wagner are perfect examples of how the distinctions between the two areas may be blurred, and four of the essays of *Art and Morality* directly deal with one or both of these figures. Roger Scruton's essay on 'Love in Wagner's *Ring*', with depth and richness of discussion (including close discussion of musical themes), attempts to disentangle some of the dense web of meanings of the operatic cycle, nonetheless sketching a unified account of the different dimensions at play, the personal and the political especially. Christopher Janaway ('Nietzsche's Artistic Revaluation') accounts for Nietzsche's employment of artistic means (including irony, dialogue, and narrative structure) in his mature writings as attempts to involve the reader directly and affectively, so as to allow one to be freed from the feelings that conventional morality brings about. Colin Lyas's 'Art, Expression and Morality', a commentary on Tanner's two monographs on Nietzsche and Wagner, reformulates the relationship between art and philosophy in terms of (Crocean) expression, and emphasizes how the line between art and philosophy can sometimes only contingently be drawn. Ultimately, suggests Lyas, what Wagner and Nietzsche have produced are expressive acts that may bring about in the reader or listener 'transformations' in his or her own life.

There are dangers, though, to regarding the distinction between art and philosophy as immaterial. Is it not instead more appropriate, in the face of examples like those of Nietzsche and Wagner, but also of, say, Plato, Berkeley, Sartre, Borges, or Calvino, to admit that there are indeed works of philosophy that employ artistic means, as well as works of art that are pervaded by philosophical content, and yet insist that the categories of philosophy and art remain separable indeed?

Finally, Sebastian Gardner ('Tragedy, Morality, and Metaphysics') claims, in the spirit of Nietzsche, that tragedy is incompatible with the perspective of morality. Rather than characterizing tragedy as poetic justice or as therapeutic emotional catharsis, we must recognize, with Nietzsche, that at the core of tragedy there is the representation of loss and suffering as ultimate realities, hence, necessarily, the frustration of any human attempt to realize value. One may want to ask Gardner, however, whether his conclusion would still follow from a less narrow view of the scope of morality, or a less normative and more descriptive characterization of what a tragedy is.

Indeed, Gardner's conclusion that the value of tragedy and of its characters (good or evil as they may be) is not moral, but is rather the value of being made acquainted, as spectators, with 'the form of human life in general' (p. 246) reflects a form of cognitivism on tragic value similar to that defended by Alex Neill ('Schopenhauer on Tragedy and Value'). Taking his cue from Schopenhauer, Neill stresses how the distinctive value of tragedy is not so much in the pleasure that it provides but rather in its showing us 'how to respond to the truth that it reveals' (p. 217). We could perhaps generalize and rephrase Neill's proposal in terms of a certain kind of *realism*: the value of a

good tragedy partly, but centrally, derives from its giving us access to a faithful portrayal of reality (whether the phenomenal world, the underlying reality, or both) and of the responses to that reality we ought to give.

Indeed, a good portion of the contemporary debate on the relationship between aesthetics and ethics turns on precisely the question of the sorts of understanding, cognitive and moral, that art may provide. When looking at that question, it is only natural to concentrate on relatively articulate narratives. Yet John Armstrong ('Moral Depth and Pictorial Art'), with notable originality, explains the conditions for a *painting* to contribute to moral understanding. In brief, that happens when the moral content of the painting is embodied in the very visual elements that need to be experienced, aesthetically, when engaging with the picture. In such cases, the picture makes us experience what it depicts through the 'atmosphere' or 'mood' that the picture brings about in us. A perhaps natural follow-up to Armstrong's suggestions would be an investigation of the sorts of moral understandings that might find their best instantiations in the art of painting, in spite of, or maybe thanks to, the reduced narrative abilities of the medium.

In 'Art and Moral Education', Christopher Hamilton argues against what he considers an excessive confidence, among authors such as Noël Carroll and Martha Nussbaum, in the educational powers of art through its ability to engage us imaginatively. By Hamilton's lights, certainly *some* art can at *some* times contribute to the moral education of *some* people, yet that will depend heavily on the approach of the individual. Someone with the appropriate sensibility, as well as an awareness of being morally 'incomplete', may certainly 'recruit art to the project of one's moral improvement' (p. 43). But not everyone has the necessary sensibility, nor do people who have it activate it all the time—sometimes, art just has the value of engaging our emotions in ways that cannot have any claim to being morally educational.

Much of what Hamilton claims is certainly endorsable; yet one is left doubting whether the point of the discussion among contemporary theorists is really on the benefits that art *happens* to have on people's characters, rather than on benefits that are conceivably *integral* to the correct appreciation of a work. This latter claim seems to resist Hamilton's critical remarks and counterexamples. Furthermore, Hamilton attacks the thesis—which has been given the names of 'moralism' and 'ethicism'—that the morality and immorality of works of art affects their value as art. Once again, one is not really left convinced by the counterexamples of artworks that appear to gain some of their artistic value (in terms of, say, wit, humour, inventiveness, or even craft) from contents that may be morally offensive, although the ease with which such alleged counterexamples to the moralist position can be found should have made proponents of moralistic approaches more aware of the need to clarify their proposals.

Matthew Kieran's 'Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge of Immoralism' also dwells on alleged counterexamples to a moralist position to the point of

presenting a change in direction from the moralist approach he has himself defended in the past. In a nutshell, Kieran now holds that, for some works of art, we must acknowledge that their immorality *enhances* rather than diminishes their value as art, and for the same reason that, for other works of art, their morality contributes to their artistic value: when the work's moral character promotes 'the intelligibility and reward of the imaginative experience proffered by the work' (pp. 56–7). Kieran calls his new position 'cognitive immoralism'. His reasoning, however, both against ethicism and in support of his present view, prompts some doubts, which for brevity's sake I only sketch. First of all, Kieran seems to understand cognitivism as necessarily depending on the idea that the value of art is partly determined by 'the ways a work may deepen our understanding and appreciation' (p. 58). Yet cognitivism as such is broader than Kieran's characterization of it, for it may just amount to claiming that the engagement with art is distinctively cognitive, without any additional thesis as to how such engagement either deepens or clouds the understanding. Second, Kieran assumes without argument that the *intelligibility* and the *reward* of an imaginative experience (hence of the work that affords it) are related (perhaps, that they even coincide). Yet, understanding and appreciating are not related in such simple fashion. In fact, some artworks may be rewarding precisely because confusing (think of Milcho Manchevsky's *Before the Rain* or of Stanley Kubrick's *Eyes Wide Shut*). Third, it is not so clear that works that are better in virtue of some immoral aspect are really counterexamples to ethicism or moralism. Admittedly the proponents of such an approach (most notably Berys Gaut, but also Carroll and earlier Kieran himself) have failed to point this out, yet it must be recognized, compatibly with the moralist approach, that *the same feature*, including a feature subject to ethical evaluation, can *both* contribute to *and* detract from the artistic value of a work. Finally, the ethical evaluation of an art narrative, such as those Kieran mentions as counterexamples to ethicism, is a complex process, one involving all the ethical aspects and commitments of the artwork, and it is not so clear that Kieran's conclusion, that a work may be artistically better in virtue of its endorsing an immoral perspective, can be drawn. Rather, in such cases one may wonder whether the work really *endorses* such immoral values or, if it does, whether the work really is better, artistically, because of *that*, and not because, say, it gains in dramatic complexity, or suspense power, or shock value, or ..., albeit at some cost to its morality.

In sum, the editors of *Art and Morality* have put together a collection of papers covering a wide range of important topics, characterized by both theoretical sharpness and serious exegesis.

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A Priori Justification, by Albert Casullo. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xiii + 249. H/b \$55.00.

The avowed aim of this closely argued volume is to 'provide a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological issues associated with the *a priori* that is sensitive to recent developments in the field of epistemology.' Casullo clearly succeeds in this aim and even those who are unsympathetic to such developments as externalism and naturalism will learn much from his penetrating discussion of the issues. Four main claims are defended in the book: (1) the concept of a priori justification is the minimal concept of non-experiential justification; (2) the basic question in the area is whether there are non-experiential sources of justified belief; (3) articulating the concept of a priori justification and establishing that there are sources of such justification require empirical investigation; and (4) the usual preoccupation with necessity and analyticity in discussions of the *a priori* is misplaced. Among the virtues of Casullo's discussion are his precise formulations of numerous arguments, his many genuinely illuminating distinctions, and his insistence that treating a priori and a posteriori justification differently requires argument. In spite of the reservations expressed below, I recommend careful study of Casullo's book to anyone interested in the epistemology of the *a priori*.

The first section of the book is dedicated to the question of the nature of a priori knowledge. Casullo maintains that no analysis of a priori justification which features only non-epistemic conditions (such as necessity or analyticity) can succeed. Even if it is extensionally adequate, such an analysis will fail to identify the salient *epistemic* feature of a priori justification. (It isn't entirely clear what distinguishes epistemic from non-epistemic conditions and so one might wonder if this constraint would, contrary to Casullo's aims, undermine an analysis of justification in terms of production by a reliable process.) Casullo counts source of justification, strength of justification and defeasibility conditions as genuine epistemic conditions. He argues that in order for a strength or defeasibility condition to serve as a condition *distinctive* of a priori justification, such a condition must require a greater degree of justification or indefeasibility of beliefs justified a priori than is required for knowledge in general and so must be defended by plausible argument or rejected as *ad hoc*.

A purely negative source analysis of a priori justification holds that it is 'justification independent of experience'. However, there is a wide sense of 'experience' which includes all occurrent conscious states and a narrow sense which includes only sense experience. The former mistakenly implies that a priori justification is incompatible with conscious phenomenology. The latter wrongly classifies introspective and memory beliefs as a priori. So, many rationalists have appealed to an analysis which seeks to specify a positive source, ϕ , of a priori justification: