noted, it is questionable to see Calvin as providing the 'text' for this faith seeking understanding project in the first place. Let me suggest a different way of reading the situation: Calvin's teaching on the *sensus divinitatis* may itself be viewed as a way of understanding the scriptural emphasis on the universal availability of the knowledge of God, combined with the Bible's lack of interest in arguments for God's existence. Reformed epistemology continues the development of these biblical themes, together with Calvin's teaching about the *sensus*, and places them in the context of modern epistemological concerns about justification and rationality. Thus conceived, Reformed epistemology can be on firm ground even if its attribution to Calvin of those epistemological concerns is mistaken.

Faith and Understanding is rewarding both for its detailed discussions of the treatment of various doctrines in the history of Christian thought, and for bringing into focus a particular, and quite illuminating, way of understanding the relationship between those doctrines and more general human intellectual concerns. It is highly recommended.

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Picture, Image and Experience: A Philosophical Inquiry, by Robert Hopkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. ix + 205. H/b £37.50.

This book addresses a difficult issue in aesthetics: the nature of pictorial representation, i.e. depiction or picturing. It also touches upon the question of the nature of the visual imagination. These two topics can find a place in the same book because the experience of looking at a picture and that of visually imagining something stand, according to Robert Hopkins, in a similar relation to vision. Though the theory of visual imagination, sketched in the last of the seven chapters of this work, surely deserves attention and indeed would be worth developing further in a separate project, this review will concentrate on the main topic of the book, i.e. the analysis of depiction.

Regarding pictures Hopkins is a resemblance theorist. He does not maintain, however, that pictures must resemble their objects—a classical claim whose well-known shortcomings are fully acknowledged and carefully summarized in his book. Instead, Hopkins locates his defence of a resemblance theory amid what he calls the experiential accounts of depiction—including very influential theories such as the illusion theory but also Richard Wollheim's 'seeing-in' and Kendall Walton's 'make-believe' theories. For these otherwise different views, what is essential to picturing lies in the distinctive kind of visual experience to which pictures give rise: *seeing* the depicted object

in the picture's surface—or, in Wollheim's phrase, *seeing-in*. It is that distinctively visual experience that, for Hopkins, must in turn be conceived in terms of experienced resemblance. More specifically, the aspect in which the picture must be experienced to resemble the object it depicts is the object's 'outline shape'. To have an intuitive grasp of outline shape, imagine tracing with the tip of your finger the contours of some object and its parts as you see them through the fogged-over glass of a window. Think of the resulting marks on the glass as that object's outline shape.

In sum, for Hopkins, when we see an object in a picture, we see the picture's surface as resembling in outline shape the object depicted. Of course, given that we can see objects in all sorts of things other than pictures—clouds, mouldy walls, or the surface of the moon—a complete analysis of depiction must include, once again following Wollheim, a 'standard of correctness'. According to Hopkins, that standard must be cashed out, for some pictures, in terms of the artist's intentions, and for others, most notably photographs, in terms of the relevant causal relations.

Special note should be taken of Hopkins's overall approach to the subject of depiction, which is methodologically exemplary. The first two chapters in particular can be considered without hesitation to be among the best presentations of the problem of depiction. Hopkins elegantly and concisely presents the overlapping elements amongst different analyses of depiction, thus marking the boundaries of an area of agreement beyond which the arena of philosophical dispute begins. In chapter one, he attempts to isolate depiction from other kinds of representation that pictures can perform. Then he helpfully distinguishes between experiential and non-experiential approaches to the question of picturing, showing the advantages of the former and the shortcomings of the latter. In chapter two he moves on to indicate the most important features of depiction, encapsulating them into six explananda. The explananda aim at drawing the boundaries of a distinctively visual notion and of a unified field of inquiry about it. They also allow Hopkins, in chapters three and four, to present his theory as a response to those theoretical requirements, and to identify and discuss, in chapters five and six, two troublesome pictorial phenomena for resemblance-based theories: the existence of misrepresentations, such as caricatures, and of pictures with highly indeterminate subjects, such as stick-figures.

Hopkins's set of explananda does succeed in emphasizing the distinctively visual nature of picturing. Among them we find, for example, that only what is visible can be depicted and that everything must be depicted from some point of view—two features whose analogues are investigated, in chapter seven, as the ones expressing the visual essence of visualizing. But doubts can be raised over whether the proposed explananda truly refer to a unified notion of depiction. They have been formulated so as to cover two sorts of pictures, those simply depicting an object of some kind (e.g., a picture of *a* man) and those depicting some particular object (e.g., a portrait of Tony Blair). However, con-

sider that, while a picture may or may not depict a *particular* object, it must depict something, hence an object of *some kind*, i.e. an organized set of coinstantiated properties. Indeed, this requirement is included within the first explanandum, establishing that a picture cannot depict an object without attributing at least some properties to it. Yet, if that is true, then we seem to be dealing with two related notions here, one more fundamental than the other. Hence one wonders if the explananda should not be reformulated accordingly, so as to refer to the most fundamental, core notion of depiction only—the depiction of coinstantiated properties—separating it from the partly different notion of the depiction of particulars. The two notions differ in the resources needed for the interpretation of their instantiations; the latter, but not the former, likely requires a perceived correlation between the picture and its object.

Let us look more closely at some of the explananda proposed. Five and six establish that knowledge of the appearance of the object depicted and competence with depiction are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to the interpretation of a picture. However, requiring that the appearance of an object be known to the viewer for her to be able to see it in a picture is at odds with common experience. We often learn about the appearances of unfamiliar objects by looking at pictures of them. Specifically, the problem is with explaining our capacity to see in pictures *kinds* of objects we have never encountered face-to-face. From Hopkins's restriction it would follow that we can see in, e.g., a picture of a cyclotron only that which we are able to recognize or classify: say, a round machine. Yet, unless this is a psychological claim (but Hopkins is very careful in not confusing the aims of philosophy with those of psychology), as a conceptual analysis of seeing unfamiliar objects in pictures it reverses the logical order between recognizing or classifying an object and seeing it in the picture. Seeing is conceptually prior to recognizing. It is precisely because we see objects in pictures that we can succeed, or fail, to classify them under familiar visual concepts. Furthermore, Hopkins's requirement seems to fail to cash out the phenomenology of our seeing unfamiliar objects in pictures, for we may compare the cyclotron to *several* familiar visual concepts: 'it looks like a doughnut; not quite, though—maybe it looks more like a big tire with a funnel inside …'; and yet while making these comparisons we are still seeing, in the picture, the same thing all along.

Pictures depict their objects by means of their appearances. By doing so, they attribute to the depicted objects a variety of properties. Misrepresentations are therefore a problem for the resemblance theory, for they seemingly depict their objects by means of appearances those objects do not possess. We appear forced to conclude that a caricature of Tony Blair is experienced by the viewer as resembling in outline shape two visually incompatible objects: Blair as he looks in real life, and an odd-looking person with a large mouth, crazy eyes, and so forth. After having presented the objection in all its strength, however, Hopkins offers a very simple solution. In a caricature of Blair, it is not

Blair that we see but Blair with the odd properties attributed to him by the picture. Hence the picture must be experienced as resembling not Blair but Blair with those odd properties. Furthermore, it is still the thought of *Blair* which enters the experience, not that of *someone else* with those very same odd properties. Accordingly, Hopkins can claim to have shown not only that misrepresentation is possible but also that it has limits—which is the fourth of his explananda.

However, one wonders if Hopkins's ingenious proposal really brings home what was hoped for—an account of the possibility of misrepresentation and not merely, and much less significantly, the possibility of depiction *in spite of* distortions. Caricatures, by definition, operate a distortion over the object depicted, which the competent viewer is supposed to appreciate. The resemblance theorist must avoid accounting for that experienced distortion at the level of seeing-in, on pain of giving in to the paradoxical claim that one can see in the picture two visually incompatible objects. Accordingly, the distortion must be experienced in virtue of a comparison, presumably occurring in the imagination, between the thought of Blair as he looks in real life and that of Blair with odd properties (or, even more significantly, between the thought of a human mouth and that of an inhumanly large one). Yet, for that comparison to be possible, the picture must be putting in the viewer's mind *both* of those thoughts. Hence the claim that only *Blair with odd properties*, and not also *Blair*, is seen in the picture sounds suspiciously ad hoc.

With a modesty that deserves remark, Hopkins is primarily interested in defending the experienced-resemblance account in general, more than his own version of that account in particular. Nevertheless, it seems that by so emphasizing resemblance in *shape*, he may be denying himself resources available to other resemblance theorists. Stick-figures and other pictures that are distinctively indeterminate with respect to depictive content, for instance, are especially problematic for his theory, in contrast with resemblance accounts employing more flexible notions, such as some sort of experienced structural isomorphism. Hopkins prefers to claim that some pictures are not indeterminate in the same way that a black-and-white drawing typically is indeterminate with respect to colour. That is, the indeterminacy is not embedded in the seeing-in experience but rather pertains to the depiction. In such cases the *depictive* content—what the picture depicts—is not the same, he proposes, as the *seeing-in* content—what correctly can be seen in the picture. When looking at a stick-figure, say, you see a man made of pencil-thin cylinders in the picture, and yet the man is depicted neither as thin nor as fat—the picture is simply neutral with respect to that.

However, there seems to be little reason to endorse the separation between seeing-in and depictive contents apart from rescuing the outline shape theory from its apparent inability to account for pictures that are very indeterminate with respect to the *shape* of the object depicted. The stick-figure and other examples mentioned by Hopkins more likely show that seeing-in cannot be

reduced to the strict notion of resemblance in outline shape. Separating depictive content from correct seeing-in content cannot be done without cost. The highest price paid is perhaps that of misdescribing the experience of seeing-in. Hopkins tells us that in an overexposed photograph where all the colours have turned green, you may correctly see a green dog, in spite of the snapshot depicting a dog of no specific colour. Yet, consider that in the experience of seeing-in, though we are aware of the medium the surface is made of, we do not allow each of the medium's qualities to enter the experience—not only the flatness of the surface but, in many cases, the colours of it. Even in non-pictorial cases, seeing-in clearly has this feature. When we see a dog in a mouldy wall that happens to be green, do we really see a *green* dog in it or rather, as seems more common, a dog of no particular colour? Why should things be any different in the case of a photograph where, indeed, standards of correctness apply?

Picture, Image and Experience provides a very clear and systematic account of a traditional view, radically renovated and reformulated with great sophistication. Though, in the eyes of this reviewer, at least, Hopkins fails to persuade his reader that the experience of looking at a picture with understanding is essentially one of experienced resemblance, and more specifically, resemblance in outline shape, he does something that is perhaps more important, and surely much needed in contemporary aesthetics. He shows that progress in this difficult area is possible and that disagreement over the nature of depiction should turn around the question of finding and explaining the features that make depiction an essentially visual notion. Hopkins has provided us with a conceptual framework which no future investigation of picturing should fail to acknowledge.

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Moral Responsibility in the Holocaust: a Study in the Ethics of Character, by David H. Jones. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. H/b $44.95, P/b $12.95.

The author says that he was led to write this study because of a lack of satisfactory material for his lecture course on holocaust ethics. That point of origin is reflected in the book. As an exercise in moral philosophy, it is fairly elementary; as a pedagogical presentation, it is exemplary for its thoroughness and clarity. Given the nature of the material and the author's aim to achieve a precise focus on philosophical aspects of his topic, his book should be assessed with the fullest rigour.