participants, in further honing the conference theme, or in reading draft chapters and the book prospectus, including Thomas Abercrombie, Gerard Althabe, Joëlle Bahloul, Thomas Beidelman, Peter Benda, Jonathan Boyarin, Renate Bridenthal, Robin Cohen, Colette Dubois, Kathryn Earle, Alison Leitch, Tony Judt, Ruth Mandel, Robert Moeller, Ceri Peach, Peter Romijn, Daniel Segal, Ionanni Sinanoglou, Steven Vertovec, and Thomas Wilson. I am grateful for their contributions, however I take responsibility for any shortcomings of the final volume. The book benefited from the assistance of Amsterdam University Press editors Suzanne Bogman and Chantal Nicolaes, and the careful attention of the copyeditors Marica Ognjenovic and Tijn Zweerts. We are grateful as well to Randy Lemaire who drew the map, and to Pierre Domenech for his powerful photograph that graces the cover. Finally, special thanks are due Lafayette College Excel Scholar Jennifer Bennett for her remarkable dedication to the project as we prepared the manuscript for publication, which included her keen editorial advice, research assistance, and unstinting attention to detail.

INTRODUCTION

Europe's Invisible Migrants

Andrea L. Smith

In the wake of worldwide decolonization movements, an estimated five to seven million people were repatriated to Europe over a thirty-five-year period that began during World War II. This mass population movement represents Europe's first important shift in the twentieth century from a site of net population exportation to one of immigration. It has now been sixty years since the first of these migrants, Italians from Libya, began to return "home" in 1940. It would be a reasonable assumption that considerable research has been completed on the long-term consequences of these migrations – the consequences for the migrants themselves, as well as for the host nations and their societies and economies, and, furthermore, that the results of this research has influenced wider theoretical developments in the social sciences. This is not the case. The subject is only now gaining the attention of more than a handful of social scientists. Previously, this work had been carried out by scholars of different disciplinary affiliations who for the most part were working within specific metropolitan contexts with little knowledge of each other's work. As a result, their contributions also remain isolated from wider debates in anthropology, history, and sociology, and most notably from the rich and burgeoning literature on European immigration, integration and multiculturalism.

This book brings together for the first time work in English done by scholars who have explored the consequences to the migrants and the metropole of postcolonial return migrations to Portugal, France, and the Netherlands. Here I introduce the reader to the three decolonization experiences covered in the chapters that follow, presenting them first in the wider context of the array of European return migrations associated with post-World War II decolonization movements. I underscore analogous and contrasting features of the colonial and decolonization histories involved. Finally, we will consider reasons for the "invisibility" of

these migrants in academic literature to date, and the ways a consideration of this new subject can challenge and advance current theory.

Migrations of Decolonization – An Overview

The decolonization migrations considered here occurred principally in the decades during and after World War II. Certainly, mass migrations had been tied to decolonization in earlier historical periods; across the centuries of European imperialism, states often embarked on new conquests while granting independence to others. In addition, some colonial officers and settlers did not leave the region following decolonization movements, and those who did were not always bound for Europe, such as the Belgians who left Central for South Africa (Salman 1994:198). However, the mass decolonization of much of the colonial world that has occurred since World War II represents a sea change in world history, and the resulting migrations to Europe are the focus of this book.

What is the scale of this migratory phenomenon? This question is surprisingly difficult to answer. Although some excellent work on European decolonization has been published recently,[1] most highlight the political or economic aspects of this process, while the social and demographic details require further attention or remain scattered in separate sources. Furthermore, owing to the complexity of the various decolonization experiences, the great geographical expanse involved, and even the disparate kinds of migration patterns from each specific setting, the precise timing of these return migrations remains elusory. For instance, Italians began leaving Libya in the 1940s, while some of those who initially stayed behind left at the time of the 1969 revolution there (Rainero 1994:32). Similarly, British departures from India, Kenya, and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe were neither immediate nor massive affairs, but have been ongoing since at least 1945, the 1950s, and 1970s, respectively. Furthermore, the destinations of the migrants varied so widely – sometimes they traveled from former to current colony – as to make generalizations difficult at best. Even when we limit ourselves to people returning to Europe, research is difficult. Not knowing exactly when people returned to a specific European nation makes it difficult to work backwards from metropolitan censuses and other statistical data. Finally, the migrants were often not identified as such in national immigration statistics or censuses, making it difficult today to state the numbers involved with precision. For these reasons, the best sources to date have worked backwards from colonial records to provide low and high estimates of returning migrants.[2] The most recent effort is reproduced here as Table 1 (see Appendix). This was not an insignificant phenomenon: overall an estimated 5.4 to 6.8 million people migrated to Europe over a forty-year period from dozens of locations in the decades following World War II.[3]

Migrants were leaving an array of colonial settings, each with unique histories, vastly varying demographic and geographical features, and diverse administrative arrangements with European powers. Colonial scholars often find it useful for comparative and heuristic purposes to distinguish settler colonies, colonies where substantial numbers of Europeans settled relatively permanently, from economic colonies and trading posts (sometimes referred to as *colonies d'exploitation*), which were typically inhabited by much smaller numbers of Europeans, principally administrators, soldiers, missionaries, and traders, and which often had quite different administrative relationships with metropolitan governments and associated systems of rule. This distinction is salient here because in general the decolonization episodes differed dramatically between these two ideal-types, particularly when we consider the degree of violence involved and certainly the scale of the resulting return migrations. The repatriations that have received the most scholarly interest thus far are those associated with settler colonies. Research on returns from other settings is still needed to determine whether or not non-settler colonial settings should be included in the same analytical framework as presented in this introduction.[4]

Who exactly were the 5 to 7 million people who made up these postwar migrations? To answer this question we must travel back to the colonial past. This was a remarkably heterogeneous collection of populations due to the complexity of individual colonial histories and the distinct decolonization experiences of each setting. In the most general terms, at least two main groups are represented: those of diverse origins identified in the colony as members or close allies of the dominant "colonist" faction, and imperial subjects, local intermediaries, and soldiers of various origins incorporated into colonial armies,[5] all of whom were brought to metropolitan countries after their defeat. Leaving aside the repatriated soldiers of colonial armies for now, who were the others? Clearly they were not all wealthy landowners; only a small subset of those repatriated owned land. We could refer to this group in the most general terms as "colonists," but this term is problematic. A category forged in the colonial context, it is based on a simplified opposition that rarely matched social realities (see Stoler 1989; Stoler and

Cooper 1997). Perhaps to avoid reductionist "colonist/colonized" terms, previous scholars have described these populations as comprised of "Europeans" and "non-Europeans" (Miège and Dubois 1994:18). In this terminology, intended to approximate historical categories employed in the colonial context, "European" would be those granted this legal status by colonial powers prior to repatriation. However, this terminology too can be misleading or cumbersome because when we consider who exactly was granted European or equivalent status in the colony, we still find a very heterogeneous and colony-specific assortment of peoples which often included, along with nationals of the colonizing nation, nationals of other European nations, mixed offspring of European and indigenous unions, non-European or intermediate traders,[6] native wives of European men, and subsets of the indigenous populations.

These migrations occurred over a period of several decades, involving a succession of distinct population transfers from many different colonial contexts, beginning in 1940 with the return of 9,000 to 15,000 Italian youths from Libya, followed by the forced repatriations of thousands of Italians from the then British-occupied East Africa during World War II (Rainero 1994). Dozens of distinct states and decolonization histories are involved. Further complicating any simple summary of this phenomenon is the fact that from each colonial site, migrations typically occurred over several years, in phases. While with hindsight it may seem obvious that the world was undergoing a dramatic shift during the era of independence movements, this was not readily apparent to most European powers or to many in the colonies at the time. During the early periods of what we now consider wars of liberation, many future migrants did not realize the enormity of the changes underway, and many tried to continue on with their lives, only to depart several years later. Consequently, the successive migrations from any one location often represented different sub-groups of colonial populations. In many settings, the Dutch Indies, French North Africa, and British East Africa for instance, the first to leave were those with few ties in the colony, including people who were in the colony temporarily and those who had arrived most recently, such as government functionaries. An intermediate group leaving somewhat later would include the more affluent, those more recently settled, and others who still had family or other close ties in the metropole. Many in this category thought they were only leaving temporarily. They often departed with just the items needed for a short vacation, only to find it impossible to return, and consequently some in this situation left all of their possessions behind. Finally, in most cases, the people who stayed in the colony/former colony the longest were those of few means, people with the longest family histories there, and those with few or no ties to the metropolitan country; in other words, the people who had the most to lose by leaving.[7]

Dutch, French, and Portuguese Migrations of Decolonization

This book presents research conducted on the three cases of mass return migrations that have attracted the most scholarly interest thus far: those of the French from Algeria (a subset of whom often refer to themselves as *pieds-noirs*), the Dutch from the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), and the Portuguese from Portuguese West and East Africa (Angola and Mozambique, respectively), often termed *retornados*. These cases all involve settler colonies with substantial European populations, and many commonalities stem from this fact. However, these cases also offer quite distinct colonial and decolonization histories, allowing for rich and interesting comparisons.

Dutch Migrations: The Dutch empire had roots in the early seventeenth century, with trading posts and settlements ranging as far afield as New Amsterdam in today's New York, the Caribbean, Dutch Guyana in northeastern South America, Ceylon, and multiple outposts in southeast Asia. By 1945 these territories had been reduced to three: the Dutch East Indies, the Dutch West Indies (Netherlands Antilles) and Dutch Guyana (or the Republic of Surinam on independence in 1975). The Netherlands tried to maintain these possessions after World War II, focusing on preserving its most important colonial possession, the Dutch East Indies, where Indonesian nationalist Sukarno had been campaigning for independence since the 1920s. After the region's occupation by Japan during World War II and a declaration of Indonesian independence two days of Japanese capitulation in August 1945, the Dutch government sent troops to the Indies, in October 1945. A long conflict ensued that ended with the transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949.

Approximately 300,000 migrants arrived in the Netherlands from the Indies between 1945 and 1963, many leaving before Indonesian independence. This was a heterogeneous population. Since Dutch and other settlers and merchants from many backgrounds had been living in the Indies for centuries, a large proportion of those returning to the

Netherlands after World War II had been born in the Indies, and many were of mixed descent. People classified legally as "European" in the Indies in the 1930s included Asian wives of European men, Turks, Japanese, and descendants of Christian Africans recruited from West Africa in the nineteenth century to serve in colonial armies (Obdeijn 1994:51; see also Stoler 1989). At the time of the Japanese occupation in the 1940s, of the 300,000 individuals identified as having "European" status, approximately 80,000 had been born in the Netherlands or in the Indies of Dutch parents, 170,000 were "Indo-Europeans" of mixed ancestry, and 14,000 were people of various indigenous origins (Obdeijn 1994:52). Also migrating to the Netherlands with the Indies Dutch were colonial auxiliaries, including 12,000 Amboinese or South Moluccans, who had served in the Dutch colonial army and who arrived in the Netherlands in the early 1950s, and approximately 7,000 Peranakan-Chinese. This decolonization experience was traumatic. Not only did it follow several years of conflict, but the mass migration to the Netherlands also came at the end of the occupation of the Indies during World War II by the Japanese and the internment of thousands of Dutch in prisoner of war camps.

French Migrations: The French Empire also had its origins in the seventeenth century with the establishment of settlements and outposts in North America, the Caribbean, India, and islands in the Indian Ocean. After the decline and loss of most of these territories, a "second" empire was formed in the nineteenth century with colonies established across Africa, into Indochina and across the Pacific. By the end of World War II, this empire was extensive and extremely diverse. It included Algeria, which was incorporated into metropolitan France as three states or "*départements*," Indochina (now Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), which the French tried to reclaim after the Japanese occupation during World War II only to abandon in defeat in 1954, the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, and an array of more classic *colonies d'exploitation* stretching across much of sub-Saharan Africa.[8] North Africa had the highest concentration of Europeans, and Algeria was France's premiere settler colony. While nearly 450,000 "repatriates" arrived from Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia in the 1950s and 1960s (Dubois 1994a:85, 92), research on these migrants is in the early stages, and this book concentrates instead on the migrants from Algeria.

French and other Europeans settled in Algeria at the beginning of the French conquest in the 1830s, and migration from Europe tapered off by the early twentieth century. As a result a large proportion of the

over 1 million French who arrived from Algeria in the early 1960s were the 3rd- to 5th-generation in their family born overseas, not unlike the Indies Dutch. In contrast, however, there was very little intermarriage with the indigenous populations in Algeria and consequently a minute number of "mixed-blood" offspring. The origins of the "repatriates" were nevertheless multiple: more than half of the European settlers came from Spain, Italy, Malta, Germany, and other European countries, and became French citizens through naturalization laws in the late nineteenth century, and a sizable indigenous Jewish population was similarly naturalized in 1870.[9] The association of these non-French nationalities with lower socioeconomic class status is an important feature of colonial Algeria that may have important implications for both the creation of pied-noir identity and pied-noir-metropolitan French relationships today. The reflux from Algeria occurred at the end of the long and traumatic French-Algerian war. Along with the French of Algeria, often termed "pieds-noirs," came approximately 100,000 to 200,000 Muslim French who served with the French army during the colonial war[10] and former members of the colonial administration (Dubois 1994a:96).

Portuguese Migrations: The Portuguese Empire was the first of the European maritime empires, with roots in the fifteenth century, and ranged from Brazil to West and East Africa and included settlements along the western Indian and Chinese coasts. It was also the last of these three colonial empires to be dissolved. Portugal in 1945 had no plans to decolonize its remaining territories, and in fact continued to encourage emigration to Portuguese West and East Africa (Angola and Mozambique) throughout the 1950s, in contrast to the Dutch and French cases outlined here. The migrations to Portugal that occurred after the decolonization of its African colonies consequently represent the most recent of the three cases, and involve individuals who were settled overseas for the shortest period of time.

Approximately 800,000 Portuguese "*retornados*" (or "returnees") arrived from Angola and Mozambique between 1974 and 1976. In Portuguese colonies, the status of "indigenous" person was fixed by law in 1954, but these laws were not applied to the small colonies of Macao, those of the Indian territories (Goa, Diu and Damao), or Cape Verde, where the inhabitants were *de facto* Portuguese citizens and therefore able to migrate to Portugal regardless of origin (Dubois 1994b:221). Elsewhere, a distinction was made between the "non-assimilated" and Portuguese citizens. While race was not ostensibly the primary criterion

in this context, few African or "mixed-origin" people received a certificate of *assimilado* status. In Angola in 1956, only approximately 30,000 people of African origins received this status out of total populations of more than 4.3 million (Dubois 1994b:221), and what was probably a very small proportion of the "mixed" population of approximately 26,000.

There are some striking similarities between the three cases presented here. Because metropolitan states dedicated greater efforts to maintaining their colonies with the largest settler populations, the migrations all followed long and violent wars of decolonization, experiences that lent a particular tenor to the life experiences of the migrants both during their final moments in the colony and their settlement in the metropole. Many migrants left after having witnessed or participated in years of considerable brutality and disruption: conflict in the Dutch Indies with Indonesian nationalists lasted four years; strife in Portuguese West Africa started in 1961 and continued through the mid-1970s; and the French-Algerian war persisted for nearly eight years, ending in 1962. Consequently, departures occurred in the context of the utmost chaos. Government agencies in Europe were largely unprepared for the vast numbers arriving, and faced the monumental task of receiving daily thousands of exhausted migrants and providing them with food, clothing, shelter, and basic goods, with varying degrees of success, as is vividly illustrated in Jordi's contribution to this book. Moreover, in each case, the migrants arrived at a particularly difficult time. Many of the Indies Dutch had spent the war years in Japanese concentration camps only to arrive in 1945 in a war-ravaged Holland where the government was already facing such severe housing and labor shortages that it was actively promoting emigration (van Amersfoort 1982:93). The pieds-noirs encountered a France that in 1962 was facing a severe housing shortage caused in part by the settlement the previous decade of several hundred thousand French "repatriates" from Vietnam, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt.[11] Many of the half a million people who crossed the Mediterranean over a brief four-month period in the summer of 1962[12] lived for weeks or even months in military barracks, dormitories, garages and barns. The city of Marseilles, which received over 60 percent of the pieds-noirs, was completely overwhelmed.

The scale and speed of this population transfer across the Mediterranean was equaled if not surpassed only a decade later with the return of approximately 800,000 "retornados" to Portugal from Angola and Mozambique between 1974 and 1976. This was a massive influx considering that the population of Portugal totaled 10 million at the time (Rocha-Trindade 1995:337). Moreover, Portugal, already the poorest of these three states, was in a serious recession at the time. The new government organization created to assist those "repatriated," IARN, housed people in vacant public and private buildings, such as old convents or army barracks (Rocha-Trindade 1995:339) and appealed to migrants' family members for assistance.[13] Ovalle-Bahamón and Lubkemann's chapters here provide vivid testimony from retornados of their experiences during this time, testimony which, in concert with Jordi's findings for France, indicates a lasting legacy of mutual mistrust between some metropolitans and retornados that persists in parts of Portugal today.

Finally, it should be remembered that in each of these cases, the first waves of returnees arrived when large numbers of nationals were being sent to the colonies to fight in bitter colonial wars. When the largest mass repatriations occurred, these soldiers too were returning home. Metropolitans who had lost family members or friends in the colonial wars often blamed the returning colonists for their losses, and they and the soldiers were often further perturbed by the fact that these migrants sometimes received preferential treatment in the already tight housing and job markets. When we consider the difficulties the migrants faced in adapting to their new societies and polities, we should keep the legacy of the colonial wars in mind.

The Invisibility of Migrations of Decolonization in Today's Academy

Given the scale and scope of these migratory phenomena and the degree of social and economic disruption involved, it is surprising how marginalized this topic has remained until recently. The reasons for its marginalization are numerous. The subject has escaped widespread attention in part because it is situated at, if not outside, the boundaries of several different academic disciplines and world regions. Colonial history and colonial studies have a temporal focus traditionally delimited by decolonization. While many of the important aspects of the migrants' lives in the colony are the subject of recent and current research by colonial historians, the former colonists, by migrating to Europe, vanish from this field of study. Aside from a few far-sighted and comprehensive overviews,[14] the "repatriates" also rarely figure in the burgeoning literature on immigration and integration in Europe.

Finally, due to the nature of the global diasporas that have comprised the life trajectories of these individuals, researchers necessarily must become experts in both colony and metropole, in the colonial heritages as well as the political and economic problems of contemporary postwar Europe, topics that are traditionally explored by scholars located in quite different disciplines if not distinct schools or academic departments. Disciplinary boundaries have therefore served as a hindrance to the recognition of this specific population and their experience as topics worthy of research.

Conceptual barriers have also worked to ensure that these populations remain invisible in today's academy. In their landmark work calling for a new approach to migration history, Lucassen and Lucassen address the various "canyons" separating migration scholars both between and within disciplines (1999:10). Heuristically useful typologies have evolved into fixed dichotomies that now shape both theory and research, dividing migratory experiences and scholarship alike into distinct, mutually exclusive, camps. They call for our reconsideration of several of such dichotomies. These include the distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration, between which recent work suggests it is virtually impossible to neatly distinguish (1999:12), as well as the contrast commonly made in migration studies between "labor migrants" and "refugees." Finally, the distinctions made by politicians between "good" and "bad" immigrant groups are also often implicit in research. I propose here that we reconsider yet another dichotomy common especially in work on Europe, that between "immigrant" and "repatriate." It is in part due to the uncritical acceptance of this distinction that the migrants of decolonization have been disassociated from the wider literature on European immigration. I will also argue that this dichotomy has been so enduring because it stems from an often unchallenged "national order of things" (Malkki 1995), and because it overlaps neatly with or is informed by another, more covert distinction that shapes much of the migration literature today, that between "outsider" and "insider," or that between "visible" and "invisible" migrants.

At first glance, the distinction made between "immigrant" and "repatriate" seems obvious and unchallengeable. Common usage of these terms would have us view immigrants as foreigners and repatriates as nationals returning home. However, to accept such a distinction uncritically is to reproduce discursive traditions forged by and for the maintenance of territorial nation-states. This is language that promotes the nationalist aim of assigning every individual to one and only one

nation, and which would have us distinguish absolutely citizens from noncitizens, those who belong from those who do not. But when we move beyond the nation-state vantage point and consider these as representing two kinds of migrants, are they really so different? When we take a closer look at the populations these terms denote, we find that there are many reasons for challenging and even collapsing this dichotomy as well.

The origins of the "repatriate" designation are revealing. At the time of decolonization and the arrival of the first "returnees," the official and legal discourse of several former colonial powers began, independently so it appears, to identify the migrants simply as "repatriates," a term that persists in much official discourse today.[15] This may have been the most efficient course of action for most governments. Identified as such, the migrants fell under the purview of already existing government agencies designed to aid repatriating citizens, agencies which usually had at their disposal financial resources available on an emergency basis to help such individuals resettle. However, the identification of the returning colonists as "repatriates" masked a far more complex story, as government officials were well aware at the time. Dutch administrators noted for instance that of the four subgroups "repatriated" from Indonesia, only one could be considered "repatriates" in the strict sense of the word (Obdeijn 1984:52). This term, which refers to citizens being brought home from a foreign state usually through government assistance, is applied with difficulty to the migrants. As outlined above, subsets of all of the "repatriates" discussed here were never originally from Europe or the specific European nation-state in question. Many more were leaving the colonies before independence, and so were really people internally displaced from one part of the empire to another.[16] Moreover, in contrast to classic repatriations involving the return of functionaries during political tensions or of prisoners of war, these migrations were often spontaneous, at least initially, and the role of the metropolitan governments was often minimal. In fact, both the French and Dutch governments attempted at different junctures to convince their nationals to stay in the colonies after independence,[17] as the migrants will readily point out today.

These migrants closely resemble other immigrant or refugee populations in many ways. Like many refugees, they left the colony suddenly, at the chaotic end of a specific political order, usually without the possibility of return. Like many labor migrants, most were migrating to a place that they had never seen. While they may have shared the language and an understanding of metropolitan legal and school systems, as

reproduced in the colony, once they arrived in the metropole, they needed to learn a whole new way of life. They had to adapt to a new territory and climate, form new social relationships, learn new standards of behavior, and change careers. What the repatriate label masks most of all is the fact that many had no ancestral connection with their new host country. This was the case for the more than half of the "French" settlers of Algeria who were originally from other European countries, and thousands of Jews from across North Africa. When they "repatriated," they were migrating to a country to which they belonged legally, but to which they had no family ties. Many Indies Dutch faced a similar experience, as Willems's contribution eloquently illustrates (see also Dieleman 1993:119). And while Portugal continued to encourage emigration to the colonies as late as the 1960s (Dubois 1994b:221), the government later determined that at least 220,000 of the "repatriates" had no clear family ties in Portugal (Ibid:231). Even those falling more neatly under the classic "colonist" rubric, such as the ethnically French from Algeria, had been overseas for so many generations as to find little attachment to their purported home (hence the widespread use of "pieds-noirs" by many French of Algeria, who consider Algeria, not France, their home). Large numbers of all of these groups in fact found themselves so ill-at-ease at "home" that they re-migrated (Rocha-Trindade 1995:339). Thousands of pieds-noirs left France after repatriation for La Réunion, New Caledonia, Canada, and even California, and approximately 18,000 Indonesia Dutch re-migrated to the US (van Amersfoort 1982:870). Willems's chapter provides a fascinating look at the role played by the colonial legacy in the lives of Indies Dutch settled in Australia.

So why the persistence of the repatriate term, at least in official discourse? This may be tied to the fact that for many states, the end of imperial rule was embarrassing and wholly unexpected. Those in power may have wanted to avoid terminology that would link the migrants to the colonial context and which could thus serve as constant reminders of their failures in colonial wars, or of the end of colonial rule.[18] In this post-World War II era, precise definitions for the "refugee" were being inscribed in international law, and as a result this term became unsuitable for the colonial migrants.[19] Other terms such as "deportee," "expellee," or "displaced person" may have been avoided owing to their recent usage for specific populations in the aftermath of World War II or more generally with a situation out of control. However, the identification of this mass migration phenomenon in official discourse as simply a process of "repatriation," a relatively coded and neutral term

(Henry 1996:152), denies the drama of this historical break which represented the beginning of the end of the era of European imperialism. Politicians, faced with the unprecedented problem of the spontaneous arrival of thousands of people with legal statuses equivalent to those of citizens and hence a legal right to settle, may have wanted to downplay or gloss over the many distinctions between these migrants and the wider population. By identifying the migrants as "repatriates," governments were claiming them as unquestioned members of the nation, a stance that may have been viewed as essential in order to stave off or minimize potential reactions against their settlement by the metropolitan public.

Labels and political exigencies aside, why is it so easy for scholars to overlook these migrations of decolonization? Here we confront the second of our problematic dichotomies. The literature on immigration, integration and multiculturalism in the "new" Europe has resulted in innumerable conferences, books and special journal issues. While not always overtly identified as its main focus, much of this scholarship has highlighted labor and economic migration and migrants. The recent history of these migrations has by now been well explored. Following varying resettlement programs after the end of World War II, postwar reconstruction efforts soon employed much of the available local labor, and many European countries began to face real labor shortages. The more industrialized and/or war damaged countries – Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and the UK,[20] with varying periodicity, degrees of government intervention, and source countries, began to import labor. In the 1950s and 1960s, the permanent settlement of this labor was not a serious consideration as workers were ultimately expected to return to their country of origin. Following the recession in 1973, many European nations tried to encourage these migrants to return home, with somewhat limited success. With family reunification programs and the long-term settlement of some immigrant populations, children and grandchildren have been born in the new host countries, and sociologists, geographers and others have turned to descriptions of these communities, and the "problems" associated with the migrants' cultural and political assimilation.[21] Interestingly, because large percentages of the labor migrants in some countries came from former colonies, many works trace the commencement of these migrations to decolonization. However, these works often neglect the parallel migrations of former colonists during roughly the same period.

Further patterns emerge in the immigration literature. Not only does much of this work highlight labor migrants, but the focus has been on the more "foreign" migrant populations, such as North Africans in France, Turks in Germany, or West Indians in Britain. From this choice of research subject, an image of the "immigrant" as a foreign racialized "other" has developed. A hidden analytical distinction informed by race emerges, and migrants are sorted, often covertly, into "outsider" versus "insider" categories, or the "visible" as opposed to the "invisible;" and scholars have tended to highlight the more visibly different in their research. In doing so, social scientists may be unwittingly reaffirming the popular racialization of the social category "immigrant." In France, for instance, the term immigrant (*immigré*) is often blurred with that of foreigner (*étranger*). However, as Silverman notes, these are *not* overlapping groups. Some people who are new arrivals to France are quickly granted French nationality. As new arrivals, they are immigrants, but they are no longer "*étrangers*" (Silverman 1992:3). In contrast, the category "*étranger*" also includes the non-immigrant children, or those born in France, but of immigrant parents, who have not yet been granted French nationality. In popular usage, however, *immigré* refers to anyone different, outsiders, non-Europeans, and especially North Africans (Ibid; see also 1991).

A similar slippage occurs in British parlance. In contrast to France, where people are classified officially by nationality, and thus as either French nationals or "*étranger*," in Britain, ethnic origin is an institutionally recognized category (Ibid:1), and the term "immigrant" is often blurred with "ethnic minority." For instance, in *The Politics of Immigration. Immigration, "Race," and "Race" Relations in Post-War Britain* (1992), Layton-Henry focuses on what are termed "ethnic minorities," a social category not entirely synonymous with "immigrant." This seemingly heterogeneous category includes both first-generation immigrants and those established for many generations in Britain as well as people who arrived in Britain as citizens and as foreigners (1992:8). This assortment of people has one key trait in common, however: they are all "non-white."[22] While there may be good reasons for highlighting commonalities between populations based on phenotype, the automatic exclusion of other first-generation immigrants, such as Swedes or Germans, again reinforces the popular conceptualization of the immigrant as one who is physically different.

Because more research has been conducted with "visibly" different migrants, a real bias has developed in the literature. The colonial migrants are a case in point. Hundreds of thousands of people who

shared a migration experience with a similar periodicity have been systematically excluded from studies on other migrant groups in Europe. Their assimilation has been considered a non-issue. As the Lucassens write, historians studying settlement "tend to concentrate on the negative aspect of the settlement process." While immigration is not always considered intrinsically problematic, they argue, settlement is. In fact, they write, "settlement scholars love this process and earn a living from studying the subject" (1999:21). As a result, our understanding of the processes of integration, ethnic minority or cultural subgroup formation, upward mobility, and legal, linguistic or educational facets of or impediments to assimilation is based on research that has considered only a subset of the array of peoples involved. While it may be true that certain migrant groups have experienced more difficulty assimilating, perhaps due to the active or covert racism in the host country involved, it seems unwise for scholars to make such an assumption out of hand. The uncritical targeting of the more visibly different migrants only fetishizes physical appearance, and could give some people further reason to believe that their immigration "problem" has less to do with their own attitudes and more to do with the new arrivals and their difference.[23]

We can counter this bias in the literature by also considering populations who may have encountered fewer such difficulties. The decolonization migrations, for instance, can be viewed as a massive social experiment with results that should be of considerable interest to European politicians and analysts today. The little research completed on this question so far suggests that the government programs that promoted the social and economic integration of colonists were unmitigated successes (Baillet 1975; Entzinger 1995:343; Rocha-Trindade 1995:341). If this was indeed the case, we will want to understand why. Colonial migrants had some advantages such as considerable linguistic and cultural capital. In addition, most "repatriates" were citizens or were quickly granted this status on arrival. Along with its important symbolic value, to what degree does citizenship facilitate the settlement process? And how significant were the preferential loans and housing facilities many "repatriates" received? Analyses of successful assimilation experiences could certainly assist in the better design of programs for all migrant populations. It is only through the consideration of both positive and negative experiences that we can begin to truly understand the variables shaping the lives of migrants overall.

Diaspora, Displacement, and Exile

Diaspora, displacement and exile are key themes in the contemporary social sciences and literary studies,[24] and it has become commonplace to note that we seem to be witnessing an acceleration in the movement of people around the world.[25] Some of this literature highlights the experiences of refugees,[26] while a growing literature explores the processes of transnationalism and the multiple border-spanning relationships held by transmigrants (see Basch et al. 1994:7), often viewed as part and parcel of processes of globalization and deterritorialized forms of nationalism.[27] Where, if at all, do the former settlers discussed here feature in these discursive formations? In the following section, I treat the colonial migrants as a new, doubly diasporic population, and illustrate how a consideration of this population helps to revise these concepts and the theories they inform.

Diasporic communities are sometimes viewed as representatives par excellence of the postmodern condition, and a wide and sometimes disparate array of transnational communities is now described as diasporas.[28] But what exactly typifies a diasporic community? Brown challenges the tendency to define diaspora solely through the sensibility of displacement (1998:293) and calls for more ethnographically grounded work to document the range of diaspora subjectivities. In *Global Diasporas* (1997), Cohen also argues for an expanded concept. The term has its origins in the Greek verb "to sow" and the preposition "over," and was employed to describe the early Greek colonization of Asia Minor and the Mediterranean (Cohen 1997:2). Since this time, it has taken on quite different connotations through its application to the Jewish diaspora in particular or forced dispersion in general. Noting both the term's origins and the difficulty in distinguishing forced from free migrations, Cohen suggests that we expand our view of diaspora. He proposes that alongside the "victim" model we consider "trade," "labor" and "imperial" diasporas, all of which include some voluntary population movements.[29] In Cohen's model, imperial diasporas involved the settlement for colonial or military purposes by one colonial power (1997:67). He further contrasts "quasi-imperial" from true "imperial" diasporas to take into account the many regions in which settlers and locals eventually rebelled against the home country, forming new nations through what Anderson has termed Creole nationalism (1991), such as the many new nation-states of South America. In contrast, "imperial diasporas" have maintained a connection with the home country. Cases in point, in his opinion, include the British diasporas to Australia, New Zealand,

Canada and South Africa. However, Cohen neglects to consider the third possibility, those imperial diasporas that finally failed. We propose here yet another type, "diasporas of decolonization." This case challenges scholars who have argued that the diaspora trope is intrinsically rooted in a simple relationship between culture, identity and territory (Soysal 2000), as these diasporas are hybrid almost by nature, and attempts to pin down the populations' origins are practically futile. Firstly, such diasporas involve the merging in a colonial space of unique combinations of several of Cohen's types, including forced and free labor, trade, and imperial diasporas. On decolonization, some large portion of this new diasporic community was again on the move, yielding yet another diaspora that often is global in scope.

Cohen's work also outlines features common to many diasporas. These include the dispersal from an "original homeland... to two or more foreign regions," or the expansion from a homeland in search of work, trade or to further colonial ambitions. Diasporas also include, in his view, a "collective memory and myth about the homeland," "an idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration ... [or]... even to its creation," "the development of a return movement," a "strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time," "a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at the least," "a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement," and "the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism" (1997:26).

To what degree do the diasporas of decolonization meet these criteria? The significance of the colony in the collective memory of former settlers is widely acknowledged, and the way this collective memory plays out in their attempts to adapt to their new host country is the subject of Cohen and Locher-Scholten's chapters here. However, can we consider the former colonists as comprising a distinct "ethnic identity"? In some ways we can. The chapters outlined here delineate many zones of disjuncture between the migrants and their new homes, and while they are nationals, they often maintain an array of distinct organizations, social clubs, newspapers and collective activities that closely resemble the identity politics of ethnic groups elsewhere. These organizations are often transnational, as settlers emigrating to new countries, as described here by Willems, maintain contacts with their former friends and family members settled elsewhere. This has led to the development not only of a sense of empathy, but also sometimes truly global linkages with members of the same decolonization diaspora.

However, one of Cohen's key features of diasporas does not apply to our case. While many dream of returning to the former homeland, the development of a viable return movement among former settler organizations has yet to take hold. The decolonization migrations therefore present further examples of diasporas that are not associated with a politics of return, challenging the linkages commonly made between these phenomena. As such, migrations of decolonization provide excellent sources for further exploration of the multiple impacts caused by the irrevocable loss of homeland. Is the possibility of return a necessary trope for the political mobilization of diaspora populations? These questions also lead us to the problem of the longevity of the "ethnic" group consciousness of former settlers. Among many of these populations as well as metropolitan politicians, the transmission to the next generation of common cultural beliefs and practices is a topic of real concern. Whether or not a "colonial" consciousness will be reproduced in future generations may be associated with the relationship the individuals have with their host countries. A consideration of the survival of these migrant cultures in contrast to, for instance, the African diaspora so eloquently outlined in Gilroy's work (1987, 1993), can tell us a great deal about the degree to which the persistence across the generations of a distinct identity and identity politics reflects enduring host country antagonisms and the legacy of racist ideologies and practices.

The colonial migrants have not only permanently lost their "homeland," in that the colonial world they grew up in has ceased, but the fact that they represent a double or even triple diaspora should tell us that their relationship with "homeland" will be complex. These people are not unlike transmigrants who maintain multiple involvements with home and host countries, only in this case, traveling back and forth physically between the two locations is often impossible. More than other migrants, they must turn to the work of the imagination.[30] Willems's chapter in this book suggests a model for scholars trying to conceptualize the multiple homelands migrants carry with them across the globe, and the ways they operate in their daily lives.

Nations and Narrative, History and Memory

There is yet another reason why the diasporas of decolonization have to date been unthinkable, and this is related to the collapse of history and existing national master narratives with decolonization. Colonial spaces were connected to the metropolitan nation-states in part

through ideological formations such as official national histories. The creation of imperial imagined communities were projects of no less importance than their national counterparts described by Anderson (1991). Imperial master narratives were developed, propagated, interpreted and to varying degrees believed in by those in the colony. A sea change in worldviews has led to a fatal challenge to the foundations on which these narratives were built. What happens to individuals when the wider narrative that gave meaning to their world can no longer be told? Decolonization was so rapid and so sweeping in scope that we have yet to determine the longer-term consequences for both the formerly colonized territories and peoples and as well as the colonizing nations involved. Moreover, these events occurred at a particularly fluid moment in European history, the period of reconstruction following World War II and the increasing involvement of European nations in the EU and the Cold War. Many states were so busy moving forward after the war that politicians and populaces alike were unprepared for the unprecedented shift in national identities that decolonization necessarily entailed. In many former colonial powers, an intense disdain for the colonial heritage grew with decolonization, a disdain that was easily transferred symbolically to the former colonists themselves, as Dembour reports for those returning to Belgium from the Congo in the 1960s (2000), and as Ovalle-Bahamón outlines here. As a result, many people – politicians, historians and social scientists alike – have actively avoided this population and the national failure that they represent.

The chapters in the second part of this book address the ways in which history is implicated in the difficult incorporation of the "repatriates" into national communities. The problem of social memory – and, more specifically, of conflicting memories and identities – is a central theme. The colonial heritage has and continues to hold very different meanings to those based in the metropole and those who spent this time in the colony, and both groups maintain quite different understandings of metropolitan history as well. Locher-Scholten's chapter on the public memorialization of the Pacific war, for instance, outlines the very different ideas held by two groups of Dutch citizens of World War II. For the Indies Dutch, memories of this war, which involved a Japanese occupation and internment in POW camps at a time of accelerating nationalist attacks, blurred into those of decolonization and their mass departure from their homeland. For the metropolitan Dutch, this war was devastating and nearly fatal as well, but occurred instead in Europe, involving a German, not Japanese, occupation.

In France, a pied-noir identity began to form during the French Algerian war but crystallized in the metropole, as Jordi and Cohen both outline. This was in part due to the migrants' confrontation with a metropole that differed from what many had imagined, or, in Willems's terms, to the great gap they found between the "imagined homeland" and the "official fatherland." In addition, as Jordi clearly shows, mutual misunderstandings that developed during the traumatic period of pied-noir settlement still linger. Cohen's description in this book of pied-noir perspectives of the colonial past, perspectives that clash with those of most metropolitan French, clearly illustrates some of the fault lines between the two groups, and the role social memory can sometimes play in inhibiting their assimilation. As he writes, "having lost everything, they saw in history their final redemption." These clashes between two memories and two identities, between two understandings of France and what its legacy should be, may go a long way towards explaining the success of right-wing politicians such as Le Pen in getting the pied-noir vote.

History and memory are implicated in the silencing of this topic in wider debates. Willems outlines the historical trajectory of Dutch interest in these migrants, an interest that emerged independently through works written by Indies Dutch, culminating in a series of conferences in the 1980s. It could be argued that Dutch scholars have made the greatest strides in grappling with these difficult questions, perhaps reflecting the fact that more time has passed since decolonization. A similar pattern appears to be underway in France. After the extensive publication of their life memoirs by pieds-noirs, discussed here by Cohen, and by some historians of historical tomes on this experience, interest in this past seems to be growing. Perhaps it will just be a matter of time (again, forty years after decolonization?) before the French public as a whole will be able to fully accept this population into the French national community. We may also see in Portugal, as we do now in the Netherlands, a similarly rich and vibrant interest in the retornados, their heritage and the contribution it has and can make to contemporary society.

Moving Beyond the Three Cases

Until further work is conducted in other European countries, it is difficult to outline in detail the potential contributions of future collaboration, but some research directions are worth enumerating here. Italy was the first of these European nations to begin repatriating its colonial

representatives, and did so even before the end of World War II. Italy's relatively short-term holdings in East Africa may not be exactly comparable to the much older settler colonies of the Dutch East Indies or French Algeria, but parallels with Portugal's twentieth century activities in Angola and Mozambique are worth noting. Like Portugal, Italy encouraged settlement of its citizens overseas well after World War I and after most other European powers had ceased to do so. One wonders if the motivation and rationalization for conquest employed by the two countries were similar, and how these may have differed from those employed by other powers during earlier eras. Little work has been conducted to date in Britain on returning "repatriates." The vast British Empire included several settler colonies that have taken varying routes on the road to decolonization. Comparisons between the cases of Kenya, Zimbabwe and even South Africa to French Algeria would be interesting.

Finally, in his thorough article on postwar migration in Europe, Ceri Peach includes in his "reflux" category the mass return migrations following World War II to Germany that continue to this day (1997). Should we include these migrants, or the reflux of Greeks from Asia Minor (see Hirschon 1998), in the scope of future research? Doing so would greatly expand the scale of this phenomenon. There are many similarities between the return migrations of the Ethnic Germans and the French of Algeria. Both groups have been defined by state officials as members of the nation and as such have benefited from a range of government programs designed to facilitate their integration, and both groups are also linked to unsavory periods of the national past. Some might argue that Algeria was a true "colony" and claim that the territories annexed by Germany during the war are incommensurable. Research exploring the degree of overlap between these cases should yield exciting results with important ramifications for further work on the classic colonial return migrations.

If we move outside the time frame explored by the authors of this book, we find a wealth of cases that could yield further interdisciplinary and collaborative projects. When we include in our scope different centuries altogether, we find instances in which colonial return migrants played pivotal roles in national economies and societies: the return of Spanish from the "New" World in the eighteenth century is a noteworthy example.[31] Finally, European countries were not the only colonial powers to undergo mass decolonization during this era. Future research should include Japan. Before World War II, approximately 1.5 million Japanese were living in Japanese colonies in Asia, especially

Appendix 1: numbers of colonial migrants moving to Europe after decolonization, 1945 – early 1990s (high and low estimates, in thousands)

	"Europeans"[2]		"non-Europeans"		total	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
FEATURED CASES						
France	1,400	1,700	350	500	1,750	2,200
Algeria	1,000	1,100	250	300	-	-
Tunisia	150	200	45	60	-	-
Morocco	200	250	20	30	-	-
Indochina	25	30	10	15	-	-
Sub-Saharan Africa	5	10	15	35	-	-
Others	20	110	10	60	-	-
Netherlands	270	300	250	280	520	580
Dutch Indies	265	290[3]	25	30	-	-
Surinam	2	4	175	180	-	-
Caribbean	3	6	50	70	-	-
Portugal	500	600	75	150	575	750
Angola	310	350	50	100	-	-
Mozambique	160	200	20	40	-	-
Others	30	50	5	10	-	-
OTHER CASES						
Belgium	90	120	15	20	105	140
Congo	85	110	13	16	-	-
Ruanda-Urundi	5	10	2	4	-	-
Italy	480	580	20	50	500	630
Colonies	320	380	-	-	-	-
French Maghreb	120	150	-	-	-	-
Egypt	40	50	-	-	-	-
Spain	170	200	10	20	180	220
United Kingdom	380	500	1,350	1,750	1,730	2,250
India and Ceylon	120	140	750	1,000	-	-
Far East	40	50	120	150	-	-
Africa	100	160	210	260	-	-
Caribbean	10	15	250	300	-	-
Mediterranean	100	120	10	20	-	-
Others	10	15	10	20	-	-
TOTALS	3,300	4,000	2,100	2,800	5,400	6,800

1. This table is adapted from Etemad 1998, Table 2, page 465. The reader is asked to consult this thought-provoking work, as well as Miège and Dubois 1994, on which Etemad's table is based.
2. For a discussion of the problematic nature of these categories, see chapter 1, page 12.
3. These figures include Eurasians.

CHAPTER ONE

No Sheltering Sky: Migrant Identities of Dutch Nationals from Indonesia[1]

Wim Willems

Yet it is no exaggeration to say that liberation as an intellectual mission, born in the resistance and opposition to the confinements and ravages of imperialism, has now shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the immigrant, and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the political figure between domains, between forms, between homes, and between languages (Said 1993:332).

Decolonization and Migration

In the years after World War II, a process of decolonization took place that has still not been completed today. It has involved the migration of millions of people who, because of changed sociopolitical circumstances, decided to leave the country of their birth or settlement and move to the homeland of the former colonizer. This was the case with Dutch migrants from the former Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia, who came to the Netherlands from 1945 to the end of the 1960s. This group consists of at least three categories: European-born people who were in the Indies temporarily; Dutch and other European nationals who were born and settled in the colony and their descendants, often of mixed Indonesian-European descent; and indigenous people with legal status equivalent to Europeans.[2] As a whole we are talking about