option for achieving long-term peace. In this insider’s telling, the moral of the post-Dayton experience of Brčko seems to be that, like Danzig and Trieste, international control of a contested city in an ethnically divided region could only be temporary and will probably be followed by ethnic homogenization.

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In both the Russo-Japanese War and World War I, one of the most significant factors in the defeat of Russia’s armies was poor staff work. At Vafangou, Mukden, Tannenberg, Gorlice, and elsewhere, Russia’s enemies proved better able to deploy and maneuver soldiers, to provide them with necessary supplies, to collect intelligence, and to coordinate the activities of hundreds of thousands of men spread out across miles and miles of front line combat. Even victorious battles in these wars were often marred by command problems that led to indecisive pursuits and the wastage of men and material.

In an effort to discover why these failures occurred, John W. Steinberg traces the history of the education and training of General Staff officers over the last two decades before the outbreak of World War I. Steinberg makes the case in the first half of the book that a serious effort was made under Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin to overhaul training methods. Seeing too much lecturing and rote learning at the General Staff Academy, Kuropatkin sought to integrate classroom learning and field exercises more systematically, in part by making summer maneuvers something greater than a large review before the emperor. Though important lessons were learned at the key “new” maneuver of this type at Kursk in 1902, the exercise ended up alienating many old officers, in particular Mikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov. As a result, Kuropatkin lost the political capital that would have been necessary to continue the reform effort. The reform movement was reinvigorated in 1905, however, after defeat in the Russo-Japanese War made clear that the Russian army was a broken military instrument. Steinberg’s chapter on the war details the command failures that led to the catastrophe, and he is led to conclude that “General Staff officers were . . . hopelessly outperformed on the Manchurian battlefield” (147).

The concluding chapters of the book treat the same issues of General Staff education and officer training in the years between 1905 and 1914. In these chapters, Steinberg argues once more that reformers failed in their mission to improve officer education and training. This conclusion that Russian military education was a failure does not always fit easily with Steinberg’s endorsement of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s claim that the reformers in the General Staff were the only group with “the intellect and experience to understand the problems and challenges that Imperial Russia faced in the early twentieth century” (1). Steinberg resolves this issue by arguing that at least some of these officers were able to diagnose the ills of the Russian army (and the Russian system more generally) but that they were politically thwarted by establishment conservatives, including the tsar. This is an argument that has been made by other scholars, but hard evidence to support it is curiously difficult to find in this work. To take just one example, Steinberg discusses Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov in many different places, normally lumping him in with antireform conservatives and accusing him of “intransigence . . . on curriculum reform” (208). But Steinberg does not present direct evidence of such intransigence. The closest he comes to a smoking gun is an order from Sukhomlinov in 1909 that made smaller changes in the structure of the General Staff Academy than reformers had wanted. Yet even Steinberg admits that the order did not prevent professors or others “from studying and teaching new ideas” (189). Steinberg’s parallel difficulty in identifying and explaining the “Young Turk” movement in the General Staff suggests that the picture of young visionary staff officers battling an encrusted old guard might need some rethinking.
It should be noted that the book could have used a strong copyeditor. There are spelling, grammatical, and transliteration mistakes throughout the work, and these errors could complicate further research by unwary students. For instance, Dmitrii Grigor’evich Shcherbachev is consistently presented as D. C. Shcherbachev, the journal Razvedchik is occasionally rendered as Radvedchik (188), “fond” is translated as “file,” and the old acronym (TsGVIA) of Moscow’s primary military history archive pops up in the notes (317) alongside the current acronym (RGVIA). These problems aside, All the Tsar’s Men will be useful to anyone seeking more detail on the ways that Russian commanders were trained in the last days of the Romanov empire.

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In this fine study of Russian elites between the February revolution and the outbreak of the civil war, Matthew Rendle demonstrates that the category “counterrevolutionary” is rarely invented by the people relegated to it. In Rendle’s telling, Russian elites contributed crucially to the February revolution by failing to support Nicholas II. Subsequently they embraced the strategies of the new regime, seeking a political voice in the new democratic Russia. While the popular movement and animosity surprised them and limited their options, relatively few embraced either the far right or Lavr Kornilov’s coup in August. Rendle’s characterization commands attention because it is based on a very broad source base, including much new material from Russian archives.

The groups who garner most of Rendle’s attention are nobles, landowners, and military officers. (Analysis of the elites he acknowledges leaving out, in industry and the church, would be welcome.) Rendle considers both the overlap among and the variations within these sectors. As the revolution unfolded, members of the second two groups, in particular, were keen to create non-estate-based organizations, while nobles, who were a major component of both landowners and officers, often participated both in estate-based and non-estate-based organizations simultaneously.

Rendle confirms that support for the government of Nicholas II among elites had dissipated all but entirely by the time demonstrations broke out in Petrograd in February 1917. While elites did not initiate the revolution, staff officers played a critical role by failing to defend the monarch and persuading Nicholas to abdicate. Lower-ranking officers, whose numbers had swelled during the war, ranged politically from left to right, with most believing that a change of government had become necessary in order to achieve military victory. Meanwhile, noble landowners, well represented in the state duma, the ministries, and the temporary governing committee, were also hopeful that the revolution they viewed as exclusively political would usher in a democratic Russia in which they could participate alongside other social groups. Rendle puts into words an idea that is not shocking, but which deserves to become a standard part of the grand narrative of twentieth-century Russian history, when he writes that, “elites did not think that they had been swept away by events, but that their acceptance of the revolution had facilitated its success and they deserved to participate” (52).

Of course, as many of them guessed sooner or later, popular aspirations were not limited to producing a new constitution. Between February and October it became clearer that what was afoot also included a settling of scores and a profound reordering of things. Rendle tracks the activities of a handful of elite groups as they tried to affect the course of events. In May the United Nobility reached out to non-noble landowners in an effort to defend the principle of private property. The Union of Homeowners that resulted achieved some electoral victories in July. The Union of Landowners also undertook reform in the spring of 1917 to defend against expropriation. This union employed publicity to stress its nonparty character, seeking links to peasant landowners who had separated from the