He does not ask what patriotism meant to cosmists, and how we are to account for the formulation of similar thoughts outside Russia. The view of Russian culture as exotic leads to generalizations that undermine critical analysis. We learn, for example, that Russians are prone to a “totalitarian cast of mind” (25) or that “[they] have traditionally believed with special intensity” (27) in some form of triumphant salvation. By ascribing if not cosmist convictions, then at least cosmist modes of thinking to all Russians at all time, Young rids himself of the analytical tools that could have contributed to a more nuanced analysis of these strange but ultimately important ideas: historical context, social setting, and the reaches and limits of these ideas’ appeal.

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In this elegant and tightly argued volume, Eric Lohr considers the history of immigration and naturalization practices between 1860 and 1930 within the context of the Russian imperial space and the larger frame of a globalizing world. On the basis of extensive archival work and the thoughtful use of secondary works on migration and the state, Lohr identifies a durable Russian citizenship tradition that he describes as “attract and hold” (12). The growth of the Muscovite state in conditions of labor shortage conditioned the autocracy to pursue a flexible immigration policy that would “attract” new subjects while restricting emigration to “hold” the subjects already on Russian soil. Large numbers of foreign settlers were invited in through specially negotiated “separate deals” to farm the empire’s lands and to create merchant communities. Throughout the imperial period, these population flows were policed through political and social institutions rather than physical boundaries. Lohr argues, in contrast to Hans Kohn, that this set of practices placed Russian citizenship policies firmly in the tradition of *jus solis* often associated with France and other “western” countries.

Economic factors played a large role in citizenship issues. Capitalist globalization during the nineteenth century pressured both citizens and the state to adjust to new circumstances. Foreign businessmen came to dominate Russian commerce, and close contact with neighboring states on questions of migrant flows became even more essential. In periods of calm, states worked together to mutually police their physical and citizenship boundaries. In periods of stress, officials watched the actions of their fellow politicians closely. For instance, a tussle regarding the German treatment of Poles and Jews in the mid-1880s led not only to Russian protests but also to Russian mimicking of German *Gastarbeiter* policies in the Far East. Increasing state capacity and competence in this period also allowed the Russian state to more effectively target its naturalization policies through “filtering.” Believing Jews to be undesirable, they allowed large-scale Jewish emigration and virtually prohibited Jewish immigration. Connected Armenian merchants and prosperous German farmers, however, continued to find a welcome home in the Romanov realm.

This “attract and hold” model was fatally undermined by World War I, which shut down borders, suffocated international trade, and made Germans and Jews targets of a nationalizing state. Lohr’s first book was on this topic, and he argues effectively that the war “crushed the tendrils of liberal rights-based citizenship and reversed the globalizing trends of the previous fifty years” (117). The revolution’s categorical
equalization of citizenship rights regardless of ethnicity promised to replant those tendrils (though the Provisional Government continued the policies of economic nationalism pursued by the state during the war), but the continuation of the war meant that citizenship policies in 1917 were mainly irrelevant.

Lohr concludes with a very interesting treatment of Soviet citizenship policies. These policies were clearly fluid in the early years of the regime, as mass population flows and the creation of new independent states required some sort of legal arrangement, whether through swaps of prisoners of war or “optation” agreements that allowed citizens in borderland regions to choose which state to belong to by voting with their feet. Desires to rebuild the economy during the early phase of the New Economic Policy also led Vladimir Lenin to support immigration policies that would promote development within the shaken global economy and to thwart party leaders such as Nikolai Bukharin who favored autarky. Very quickly, however, the Soviets turned from this path. By the end of the 1920s, they were determined to fight integration into the capitalist economy. This had serious effects on citizenship policies. Police organs had been a strong, even decisive, voice in migration debates from the start of the Bolshevik regime. Now they determined policy unchecked. “Attract and hold” became simply “hold” as immigrants were treated as spies and potential emigrants as traitors. The new migration regime, Lohr demonstrates, constituted a rejection not only of international norms but of a lengthy Russian tradition. One might indeed suggest on the basis of this evidence that the closed nature of the Soviet Union was determined neither by the paranoid, conspiratorial strand of Bolshevik thinking, nor by some eternal Russian xenophobia, but by the anticapitalist drive that eliminated the key lobby for porous borders.

All of these points are made in clear, lucid, and satisfying ways. This is a book that will speak not only to historians of Russia but to students of migration and citizenship in its global context as well.

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The title of James Ryan’s book is a little misleading. Announcing itself as an intellectual history that seems to privilege one side of the “ideology versus circumstances” debate, in fact, the book analyzes Vladimir Lenin's theory and practice of violence, and the author situates his work between that of Martin Malia and Arno Mayer. In other words, the book is actually richer and more nuanced than the title suggests.

**Lenin's Terror** offers a chronological narrative of Lenin’s relationship with violence from the 1890s to the 1920s, and this makes it a real contribution to the historiography—both in terms of enabling further evaluations of the influence of Leninism on Stalinism as well as in its own right. For scholars of political violence, to wit, it is decidedly beneficial to find contained in one volume a comprehensive overview of Lenin’s take on terror, revolution, war, and dictatorship, especially because for Lenin, depending on the circumstances, violence understood as terrorism, for example, could be properly rethought—and legitimized—as partisan or civil war.

How Ryan characterizes Lenin’s take on all this violence may be summed up as follows: sometimes necessary, but not always sufficient, and definitely not desirable in itself. “[Lenin] accepted that coercion and violence would be required to transform