
In this engaging study, Sara Dickinson surveys a sizeable corpus of travel literature written between 1689 and 1850. In addition, she offers insights into the cultural history of traveling and explores the development of Russia’s “imaginary geography,” her emerging conception of Western and domestic spaces. This is a tall order for an average-sized monograph—and the study remains necessarily partial in the sources it marshals, the issues it foregrounds, and the secondary literature it engages. Yet harnessed together, the three foci—close readings, cultural history, and study of identity formation—enrich one another and confer a unifying thread to the book’s overarching narrative.

Dickinson offers lively characterizations of forgotten texts along with a discussion of the more obvious culprits (Fonvizin, Radishchev, Karamzin, Pushkin) which anchor her narrative. She deserves commendation for unearthing and bringing to life second- (if not third-) rate literature. On occasion, she makes the case for the intrinsic qualities of a rarely considered text (Ivan Martynov’s “Filon,” a parody of sentimentalist traveling, Konstantin Batiushkov’s “Journey to Château Cirey,” which takes on the red herrings of patriotic travel writing, or Vil’gel’m Kiukhel’beker’s *Journey*, a narrative of self-discovery). Her textual analysis is carefully set in the context of wider historical trends, of the writer’s personal and intellectual biography, and of a rich field of textual antecedents. (The significance of Fonvizin to subsequent writers is one theme of her study.) Specialists of the period will find the discussion of poorly known texts more useful than that of the canon, as Dickinson remains too general to break new ground in the latter.

Dickinson adopts a certain number of double-edged premises. Most problematic to this reader is the decision to measure a broad variety of genres of writing with the same yardstick. “Literary” travelogues, memoirs, personal letters, diaries, letters to a dignitary, verse fiction, scientific or military accounts, and so forth, are assessed by a standard of literary stylization that remains unchanged over the eight decades the study primarily spans. Contemplating such disparate texts through the same lens magnifies the self-consciousness and cohesiveness of the corpus. But is this not an ocular illusion that risks unfairly distorting their intended purpose?

Dickinson draws a line of development that roughly goes from the initial imitation of Western models up to 1789, to the still highly Western-minded discovery of internal space during the 1790s and 1800s, to renewed interest in the West after 1812, albeit with a greater sense of national identity, and finally to an autonomous reimagining of domestic space between 1825 and 1850. This periodization is at once revealing and deceptive. It provocatively lines up Karamzin with domestic travel, sidelines interesting journeys to the West written in the 1790s and 1800s or after 1825, and oddly ignores the discovery of the Caucasus and Crimea in the 1820s and 1830s. Indeed, the coverage of the Nicholaevian period is noticeably thinner than that of earlier decades. The tongue-in-cheek revalorization of the provinces by the likes of Pushkin and Zhukovskii might have been contrasted with the Slavophile celebration thereof, for example, in Ivan Aksakov’s rich description of travel through Russia in his *Letters to Family* (1844–1856).
Dickinson mounts a compelling argument that the assimilation of Western conventions in fact laid the ground for the emergence of an autonomous identity. Yet the emphasis on the mere fact of cultural borrowing could have been productively dynamized if more attention had been given to the manner of imitation, the selection and textual embedding of stereotypes. After all, there are no texts in the Western canon quite like Karamzin’s tour-de-force or even Shalikov’s atrocious journeys.

And yet, generous and patient in its consideration of a then-popular kind of writing, this eminently readable study enriches our understanding of a seminal period of Russia’s culture, one that arguably laid the ground for her modern identity.

Andreas Schönle, Queen Mary College


For Chester Dunning, and to a qualified extent his collaborators Caryl Emerson and Sergei Fomichev, the “truth hidden in plain view” for two centuries is that the play Pushkin gleefully entitled Komediia in 1825 was an openly revolutionary and popular work. A “historical comedy” rooted in the subversive popular traditions of “smekhovaia kul’tura,” it cast astringent doubt on the high politics and classical tragic forms of the elite, giving voice to the secret truth about Dmitri the Pretender’s easy rise: the “people’s Tsar” had promised to abolish serfdom. There is thus no need to look further than a literal reading of the play’s original ending, “Da zdravstvuet Dmitri!” Moreover, the enthusiastic reception of Pushkin’s oral readings of the play in 1826 Moscow reflected liberal society’s covert enthusiasm both for its political message and its messenger, newly restored from exile for his earlier “freedom-loving” verses, to which each Decembrist, under interrogation during those very months, traced his awakened political consciousness. The form and content of the play were at this point perfectly unified, and perfectly understood by its liberal listeners. It was only the implacable Nicholaevan censorship of the play, its banning from the stage, the silencing of all mention of the Decembrists, and the young poet’s desire to step into Karamzin’s authoritative position vis-à-vis the government that induced the “astute and practical Pushkin” (p. 115) to recast it for publication. He fragmented the play’s comic unity by omitting popular and subversive scenes, smoothed its expressive variety by imposing a consistent meter, and reframed the play as a Karamzinian high tragedy of character, which ended with a silenced rather than liberated people, gloomily contemplating the error of their ways in the famous stage-direction: “Narod bezmolvstvuet.”

As an added benefit, Dunning and Emerson propose that Pushkin’s original Komediia was a startlingly modern piece of stagecraft, which in its original form would have been and can now be a lively stage success. Their new edition thus claims to resurrect the real theatrical script from the revised and compromised play for reading. The story eagerly articulated by Dunning is American in its democratic optimism and its streamlined message; he also checks Pushkin’s sources with admirable care to prove the young poet’s solidity as a professional historian. Emerson and Fomichev contribute greater cultural subtlety and stylistic-semantic polyphony to the interpretation, while promoting the Bakhtin-Morson-inflected idea of Pushkin’s interest in “infinite narrative potentials” and the ethical freedom they imply.

It is exhilarating that almost two hundred years later, the same Pushkin texts and contexts can be assembled and read together to produce markedly different interpretations. In Dimitry’s Shade (2004) J. Douglas Clayton’s reading of Boris Godunov’s Smuta world of conflicting
(medieval/Renaissance, Western/Russian, Catholic/Orthodox) discourses, it is the aesthetic but untrustworthy use of language emanating from post-Renaissance Poland which is carried like a contamination into Russia by the dissident-aristocrat-turned-monk-turned-Pretender Dmitri, who is also the improvising poet of the play. Ultimately, though, the play’s conflicted surface is united—not by its revolutionary message, but, more conservatively, by a deep pattern of poetic-religious metaphors that imply the intact existence of a Russian-Orthodox worldview, temporal consciousness, and iconic language. Such poetic-religious unity of language and vision—as in the pervasive St. George symbolism that lies concealed under secular history’s disorderly surface—aligns Pushkin’s play with a Karamzinian notion of the “narod” and its projected conservative acceptance of history. To support his argument, Clayton assembles a convincing picture of Pushkin’s reactions to contemporary events and ideological controversies. Foremost among these were the changing assessments of Napoleon, revolution, enlightenment, and modernity in the years after Napoleon’s defeat, changes that, as I. V. Nemirovskii has shown in his recent book, *Tvorchestvo Pushkina i problema publichnogo povedeniia poeta* (2003), put Pushkin as often as not on the opposite divide from his closest liberal friends.

*Boris Godunov* becomes, then, Pushkin’s intellectual justification and poetic confirmation of the Russian people’s separate historical path and categories of consciousness. Thus when Pushkin crowed to his Muscovite friends after the Decembrist interrogations and executions that he had been providentially spared, when he said he would change his patronymic to “Nikolaich” as a sign of his “rebirth” into a new life under the tsar, Clayton’s view is that he should be taken at his word, as a born-again Russian conservative whom history, both as personal experience and as a system of knowledge, had taught a lesson.

For Dunning-Emerson-Fomichev, the original *Boris Godunov* was a revolutionary work about Russian history addressed to the Russian people in their own popular artistic medium and language, calling for change. I would suggest that Pushkin conceived images of history in light of contemporary pressures, and wrote *Boris Godunov* as a tricky act of communication with a many-headed audience. In it he planted polarities of perspective, worldview, language, and mimetic attraction that act as a litmus test for the hidden tendencies of his audience’s desires to this day.

Monika Greenleaf, Stanford University


This book examines the place of the art of painting in Vladimir Nabokov’s literary oeuvre. The introductory chapter discusses some general issues of the interaction between the verbal and the visual in Nabokov’s art. The authors argue that Nabokov’s frequent invocation of painting is “the result of careful selections to match the various themes in his novels, thus contributing to the profoundness of his art” (p. 29). Most importantly, Nabokov’s allusions to painting and painters create “visual subtexts” whose purpose is to inform literary texts with additional, albeit veiled, meaning. In this way Nabokov could encode in literary fiction his larger ethical concerns, while remaining staunchly opposed to openly moralizing art. This thesis serves as an analytical blueprint throughout the book whose authors focus on the identification of visual subtexts and the subsequent illustration of their interpretive value in reaching a fuller, ethical understanding of Nabokov’s characters and their actions.

Analyzing the visual subtexts of *Laughter in the Dark*, the authors single out Lubin Baugin’s *Still Life with Chessboard* as a crucial key to the novel. The color palette in *The Real Life of
Sebastian Knight is examined in the context of Nabokov’s alphabetic chromesthesia (association of letters with colors). Next, Pnin and its visual subtexts (Flemish masters, Rembrandt, Van Gogh, Degas) are read against the backdrop of the historical tension between the mimetic and imaginative values of art. In the fifth chapter, the authors argue that Lolita’s painters and paintings (Beardsley, Botticelli’s Venus, Van Gogh’s Arlésienne, Prinet’s Kreutzer Sonata, Reynolds’ The Age of Innocence, Whistler’s Arrangement in Grey and Black) help distinguish the novel’s implicit story of a child’s wrecked life from Humbert’s glib and obfuscating narrative.

Chapter 6 proposes a reading of Pale Fire with reference to a wide range of painters and visual esthetics, from Teniers the Younger to Hogarth to Manet to Picasso. The following study, by Gerard de Vries, shows the importance of Leonardo da Vinci’s Last Supper in the semantic structure of “Spring in Fialta.” D. Barton Johnson goes on to give an encyclopedic survey of Ada’s art gallery, not only to illustrate the text’s status as “the most painterly of Nabokov’s novels” (p. 98) but also to examine its “integration of the visual with the verbal” (p. 144). The ultimate chapter, by Liana Ashenden, postulates the centrality of Hieronymus Bosch’s paintings The Ship of Fools, The Last Judgement, and The Garden of Earthly Delights, to Ada’s imagery, esthetics, and hidden meaning. The two appendices closing the book contain the lists of passages in Nabokov’s fictional and autobiographical writings referring or alluding to painting and painters.

This reviewer was confused about the authorship of the first six chapters and both appendices which are not clearly attributed. The reader is thus invited to engage in a typically Nabokovian interpretive exercise involving implicit and explicit authorial claims and multiple narrative voices. But if one were to judge this book by its cover, I would venture to surmise that the texts in question were authored jointly by de Vries and Johnson.

Although linked by the overarching theme of painting, the book’s constitutive studies are autonomous and can be read out of sequence. The authors’ erudite striving to account as exhaustively as possible for the visual subtexts in Nabokov’s art tilts the overall balance of the studies in favor of encyclopedic yet cursory surveys, at the expense of in-depth analysis. As a result, the book makes for a somewhat monotonous read and, at times, resembles a compendium of annotations to Nabokov’s texts. I do not intend this as a reproach to the authors who have, beyond any doubt, achieved the goals formulated in the introduction. Still, for all its original critical insights, their book does not exhaust the interpretive potential of the art of painting in Nabokov’s works under discussion. It is clear, however, that de Vries’s, Johnson’s, and Ashenden’s pioneering book is an indispensable reference source and resource tool for all future study of painting in Nabokov’s art and thought.

Leonid Livak, University of Toronto


With the book under review, a group of scholars from the Department of Twentieth Century Russian Literature of the Ural Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences presents the first volume of their research project, the title of which may be rendered in translation: “Russian Literature of the Twentieth Century: Regularities of Literary Development.” The authors examine major twentieth-century “historical and literary systems,” from symbolism to postmodernism and postrealism. The overarching “methodological principle” of the research gathered in this volume is that most significant literary systems of the twentieth century may be examined as
varying attempts to resolve the fundamental (original) opposition between chaos and cosmos (p. 6). The interplay of these two powerful forces, according to the head of the project Professor N. Leiderman, determines the essence of “any aesthetic activity” and is “manifested throughout the history [of literature] in various particular oppositions” (p. 29).

The volume’s scholarly goal is to find and examine the most essential features of twentieth-century Russian literature as an “integral historical and cultural phenomenon” (p. 7). To achieve this goal, the authors enthusiastically apply terminology and imagery characteristic for intellectually cosmopolitan Western philosophers and geopoliticians: “cultural era,” “megacycle,” “macrocycle,” “apocalipticism,” “revolutionism,” “mental type,” “mental crisis,” “chaorgraphy,” “cosmography,” “aggression of simulacra,” and so on. This stimulating universalist terminology goes hand in hand with a more earthly and traditional one: “literary tendency,” “genre,” “creative method,” “systematic analysis,” and so on. This peaceful coexistence of Jean Baudrillard and G. N. Pospelov (a leading Soviet literary theorist) is programmatic for the authors, since they see the modernization of the traditional historico-literary apparatus as one of the most urgent tasks of contemporary Russian literary theory.

The authors present the “master plot” of the twentieth century in terms of an interaction between two types of culture—a classical one and a modernist one. They argue that the “major dispute” of this age dealt with the possibility of reaching a state of harmony between man and world. The story vaguely resembles a Hegelian system. In the beginning, there was the mutual repulsion between “chaographic” and “cosmographic” systems. Then “unconscious borrowings” took place. Finally, we see “attempts at a conscious synthesis [of the two opposites] in order to accommodate the achievements” of both (p. 36). The cycle is over and a new one begins.

To briefly fill in some of the detail concerning this twentieth-century literary cycle, it began when the artistic discoveries of Chekhov initiated the passage from the classical phase to the modernist one (p. 86). Symbolism, in its deification of chaos, proceeded from destruction to teleology, from a “disharmonizing metaphor” to the “harmony of the apocalypse.” However, chaos “was transformed not through an organic process, but through mechanical subjection to the system of the state” (p. 86). The Acmeists, in their turn, tried to civilize “earthly chaos” by means of their art. They discovered in chaos the “ontological laws,” which “support the pulsation of life itself” (p. 150). The “anti-cosmographical” poetics of the Russian expressionists (they did exist, according to L. N. Anpilova and N. L. Leiderman—Maiakovskii, Pil’niak, even Khlebnikov) led to the most radical version of modernism—the idea of the world as absolute chaos. The avant-gardists of the 1910s–20s challenged the rules of classical poetics and made it “unbalanced” (p. 293). By the end of the 1920s, the modernist paradigm passes through a deep crisis. As a result, new creative strategies arise and propose their solutions for the critical situation. First of all, this is postmodernism, which “accepts chaos” and endeavors to “submit it to the law, which is to say, to discover the unique attractions of the situation, a ‘feast in the time of plague’” (p. 43). This “strategy of total scepsis” finds a peculiar catharsis in the total disintegration and profanation of everything (p. 43). The second solution was suggested by Socialist Realism, which modeled cosmos in imitation of the totalitarian state. This method’s aesthetic program brings the “artistic consciousness” back to “normativism” (p. 45). Finally, post-realism, as the third trend of this period, shows how cosmos grows out of chaos, “turning into chaosmos” (a monstrous term borrowed from Joyce). Postrealism “regulates chaos via dialogical debates of different sides, organizing, rather than closing, the reclamation of the ‘terrible world’” (p. 45). These three “paradigms” are examined in respective chapters. The conclusion, “The Essence of a Literary Megacycle,” contains an attempt to survey the entirety of twentieth-century literature from a bird’s-eye view, and speculates on what is to come in Russian literature of the twenty-first century. It ends with the melancholy, yet certainly just, statement: “Time will tell” (p. 465).
Now perhaps, the bold attempt of the participants of this academic project to embrace, with their theorization, the chaotic reality of twentieth-century literature deserves respect. A reader may find here some interesting and valuable insights and information, especially in the sections dealing with discussions of Russian expressionism (N. Leiderman, L. N. Anpilova), postmodernism (a fine and thought-provoking chapter by M. Lipovetsky) and neo-sentimentalism (“Conclusion”). However, the book demonstrates an unbelievable stylistic and methodological cacophony. It seems, for example, that the chapters on Chekhov and postmodernism were written not only in two different scholarly languages, but in two different eras of the Soviet/Russian literary metacycle (in critical discourse). There are many exaggerations (Khlebnikov as a poet of chaos?) and lapses in this book (no reference to A. Chudakov’s works in a section dealing with Chekhov’s poetics of chance). The editors would have done well to eliminate such confusing phrases like “The Khrushchov’s ‘thaw’ cracked open a valve, nourishing literature with ideas that were not traditional for Socialist realism” (Khrushchevskaia ‘ottepel’ priotkryla kliapan, numaushchii iskusstvo netraditsionnymi dlia sotsrealizma ideiami...; p. 273).

All in all, this book may serve as a good illustration for the contemporary state of Russian academic thought which seeks modernization, reopens the “valve” admitting Western terms and ideas, yet also strives to preserve untouched its traditional approaches, scholasticism, vocabulary, and the utopian belief in a possibility to embrace the boundless.

Ilya Vinitsky, University of Pennsylvania


This is not the first volume dedicated to the issue—or rather complex of issues—relating to gender in Russian culture. However, unlike volumes that have come before, this collection focuses exclusively on twentieth-century culture and is the stronger for it. Specifically, this focus allows all the contributions, which are arranged more or less chronologically, to address—from a variety of cultural and historical vantage points—an issue peculiar to the last century, concerning the coexistence of a traditional, hierarchical distribution of gender roles within and alongside progressive, modern gender discourse and institutions. The focus of the volume is further sharpened in a very informative introduction in which Goscilo and Lanoux delineate certain gendered “archetypes” and “discursive patterns” in twentieth-century Russian culture and then suggest ways in which those archetypes and patterns are reiterated, reinforced, and sometimes challenged in Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet culture. Only by exposing the gendered “fictions that pass as history,” the editors insist, can we hope to avoid becoming “lost in the myths” (p. 24) that continue to surround Russian identity.

The essay by the sociolinguist Valentina Zaitseva, which opens the volume, is the broadest in scope and offers an insightful and well-organized exploration of the ways in which gender distinctions and hierarchies are encoded and reinforced in Russian linguistic practices. Especially convincing is Zaitseva’s discussion of the use of feminine diminutives in Russian to mark intimacy between interlocutors, which she then maps onto the more fundamental cultural opposition of us/them, gendered female/male, respectively. The contributions that follow Zaitseva’s overview of the language of gender explore more specific cultural manifestations, or utterances. For example, Goscilo’s essay on the institution of widowhood reveals not only the stability of certain gendered archetypes, but also their flexibility in the hands of a strong-willed, intelligent woman such as Nadezhda Mandel’stam. Other contributions that stand out in the volume are Lilya Kaganovsky’s insightful reading of Nikolai Ekk’s 1931 talkie The
Road to Life, Elena Prokhorova’s careful analysis of the woefully under-studied genre of the Soviet television serial, and Eliot Borenstein’s comprehensive examination of the metaphor of prostitution in late perestroika and early post-Soviet Russian culture.

Like Borenstein’s piece, Yana Hashamova’s article on representations of gender in post-Soviet film effectively isolates and discusses a particularly post-Soviet set of anxieties, although I am reluctant to agree that “Russian screen images of men and women reflect the consequence of [contemporary Western ‘gender hesitations’]” (p. 197). As John Borneman argues in his introduction to the collection Death of the Father: An Anthropology of the End in Political Authority (2004), patriarchal authority is deeply personalized in totalitarian societies through the metaphor of the all-powerful “father of the people,” and so the collapse of that authority is experienced with particular acuteness there. Suzanne Ament’s essay on Soviet war songs and Luc Beaudoin’s essay on homosexuality help to round out the volume, although they appear somewhat under-theorized alongside the other contributions. For example, instead of describing post-Soviet Russian gay identity as a “paradoxical fusion of Russian literary history, American pornography and sexual mass-marketing” (p. 236), lending it a bizarre unity, Beaudoin might better have isolated different discursive sites within post-Soviet culture, each constructing “homosexuality” in more or less its own way. And while Elizabeth Jones Hemenway’s discussion of the use of hagiographic elements in early Soviet descriptions of woman revolutionaries is quite convincing, she fails to demonstrate her second claim—that this intensified after Lenin’s death. Those minor points aside, this is an important, well-organized, and focused collection of essays that explores the complex relationship of gender and national identity in Russia, where traditional gender categories and roles have proven to be surprisingly resilient in the face of radical political, social, and economic upheaval.

Brian James Baer, Kent State University


This volume contains twenty studies dealing with different aspects of East European Jewry. While most readers do not anticipate that the articles in an issue of a journal will be closely related to each other, there are often greater expectations from a volume of studies. However, it is difficult to achieve focus when a collection is made up of papers given at a conference. In that case, the realities of invitations (and cancellations) often mean that editors have little room for maneuver. This volume is a case in point. It contains some very interesting articles but the range is from the early Enlightenment period to post-Holocaust controversies, and, for the sake of this volume, Eastern Europe includes Hungary and beyond.

At the core of this book are a number of studies of Jewish culture—literature, art, music (or music publishing), and theater. These articles could have been published separately in a volume devoted to culture in Eastern Europe, perhaps together with a few invited articles as supplements, and the remainder of the articles could have been published elsewhere. This apparently was not possible (or desirable) and the results are in front of us. I should note that most of the articles are quite good and not all can be referred to here. I found Seth Wolitz’s study of the making of the Jewish art book to be a fascinating study of aspects of cultural modernization at the time of the Bolshevik revolution. Alina Orlov’s study of the institutional context of early Russian Jewish art is a very original study of the organization supporting Jewish artists that enabled some remarkable achievements. Among the studies devoted to literature is a very incisive (and moving) close reading of a Bergelson story by Harriet Murav.
If it is necessary to be convinced that Soviet Yiddish literature merits a close look, this article should do it. Studies of popular Jewish culture by Jeffrey Veidlinger and of Shaykevitsch by Audrey Bredstein are intriguing analyses of overlooked phenomena. John Klier explains why Yiddish literature is not a simple mirror of the realities of its times, a useful lesson, while Gary Rosenfield avoids morbidity in his description of how Russian authors described deaths of Jews in Russia and shows how this is a useful key to understanding attitudes towards Jews.

Not so related to culture, but certainly quite interesting, are two studies of Jewish communities. A fascinating and very innovative study of Bialystok Jewry by Rebecca Kobrinn raises many methodological and historical questions, and Ted Weeks’s study of Vilnius discusses the changes in values and behavior of the Jews of that city between 1881 and 1939. Elyana Adler offers a typology and examples of individuals who opened schools for Jewish girls in Imperial Russia. This topic has not received much attention in English and it is both interesting and significant.

The range of topics and the mix of veteran and young scholars testify to the success of training of specialists in East European Jewish studies in recent years. While not all of the studies are of equal originality, they are all quite competent, up to date, and relevant to a wide variety of interests.

Shaul Stampfer, Hebrew University

Keith Livers’s book brings together four fascinating readings of the body in the Soviet Union of the 1930s. The scope of the project, which “examines the remarkable, indeed, unprecedented fusion of private bodies and state ideology as reflected in a number of works from the Stalinist ‘30s” (p. 2) is problematic, for although the title promises a study of fictional representations of corporeality, the chapters deal with Andrei Platonov, Mikhail Zoshchenko, Lev Kassil’, and the building of the Moscow Metro. Most of the Metro texts are not fictional, and Livers never makes a case for the special status of fiction per se in Stalinist culture, though he does quote the work of Mikhail Vaiskopf and others to claim a particular importance for the written word in the Soviet 1930s. The general argument of the book is that the display and taming of the body was extremely important to Stalinist ideology, and while this claim is not destabilizing or new, the strength of the undertaking is in its particular readings.

The longest chapter in the book is devoted to Andrei Platonov, and to Dzhan and Happy Moscow in particular. In a wonderful analysis of the latter work, Livers portrays it as a tragic celebration of woman as the incarnation of the principle of compromise between the competing spheres of spirit and matter. Platonov’s heroine “embodies the peculiar coupling of raw physicality and spiritual transcendence that constitutes the central paradox of the human condition. An ideal embodiment of Bakhtinian dialogue, she is both filth and cleanliness, high and low, self and other” (p. 14). Working “to dismantle the very antagonism of matter and spirit that underpins much of Western thought” (p. 15), Platonov “blurs the boundaries between ontologically incompatible realms” (p. 29), seeing woman’s body “as a locus of rapprochement rather than an ontological impediment” to utopia (p. 45) and finding in femininity “a kind of immanent transcendence—an immortality in and of the body” (p. 15). Livers’s pursuit of the sewage theme in Happy Moscow is inspired; he rightly focuses on the kanalizatsionnaia truba as the work’s central connecting motif, and he ingeniously compares this to the Belomor Canal project so vital to Stalinist construction. (One might also see the sewage pipes as a debased
version of Platonov’s own earlier irrigation projects as well as the grander enterprise of “The Epifan Locks”). The reading of Dzhan is not so corporeally centered, but it presents the long povest as similarly about the necessity of compromise and as a renunciation of the Stalinist principle of all-powerful vision and plenitude. While others have dealt with these themes before, Livers finds new details in support of Dzhan’s status as a watershed work. He also makes excellent use of Platonov’s recently published notebooks, establishing them as an essential part of Platonov’s oeuvre.

Some parts of the Platonov chapter work less well than others. The excursus into Derrida’s theory of hospitality seems forced, and the absence of femininity from Platonov’s early work is exaggerated. In many respects, the early work was, like Platonov’s fiction of the 1930s, “biophilic”: feminine and maternal images are present from Platonov’s first poems, and the work of the 1920s—culminating in The Foundation Pit—is largely about their cooption, repression, and reinscription. An odd aspect to the Platonov chapter is its placement in the manuscript. Livers portrays Platonov as resisting the generally purifying discourse of Stalinism, but he establishes the norms for that discourse only in the subsequent chapters. Part of the problem, I suspect, is that Livers only half believes the Groys-Weiskopf thesis, which he cites several times, about Stalinist discourse as a dialectic, master reconciler of opposites. As Livers admits, in the 1930s “the image of the female body (particularly in its connection to fertility and child-bearing) that had been marginalized, indeed even demonized during the previous decade, once again takes up a central place in the cultural imagination” (p. 14), and Platonov’s “persistent undercutting of boundaries appears—if only superficially—to echo Stalinism’s promotion of itself as the greatest synthesizer of opposites” (p. 31). So is Platonov taking his cue from or deconstructing the Stalinist ideology? If Stalinism rejected filth and promoted the image of a beautiful body was it, in at least that one respect, departing from its all-encompassing reconciliation of competing values? Might the Stalinist view of ideal corporeality—whether male or female—be the point which gives the lie to the very notion of Stalinist completeness and reconciliation?

Livers juxtaposes Zoshchenko to Platonov. Rather than struggling with Stalinist ideology, Zoshchenko uses it as a sort of therapy to effect “his passage from the troublesome world of desire(s) to the sublime realm of Ideology” (p. 18). The writer’s “legendary quest for self-healing” meshed “with Stalinist culture’s program of social hygiene and ideological purification” (p. 96). Livers’s readings of “A Story about a Student and a Diver” and “The Sorrows of Young Verter” are clearly inspired by Alexander Zholkovskii’s methodology and interpretations, but Livers seeks to place Zoshchenko’s invariants or obsessions more firmly within a historical, ideological paradigm. As a result, he sees “Stalinism’s optimistic projection of a totally unified and transfigured body (politic)” as resolving or displacing “the perennial standoff between father and son” (p. 100); in effect, Stalin cured Zoshchenko’s oedipal complex. Zoshchenko’s preoccupation with strong hands and sentinels culminated in his seeing his own authorial hand as the vehicle for the dominant ideology; this made Zoshchenko “if not the ideal then at least a compelling apologist for Stalinism’s fabled strong-arm tactics” (p. 115).

Livers sees the homoeroticism present in Zoshchenko’s attempts at self-analysis as consistent with the general masochistic paradigm outlined by Igor Smirnov, Mikhail Zolotonosov and, to a certain extent, Katerina Clark, and he finds this tendency heightened in Lev Kassil’s children’s novel Goalkeeper of the Republic. In effect, this third chapter establishes much of the dominant paradigm of Stalinism. Here, as in the fourth chapter, Livers relies on conceptual models proposed by others, but he applies them brilliantly, and his close, allegorical readings are great fun to follow. While in some respects Kassil’s novel is a throwback to the earlier utopian of the 20s, it also captures the unique subjectification processes of the 1930s: “The importance of containment as one of the central motifs of Kassil’s Goalkeeper of the Republic is rivaled only by the novel’s repeated allusions to the natural (indeed even necessary)
transgressiveness of Stalinist subjectivity” (pp. 158–59). The themes of vision and blinding are insightfully pursued and the importance of water as a mythological image of chaos is convincingly developed. Indeed, the abiding contribution of this book may be our awareness of the centrality of water as a master (and to-be-mastered) image in Stalinist ideology. The liquid theme and its representation of pernicious, uncontrolled femininity is the pedal note of the Metro chapter. There are some arresting, from today’s perspective almost campy, depictions of the dangerous, dank depths of the earth that rival anything Wilkie Collins wrote about Blackwater Lake. To be sure, here, as elsewhere in the book, Livers channels Zolotonosov’s brilliant but perhaps overly exuberant readings of 1930s culture, but he does so to excellent effect. My only quibble with the Metro chapter is its attempt to bring in Bulgakov. While one can certainly make the case that The Master and Margarita contains a broad “philosophical argument with Stalinist ontology,” it seems very far fetched to view it as containing “a thinly veiled polemic with the metropoliten imeni Kaganovicha” or to agree that: “Bulgakov responds to Kaganovich and company by turning the underground’s ubiquitous “M” into a devilish “W,” once more joining order to chaos, and darkness to light” (p. 223). The reversal of the letter is a neat idea, but if there is a polemic here, it is heavily curtained.

Since Livers’s book is fundamentally concerned with the difficulty of disciplining unruly elements, it is perhaps appropriate that its organizational system continually leaks. There is a great deal of repetition. At times the chapters seem incompletely integrated, so that ideas and quotations are introduced twice, sometimes in different translations (pp. 66/112/127/165/169, 42/62, 112/199). Works already dealt with are reintroduced as if presented for the first time (in one case, with a different title: “The Soul of the World” becomes “The World Soul”). Quotations or ideas appear in the text and then later (or earlier) in footnotes (pp. 62, 86, 206/230). An article by Drubek-Meyer is attributed to Kornienko (who would never have written it). At some stage in the writing new quotations and footnotes must have been introduced that have the effect of separating footnotes from their enclitic ibid. The result is that Platonov’s words are attributed to a biographer of Mechnikov, my thoughts to Livers, Jochen Hellbeck’s to me, Vaiskopf’s to Sheila Fitzpatrick. These mistakes are all fairly obvious to anybody who has read the originals, but they will confuse those new to the topics. The actual footnote numbers occasionally seem to have been wrongly placed, so that it is unclear what is being attributed to whom; some footnotes have a minimal relationship with the text (for example, pp. 126/149), some begin with “quoted in” when nothing has just been quoted (pp. 125/149). The introduction and conclusion largely recapitulate the material in the intervening chapters. The strange thing about these purely formal defects is that Livers is such a good close reader. I noticed these mistakes because his interpretive practice encouraged me to stick with him and pay attention to everything he says. But a seamless text would itself be a utopian enterprise, and the textual excess here does not distract from the book’s valuable contribution to the scholarship on Platonov, Zoshchenko, and Stalinist culture.

Eric Naiman, University of California, Berkeley


In 1946, at the suggestion of Sergei Konovalov, a Russian émigré and professor of Russian at Oxford, the eighty-year-old Viacheslav Ivanov sent C. M. Bowra, also at Oxford, some offprints of his articles, accompanied by a six-line Latin address in praise of the British classical scholar
and translator. Thus began an acquaintance that was to result not just in the subsequent exchange of ten letters, but also in Bowra’s twice seeing Ivanov in Rome (in 1947 and 1948); his writing the foreword for *Freedom and the Tragic Life* (1952), the English version of Ivanov’s study devoted to Dostoevsky; and his authoring the introduction to *Svet vechernii* (1962), a collection of poetry by Ivanov which finally was published in no small part through Bowra’s efforts. Bowra had already translated three of Ivanov’s poems into English for his *A Book of Russian Verse* (1943), and he later translated two more poems for *A Second Book of Russian Verse* (1948).

The title, by echoing that of the famous correspondence between Ivanov and Mikhail Gershenzon, promises somewhat more than these letters deliver. The exchanges are not lengthy, and they only hint at the differences in outlook between Bowra and Ivanov. Their fundamental disagreement about culture becomes explicit only in Pamela Davidson’s extensive commentary on the relationship between the two men. She notes that whereas both were adherents of the great humanist tradition, Bowra did not consider religion as fundamental to that tradition while Ivanov sought his ideal in a blend of classical antiquity and a specifically Christian humanism. The letters’ intrinsic value is more apparent in their occasional references to the nature of and approach to translation. The very first note from Ivanov, in Latin distichs, refers both to Bowra’s translations of foreign poets into English and to Ivanov’s own translations of Russian poems into German. Bowra went on to send Ivanov his translations of Coleridge and Swinburne into Greek; Ivanov responded by praising the translations of Swinburne but finding the Coleridge resistant “to the spirit and style of Greek poetry” (p. 93). In reply, Bowra offered perceptive thoughts on the difficulties inherent in translation, noting that beyond the obvious linguistic challenges lurk the often even more problematic differences in manner of thought and cultural background.

In all, though, the value of this publication for most scholars will probably lie less in the relatively brief correspondence than in the accompanying material. Informative notes elucidate specific points in the letters (which appear in Chapter 5), while the significance of the correspondence is discussed in the volume’s fourth and longest chapter, where Davidson depicts the views of the two men in detail, describes the roles of both Konovalov and Isaiah Berlin in the relationship, and elucidates the importance of individual letters. These two chapters would comprise a solid publication on their own, but one that is more of article than of monograph length. The first three chapters flesh out the volume by offering still more background material, and are of varying importance for understanding the letters. The first provides a concise account of Ivanov’s attitudes toward humanism and how they evolved; it thus helps prepare for some of the points made in Chapter 4. The second chapter, while of less direct relevance for the letters, nonetheless usefully outlines C. M. Bowra’s career and specifically his relationship with Russian literature. Here Davidson suggests that the affinity of the two men arose in part from their common interest in Symbolism, in part from the way in which the two combined scholarly erudition with a romantic poetic outlook, and of course in part from their shared interests in languages and translation. The third chapter, where two translations of Ivanov’s poetry by Bowra are analyzed in some detail, seems least related to the publication of the letters, though it is noteworthy for illustrating Bowra’s preference for translating by trying to remain literally faithful to the form as well as the meaning of the original.

In all, then, this is a volume that will appeal primarily to specialists, but it is a study offering valuable nuggets of information both about the particular friendship and about two figures, each of great interest in his own right.

*Barry P. Scherr, Dartmouth College*
Clare Kitson’s richly illustrated volume on Yuri Norstein—one of the most influential directors of animated films—is a welcome first in the study of Russian animation, a field largely overlooked by contemporary scholars of Russian culture.

The author—a former commissioning editor of animation for the UK’s Channel 4—set out to write this book in an attempt to get a better understanding of Norstein’s most famous and complex film, Skazka Skazok (Tale of Tales), which received numerous awards at animation festivals around the world and which continues to top the lists of all-time best animated films. In her introductory chapter, Kitson recalls the shock and amazement of Western audiences upon viewing the film at the 1980 Zagreb International Animation Festival, where the Tale of Tales won the Grand Prix: “What sort of Russian could think of making such a truly original film at this time? And, perhaps even more pertinently: How did he manage to get away with it?” (p. 2) In subsequent chapters Kitson answers her questions in true journalistic fashion through detailed research and numerous interviews, although the result may not satisfy all readers.

The book is a biography of Yuri Norstein, with the second half of the text devoted largely to the making of his masterpiece film. Kitson uses many black-and-white photos and illustrations, along with several color plates of artwork, to good effect in weaving her own tale of the artist and his art. She finds the focus for her text in the discovery that Tale of Tales is based on Norstein’s childhood memories. Given this historical perspective, there is little analysis or interpretation of the facts, but the book’s real strength comes in the way Kitson threads her narrative between many layers: the artist’s biography, the country’s history, the culture and politics of the time, the artistic vision, and the unusual media in which Norstein becomes so proficient. For the uninitiated in either Soviet history or the process of animated film production, Kitson gives just the right amount of background to make the story clear and keep the narrative moving.

Although some readers may be disappointed by the book’s lack of interpretation of the film, the author makes it very clear at the start that her objective was not analysis but rather a deeper understanding of the filmmaker’s life and the atmosphere that inspired his art. Overall Kitson has succeeded in her goal, with one possible shortcoming. The chapter in which Norstein presents the completed film to the studio and subsequently to the ministry (Goskino), while informative, fails to synthesize the factual material and to make it clear, especially for a Western audience, just how risky—and heroic—Norstein’s actions were at the time. In an era when careers were ruined for much less, not only did he dare to create a film outside of the prescribed style and linear plots of Socialist Realism, to request a time extension for completing the film, and to deviate significantly both from the approved script and length, but when confronted with demands to make changes, Norstein dared to refuse. His stand-off with the bureaucrats regarding his Tale of Tales was a watershed event. It is, in fact, one of the few incidents from that era that Russian animators still talk about today. The full significance of this event somehow fizzles out at the end of Kitson’s discussion.

The above criticism notwithstanding, Yuri Norstein and Tale of Tales is informative as well as enjoyable, and is a great addition both to Russian studies and film studies collections.  

Bella Ginzbury-Blum, College of William & Mary
In his ambitious new monograph, Andrew Baruch Wachtel continues his preoccupation with the social role of the writer and of national literature as a cultural institution in Eastern Europe which earlier resulted in his penetrating monograph on the role played by writers in the constitution and subsequent dissolution of Yugoslavia, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation* (1998). This time, Wachtel’s focus is on the ways in which writers as a sociocultural group adapted to the changes in the political, cultural, and economic landscape that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s—early 1990s.

The goals of Wachtel’s project led to a book that is interdisciplinary and comparatist in scope, inasmuch it endeavors to tackle the changes that befell more than a dozen different countries, and combines quantitative social science (complete with statistical tables and opinion polls) with close readings of passages from poetry, prose fiction, journalistic essays, and other types of texts. This breadth of focus was made possible by the assistance of a sizeable team of field researchers hailing from different countries of the region. The resulting book, however, offers not a country-by-country survey, but a taxonomy of adaptive strategies adopted by various East European writers, with examples chosen sometimes from one country, sometimes from another, whenever a particular case was deemed by the author particularly fitting for illustrating his argument. The very logistical complexity of managing such a project resulted in a strategic simplification: Wachtel repeatedly asserts that his observations led him to conclude that the overall course of change was largely similar across the many countries of the region, so an example from, say, Moldova or Croatia is supposed to illustrate tendencies also observable in Bulgaria or Poland—a point that the reader is supposed to take on faith. The very designated region of Eastern Europe, for Wachtel, in a somewhat arbitrary gesture, includes Russia, but the argument in support of including Russia makes one wonder about the logic behind the exclusion of, say, Georgia or the former German Democratic Republic. The reliance on reports from field researchers from countries with whose national literature he may not be closely familiar also resulted in occasional misrepresentation of the aesthetic and political choices made by some writers (Ukraine being the most obvious such case for the present reviewer). Additionally, boldly advanced judgments based on personal taste (as in the case of Wachtel’s reading of the nonfiction writing by Duvarvka Ugrešić, which he appears to strongly dislike, although he claims to admire her prose fiction) sit uneasily next to “objective” sociological outlines. In the pages of Wachtel’s book, the category “writer” is stretched to include both those individuals who came to be officially labeled as such during communist rule, even if they have since abandoned literary labor for careers as full-time politicians, nonconformist dissidents who also often left literature for other pursuits, representatives of the new generation of producers of high literature who eschew such alternative careers, even though they have to engage in other professions to make their ends meet, and authors of new commercial fiction: an odd mix of characters including Vaclav Havel, Dobrica Ćosić, Oksana Zabuzhko, and Aleksandra Marinina, to name just a few.

As a result, this relatively short book ultimately offers the reader a fragmentary, kaleidoscopic account of the shifting sociocultural landscape of post-Communist Eastern Europe, glossing over frequently contradictory details for the sake of streamlined elegance of presentation. Like other books authored by Wachtel, it is ambitious, bold, and engagingly written; it will serve as a helpful introduction to the recent cultural politics of the region for a nonspecialist academic reader or for an undergraduate student in a survey course. Scholars with more
specialized interest in Eastern Europe will undoubtedly advance caveats and disagreements with occasional details of its argument. It is, however, a book that will not leave its readers indifferent, and will likely provoke impassioned response from some of them—and this is surely a remarkable accomplishment for a scholarly monograph.

Vitaly Chernetsky, Miami University, Ohio


Robert Hewsen is to be vigorously applauded for the publication of his historical atlas of Armenia. Part scholarly work in its erudition and painstaking mapmaking, part coffee table book in the beauty of its layout, physical size (11” x 17”), and the engaging stories that the maps tell, Hewsen’s atlas should be both a standard book on the shelves of all scholars interested in Caucasia and the Middle East as well as a cherished addition to the home libraries of Armenian families around the world. As far as I know, nothing like it (in terms of scope, completeness, accuracy, and presentation) has appeared in any language. In its unveiling of new vistas on Armenian and Caucasian history, the book should serve as a model for future atlases of other regions of the former Russian/Soviet Empire.

Hewsen was well positioned to produce this volume. A student of Cyril Toumanoff, he is well known as a scholar of Armenian history and geography, as a contributing mapmaker to a number of other books and atlases on Caucasian and Middle Eastern history, and as the cofounder and first president of the Society for the Study of Caucasia. The atlas has its own interesting history. First conceived in 1982, the project was well on its way to completion when computer technology began to revolutionize the cartographic field. Despite having already painstakingly hand drawn and cut many of the maps in the old way, Hewsen rightfully decided to embrace the new technologies (with all their advantages and pitfalls). While longer in germination, the result is a much more thorough and visually engaging atlas than would likely have been possible otherwise.

The atlas includes 278 maps, divided chronologically and thematically: 60 maps on the ancient period, 52 on medieval, 30 early modern, and the remainder, 136, on the modern era (post-1878 in Hewsen’s divisions). Forty-four maps show what Hewsen calls the “entire target area from Kayseri in the west to the Caspian Sea on the east and from Sukhumi and Derbent in the north to Antakya, Aleppo, Mosul, and Resht in the south” (p. 2). These full-page, regional maps are accompanied by a bounty of other more detailed maps focused on particular areas, kingdoms, political territories, and historical moments. There are multiple diagrams of town layouts, including most of the major Caucasian and Anatolian cities in which there was an Armenian presence (offering a good introduction to urban history in the region), along with maps of Armenian settlements further afield (such as the Armenian quarters in Venice and L’viv). Other drawings detail the architectural designs and layouts of fortifications, monasteries, and churches (indeed, Hewsen does well in describing and locating Armenian churches and ecclesiastical sees). There is a large section of maps on the Armenian diaspora, noting locations of major settlements. Also included are reproductions of earlier historical maps, such as the one of Armenia and Caucasia in the *Peutinger Table*. Finally, there are numerous maps that convey the military history of the region (usually with arrows showing attack routes or sequential insets to show change over time). These range from one of the earliest maps in the book that shows the “direction of foreign invasions” (listing twenty-one major invading forces), to the Russo-Turkish/Russo-Persian wars of the nineteenth century, World War I, and to the recent
fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh. The maps understandably become more numerous, detailed, and diverse as the book moves toward the present. While the chronologically earlier maps focused on politics, war, locations of settlements, and religious institutions, the later maps supplement these topics with details of the region’s ever-evolving ethnic makeup, its economic structures and activities, and its cultural centers and historical sites.

Each chronological section includes a brief historical overview, a helpful timeline of major events, and then extensive textual discussion of the topic at hand. As Hewsen is quick to underscore, the essays in the book are “not intended to be a history of Armenia in the conventional sense” but “rather, the text is designed to explain and clarify the maps” (p. 5). The bibliography itself is an accomplishment, bringing together major primary and secondary sources for Caucasian history in more than ten languages. While the focus of the atlas is always on Armenians, Hewsen is at pains to present “Armenia as a nation intimately connected to those around it” (p. 2). As such, the atlas speaks broadly to the history of Caucasia and its surrounding regions.

Although Hewsen laments that the atlas could have been more thorough (pp. 1–2), it seems nonetheless Herculean to have achieved what is here. Simply uncovering and compiling the thousands of place names and political divisions in this atlas is a daunting task to say the least. Hewsen rightly notes that historical cartographers, like all historians, are at the mercy of their sources’ accuracy and completeness. Maps—that demand, at least in their contemporary incarnations, specificity and accuracy—are especially hard to draw when they involve regions of the world and periods of time in which the political authorities took little interest in delimiting frontiers precisely. Hewsen notes, for example, that “the boundary between the Ottoman and Persian Empires was never accurately surveyed, if surveyed at all” (p. 2). Place names in the region are notorious for changing and for their multiple variants, written in different languages depending on who was in power at a given moment. Moreover, maps are also at the mercy of the minefields of human politics. They require the cartographer to lay in concrete form human processes that were often less than fixed and about which different communities continue to argue. As Hewsen notes, Armenian history has numerous “controversial” moments, especially in the modern era with the genocide, nature of Soviet rule, and the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Simply to prepare some of the maps required Hewsen to sort through and take sides in these contentious debates.

As I delved into the book, I wondered to what degree the atlas would offer new ways of thinking or approaching Armenian and Caucasian history. Would the atlas simply serve as a visual reinforcement of the broad patterns of history that I already knew from textual sources, or would the different medium open up new vistas? Certainly, Hewsen makes no claims to original analysis in the atlas’ text. Yet, as I looked through, I found the maps did indeed unveil new levels of understanding for me, especially in terms of the motion and flow of history and the region’s shifting fortunes and boundaries. As Hewsen rightly notes, “any understanding of Armenia is linked inseparably to the physical geography of the country and the ethnic complexity of the population upon the Armenian Plateau” (p. 10). The dynamic and dramatic ebbs and flows of the peoples and political units of Caucasia through in- and out-migration, and through the appearance and disappearance of whole societies and cultures, became visible in novel ways. Caucasia’s location at the nexus of the Middle East, Europe, Russia, and Central Eurasia took on enhanced meanings for me.

As the people of Caucasia face the opportunities and tribulations of the post-Soviet era, and as Armenians celebrate the 1700th anniversary of the conversion to Christianity, this treasure trove of historical and geographic information brings to life the immense riches of the history, people, and culture of the region.

Nicholas B. Breyfogle, Ohio State University

This book is identified as a translation of a study that Isaievych had published in Ukrainian in 1966. In fact, it is much more than that. The author has added and rewritten large sections of the original, done a good deal of additional research, and updated the citations. The result is an empirically rich, thoughtful, and generally even-handed discussion of an important topic that has received very little attention in English.

Confraternities were widespread in early modern Europe, typically in cathedral or mercantile centers. Affiliated with the church, they nevertheless consisted mostly of laymen (and occasionally laywomen) who in quite a few instances pursued agendas independent of the direction of spiritual and political authority. For this reason some scholars have considered them as building blocks of urban civil society, organizations with high sense of self-consciousness and mission that pursued the interests and visions of their members. In some locales they were almost indistinguishable from trade guilds. In others they organized schools, publishing houses, philanthropic activities, and occasionally political struggle, all in the service of a faith-driven civic mission.

What was true for Europe in general, according to Isaievych, was true for Ukraine and Belarus as well. He identifies many Orthodox and Catholic confraternities that functioned in that area between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, and he exploits to good purpose the extensive records of the L'viv Dormition Confraternity, whose records miraculously survived intact. He details their social activities, in particular education and print (subjects about which Isaievych has written extensively over many years), their complex interactions with bishops, and especially their involvement in the region’s interconfessional struggles after the Union of Brest and the establishment of the Eastern-rite Catholic Church (Uniates). In the face of the politically sensitive nature of the Orthodox/Uniate conflict, Isaievych sticks to the facts, carefully avoiding any hint of religious partisanship. If anything, he understates the rupture’s deleterious social effects and situates the decades of violence that it engendered in the background.

Although the writing is scholarly throughout, it does have an ideological dimension to it, if only by implication. He treats Ukraine as a coherent geopolitical entity, not as a nation per se but as a single space nevertheless. The cultural boundaries of his historic Ukraine correspond to the geographic boundaries of independent Ukraine today. Implied here is the idea that theirs was a shared experience, irrespective of shifting political borders and the pressures of outside powers from the west and east. This is not an unreasonable perspective, but it is, or should be, controversial, and one would have appreciated a more explicit and detailed discussion of the transposition of modern borders onto an early modern era for which the idea of national consciousness is a bit of an anachronism.

The complement to the idea of a historic Ukraine is the insistence on a historical trajectory separate from, and even in opposition to, Russian history. Here Isaievych is more explicit, albeit in *sotto voce.* The boundaries of the shared European experience of confraternities end, implicitly, where Muscovy/Russia begins. Here he has a point, although he never develops it. Muscovy had few if any confraternal societies prior to the incorporation of eastern Ukraine. Even then, the institution did not spread eastward, a noteworthy point of contrast between Russian urban society and much of the rest of Europe. But the significance of this contrast, if there is one, needs to be spelled out in the full scholarly manner that informs the rest of the book.
Finally, a word about style. Chapter organization is logical, but the decision to treat confraternities within each chapter ad seriatim makes for some confusing chronology. The translation is accurate, but at times overly literal. Still, these are very minor matters. Scholars in our field are fortunate to now have such a well-researched and substantively presented book available in English.

Gary Marker, State University of New York at Stony Brook


This volume builds on Natal'ia Selunskaja’s earlier Stanovlenie Rossiskogo parlamentarizma nachala XX vek (1996) and further develops the post-Soviet historiographical interest in reexamining the reforms of the prerevolutionary era as an alternative to revolution. Inspired by the theoretical contributions of Robert Putnam and Jürgen Habermas to our understanding of the emergence of democracy and civil society, the core argument is that the events of 1905–7 were not a revolution, as the traditional historiography asserts, and that, at least in the years 1905–7, not only was reform a viable alternative, but Russia was following the general European path of democratization.

In demonstrating their thesis, the authors refreshingly avoid polemicizing with past or present scholars and, instead, adopt a non-narrative approach, drawing on original research in local and central archives and both comparative and secondary works, including local case studies, often by Selunskaja’s own students, that reflect the major social and economic characteristics of Russia’s current state of development. The goal: to examine the electoral process itself, from the conception and enactment of the electoral law through the selection of vyborshchiki to the different curia (Voronezh, Vladimir, and Kaluga provinces) on up to the provincial-level assemblies (Tambov and the Don) and the special urban assemblies (Nizhniy Novgorod) that elected representatives to the Dumas and, thus, view how and to what degree various segments of the population were drawn into the political process and, hence, the emergence of a culture of democracy.

Divided into three major sections, the first three chapters of Part One examine the process leading to the reform of government administration, the emergence of political parties, and the rapid transformation of political discussion from a focus on ideals and models to the immediate task at hand—winning votes and, hence, the election of their candidates to the Duma. Part Two begins with an analysis of the new electoral law that deliberately focuses on its positive aspects, particularly the creation of curia based not on participants’ soslovie status but on sources of income and property ownership. This is followed by an overview of the electoral process, which demonstrates, in contrast to conventional views dominant since 1906, that social origin (soslovie) did not, in fact, determine political identification and that both regional issues and the degree of politicization were more important. In particular, the authors note that failure to identify with any specific party did not mean political indifference, as is generally assumed, but was a specific form of politicization in a situation where party identification was fluid and unstable and local issues were of primary importance. Further, the lack of correlation between the political preferences of vyborshchiki and the representatives they elected to the Duma is considered a result of the success of party propaganda and agitation in influencing the electoral process. Chapters 6 and 7 then examine the processes of politicization at work at the local level, the degree of involvement of the local populations, the importance of local issues, and the relative success of different parties’ campaign strategies.
The Russian Review

The last chapter in this section is somewhat incongruous, for instead of analyzing the memberships of the first two Dumas, as would seem logical, it compares the deputies to the First and Fourth Dumas. The Fourth Duma, however, lies far outside the purview of most of the arguments of the work under review, not to mention that the electoral law was significantly revised between the two comparison points in order to expand the influence of more conservative forces. A brief analysis of the political identities of the State Council’s members has a similarly tenuous connection to this book’s basic focus.

The volume concludes with a comparative analysis of the democratization process and its institutional forms in Western Europe and the German, Austrian, and Russian empires in order to establish whether the Russian case conformed to or diverged from the general European model. Based on a comparison of eleven basic characteristics of democratic development, the authors conclude that Russia exhibited the same democratic tendencies as the other European countries. And, while there were differences, they were not essential and have often been exaggerated. On the other hand, the Russian form of government was more similar to that of the German and Austrian empires, for in all three, political institutions were less formally developed than in Western Europe.

But then, the authors digress by raising something of a historiographical straw man and argue that, while the events of 1905–7 were not a revolution (from below), they were also not a “reform from above,” because the reforms were granted by the tsar as concessions in response to popular disorders and political demands. That said, the authors then seek to have their cake and eat it too, for they now point to some essential differences that, in fact, set Russia apart from the rest of Europe, most notably: the undiminished and unlimited power of the head of the Russian state; and the lack of both a legally defined official “government” and a chief minister who possessed parliament’s trust and the political power sufficient to select the members of the government, or at least significantly influence their selection (what the authors call “parliamentarism”). They go on to argue that the revision of the electoral law of June 3, 1907, cut off all options for further democratization, thereby providing one of what they define as the most important contributory causes of the 1917 revolution. In support of their interpretation, the authors cite two unique characteristics of Russian political life: a monarchical tradition of unlimited power, which beguiled all political actors from the tsar and his ministers through the right, center, and left parties; and a radical or revolutionary tradition that was elitist in nature, distrusted the population at large, and focused not on reform and on limiting supreme power, as was the case in the rest of Europe, but on overthrowing it and replacing it. True “constitutionalism,” in the sense of placing limits on the supreme power, it seems, was never able to gain a foothold.

Thus, while the authors’ basic argument about the development of a democratic political culture in Russia according to the European model and its (temporary?) interruption seem perfectly acceptable—an argument that, furthermore, aligns well with recent historiography outside Russia—the authors end up contradicting themselves and making a case for Russia’s exceptionalism. In effect, they have reverted to a deterministic model built around binary oppositions that is very similar to the arguments they claim to replace. Similarly, having initially argued that the reforms of 1905–7 were not reforms from above, the authors have concluded, in effect, that they were “from above”—because they were concessions and could be taken back, even though this pattern of popular demands and elite concessions differs not the slightest from the history of democracy’s emergence in the rest of Europe, as the authors have themselves acknowledged.

David A. J. Macey, Middlebury College

“When an irrational crowd, under the influence of evil agitators, throws itself on the armed forces, the armed forces can do nothing else but shoot. ... Thus it has always been, thus it will always be” (p. 177). Thus the Russian Minister of the Interior defended the killing of hundreds of striking gold miners in the Siberian town of Nadezhdinsk on April 2, 1912.

In the spirit of Dashiell Hammett’s Continental Op, Michael Melancon’s readers will be tempted to count how many lies can be found in those few words. The author’s meticulous reconstruction of events indicates, for example, that the crowd was not under the influence of agitators, evil, or otherwise; that the workers conducted themselves peacefully even in the aftermath of the shooting; and that some officials on the scene tried desperately to prevent others from giving the order to shoot. Melancon’s assessment also challenges the minister’s conclusion: Russia, he suggests, has not always been thus, and the Lena episode might even be seen as a portent of emerging social consensus and reconciliation.

Melancon tries to use what he calls a Bakhtin/Rashomon approach to produce a “multi-voiced” analysis of events, but he also rejects a relativistic reading of the sources. For example, he introduces two of the principal figures, Chief Mining Engineer Tul’chinskii (who supported many of the workers’ complaints) and assistant police chief Treshchenkov (who gave the order to open fire on the workers) as “good genius, evil genius.”

Did the employer, the giant Lenzoto corporation, behave in a ruthlessly exploitative fashion? The firm’s own officers denied this, as did many officials, locally and in St. Petersburg. But the Chief Mining Engineer, along with many other officials, had been raising alarms about the company’s behavior long before the strike of 1912 began. Melancon makes it clear which witnesses he regards as credible.

As events advanced toward their tragic denouement, Lenzoto’s defenders tried to depict striking workers as politically motivated, and suggested that they were plotting violence. Melancon weighs these claims against the credibility of those who were making them. He finds abundant evidence of bad faith on the part of management and government: for example, the minister of trade and industry refused to send independent observers to assess the strike firsthand, citing local assurances that the scene was peaceful; simultaneously and secretly, he ordered that additional troops be sent. After the shooting, the assistant police chief confiscated and destroyed photographs and negatives that showed the course of events. He also pressured subordinates to coordinate their stories of what had happened. These voices are part of Melancon’s “polyphony,” but the author leaves us in no doubt as to who is (or isn’t) telling the truth.

The shooting resonated throughout Russian society. The killings were condemned not just by liberal and socialist critics but also by conservatives and arch-reactionaries. All faulted the government and its unhealthy partnership with the corporate elite, but each party or faction offered its own reasons for condemnation. The ultra-rightists, for example, seizing on the fact that Baron Alfred Ginzburg and his brother were senior shareholders of Lenzoto, blamed the massacre on “the kikes and their stooges” (p. 173). In this chorus of criticism Melancon discerns an emerging “social consensus rather than fragmentation” (p. 183). He posits an “overall sense of agreement” across the political spectrum, transcending the rhetorical differences among the different parties—including the ultra-rightists (p. 193). But were they really all singing from the same score?
Melancon may be correct that the paradigm of Russian social fragmentation, to which he himself once subscribed, is ripe for reappraisal. But that reappraisal will need fuller and stronger evidence than this otherwise persuasive study provides.

R. E. Johnson, University of Toronto


This book contains more than twenty essays on the experience of Jews in Eastern Europe and particularly Russia during World War I and the Russian Civil War. The editor argues that Jews “were not only victims of the global catastrophe but also the makers of a new world reality” (p. 8). Several essays pinpoint the attributes that were ascribed to Russian (and Galician) Jews, as “cowards,” as “spies,” or as vectors of cholera, typhus, and venereal disease. These projections became magnified as Russian, Austrian, or German soldiers encountered Jews for the first time. Although the negative stereotype was already in place before the outbreak of war, as Frank Schuster, Semen Goldin, and John Klier point out in their respective essays, the war unleashed the full force of military wrath upon Russia’s Jewish population (and not just Jews). New material from the Grodno archives is brought to bear by Sergei Pivovarchik, who shows how the tsarist authorities began to draw up lists of “untrustworthy” subjects in 1911. Boris Kolonitskii contributes a lively piece on insults directed at the Russian imperial family, criticising the anti-Semitism of the tsar and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. A different perspective emerges in a subtle article by Eugene Avrutin on applications from Russian Jews to change their given names before and during the war. Government officials appear to have denied most of these requests because of their deeply engrained mistrust of the tsar’s Jewish subjects. Two informative articles complete this section. Anastasia Tumanova contributes new material on Jewish relief associations in Tambov. Anatolii Ivanov points to a rise in Jewish student numbers during the war and identifies a widespread sense of affiliation to the cause of defending Russia.

The second section looks at the immediate postwar period. Oleg Budnitskii traces the abortive attempt to form “Jewish battalions” in the Red Army which came unstuck because Jewish Communists believed it would foster the very anti-Semitism that the Ukrainian military commissar Podvoiskii hoped to counter (p. 241). Sergei Iarov explores “fragmentary” (p. 284) anti-Semitic sentiment in Petrograd in February and March 1921, finding some evidence in reports of conversations in street markets and railroad stations. Jonathan Dekel-Chen summarizes some of the findings in his recent monograph on Jewish colonization in Crimea and southern Ukraine, while Lilia Kal'mina shows that many Siberian Jews embraced the Zionist project in the face of virulent hostility from other residents. Bolshevik views of Zionism figure in Gennadii Kostyrchenko’s essay. Jews in independent Poland and Lithuania are discussed by Szymon Rudnicki and Vygantas Vareikis respectively, the latter concluding that the new state briefly reached a *modus vivendi* with Jewish political leaders.

The book concludes with six contributions on leading individuals in Jewish public life, including Viktor Kel'ner’s essay drawing on S. M. Dubnow’s correspondence with Maksim Vinaver in which Dubnow debated the twin options of Jewish autonomy and Jewish statehood in Palestine, concluding that the latter was not in his words a viable “solution to the Jewish problem” (p. 297). Gabriella Safran’s study of S. An-sky (Rappoport) discusses, among other things, his reflections on human beings’ proclivity to shed blood. Mikhail Krutikov argues that Yiddish poetry flourished against the backdrop of terrible events in 1919, suggesting that it represented a “new epoch” (p. 318). Vladimir Khazan provides a short account of the life of...
Andrei Sobol’ (1888–1926), a complex and protean figure who maintained contact with people of different political persuasions and who spoke of the “burden” of being Russian and Jewish. Nikolai Tsymbaev draws attention to the debate between Gershenzon and Landau on the role of the Jewish intelligentsia. Finally, Viktoriia Mochalova provides a wide-ranging summary of Central European Jewish literary life.

If there is a general conclusion that might be drawn from the contributions to this book it is that Jewish social and political life in Russia flourished even in the midst of upheaval and violence. The years of war provided abundant evidence of persecution and uncertainty but also of opportunity and political and cultural self-expression.

Peter Gatrell, University of Manchester


In July 1917 the British government signed a convention with the Imperial Russia whereby the Russian émigrés in Britain were to be drafted either to the British army that fought in the Western Front of World War I or else go back to Russia and join the tsarist force. Of the 120,000 Russian Jewish immigrants who had settled in Britain since the 1880s, about 4,000 chose the first alternative while about 3,500 opted for the latter. Harold Shukman’s book tells the story of those who were shipped to Russia in the summer of 1917 in between the February and the October revolutions and the few who finally made it back to their families in London after the Civil War.

In the book’s seven elegantly written chapters the author takes the reader from the debate over conscription in Britain, the Russian-Jewish milieu in London’s East End, of mostly artisans, refugees of anti-Semitic persecutions, through the dilemma the conscription law forced upon them and finally their struggle of survival in disintegrating revolutionary Russia. The author deals with but a negligible percent of the entire Jewish group, with the so-called Conventionists, and then follows the destinies of but a few of them. Moreover, if the émigrés set out as a group, on arrival in chaotic and violent Russia they split and went each his own way, their lot being decided by “bad luck and extraordinary good fortune.” The scarcity of personal documentation forced Shukman to rely mostly on interviews with survivors or their families. However, contrary to what one might expect precisely these constraints turned the odysseys of the few, the author’s father and uncle among them, into a fascinating and rich story that opens wider vistas to Jewish life in London before World War I and to life in Russia in the throes of revolution.

Nurit Schleifman, Tel Aviv University


Timo Vihavainen, Professor of Russian Studies at University of Helsinki, has brought together a collection of essays on the role and nature of popular opinion in the former Soviet Union. The bulk of the essays deal with the period from 1917 to the Second World War, except for a well-researched article by Jeremy Smith on the reaction of Estonians to Khrushchev’s purported school reforms. The essays, written by both Russian and Western scholars, have used recently declassified OGPU surveillance files from the Stalinist era. But the editor, in an interesting
introduction, warns us that one should not use a simple paradigm of either popularity or resistance to understand the Soviet Union. Citizens in a totalitarian society have a different range of political options than their counterparts in liberal societies and their behavior is often marked by a pragmatic desire to survive. Citizens may engage in what seems to us as acts of solidarity with the regime simply in the absence of other possible choices, and at the same time zealous historians may misinterpret everyday acts of noncompliance as resistance. Thus Nikita Lomagin in his article on the siege of Leningrad shows that while people engaged in various anti-Soviet activities, through a policy of selective repression the regime sustained the general loyalty of the people throughout the war. Similarly, Tatiana Smirnova, in a fascinating article on the privileged classes after 1917, shows how certain sections adapted to the new order and even prospered within it while successfully hiding their social antecedents. Vihavainen skillfully analyzes how both members of the party as well as Soviet citizens from various social classes used the culturally loaded concept of *meshchantso* to denounce inappropriate behavior. Sofia Tchoukina’s article on the generational conflict of the old and new intelligentsia in the Soviet Union reproduces many of the self-representations of the Russian intellectual class.

Both Hiroaki Kuromiya and Gábor Ritterporn caution us that surveys of popular opinion in the Stalinist period tell us less about the mentality of Soviet people and more about the peculiarly distorted information context in which Stalin and other Soviet elites operated. The Soviet elites lived in fear of an imminent collapse of the regime and used terror to ward off the evil day. Dmitry Shlapentokh argues that the predilection for terror as social policy was not restricted to the Bolsheviks and that the Trotskyites were equally vocal in their advocacy of terror. According to Nick Baron, the Stalinist system created chaos by giving incomplete orders and forcing its subjects to live in what Baron terms a sphere of ambiguity that was marked by terror. Some of the articles deal more explicitly with state policy than with popular opinion. Thus Irina Takala shows that the Soviet state monopolized the production and sale of alcohol to raise state revenues despite the catastrophic toll alcoholism exacted on Soviet society and the economy. Sofia Tchoukina examines how the state, in lieu of genuine social mobility, created the concept of hereditary worker dynasties to reward exemplary workers.

Some of the essays are culled from larger published works. The collection contains a shortened chapter from Sarah Davies’s book on popular opinion during the 1930s. Similarly, Sergei Zhuravlev’s essay on the experiences of German workers in the Elektrozavod plant in Moscow during the First Five Year Plan is taken from his excellent monograph on the subject. But Zhuravlev’s focus on those he calls “the little people” is a much-needed corrective to our fascination with the experiences of well-known visitors to the Soviet Union.

This is an extremely useful collection, but it would have profited from more rigorous editing and systematization of citations and bibliographies.

**Choi Chatterjee, California State University, Los Angeles**


Two decades after Teresa Torańska’s accusatory yet evocative interviews with some of Poland’s early communists in her book *Oni/Them* (1985/1987) comes Marci Shore’s entirely different portrait of the generation of Polish intellectuals who embraced Marxism during the interwar period and became entangled with the imposition of communist rule in Poland after the Second World War. In her examination of this cosmopolitan group of intellectuals—based on archival
research and interviews in Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Israel, and the United States—Shore strikes a beautiful balance between empathy and dispassion. Her thorough research into the lives and papers of the Polish avant garde writers who became Marxists rescues many of them from the margins of receding memory, while explaining the world in which they lived. Unlike her protagonists, for whom the march of History was seen to be inevitable, Shore emphasizes the delicate interplay of contingency and choice, even in the most Manichean of worlds. “Marxism as a lived experience” (p. 6) turns out to be even more complicated—and tragic—than Marxist ideology itself.

Shore’s narrative begins in a Warsaw café where, after Poland gained its independence, several interconnected circles of young Polish poets met. The poets who gathered there—among them, the Skamander poets Julian Tuwim, Antoni Słonimski, and Jan Lechoń, the futurists Aleksander Wat, Anatol Stern, and Bruno Jasieński, and the “independent poets” Władysław Broniewski, Adam Ważyk, Stanisław Ryszard Stande, Mieczysław Braun, and Witold Wandurski—had been born in the age of empires and came of age in the modern postwar world. With the exception of Jasieński, Broniewski, and Wandurski, they came from Jewish families (often split between communism and Zionism) and Shore successfully demonstrates the “polyvalence” of their self-identification, noting throughout their shifting conceptions of themselves as Poles and Jews (p. 374).

In the 1920s, largely due to their intense appreciation for Mayakovsky’s poetry, their sense of bourgeois guilt, and their desire to usher in the new world, many of these writers came to support radical Marxism. Those, like Wandurski, Jasieński, and Stande, whose commitment took them to the Soviet Union in the 1930s were the first to be consumed by the revolution, executed in Stalin’s purges, often as “Polish nationalists.” For those who stayed in Poland, however, communism remained an attractive alternative.

If before the war several protagonists experienced the “caviar” of the book’s title at functions at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw or on visits to the USSR, it is during and immediately after the war that the “ashes” began to accumulate. Shore illustrates how the war forced everyone to take sides. His beloved Warsaw reduced to ashes, Broniewski continued writing socialist poetry but succumbed to drink. Janina Broniewska, Broniewski’s former wife, and her dear friend Wanda Wasilewska, who emerged as heroes in the Soviet fight against Fascism, cemented their commitment to communism. The formerly apolitical and assimilated Tuwim, who was unhappily exiled in New York and lost his mother to the Nazis, turned to the left and embraced his Jewishness upon his return to Poland. The acerbic Słonimski, who had spent the war in England, returned to support the new regime, while Ważyk, the first Polish translator of Apollinaire, emerged as the “‘terroretician’” of Socialist Realism (p. 277). Meanwhile Wat, whose imprisonment in the Soviet Union and dramatic reunion with his wife and son in Kazakhstan turned him toward mystical Catholicism, largely refused to take part in the imposition of communism in Poland.

None of these poets really survived the war or his commitment to Marxism. Broniewski died a broken man in 1962, as did his friend, Wat, who committed suicide five years later in Paris. Słonimski eventually became a dissident tailed by the government while Ważyk faded into obscurity. Shore’s long journey with these men and women through the horrific middle of the twentieth century shows clearly how they were at once “the creators as well as the victims of tragic fate” (p. 376). For them there was no exit from Marxism, only the effects of having opted for it in the first place.

Nathaniel D. Wood, University of Kansas
The debate concerning the origins of the Second World War continues, as lively as ever, even though the conflict is now more than sixty years distant. Keith Neilson (professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada) adds here a new perspective to this controversial topic. How convincing is this revisionist work?

Neilson argues that a major concern of interwar British policymakers was to maintain the settlements reached between 1919 and 1923 and to ensure that negotiation, not force, would sanction any future changes. The outbreak of World War II in 1939 signified the failure of this British policy. To quote the author himself, “this study is an attempt to explain why this failure happened” (p. 1); the method employed is to make an elaborate examination of Great Britain’s policy toward the Soviet Union in the period from 1919 to 1939.

The negative attitude of both Japan and Germany toward the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference—the basis of British strategic foreign policy since 1925—forced British politicians and high officials to look at and to experiment with other ways of protecting their interests. As a result, the possibility of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Great Britain became a serious topic of discussion. The difficulties inherent in such an exercise, however, were obvious and multiple: first, the legacy of World War I (the issue of compensation for lapsed tsarist bonds and for property seized by the Bolsheviks, as well as the ideological dislike of Bolshevism and the fear of domestic communist subversion) and the temporary rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1927; then the arrest in 1933, on charges of sabotage and espionage, of a few British engineers working in the Soviet Union for Metro-Vickers and the skepticism about Soviet military capabilities in the wake of the Purges; finally, the caution and reticence of the British authorities—in particular the last two prewar British prime ministers, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, who shared a visceral dislike of communism and who worried that any arrangement with the Soviet Union would limit their diplomatic options. The strong suspicion of the Soviet leaders that British policy toward Hitler aimed at driving the Germans to the East against their country did not help either.

The greatest contribution of this original book is to tell, in a clear and readable prose and in a narrative grounded in an excellent knowledge of the relevant literature, the complex story of the debates over policy alternatives facing those who made British strategic foreign policy. Not unexpectedly, the main players involved—the War Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade, and, in particular, the Foreign Office—provided both analysis and options in abundance, but they could not always agree on a common policy, even though they always recognized in their discussions the strong connection for their country’s security between Europe and the Far East. Furthermore, changes of personnel and conflicts of personality inevitably complicated things.

A book for specialists of British history first and foremost that draws on a wide range of primary sources (regrettably, though, Neilson’s bibliography does not include any references to Soviet archives or books and articles written in Russian), *Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919–1939* does not add much to what specialists of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union already know. Some readers will also likely conclude that the thesis implied in the book’s title is somewhat flawed: although the Soviet Union, simultaneously a threat to the *status quo* and its potential guardian, affected British strategic foreign-policy making, the Versailles Order collapsed because of Imperial Japanese and Nazi German aggression, not because of the inability—essentially for ideological and historical reasons—of Great Britain and the Soviet Union to come to an agreement on how to maintain the new world order created.
in the wake of World War I. Furthermore, this reinterpretation of international relations between 1919 and 1939 that rejects as "simplistic and inadequate" (p. 8) the significance of appeasement as a contributory factor to the outbreak of World War II will not convince everybody.

J.-Guy Lalande, St. Francis Xavier University


For three decades after 1945, Western accounts of the so-called “Eastern Front” of World War II viewed that conflict through German eyes. German sources were more easily available than Russian ones, and in the context of the Cold War, Soviet accounts appeared to be largely Marxist propaganda. Beginning in the 1970s, a dedicated group of scholars including John Erickson and David Glantz began a systematic reinterpretation of this titanic struggle, comparing Soviet histories with German records to develop a more nuanced view of the Soviet side of the war. The collapse of the Soviet Union accelerated this historiographic process by providing much greater if still limited access to archival materials.

Evan Mawdsley, professor of history at the University of Glasgow and author of a series of books on Soviet political and military topics, has attempted the Herculean task of summarizing the Soviet-German struggle from both sides, providing a précis that includes political as well as military aspects of the war. The result is an admirably concise account for general students of Russia and of World War II.

Of necessity, such a work can contribute to the literature primarily through reinterpretations of well-known events. Consider, for example, the question of why Germany’s attack on June 22, 1941, surprised the Soviets. Traditionally, historians have believed that Joseph Stalin was aware of the weakness of his armed forces, and desperately sought to gain time to repair the ravages caused by his purge of the Red officer corps. To the contrary, Mawdsley suggests that Stalin was so impressed by his numerical superiority over the German armed forces that he believed that he was negotiating from a position of strength (pp. 34, 43). Similarly, the author contends that the imbalance of the Red Army in 1941, with too few troops in the north and too many in the south, was due not to misreading German plans for an invasion but rather to the Soviet contingency plans to eventually conduct their own offensive from the Ukraine into Central Europe (pp. 39–40).

Mawdsley also explores the Soviet government’s ability to control its population. Stalin’s famous “Not One Step Backward!” decree of July 29, 1942, appears to the author to be significant not because of its draconian punishments for cowardice but because the Soviet government acknowledged its failures and the necessity for a long war. Such an explanation, Mawdsley implies, gave Soviet citizens a sense that their government was being honest with them (pp. 168–69). A year later, when most accounts portray the Soviet economy as totally mobilized for warfare, Mawdsley notes that the government had to reduce weapons production in order to meet civilian needs. He is equally perceptive about Hitler’s political problems, especially German efforts to keep their satellite states in the war during 1944, and about the relationships of both dictators with their senior commanders.

The author provides brief but deft accounts of the large-scale military operations of the war. Readers familiar with military history will find themselves occasionally wishing that Mawdsley would provide a more detailed explanation for the success or failure of a specific
battle, but such explanations would have exceeded both the length and the focus of this work. The study would, however, benefit from maps in greater number and detail. Overall, the author has succeeded in a difficult task, making the more recent scholarship readily available to political historians and the general public.

Jonathan M. House, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College


This is an edited collection of oral and written accounts of the Arctic convoys during World War II. Between 1941 and 1945, forty Anglo-American convoys shipped vital Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet ports of Arkhangel'sk and Murmansk. The first half of the volume paints a vivid picture of these dangerous crossings. Fierce Arctic storms and German U-Boat and air attacks made the Arctic Ocean one of the most testing environments of the Second World War. The largely unenlisted merchant seamen record the fear, bravery, religious fervor, and madness of this “forgotten front.” The second half of *Eyewitness Accounts* recounts the sailors’ experiences on shore in the USSR. Their interactions with the local Soviet population generated a mixture of confusion, frustration, and delight. Some remembered the stifling hand the local Soviet bureaucracy, others the fruits of successful social relations ashore.

Mark Scott’s volume is a timely reminder that the generation which fought in World War II is passing away. These lively first-hand accounts are a valuable resource for both military and social historians of the period. The first half of the book offers an insight into the experiences of unenlisted men under fire. However, it is questionable whether the material adds much that cannot be found in the already voluminous memoirs of the Arctic convoys. Mark Scott’s decision to focus on the wider experience of the American sailors, including their time ashore, makes the second half of the book more unusual and interesting. The reader is offered an outsider’s perspective on wartime life in the Soviet Union. The respondents’ descriptions of bartering, dancing, and socializing with the Soviet population are of great interest to the culturally inclined historian of the USSR.

One unfortunate aspect of the book is the author’s failure to describe the process by which the material was gathered. For example, it would be easier to evaluate and use the accounts if the author informed us whether all of the respondents were asked different questions, the same questions, or simply asked to tell their story. The interviewer is a silent figure throughout *Eyewitness Accounts*: a little information about his active role would have been helpful. Scott has also taken the decision not to comment on his primary materials. As the person most familiar with the interviews, however, his insights would have added to the book. What issues does the author think shaped the respondents’ narratives: their Americaness; the desire for recognition of this “forgotten front”; the timing of the interviews during perestroika (they were conducted in 1988–89); or other factors? *Eyewitness Accounts* offers a number of tempting avenues for exploration. The American respondents almost unanimously fail to mention the British sailors who were ashore at the same time (a feature that is mirrored in similar British accounts). Some of the testimonies also allude to a certain disappointment with the reception the convoyers received in the USSR. What, if anything, is the reader to make of these hints at the complexities and tensions of the Grand Alliance relationship ashore in Murmansk? The answers to some of these questions might be most productively pursued through recourse to the local Soviet-era archives. However, Mark Scott could have provided some valuable suggestions.
A little more information would have assisted other historians in making use of this material. Nonetheless, *Eyewitness Accounts* is a valuable historical resource which draws our attention to an underexplored and intriguing topic.

**Timothy Johnston, Keble College, Oxford**

Walter Dunn set himself an admirable goal when he decided to write a brief volume on how the Soviet Union won World War II. The Soviet achievement during the war was unprecedented. As Dunn writes, “no other nation has lost one-third of its population and its prewar army and then replaced it three times in the course of eighteen months, all while fighting one of the most highly trained and experienced armies the world has ever seen” (p. 1). The question he reasonably wants to answer is how Soviet military and political authorities managed to mobilize men and weapons to continue the fight after suffering much greater defeats than those that knocked other European states out of the war.

Dunn’s own interests lie in the technical details of the “rebirth of the Red Army.” He spends a great deal of time discussing not only how many tanks and guns the Soviet economy produced during the war, but exactly which kinds of tanks and guns were manufactured and where. He is even more absorbed by the ways that military leaders formed and disbanded army units, often renaming them in the process to confuse German military intelligence. Dunn makes some interesting points here regarding the Soviet strategy of manpower replacement. He stresses that despite heavy losses, military officials did not throw untrained men into the lines but ensured that each new recruit had at least a couple of months of training prior to combat. When fresh faces did arrive at the front, they did so in groups. After March 1942, divisions were only supposed to take on replacements after they had rotated to the rear and reformed. As Dunn notes, “the advantages of rotation were manifold: New men had time to assimilate into their platoon; veterans had welcome relief from combat; and the army commander had a reserve in the event of an unexpected severe crisis” (p. 45).

When an authoritative account of the Soviet victory is finally written, these sorts of technical details will have to play an important role. Unfortunately, Dunn’s book is not that account. Indeed, from the perspective of scholars and their students, this book is practically unusable. In the first place, Dunn uses no footnotes whatsoever, remarking in the preface that the “source of most of the data is my personal database, which is derived from a wide range of sources” (p. x). Judging by the select bibliography, those sources range from Soviet published sources to German military estimates to English-language materials. Surely Dunn must realize that these sources have different strengths and weaknesses and cannot simply be plugged into a database as if they were uniform pieces of data. Readers have a right to be aware of which sources are being used and to be able to make judgments on reliability accordingly. In the second place, there are so many mistakes in the information that Dunn drags out of his database that every piece of information in the book becomes suspect. Khabarovsk becomes “Charabarovsk” in his account, Osoaviakhim becomes “Ossoawiachim,” and so forth. The mistakes go beyond misspellings and mistransliterations (though these will certainly frustrate and confuse any diligent student who seeks to cross-reference this material). In discussing ethnic politics in the army, he mentions the sudden demobilization of Chechens and Crimean Tatars without, apparently, being aware of the mass deportations that prompted the change in military nationality policy. Dunn even has the wrong name for the initial German invasion, calling it “Operation Barbarous” (p. 63) rather than “Operation Barbarossa.” The invasion was of course barbarous, but the
The operation was named after the medieval crusader, not the practices of the Wehrmacht. Throughout the book, Dunn gives the impression of being unaware of the broader scholarship on the Soviet Union in the war years, and he even neglects most of the recent scholarship on the Soviet military, leaving such important scholars as Mark von Hagen, Roger Reese, David Stone, and Lennart Samuelson out of his bibliography. It is a shame that such a promising volume proves impossible to recommend.

Joshua Sanborn, Lafayette College


This book on Sweden’s role in Soviet foreign policy and military planning in the second quarter of the twentieth century is addressed to Russian readers. The three authors are from the European University in St. Petersburg, the Institute of history of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the same city, and the Stockholm School of Economics, respectively. The book is sponsored financially by the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences. The former Swedish ambassador to the USSR and Russia from 1989 to 1994, Örjan Berner, has written the foreword.

This book analyzes how enemy images and conspiracy theories in Moscow colored the image of Sweden. Diplomatic and military papers as well as published memoirs and unpublished notes by Soviet officials are the sources. For much of the period, the Old Bolshevik Aleksandra Kollontai was Soviet minister in Stockholm. Her sober analyses of Swedish political actors’ views and policy recommendations concerning the USSR, which are richly quoted, stand in contrast to the paranoid interpretations in Moscow of what happened on the Swedish scene.

The longest chapter in the book, some fifty pages, is devoted to Soviet military planning against Sweden in the second half of the 1930s and in 1940. The fact that the historians can show that there were elaborate plans for attack on Sweden is not a proof of the intentions of the Soviet political leaders. However, the authors argue that the military leaders believed that Sweden was a military threat at the same time as they grossly overestimated the battle power of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The military’s alarmist and aggressive attitude was an emanation of the very biased views on European politics in the Kremlin. For Stalin and Molotov, the main enemies and threats were the United Kingdom, Poland, and Finland. After Hitler’s rise to power, Germany was added. Sweden was seen as a potential military supporter of Finland and as an instrument of the imperialist powers.

The other chapters of the book are replete with relevant extracts from archival sources. Swedish historical research and political memoirs are very well-covered. The Russian reader receives an updated picture of different interpretations and viewpoints among Swedish historians on Soviet-Swedish relations. Moreover, the language is straightforward concerning Soviet politics and military actions against Finland and the three Baltic States. Aggression is called aggression and occupation is called occupation.

Although the different chapters are unequivocal in the demonstration of the fact that the Soviet policy towards Sweden was marred by misperceptions founded in Bolshevik conspiracy theories, the book is permeated with a classical realist approach to international policies. At the same time the book is firmly anchored in Russian historiography: the Soviet historian Boris Porshnev’s classical work from 1976 on Russia, Sweden and the Thirty Years War is quoted to the effect that foreign policy acts must be interpreted as following the logic of “the complexities of the system of states” (p. 17).

The authors argue that Soviet policy toward Sweden was an effect of the correlation of forces in the international system. In the late 1930s, the foreign policy actions of the Soviet
leadership were determined by the inferiority complex of a “weak and illegitimate child” (p. 431), whereas in the 1950s they were based on self-reliance. Soviet policy toward Sweden became more relaxed. I. S. Chernyshev and K. K. Rodionov, Kollontai’s successors as Soviet ambassadors to Sweden, actively contributed to the conciliatory line. Thirty years later the Swedish ambassador to the USSR and Russia, Örjan Berner, became a Swedish counterpart to Kollontai.

Kristian Gerner, Lund University


Greta Bucher’s book focuses on Moscow’s post Second World War recovery, asking how the enormous losses of men affected urban women’s lives. The study is based on archival research looking at Moscow state and municipal committees, unions, and ministries, and on interviews with fifteen women, largely of the intelligentsia and professional classes who lived in Moscow as teenagers or young women in the postwar era. Bucher emphasizes societal and institutional tensions due to impossible state policy demands. The press played a role in shaping society; it conveyed unrealistic propaganda messages, thus laying the foundation for conflict between policymakers, bureaucrats and ordinary citizens. The state expected that women would be fully engaged in the work force while also producing children. In a tacit contract with women, the state assured that it would provide needed goods and services, promising more than it could deliver. The bureaucracy responded with what Bucher calls a “bureaucratic shuffle” in which soviet bureaucrats shifted responsibility to cover their inability to meet expectations due to lack of resources. Discussion of problems replaced action. Women dominated the work force numerically, occasionally in powerful positions, but men were in leadership, largely, in Bucher’s view, because women were unable or unwilling to pursue managerial positions because of their family responsibilities. Women responded to pressures on them not by trying to meet state goals, but by focusing on family life rather than professional advancement and limiting family size despite the state’s exhortation to produce more children.

Bucher observes that the Soviet Union failed to create “new women,” but she describes how for many women their work became an essential part of their self-image, causing them to cling to what the Soviets called their “collective.” Natalia Baranskaia’s novella, *One Week Like Any Other* (1969), told essentially the same story: a professional woman’s frantic efforts to balance family and the career with which she identified.

The tension between the state’s need to have women in the work force and its desire to increase the population resulted in the 1944 family law which, in Bucher’s view, tacitly encouraged men to father children outside as well as inside marriage by limiting their financial responsibility solely to their legal families. The propaganda campaign that followed highlighted aid to single mothers who supposedly could rely on an array of state institutions to help them raise their children. The reality of aid did not conform to promises but was “merely nominal,” as interviews made clear. In general, the women did not blame the state for the insufficiencies: if they blamed anyone, Bucher observes, it was individual managers who failed to follow the laws, rather than the state that neglected to enforce them. The story is familiar: male policymakers channeled resources into heavy industry and military development, rather than to fulfilling promises to women.

Bucher suggests that the state’s offer of itself, in effect, in the 1944 family law, as economic provider and a substitute for the support of a father, had “unforeseen consequences for the
concepts of fatherhood and family. ... By presenting the single-parent family as a viable alternative, the state appropriated the main function that a father was supposed to have in the Russian urban household” (p. 176). Thus, she sees men becoming less valuable members of the urban family; in fact, the state’s promise to assume the role of economic provider tended to make urban men “superfluous.” Bucher does not believe that the state intended to marginalize men; it simply sought a way to increase the population in the absence of two generations of men.

The 1944 family law and the subsequent press and bureaucracy campaigns, while not designed to replace the two-parent family, did create an additional family model—the single mother—that the state, in the interest of population growth, found preferable to single, childless women. Yet if state aid was at best “nominal,” could the “single mother” model have been particularly appealing? Were fathers really in danger of being marginalized in the postwar era?

A remarkable feature of Bucher’s interviews, which focus on daily life, is the apparent unawareness on the part of ordinary female citizens of the postwar renewal of Stalinist repression, which seems nowhere reflected in their concerns. Was the average professional woman oblivious to the political atmosphere?

While the main lines of Bucher’s study of women’s lives in the postwar era are familiar, her contribution is in the documentation and detail gleaned from archives and interviews. Her book provides a concise overview, with broad coverage in her footnotes of the relevant historical literature; it should be useful to students in Russian history and comparative women’s studies.

Beatrice Farnsworth, Wells College


Here is a bold illumination of more than the title implies, using “Stalin” to name a system of rule, hardly an individual who had no opinions on physics beyond its use in making bombs. “Stalin” as a system brought stultification along with creativity to physics and to other sciences, and Kojevnikov shows both in this book, including sections on Lysenko and Pavlov as vozhdí—chiefs or commanders—but refrains from using vozhdízm to name the system. Russkaia filosofia: Slovar’ (1995), uses vozhdízm in the article, “Stalin,” to sum up the system named for him, but has no entry for vozhdízm as such. Those who dwell on similarities of Nazi and Communist systems tend to brush aside Nazi pride in the Führerprinzip as against Communist reluctance to acknowledge their command principle, which had stultifying effects in many fields, as well as the triumph in “overtaking and surpassing” a democratic nationstate in making bombs that can do what the U.S. did to Hiroshima and to Nagasaki while Japan was trying to surrender.

Kojevnikov, a trained physicist, illuminates the political essence of “the atomic secret” that spies brought to Stalin’s regime concerning the Manhattan Project and Britain’s Tube Alloy: how close they were to success and therefore how urgent was the need for the Soviet Union to “overtake and surpass.” Among Kojevnikov’s oversights or evasions are the stultifying effects of Pavlov as vozhdí and his “doctrine” as the command principle in biomedical sciences, which entailed resistance to molecular biology, and faith that the conditioned reflex is the basic unit of learning, to be explained by speculative brain localization, and mystification of language and mathematics in the Pavlov doctrine of “higher nervous activity.”

Most impressive, and debatable, is Kozevnikov’s effort to show that a “revolutionary combination of utopianism and utilitarianism” emerged from “the crisis of World War I and the
general revolutionary situation in the country,” generating a mindset shared by Bolsheviks with scientists who overwhelmingly disapproved Lenin’s revolution. Stalin’s “revolution from above” with its velikii perelom (great break) from patience to violent haste in leaping out of Russian backwardness, included forced collectivization of peasants and forced change from “bourgeois” to “red specialists” (or at least specialists who would conceal disapproval of Communist rule). Kozhevnikov lumps all that in “the cultural revolution,” which I find misleading. The cultural revolution was a concept with different meanings to Russian Marxists in changing times. Lenin’s comrade Bogdanov, for example, in 1917 denounced Lenin’s “proletarian revolution” since the Russian working class was culturally unprepared to rule, as Lenin tended to agree, and therefore plunged for a dictatorship of his party.

Kozhevnikov’s most unusual theme concerns collectivism and freedom as concepts transferred by Russian physicists into analysis of particles in fields of interaction. He insists that he is not only describing a psychological process in the minds of physicists as they turned metaphors into mathematical functions, but also describing physical realities of freedom and collectivism. I fear he evades the highly contested meanings of individual freedom and social constraint in human history. Can particles and fields experience freedom and collectivism as J. S. Mill and Karl Marx understood them? “All that makes existence valuable to any one,” Mill declared, “depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people.” That is a basic reason why Marx saw that liberalism entails alienation of human beings from each other, and why Mill himself came to analogous arguments for socialist modifications of capitalist society.

Kozhevnikov cites Nobel prizes as evidence of greatness in Soviet physics. Take that measure seriously, and the historian confronts a deep puzzle. Why were Nobel prizes awarded for achievements of Soviet physicists during the reign of Stalin, a vozhd’ who used mass terror as a method of rule, while succeeding decades of Communist rule without terror showed a marked decline of creativity as measured by Nobel prizes in physics? To compound the puzzle note the startling appearance of an economist among Soviet Nobel laureates in those years—actually a mathematician (Kantorovich) who showed how a Communist economic system might lessen or overcome its self-destructive inefficiencies.

I put such puzzles before Kozhevnikov as a tribute to his great achievement, including profound challenges that this landmark book presents to historians of science and of Russia, who approach their topics mostly as self-righteous citizens of self-righteous nation-states in the most murderous century of human existence, so far.

David Joravsky, Northwestern University


This edited volume of essays on the deployment of prerevolutionary Russian leaders and authors by Stalinist propagandists beginning in the middle to late 1930s is far more coherent than most article collections. In the process of preparing the volume many of the contributors appear to have read and discussed one another’s essays. The happy result is that the book reads like a nuanced discussion of a single set of issues, rather than a set of stand-alone monologues.

Epic Revisionism is also an important contribution to recent debates in which scholars have challenged Nicholas Timasheff’s “Great Retreat” thesis. In his eponymous 1946 book, Timasheff, a Russian émigré sociologist, catalogued recent shifts in official Soviet rhetoric and policies, such as the revival of a heroic Russian nationalist history, restrictions on divorce and
abortion, and the return to “traditional” educational practices (uniforms, grades, exams), which he argued amounted to a retreat from “revolutionary” values. Stephen Kotkin and David Hoffman, among others, have reduced Timasheff’s original thesis to the claim that Stalin returned Russia to “traditional” prerevolutionary values. Yet in fact Timasheff did not argue that high Stalinist culture was a simple reversion to Tsarist traditions, describing it instead as a pragmatic synthesis of prerevolutionary and Bolshevik elements. Several essays in Epic Revisionism provide support for Timasheff’s analysis, demonstrating that Stalin and his subordinates’ decision to revive the reputation of figures such as Prince Alexander Nevskii and Romantic poet Mikhail Lermontov was entirely pragmatic. The goal was to stabilize Soviet society and shore up regime legitimacy in the face of the growing war threat. Essays on the Stalinist cooption of Lermontov (David Powelstock), the partial rehabilitation of Ivan the Terrible (Brandenberger and Platt), and the rewriting of Glinka’s opera A Life for the Tsar under the title Ivan Susanin (Susan Beam Eggers) indicate also that the revival of “traditional” heroes was not a simple reversion to earlier prerevolutionary discourse. Rather, it was a complex syncretism of prerevolutionary cultural products and Soviet cultural norms (in the rewritten opera, for example, the peasant Susanin tricks the Polish invaders not to save the Tsar Mikhail Romanov, but to protect “the Russian land”).

Another strength of Epic Revisionism is the early essays which track changes in official attitudes toward the prerevolutionary cultural heritage from the late 1920s onward. William Nickel’s piece on the 1928 celebration of the centenary of Lev Tolstoy’s birth shows how Soviet commentators criticized Tolstoy’s alleged political passivity, while applauding his “realist” criticism of prerevolutionary Russian society. At this point Soviet critics still viewed Tolstoy through a revolutionary lens. A. M. Dubrovsky, Andrew Wachtel, and Maureen Perrie chronicle how Demian Bednyi, Dmitrii Shostakovich, and Mikhail Bulgakov in the mid-1930s each stumbled against changing standards for evaluating performance works set in the Tsarist past. In what is perhaps the most interesting single essay in the book Kevin Platt traces novelist Aleksei Tolstoi’s reconfiguring of Peter I in successive works ranging from 1917 to 1945. Platt argues that Tolstoi’s reworking of Peter’s character almost inevitably left an “afterimage” of earlier “Peters” he had created.

Every essay in Epic Revisionism (with the exception of the introductory piece by Platt and Brandenberger and the epilogue by James von Geldern) has an attached primary source document translated into English. These documents are fascinating in themselves and fit the book well for teaching upper-level courses in Stalinist culture and/or literature.

Matthew Lenoe, University of Rochester


During the second half of the 1990s, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania established international commissions to investigate crimes against humanity in their lands during the World War II period (1940–45). At the call of the presidents of all three countries, commissions of prominent experts were formed, many of these from Western Europe and the United States; teams of historians were assembled to scour archives in the Baltic and elsewhere; numerous conferences were held to present findings; and the results of these inquiries began to appear as publications. In Latvia and Lithuania, these publications have taken serial form. In the case of Estonia, the main findings have now appeared in the form of a single massive thirteen-hundred-page volume in English, which is the book under review. In the course of
time, when these three projects are deemed to have been completed, the entire corpus of publications will surely deserve a review essay, if not a lengthy article, to assess what permanent contribution have made to historical knowledge and to the righting of past wrongs.

From the outset, the Estonian commission (as well as the commissions in the other Baltic states) decided to examine the World War II period in its entirety, which meant that research had to focus on the first period of Soviet occupation (June 1940–June 1941), then the longer period in which Estonia became part of the new Ostland territory of the Third Reich (July 1941–fall 1944), and finally the beginning of the second Soviet occupation (fall 1944–spring 1945). The seventy-one chapters of the present volume generally stay within this time frame, though the context-setting chapter for the first Soviet occupation necessarily backtracks to the fall of 1939 and the creation of Soviet military bases on Estonian territory, and one chapter deals with Estonian POWs in Germany after the war. By and large, the research in all chapters—whether these deal with administrative arrangements, sovietization, rigged elections, military formations, public attitudes, partisan groups, detention facilities, German and Soviet execution squads, or Estonian participation in the changing apparatuses of oppression—underline the harm visited by these two occupations on ordinary people, and, where warranted, on the imprisonment, deportation, and outright murder of persons who were classified as undesirables by the totalitarian regime in power at a given moment. On this latter theme, separate chapters deal with political arrests in 1940–41, the deportations of June 14, 1941, and the seek-and-destroy battalions formed by Soviet authorities after the German invasion (all these in the first Soviet period); and, in the German period from 1941 to 1944, with imprisonment and executions, the prison and concentration camp systems (four chapters), and the destruction of Estonian Jews and Jews brought to Estonia (three chapters). Numerical exactitude about victims is impossible because of imprecise sources, but the commission report estimates that in the first Soviet period, of the 7,000 Estonian citizens imprisoned, 1,800 were executed and 4,500 died in prison; about 10,000 were deported to the USSR on June 14, 1941; and about 32,000 were transported to the USSR in July and August of 1941 before the consolidation of the German occupation. In the German occupation period, virtually all of the 1,000 Jews remaining in Estonia after July 1941 (some 3,500 had fled to the Soviet Union) were murdered, as were, by 1944, the approximately 5,000 Jews who had been brought by the Germans to Estonia from other occupied territories. Some 400–1,000 Roma were killed, as were some 6,000 ethnic Estonians and about 1,000 ethnic Russians (all statistics, pp. xii–xiii, xviii–xix).

The volume begins with a 1999 statement by the late Lennart Meri, then President of Estonia, introducing the work of the commission, and a statement by the commission itself, summarizing the findings and allocating responsibility and culpability in light of the definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in the 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A 230-page concluding section contains biographies of the leading protagonists, a detailed chronology, indices, and maps. The thoroughness of the research in this volume suggests that it may well be the last word on the tragic events in Estonia during a horrendous chapter in the history of the twentieth century.

Andrejs Plakans, Iowa State University


This book constitutes the first in a two-volume history of the USSR, with document translations by Tom Stableford of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and historical narrative by Edward Acton,
What is most striking about Soviet Union is the amount and variety of documentation, as well as the balanced and incisive commentary which accompanies it. Drawing upon the research of a team of Russian scholars at A.M. Gorky Urals State University, this volume incorporates 205 primary source documents, many of which have only become available since 1991. Documents are diverse in type and include speeches, government decrees, letters, memoirs, émigré accounts, and conversations via telegram. Included are items such as the abdication letter of Nicholas II (p. 12), Trotsky’s 1919 speech celebrating the founding of the Comintern (pp. 81–82), the 1921 resolution of the sailors at the Kronstadt naval base (pp. 145–46), Stalin’s 1929 anti-kulak speech to a conference of Marxist agrarians (pp. 275–76), and an excerpt from the prophetic 1932 anti-Stalin “Ryutin group” platform (pp. 362–64).

Documents are drawn from a number of sources, including Soviet newspapers, archives, and the writings of Lenin, Stalin, and Bukharin. Archives utilized include the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Sociopolitical History, the Russian State Military Archive, and the State Archive of Sverdlovsk Oblast. Of particular interest is the usage of materials from a local archive, the Sverdlovsk Oblast Center for Documentation of Public Organizations, to provide a ground-level view of the struggle between the Stalin regime and the kulaks during collectivization (pp. 278–80). In addition, there is other fascinating documentation illustrating various forms of internal resistance to Soviet power, including sources attesting to the government’s struggle with worker discipline and labor turnover during the First Five-Year Plan (pp. 315–20), and examples of more blatant dissent such as a 1938 leaflet by two young physicists who accused Stalin of being “on a par with Hitler and Mussolini” (pp. 384–85).

This volume is divided into three sections encompassing the 1917 revolutions and civil war, the NEP period, and foundational Stalinism. This chronological arrangement works well, as Acton and Stableford alternate judicious commentary with pertinent sources, providing multidimensional coverage of relatively complex aspects of Soviet history such as the post-Lenin leadership struggle, the ongoing interaction between the Bolshevik state and the Russian church, peasantry and intelligentsia, and the effects of Stalinist policies of collectivization and hyperindustrialization on the Soviet peasantry and working class. Of course, the potential weakness of a one-author narrative as opposed to an edited collection of essays and documents (see, as a good example of the latter, Ronald Grigor Suny, ed., The Structure of Soviet History) is the lack of alternative points of view. Acton compensates for this limitation, however, by playing both historian and historiographer: he navigates contested topics such as the Bukharin/NEP alternative to Stalinism, the Kirov assassination, and the origins of the Stalin’s Great Terror in an even-handed fashion, explaining and comparing opposing arguments while utilizing a lively footnote discussion to point readers in the direction of further study.

Finally, the volume also includes helpful sections such as a glossary of Russian words and acronyms, a guide to further reading, a map section, and a superb forty-three-page bibliographical index. To sum up, then, this is an excellent research or educational resource, and may be used in-class either for supplementary primary source reading or as a textbook in its own right. The softcover edition is also attractively priced at about one-third the hardcover cost.

Michael G. Stefany, Indiana University of Pennsylvania
This book is a look back from one of the field’s towering figures, the history of whose own life overlaps with much of the history of the short century he describes. In it, Moshe Lewin proclaims the need for a new approach in analyzing the Soviet dictatorship. “Anticommunism,” he reminds readers, “is not historical scholarship” (p. 378). Instead of viewing the socialist regime through a set of oversimplified clichés, Lewin argues for the need to see it as a complicated, chaotic work-in-progress—an organism made up of myriad institutions and individuals, both agent and object of frenzied self-examination and continual change. He proposes to take readers behind the system’s “veil of secrecy” (p. viii), and so reveal a different way of thinking about “state” and “ideology” and, above all, the abilities of both to mobilize and repress. The result is a montage-like reflection on the Soviet past that all familiar with Lewin’s tremendous legacy will recognize.

At the heart of the book is the problem of Josef Stalin. Lewin says he does not wish to “demonize” the dictator; nor does he want to “Stalinize” the whole Soviet phenomenon. Yet the author’s engagement with Stalin is a deeply personal one—Lewin, born in Vilnius (then Wilno, in Poland), fled the Nazis in 1941 to serve in the Red Army during the Second World War. The result was an enduring sympathy for the Soviet people and rage against a leader who, in Lewin’s eyes, chose to deviate fundamentally from the legacy of his predecessor, Vladimir Lenin, thereby wreaking irreparable damage on both a country and a set of honorable ideals. Lewin cannot but view the Stalin era as a devastating rupture, even as he hints at a more continuous model of Soviet ideological and bureaucratic confusion, improvization, and evolution extending throughout the twentieth century.

Thus for all the author’s appreciation of the complexity of power, in his analysis of Stalin, he at times returns to the heavy-handed models of single-leader intention and authority that he elsewhere declares it his desire to overcome. During the 1930s and 40s, he writes, “the country’s destiny ... found itself at the mercy of one psyche,” as the connoisseur “of intrigue and backstage manipulation [gathered] all power in his hands” (p. 82). Suddenly the extra variables Lewin himself on occasion vividly describes—the violent yet often desperate officers of the NKVD, the ambitious yet vulnerable party leaders, the control workers from rival agencies, all charged with sifting through innumerable denunciations from ordinary citizens, even the wartime truckdrivers Lewin cites in an aside, so determined that they could repair broken engines with their own shoelaces (p. 376)—fade into the background. They become peripheral in a setting in which an omnipotent Stalin imposed terror by decree, with the party bureaucracy serving as an “obedient tool” (p. 75) in his obsessive quest to “master the masters” (p. 81).

Lewin’s emphasis on the dictator’s colossal agency, partly in spite of his own proposed methodology, represents a broader trend. A number of historians are currently engaged in something of a Soviet-style rehabilitation of their own—dusting off 1950s totalitarian theory and reemphasizing, with great justification, the importance of the person of the leader, his pronouncements, and his mechanisms of communication and surveillance. The challenge remains, however, to reconcile a resurgent appreciation for top-down control strategies with the mass complicity, even initiative, fundamental to the societal upheavals of the Stalin age: industrialization, collectivization, deportation, country-wide witch-hunts for “hidden enemies,” and total war against the Third Reich.

Lewin does not ignore such nuances, and in his analysis of the post-Stalin USSR they assume pride of place. Incremental, cumulative economic and social processes grow more important than personality in explaining Soviet power. To be sure, the country’s leaders still cut colorful figures after 1953, but in Lewin’s account they function less as shapers of the “Soviet system” than as prisoners of it, constrained by a variety of amorphous “somethings,”
each with a powerful logic of its own—including what Lewin calls the force of “spontaneity” (p. 203). One prime example of foiled actors is Yuri Andropov, who as head of the KGB recognized the need for reform, yet failed to overcome the inertia of his fellow party members. Lewin repeatedly underscores Andropov’s relative unfreedom, commenting that he “was a loyal Brezhnevite, but what else could he have been?” (p. 254) and arguing that “of course he ... put political opponents in jail ... [but h]ow else should he [have been] expected to have behaved, given that he was under close surveillance by hawks in the Politburo and his own agency?” (p. 256).

“Precipitous urbanization” is another key factor Lewin identifies, post-Stalin, as a force that transforms not only Soviet society but also the structure of Communist rule (p. 203). Lewin has always been at his engaging best while describing urban-rural tensions in the USSR and the cataclysmic culture clash that resulted from the violent imposition of a modernizing ideology on a traditional, agrarian society. Here, he continues this story into the 1960s and beyond. He notes the porous boundaries of cities (and bureaucratic frustration with the same), remarking that despite official efforts to limit population movements, between 1961 and 1966 at least 53.2 million citizens cycled in and out of urban areas in the Russian Federation alone (p. 204). His words evoke the picture of a government struggling to manage a number of overcrowded, haphazardly constructed cities teeming with residents, all in search of adequate housing, work, education, and consumer goods. In sum, his analysis leads to the powerful conclusion that, while in the 1930s state policies drove urbanization (even as they generated a variety of unintended outcomes, such as the “ruralization of the towns” [p. 69]), after World War II urbanization became a phenomenon so vast and multifaceted that it drove the state, reshaping (and often rebuffing) Soviet control strategies.

In sketching such changes, The Soviet Century presents readers with a regime which, as its leaders diminished in stature and its society grew evermore modern and complex, seems to have morphed from ruthlessly effective before 1953 to almost absurdly ineffective thereafter. The epic triumphs and tragedies of the 1917–45 era soften into a by-and-large tragicomic banality characteristic of the USSR’s final years. Readers are left to wonder at this essential shift in the very tempo and scale of Soviet history.

Cynthia V. Hooper, College of the Holy Cross


In his innovative and stimulating book, Malte Rolf explores with subtlety and insight the complex and contested processes of festivities, festivals, and parades through which the Communist party and the Soviet state tried to legitimize themselves. This study consists of five chapters. The first deals with celebrations in Imperial Russia, the second with formations and discourses in post-October Soviet Russia (for example, with didactical aspects and planning of celebrations), the third with representations of power and hierarchies in the celebrations, the fourth with aspects of power, society, and festivities, and the comparative fifth contextualizes the Russian experiences. It is devoted to festivals in the United States and in different totalitarian societies like fascist Italy, and National-Socialist Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. The book covers the whole Soviet period from 1917 to the very end, but focuses especially on the Stalinist era.

Like Bob van Geldern, Karen Petrone, and Donald J. Raleigh before, Rolf argues that the Bolsheviks strictly controlled public festivals from the very beginning of the Soviet state. The
meticulously choreographed celebrations already in November 1918 can be seen as an aspect of uncertainty among the leaders as to the status of their new regime. There was also a certain distrust of the population in general and of the independent activity of the masses.

The strength of the book lies in the deep insights it offers. It shows how the Bolsheviks created the New Soviet man by shaping new cultural practices, values, and institutions that replaced the older ones like the church, thus gaining popular legitimacy and exerting political control. A common feature of all different types of mass festivals—like military, industrial, commemorative, cultural, and so forth—and parades was that they not only demonstrated specific political messages intended by Soviet leadership but also were used to mold behavior. The participants were not only smart, fit, healthy, and smiling but also disciplined servants of the Soviet state.

Mass festivities, parades, and holidays, however were Janus-faced. The participating masses weren’t that homogenous. They displayed distinct social, economic, ethnic, gender, and so other hierarchies which can be described by asymmetric dichotomies: the participating party elite visible on tribunes vs. “normal” spectators, onlookers vs. marching participants, workers vs. peasants, Russians vs. non-Russians, center vs. periphery, men vs. women. These celebrations and especially parades of the masses were featuring practices of inclusion and exclusion. Udarniki and Stakhanovites formed the first ranks of a parade, idlers were at the very end, thus marking their backwardness, while social aliens, beggars, and prostitutes often were not allowed to participate at all (p. 166).

Concerning the organization of festivities, Rolf clearly shows on the one hand that the experiences of the Soviet leaders in Moscow shaped the celebrations at the periphery, on the other they intensified the already existing tensions between the cities and the countryside. As most of the festivities were urban events (only cities provided the necessary prerequisites as broad streets, and huge public squares), the countryside remained almost untouched by the Bolshevik cultural and political practices. While these findings are not new, Rolf enlarges our knowledge focusing on Soviet provincial cities.

This is an original, interesting, and very well researched monograph. It is based on seven Russian archives: two at Moscow (GARF and RGASPI) and five provincial (Novosibirsk, Kemerovo, Novokuznetsk) including the former archive of the Communist party in Voronezh. Against this background it makes us wonder that he did not use the French article by Sophie Cœure on the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow. It is regrettable that Rolf does not discuss the actions and behavior of oppositional circles. At the time of the tenth jubilee in October 1927, foreign observers were reporting increased police activity and arrests. Thus the opposition was almost muted, as the German newspaper correspondent Paul Scheffer remembered—an eyewitness-account not used by Rolf. These are, however, minor quibbles.

This study adds much to our knowledge of the cultural history of the Stalinist period in general, and it marks a welcome departure in scholarship on Soviet festivals and celebrations in particular.

Lutz Häfler, Universität Bielefeld


Russian history from the Time of Troubles to the early Bolshevik era—three hundred years—has witnessed an inordinate number of intense popular uprisings. Heinz-Dietrich Löwe,
professor and director of the Seminar on Eastern Europe History at the University of Heidelberg, has assembled a dozen colleagues, nearly all under forty, to examine sixteen such events. The bouts of unrest they tackle range from Cossack rebellions led by Razin, Bulavin, and Pugachev; to urban revolts over high salt prices, inflation, and outbreaks of the plague and cholera; and from two revolts of old Muscovy’s musketeers (*strel’tsy*) to the Tambov uprising against the Bolsheviks. The authors consulted relatively few archives but made use of huge quantities of published primary sources. They nearly all engage Soviet scholarship (the concept of “peasant war” as unsatisfactory is a frequent refrain) and have read most relevant Western historiography, though only a few draw on social-science and cultural theory.

An explanatory thread running though most of the studies concerns the rebels’ rejection of arbitrary government and their attachment to tradition, to premodern values, to the Orthodox religion, and to “the good old ways.” Thus, higher taxes and arbitrary government sparked the Moscow revolt of 1648. A desire to return to the pre-*Ulozhenie* rights and laws animated the “copper rebellion” of 1662. The revolts of Razin, Bulavin, and Pugachev aimed at resisting the gradual decline in the material circumstances of the Cossacks and the inexorable encroachment of state authority on their “traditional liberties.” The *strel’tsy* rebelled in 1682 to fight arbitrary rule and the unjust imposition of taxes, but in 1698 only to save their families from banishment. The hundreds of incidents of unrest and revolts among Urals ironworkers (1754–68) were mostly about exploitative work conditions, though in many cases even these rebels yearned for a “good, old order.” Similarly, the 1768 revolt of peasants, who in many cases were allied with Cossacks, wished to restore “ancient liberties” allegedly infringed by Polish magnates. They even apparently thought they were acting under the protection of the Russian tsar, a leitmotif that recurred five years later in the Pugachev revolt. The distinction of the Plague rebellion in Moscow in 1771 and the Cholera uprising in St. Petersburg in 1831 consisted in the rebels’ hostility to the government’s disease-fighting measures, which conflicted with Russian Orthodox funereal rituals. The Potato uprisings of 1834 and 1841–43 were not really about potatoes at all; nor did the rebels oppose the tsar or the church. Rather, they feared a loss of status from reforms intended to increase the productivity of state and appanage peasants. Most of the Potato uprisings could have been avoided, it seems, had the tsar issued personal ukases enacting the reforms. The peasant rebellions and unrest of 1905–7 were not revolutionary or even “progressive” but erupted from hostility about the “the loss of backwardness or even more the loss of tradition” (p. 495).

Ironically, among the only progressive social movements discussed were those whose story involves no rebellion: peasant authors of some fifteen hundred petitions asking for practical things like land, good government, access to education, and equality before the law. Finally, the only truly revolutionary uprising, apparently, was the Antonovshchina in Tambov. Not only did these rebels reject Bolshevik rule, they also wanted to carry their revolution across Russia and to establish a relatively liberal form of government. Their movement was well organized, long lived, and geographically extensive. Most important, their rebelliousness correlated directly with market integration, suggesting perhaps that Russia was becoming economically ripe for a broad-based efflorescence of civil society at precisely the moment when the Bolsheviks all but outlawed civic activism.

The only problem with the collection, aside from the usual unevenness of the entries and the absence of both index and bibliography, is its almost complete neglect of the mass rebellions of 1905–7 and 1917–21. It is also regrettable that Marc Raeff is scarcely credited with anticipating the authors’ results, at least for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Still, it is an important book that helps one to think fruitfully about a significant and recurrent theme in Russian history.

Jonathan W. Daly, University of Illinois at Chicago
Otto Kuusinen was the highest ranking Finn in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Born in 1881, when Finland was part of the Russian Empire, he joined the Finnish Social Democratic Party in 1905 and participated in the failed attempt to transform Finland into a Soviet republic in 1918. He moved to the Soviet Union, where he was the secretary of the Comintern from 1919 to 1939. Such was his skill or luck that he avoided Stalin's “meat-grinder” in the 1930s. Other Finnish Communists never forgave him for his cold indifference to their fate. He served as head of the “People’s Government” of Finland from 1939 to 1940, when Stalin considered it possible that Finland would return to the Russian fold. Kuusinen was promoted to the Politburo (Presidium) at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952. He was immediately dropped by the new leadership after Stalin’s death but proved so useful to Khrushchev that he was again elected to the Politburo and was also made a Central Committee secretary. He died just before Khrushchev was deposed in 1964. The Finnish authorities never permitted him to revisit his homeland, revealing the depth of animosity felt toward him by non-Communist Finns.

Despite his successful career, Kuusinen has been ignored by the English-speaking scholarly world. The only work on him is in Finnish. Jukka Renkama attempts to rekindle interest in him in this fine, meticulously researched study. It is not a biography, but this work centers on Kuusinen’s chosen areas of expertise: ideology and foreign policy. Khrushchev, “uneducated” in ideological matters, needed a guiding spirit, someone who could assemble his inchoate, confused musings on the Marxist-Leninist classics into coherent prose. Kuusinen probably had more influence over the first secretary in this policy area than anyone else. This only infers that he put ideas into the leader’s head but had to retreat frustrated on many occasions.

The best introduction to ideology under Stalin is Slava Gerovitch’s From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics (2002), but it was not available to the author. Gerovitch reveals Stalin as a master of Bolshevik newspeak. Debate was conducted according to set formulae. This tradition carried over into the post-Stalin era, but Khrushchev’s ascendancy broke all the rules. The first secretary, quite incapable of reproducing the subtleties of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, had to express himself in simple, direct language. Renkama’s study is of great interest as it traces the decline of the ruling ideology. The first secretary’s utopian vision of communism in our time did irreparable damage to Marxism-Leninism.

The main “Reform Platform” was to remove the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kuusinen regarded it as justifying the Stalinist terror and he was trying to ensure that it never recurred. The problem was that Lenin had envisaged the dictatorship lasting as long as the state. Kuusinen had to obfuscate and eventually supported the concept of the “all-people’s state.” Khrushchev was keen on promoting grass-roots activity but could not grasp that there was a tension between this and the vanguard role of the party. Renkama follows well the convoluted prose which attempted to cover up the fact that the Soviet Union was a one-party dictatorship.

He also examines the reform proposals of Imre Nagy (Hungary), Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia), and Edvard Kardelj (Yugoslavia) to see if there was any cross-fertilization. Mao Zedong’s “Great Leap Forward” is also analysed. Kuusinen was the editor of Foundations of
Marxism-Leninism (1959), which was a flop, and failed to dampen Khrushchev’s economic utopianism in the Third Party Program (1961). The result was that the program was ridiculed in private.

Martin McCauley, University College, London


The attention that has been paid to “reformers” since the late Soviet years has tended to obscure a rather different set of ideas that may broadly be described as Russian nationalism. Kevin O’Connor is not the first to discuss them: one thinks for instance of substantial studies by Yitzhak Brudny, John Dunlop, and Peter Duncan (whose *Russian Messianism* [2000] is missing from an otherwise comprehensive bibliography). But this is perhaps the most satisfactory study we have of a process that is still continuing in which communist and nationalist positions have become increasingly closely associated; and it links these developments to a number of key individuals, the most interesting and enigmatic of whom is the Krasnodar and later Russian party first secretary, Ivan Kuz’mich Polozkov.

O’Connor sees his work as one of “both political and intellectual history” (p. 15). Its main focus is the public rhetoric of Russian nationalist intellectuals and of the Communist party leaders who were sympathetic to their views. His sources are literary and political journals, newspapers and memoirs, and some use is also made of interviews and party archives. O’Connor makes the interesting, important and (in my view) valid point that the central tension of the late Soviet period was less between “democrats” and party conservatives and rather more between “Westernizers” and those who saw Russia’s salvation in the development of its own distinctive qualities. This was a development that, rather later, prepared the way for a “left-patriotic” Communist party under the leadership of Gennadii Ziuganov—perhaps even for Vladimir Putin.

Two early chapters cover the relatively familiar territory of Soviet nationality policy from Lenin to Brezhnev. The discussion then moves on to the RSFSR writers’ union, where anti-perestroika Russian nationalists and Soviet conservatives found common ground, and to rival tendencies in the literary journals of the period. This is complemented by a discussion of the emergence of a newly established Russian communist party organisation that became increasingly sympathetic to the national-imperial idea. It is here that Polozkov is the key figure; it was Polozkov, for instance, who argued in 1990 that the Orthodox Church was the party’s “natural ally in the drive for the protection of morals and against ethnic conflicts,” and in 1991, that it was a “most important foundation of all Russian statehood” (p. 219). The attempted coup later in the year reflected this *ad hoc* coalition, each element of which had a “common interest in retaining the centralized, Russian-dominated Soviet state that they believed the president was helping to destroy”; their struggle was “not for communism, but for Russia, ‘one and indivisible’” (p. 17).

This is a detailed and often thoughtful study that provides a necessary balance to the much larger number of accounts that feature the reformers, but it is not free of minor error: my favorite is on page 162, where the Italian journalist Giulietto Chiesa is converted from a male into a female.

Stephen White, University of Glasgow
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, discussions about the fate of Russia have been linked to a parallel discussion about China. While beliefs in rapid Russian success were still riding high, the tendency was to downplay China’s economic success and to point to the absence of political reform as a cause of pending disaster. Following the Russian financial collapse in 1998, the tide turned and Russia-bashing instead became laced with reference to Chinese wisdom and success. Few, however, have possessed the skills, linguistic and otherwise, to undertake a serious scholarly study of what may be made out of such comparisons.

Christopher Marsh possesses such skills, and he has put them to good use in making a convincing case. What seems to have triggered his ambition to write this book is the frequently heard prediction of pending Chinese collapse. He does recognize that if China were to meet with such a fate, it would be an “earth-shattering event,” as the “fallout from a Chinese transition could make Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya look like mere skirmishes” (p. 2). The likelihood, however, of such a horrendous outcome is seen to be slim indeed, and here lies the main thrust of his argument.

Those who are found at the receiving end of Marsh’s assault allegedly rest their case on two assumptions. One holds that since the Soviet and Chinese paths of transition have exhibited such great similarity, they must lead to similar outcomes, that is, since the Soviet Union collapsed, so must China. The second assumption is more teleological, and holds that even if we do recognize major differences between the two, it will have to remain a fact that both represent Communist systems that for inherent reasons do not evolve. They collapse.

Marsh finds both assumptions to be lacking in theoretic rigor and explanatory power. His own suggestion is that we are looking at “unparalleled” reforms, at two different cases, or trajectories. In particular, there was nothing to suggest that the implosion of the USSR was in any sense inevitable. If the latter really was “the very improbable result of a series of accidents of history and misguided policies that were attempted without any clear understanding” (p. 3), then a potential Chinese collapse surely must also be avoidable.

While the former argument is presented with sufficient rigor to make a solid case, the latter is a bit fluffier. On principle, arguments on how and why the Soviet system collapsed represent a can of worms that is perhaps best left unopened. On specifics, his account of the Soviet experience is a bit lopsided, ignoring the continuity arguments of Richard Pipes and championing Martin Malia’s view of communism as an anomaly in Russia’s long-term history. This said, the two arguments jointly do form a convincing case of reforms that really do not have all that much in common.

Following a quick review of the respective merits and demerits of transitology and comparative politics, Marsh builds his case in three consecutive steps. In the first, he charts the respective courses of China and the Soviet Union, from their decisions to reform up until the onset of systemic crisis. The second compares their respective experiences of post-crisis development, and the third contrasts the willingness of each to learn from the other.

The latter, making up the most important part of the book, shows how the Chinese, having panicked in 1989, launched a broad effort to learn how to avoid following the Soviet path. In sharp contrast, Moscow has persistently refused to learn from China. While this may be due to a refusal to learn from a developing country that was once a follower of Moscow, Marsh also hints, conspiratorially, that there may be a genuine fear over what might happen if Russians were to become convinced of the superiority of the Chinese way.
If the key to understanding post-Socialism does lie in pragmatism and a willingness to learn from others, then the future for China does look bright, and that for Russia rather less so.

Stefan Hedlund, Uppsala University


Russian interest in the social history of its academic elites has been growing at a remarkable rate in the past decade or so, something hardly surprising given the constraints imposed on this subject for much of the Soviet era. The initial impetus for this expansion came from the fact that the “post-Soviet” scholarly community found it essential to embed in its new identity an enriched and revised vision of its past. In addition to genealogical and self-reflexive drives, explorations of the history of Russia’s academic intelligentsia is today stimulated by a newfound sense of methodological freedom—the importation and further development of a whole range of possible approaches to the subject, appealing especially to younger generations of historians.

Yet this field is still very much in the process of formation and consolidation, with only a few tentative attempts at providing overarching definitions of its boundaries, themes, methods, and sources. As is often the case in the emergence of a (relatively) new domain of research, its first systematic representations as a distinct area of scholarship tend to target university students. A. N. Eremeeva’s book—based on her lectures delivered at the universities in Kuban’ and Krasnodar—is precisely this type of generalizing textbook survey—a work of provisional synthesis that seeks to provide, in introductory form, a more or less comprehensive picture of what has been done so far and what is currently being done in the sociohistorical study of Russia’s scholarly intelligentsia.

The book focuses on the twentieth century, including chapters on the pre- and post-Soviet academic worlds, although most of the narrative is devoted to the evolution of Soviet academia. Given its reliance on secondary literature (with the exception of some brief discussions of provincial academic communities), the book works primarily as an extended bibliographical essay, introducing the main themes of this field of research, as found in the available historiography (Western readers should here find Eremeeva’s references to an abundance of less familiar Russian research very useful).

As might be expected of a textbook, Eremeeva’s survey seeks to “tick all the boxes”—to account for all the key themes, events and approaches. Particularly useful here is that she traces, clearly and concisely, all the most relevant twists of fate experienced by Russian/Soviet academia across the entire century. The problem, however, is that Eremeeva resists entering into any serious polemics with the scholarship that she uses for her synthesis. This somewhat uncritical approach, though understandable and forgivable in a student manual, is nonetheless regrettable, because potential contradictions between different methodologies are left unanalyzed.

For instance, at the outset, Eremeeva presents Russia’s scholarly community as a relatively unified group held together by a distinct, nationally specific and historically determined, ethos of devotion to science and patriotic service to state and society. She does very little to problematize the nature of this “academic ideology,” and hence to show how the collective identity of Russia’s academia was (and still is) socially constructed. What she does instead is analyze what she calls the scholars’ “behavioral strategies” in times of major socio-political transformations. The ultimate objective of these “strategies,” in Eremeeva’s presentation, is almost invariably the scholars’ sheer survival—material, psychological and broadly professional.
In this context, Eremeeva rightly analyzes the Russian/Soviet scholars’ “cult of science” as essentially a tool of survival—and therefore a function of behavior, rather than some purely intellectual structure of values and beliefs. Yet this methodologically crucial point is never made explicit.

Also, while highlighting potentially exciting new avenues of research (such as the increasingly popular anthropological concern with scholars’ “everyday lives”), Eremeeva, in her necessarily speedy survey, fails to clarify what sort of alternative insights these approaches have to offer. Instead she ends up merging them with more mainstream approaches to the overarching problem of Russian scholarship’s dependent, tense and ambiguous relation with political power.

The book is produced as a very cheap paperback with the circulation of a mere five hundred. Given that it is intended for a Russian student audience, it is uncertain how many copies are likely to reach Western libraries. Hopefully, though, this textbook will stimulate the eventual publication of a more ambitious systematization. This, however, should ideally be a multi-authored volume incorporating a more critical and polemical approach as the best recipe for galvanizing further methodological innovation and diversification.

Andy Byford, Wolfson College, Oxford


Despite his book’s title, Bryon Moraski does not deal much with parties (because, as he correctly asserts, parties were not important actors in Russia’s electoral politics during the period under observation) or patronage (because, while patronage is indeed employed as an explanatory factor, little original research on the subject in cross-regional perspective is presented). Rather, Moraski attempts to explicate incentives for electoral system choice in the regions of Russia from 1993 to 1996. Only essential factual information on more recent developments is provided. The topic is important and obviously understudied. While the consequences of electoral system choice in the regions of Russia did receive significant scholarly attention, incentives have been discussed largely in passim. I believe, however, that the promise of the book remains largely unfulfilled.

First, the book is not devoid of significant conceptual flaws. Most importantly, Moraski does not make a substantive distinction among different systems that involve multimember districts, which in Russia during the observed period was equivalent to the distinction between proportional representation (PR) and multimember plurality systems. This heavily affects the interpretation of the statistical analysis presented in the third chapter of the book. While the author assumes that multimember districts produce more proportional election results, which could be a primary reason for introducing them (p. 38), the dependent variables, however constructed, assume largest values for the cases of multimember plurality. The largest weighted average district magnitude for a mixed system involving PR, 3.57, is actually smaller than in four multimember plurality systems. Yet multimember plurality, as it is well known from the bulk of comparative literature on the subject, is one of the least proportional electoral systems. It does occasionally produce roughly proportional results, but this happens only under specific political circumstances. There is no reason whatsoever to believe that electoral system designers in Russia introduced multimember plurality because they sought more proportional election results. The reverse might be quite possible, at least rational.

For better or worse, the flaws of conceptual thinking that underlies Moraski’s analysis are inconsequential anyway because it is also flawed empirically. While the values of dependent
variables on which the analysis has been performed seem to be derived from McFaul and Petrov’s Politicheskii al’manakh Rossii largely as reported, there is one significant exception. In fact, and McFaul and Petrov do not misreport it, the largest districts magnitude in Russia during that period was in Ingushetia, where the whole legislature was elected by multimember plurality in a twenty-seven-member district. Moraski, however, treats Ingushetia as a case of single-member plurality. The largest average district magnitude that remains in his analysis is 6.32. Everybody who has ever performed small-N statistical analysis is able to appreciate the consequences. Of course, in many streams of statistical analysis it would be permissible to exclude the case of Ingushetia as an outlier. However, in research that deals with a general population such exclusions are highly undesirable and need thorough justification. In this case, I fear, such a justification would not be available even if attempted. This renders the results of Moraski’s statistical analysis empirically irrelevant.

Thus Moraski’s attempt to develop a general explanation of electoral choice in Russia’s regions is neither conceptually sustainable nor empirically valid. The four regional case studies presented in the last three chapters of the book are generally sound and empirically grounded, but they do not add much to the article published by the author in Europe-Asia Studies in 2003. The book itself can be recommended neither to the students of electoral system choice who have additional interest in Russia nor to the students of Russia who have additional interest in comparative electoral engineering. Some texts, it seems, might be better off if they remain what they are destined to be, Ph.D. theses, not seeking wider outreach.

Grigorii V. Golosov, European University at St. Petersburg


It remains unclear whether Russia can still be described as a federal system. Although the formal name of the state proclaims that it is the “Russian Federation,” the spirit of federalism, what the Germans call Bundestreue (federal state loyalty) and what others have called “federality,” appears to be notably lacking. This is a two-way process, with the “subjects of the federation,” otherwise known as regions and republics, pushing for as much autonomy as they can, while the center under President Vladimir Putin has been trying to roll back the development of the segmented regionalism that had emerged under Boris Yeltsin. This is the background to the chapters presented in this book. It is not clear whether the work conveys much sense of the “dynamics” of Russian politics, but we do get some informative and balanced analyses of certain aspects of the restructuring of central-regional relations during Putin’s presidency. This is a moving target, and the authors were forced to add a useful appendix on the changes announced in the wake of the Beslan massacre of early September 2004, above all the appointment of governors. The bulk of the contributions take the story up to 2004, and thus the changes since then are left unanalyzed, giving the book a slightly dated flavor.

Overall the authors give a surprisingly positive assessment of Putin’s regional reforms. Philip Hanson employs the notion of “authoritarian modernisation” (p. 296) and argues that Putin’s reforms have helped overcome impediments to economic performance. A number of contributors focus on the role of the presidential envoys in the seven new federal districts. Nikolai Petrov notes the high proportion of officials with a security background in them, and stresses the reemergence of some Soviet practices, notably the rotation of officialdom to prevent “regional capture.” Emil Pain rather exaggerates when he argues that Chechnya is the model for the rest of Russia, as he notes in his other chapter where he stresses that there have been no
serious manifestations of separatism (p. 345). The threat to Russia is not so much disintegration as segmentation, and it is this that Putin’s reforms are intended to counter. There is not much attempt in this to establish what Putin’s aims really are, although implicitly a number of authors propose that centralization is being pursued as an aim in itself, with the chief instrument being security officials. This suggests greater coherence and consistency than is probably warranted. Darrel Slider’s chapter probably conveys the confused process most eloquently, describing some positive results of the reform of the Federation Council, while noting that Putin made a real hash of the method of selecting senators, a problem that will probably be resolved by returning to a system of direct elections, as suggested recently by the speaker of the upper house, Sergei Mironov.

Like the subject itself, the book reflects the lack of a substantive debate about the nature of Russian federalism, and in particular the role of ethnicity and regional identities, and the problem of imbuing territories with autonomous powers that are nevertheless constrained by an overarching commitment to making the Russian state work. It takes at least two parties to make multilevel governance viable, but federalism requires, in addition, a sense of shared destiny and a moral commitment to certain values. Until this develops we will have instead problems of Russian regional governance, and that is what is so well analyzed in this volume.

Richard Sakwa, University of Kent at Canterbury


This is an informative book covering Soviet food policies and the change they have been going through since 1992. By food policies Wegren means all policies affecting food production, procurement, and domestic and foreign trade. The volume is particularly helpful to all those interested in Russian legislation and executive decisions relevant to agriculture as well as food exports and imports.

In a nutshell, in the early nineties, Russian food producers were abandoned by the all-too-powerful state which used to meticulously regiment prices, procurement channels, as well as investment. As a result, production plummeted from 1992–98. Despite the resumption of growth in 1999, Russian regional governors have installed barriers to food crossing their respective regions. Whereas the Soviet Union used to import feed grain, Russia is now importing primarily meat and poultry and has reemerged as a significant exporter of grain. Under Yeltsin, foreign trade was liberalized, but under Putin, many protectionist measures have been taken in order to boost “national food security.” Because of low productivity on Russian farms, poor infrastructure, and the dismal sociodemographic situation in the countryside, it is unlikely that Russian agriculture stands to gain as a result of Russia’s potential accession to the World Trade Organization.

The book is well structured and easy to navigate. All six chapters have previews of topics broached, and all major conclusions are restated and reworded several times. Apparently stemming from teaching experiences as well as personal diligence, the author’s intent to make his narrative fool-proof is irritating at times, particularly when commonplace statements, like “competition is important because it is the force that guides private self-interest” (p. 58) or “efficient price formation is particularly important for the efficient allocation of resources in a market economy” (p. 59) reach a critical mass.

Among the more serious shortcomings is a neglect of Russia’s physical environment and sheer immensity of its agricultural space, both as factors limiting agricultural productivity and as Russia’s comparative disadvantages in foreign trade. At one point, Russian Agriculture
Minister Gordeev is quoted as saying that in Russia “the biological potential of agricultural land [is] on average 2.5 times lower than in Western Europe and the US” (p. 158), but Wegren does not follow this lead. As a result, none of his five hypotheses of why support for protectionism in food trade is strong in Russia (ibid.) has an explicit reference to the physical environment, despite the fact that in Russia’s domestic discourse on foreign trade this is the most frequently raised subject. It is sufficient to point to Andrei Parshev’s Why Russia is not America (2000), which was on the Russian bestseller’s list for fifty-two straight weeks and became a manifesto of Russian antiglobalists.

The goal of retaining rural population (high on the priorities list in the European Union, particularly in France) does not inform any of Wegren’s hypotheses either. Although Russia’s rural demographics are indeed discussed in the very end of the book, it is unclear how they square with the author’s assertion that “the number of solvent farms increased” (p. 97) since 2001 when it was stated that 61 percent of large farms were insolvent. By all accounts, 61 percent is a conservative estimate, and most peripheral large farms are not commercial farms any more because of ageing, depopulation, and social dysfunction. Finally, it seems that the phenomena that take center stage in Wegren’s analysis are those that are reflected in Russian agricultural data books, whereas the phenomena that are not get neglected. This may explain why vertical integration of farms and food processors is referred to as “episodic, even exceptional” (p. 108), whereas in fact most if not all success stories in Russian agriculture have lately been associated with agribusiness.

Wegren is at his best when discussing dilemmas and questions surrounding domestic food trade in Russia, as well as the rise of rural interest groups. Despite the shortcomings and due to Wegren’s thoroughness in researching what came within his eyesight, the volume is guaranteed a long shelf life as the best reference book on rural change in Russia spanning the critical period from 1980–2002.

Grigory Ioffe, Radford University


In his survey of Russian environmental developments since 1991 Jonathan Oldfield, a lecturer in human geography at the University of Birmingham, UK, argues that only a nuanced, historicized approach can illuminate matters. He rightly urges us to view Russian environmental issues on a multiplicity of spatial (and temporal) levels as well: global, national, regional, and local.

Oldfield does not discount the grim Soviet environmental legacy, but he does remind us that the old order also bequeathed to Yeltsin’s Russia a network of protected territories, environmental monitoring agencies and facilities, and a host of laws (he might have mentioned a tradition of nonobservance as well). There were also other positive bequests, such as the substitution of natural gas for oil and coal in the Soviet economy during the 1980s and the relatively small number of private motor vehicles (and a correspondingly well developed system of mass transit).

What makes the post-1991 period notably different from the Soviet one, of course, has been the massive shifts within the Russian economy and, by extension, society. The collapse of the Russian economy to 1998, especially heavy industry (including military production and energy production) and agriculture, has had dramatic but uneven environmental effects. Russia’s generation of CO₂ equivalent fell 40 per cent from 1990 to 1999, for example, in the wake of a 35 percent decline in coal production and a 37 percent decline in that of oil. These declines
gave Putin the economic cushion to commit Russia to the Kyoto Protocols (Oldfield speculates that WTO membership was also seen by Putin as a quid pro quo). Pollution from agriculture dropped by 60 percent in the wake of a 45 percent decline in agricultural production, especially livestock decline. If all that progress, especially in curbing aerial emissions, occurred as the inadvertent accompaniment of economic decline, the large expansion in protected territory (zapovedniki and national parks) must be credited actively to the Yeltsin regime (although planned by Nikolai Vorontsov and his team in the last two years of the USSR).

On the other hand, what was given with one hand of economic decline was taken away by the other. Oldfield notes the significant contraction of Russia’s environmental monitoring network, defunding of other environmental programs, defunding and obsolescence of all major municipal sewage treatment facilities, increased reliance on atomic energy, increased pollution associated with increased energy intensity per unit GDP, and other inefficiencies associated with deteriorating industrial infrastructure and the decommissioning of abatement facilities in factories. So much, he observes wryly, for the “cleaner” and more efficient “capitalist” production predicted by transitology. Now add to this the elimination of an independent government agency for environmental protection (eliminated in 2000 by Putin), intimidation of environmental activists and NGOs, and the economic upturn since 1999, and the stage is set for unprecedented environmental risk.

Russian Nature provides a nice tour d’horizon of these issues, but could have profited from significant expansion and by exploring its terrain more deeply. The environmental implications of the dismantling of large portions of the country’s arsenal (especially rockets and submarines), foreign extractive companies’ practices, and Russia’s place in global and transboundary environmental webs all warrant inclusion in an expanded treatment. Key works such as V. I. Bulatov’s Rossiia: Ekologia i armiia (1999) and N. N. Kliuev’s Rossiia i ee regionalnye: Vneshnie i vnutrennie ekologicheskie ugrozy (2001) are absent from the bibliography, which should also include such important periodicals and web resources such as Russian Conservation News, the CIS Environment and Disarmament Yearbook, and REDfiles. Most of all, what readers would find useful are examples and details that illustrate the broad points. These were sacrificed, most probably, to today’s stringent page limits. To my taste, the exposition was a little uninspiring, in good measure caused by the author’s tendency to qualify his statements so thickly as frequently to disable their meaning.

Certainly, the author’s premise that the post-1991 period must be studied on its own terms (while of course recognizing continuities) is a good one; however, I still can’t help but see an enduring continuity with Soviet and pre-Soviet Russian history: the persistence of a predatory tribute-taking (Stefan Hedlund) or risk-producing (Oleg Yanitsky) ruling elite. And that continuity, if it is true, is the reason why the environmental improvement of the 1990s in Russia will only be a blip in the overall long-term trend of increasing danger, whatever its economic system is called.

Douglas R. Weiner, University of Arizona


This fascinating and ambitious volume is based on an edited collection of highly interdisciplinary papers originally presented at the Third Aleksanteri (Finnish Center for Russian and East European Studies) Conference at Helsinki University in November 2003. The team of authors are highly interdisciplinary, collectively and individually, including highly regarded academic
The fourteen included papers focus on concepts and representations of “Russian” nature describing nature as a “megatext” composed of various aspects of self-imagination and in total constituting both empirical and mythical national materials which the authors persuasively argue are reconstituted in the collective mind and memory of Russians. Hence, this “megatext” is presented as both vital and foundational for understanding Russian culture. The authors’ collective goal is two-fold. The first is to point out the multitude number of ways that it is possible to “read” nature-cultural interactions. The second is to demonstrate and emphasize the imprint that the natural surroundings have on the development of (Russian) culture. With these twin goals in mind the essays are organized into four sub-themes: nature—the cultural imagery of landscape and animals; remarking nature—nature as resource; nature-society interaction; and philosophy of nature.

In the initial paper of the first section, historian Christopher Ely focuses on Russian nineteenth-century landscape imagery to ask the question of whether and how Russian prerevolutionary landscape perception may inform us about possible biological bases of aesthetic experience. In the second paper, Russian and environmental studies scholar Jane Costlow makes a significant contribution to the rewriting of Russian nature writing by emphasizing the holistic approach in the numerous and largely forgotten writings of Dmitrii Kaigarodov, the chair of forest technology at the Imperial Forest Institute. In the final paper in this section, one of the editors, Arja Rosenhom, Professor of Slavonic Philology at the University of Tampere, takes a cultural studies perspective and looks at animal imagery in Russia as a cultural representation and construction of human identity in some very interesting social and cultural contexts and reveals how such imagery symbolically contributes to the images of the Russian mother.

The second section begins with Alla Bolotova’s paper, a researcher at the Centre for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg, showing the complex culture-science-nature links between the formal Russian/Soviet geology discipline and the forced industrialization colonization history of the Russian North and Far East during the Soviet era, a complex linkage indeed. In a case study of Karelia that is based on Russian archival materials, a researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute, Sari Autio-Sarasmo, illustrates the role of forest resources and the illusion of their limitlessness in Stalin’s forced industrialization policies. In the third paper Maria Tysiachniouk, an Environmental Scientists and Biologist, and Jonathan Reisman, a visiting researcher at the Center for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg, present an overview of international NGO efforts to introduce “sustainable forestry” and other more environmentally sound practices into Russia via series of case studies. Next, Dmitry Vorobyev, also a research fellow at the Center for Independent Social Research, takes a fresh look at the discourse and major players in the famous “re-making nature” or massive Soviet river diversion schemes.

The well-known and highly regarded environmental historian, Douglas Weiner, leads off the third section within a comprehensive essay on how the huge Soviet Union became so environmentally hazardous and the roles of the planned economy, a tribute-taking tradition, the
military-industrial complex and perestroika had in the process. He carries his careful analysis into the post-Communist transition period to highlight both positive changes and negative continuities in Russian environmental policies. In the next paper, Jonathan Oldfield and Denis Shaw, both well-known geographers from Britain, explore the Russian understanding of the concept of “sustainable development” revealing both its historical antecedents and the influence of Western intellectual developments. Next Emma Wilson, a recent Ph.D. from the Scott Polar Research Institute, provides an integrated, local to global, portrait of the complex human, economic, and environmental issues surrounding the multinational development of Sakhalin’s oil and gas deposits. The fourth paper by Nina Tynkkynen, an environmental policy specialist, uses an examination of the Russian debate about the Kyoto Protocol to show how the environment has become an international bargaining chip for the Putin government.

Leading off the final section Mikhail Stroganov, a historian of Russian Literature at Tver’ University, provides a new synthesis of Aleksandr Herzen’s writings on the theme of “man” vs. “nature.” Next, Tatjana Kochedkova, a post-doc in Humanist Studies at Utrecht University, poses interesting questions about possible transcendentalist and Romantic approaches to nature from the perspective of environmental policy. In the volume’s final essay, Margareta Tillberg, a professor of History and Theory of Art and Design at Växjö University, illustrates a very interesting dialogue about nature and culture that took place in the Russian avant-garde art world in Leningrad during the years 1911–34.

All of these papers are well researched and written making for a very interesting and insightful read to a rather wide audience from specialist to nonspecialist of representations, values and concepts of Russian nature.

Craig ZumBrunnen, University of Washington


With this thorough and rich study of changing masculinities in contemporary Russia, Rebecca Kay has made an important contribution to our understanding of gendered structures and relations in post-socialist societies, both as they operate on the level of society and as they are experienced and lived by individuals. While the female role and women’s plights and burdens have been documented and discussed in a number of studies published during the last fifteen years (see, for example, Buckley [1997], Funk and Mueller [1993], Gal and Kligman [2000], Kay, Pinnick, and Bridger [1996]), men’s changing roles and lives have been far less documented. Kay’s study, therefore, fills a gap in the literature and simultaneously challenges prevailing stereotypical images of the Russian male as an emasculated, heavy-drinking, and irresponsible person, inflexible and unable to cope with change.

The study builds on qualitative research material collected in 2002–3 in two regional locations of Russia: a small town in Kaluga region and the city of Barnaul (capital of the Altai region), the latter involving an examination of one particular Crisis Center for men. In addition, extensive use is made of both national and local media sources.

The book is divided into two parts, dealing with men in the public and the private sphere respectively. These parts are preceded by two introductory chapters where Kay places the study within the framework of masculinity studies internationally and outlines the historical context for the study of gender issues in Russia. In line with many others scholars, Kay stresses the development and spreading of biological essentialism during the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period, a process through which “male” and “female” increasingly came to be seen as natural opposites. Against this background she discusses different stereotypes and ideals of
masculinity today, adding the image of the “good Russian man” to the well-known negative stereotypes; the male as a responsible authority, a person who “never stops,” who is physically strong, practical, and family-oriented (p. 31).

Part one of the book has chapters on the military service, making a living in the new labor market, and the challenges of private enterprising. Chapters 3 and 4, which discuss employment situations and business activities, demonstrate very well the hardships experienced by individuals who strive to fulfill the ideal of the “good man” in an unpredictable market economy. Kay argues that, contrary to the negative stereotypes, her informants demonstrate great flexibility and inventiveness when adapting to challenges.

Part two has chapters on fatherhood, male-female relationships, and the Altai Crisis Center for men. In the family-related chapters 5 and 6, the ideal of the male breadwinner comes to the fore as a key component of male identity, demonstrating a wide acceptance of this dominant societal norm. But Kay also emphasizes her informants’ expression of their strong emotional bonds to their children and their fear for or grief from the loss of contact with children after divorce, a harsh reality facing many men in a society where motherhood is deemed sacred and single fatherhood is a rarity.

Men in Contemporary Russia is an intriguing study which deserves the attention of scholars of gender studies and students and researchers concerned with anthropology and sociology of Eastern and East Central Europe. As Kay herself states in the concluding chapter of the book, many of the predicaments and dilemmas facing Russian men are shared by men in many parts of the world. To reach further beyond the field of Russian and East European studies, the work would have profited from a more extensive and integrated use of comparisons with the growing internationally oriented literature on masculinities. Kay’s data material includes informants from different backgrounds and generations. The range of the material does not seem to be fully used in the analyses, in particular when it comes to differentiating between class and/or educational background. To achieve a better understanding of the life trajectories of individual men, it would have been an advantage if some cases had been developed more in-depth, rather than only quoting different informants quite briefly in relation to the topic discussed. Despite these few objections, the book is highly recommended for its novel perspectives on gender relations in Russia, and for its nuanced and well-informed discussions on complex and sensitive topics.

Haldis Haukanes, University of Bergen, Norway


Galina Lindquist presents a fascinating study of magic and healing in contemporary Russia. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in Moscow in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Conjuring Hope draws the reader into the personal lives and business activities of a group of Russian magi and their clients. Through careful attention to how magi and their clients approach magical healing as simultaneously a business enterprise, a project of self-making, and an existential experience, Lindquist sheds important light on changing labor practices and interpersonal relations in Russia. Specifically, Lindquist argues convincingly that magic and healing are transformational activities that enable Russians to deal with the uncertainties of daily life and work in the new Russia. Magical intervention provides Russians with such resources as the tools and self-assurance to engage in successful business transactions, the means for managing and healing emotional, physical, and social problems, and lucrative sources of symbolic and economic capital. Ultimately, through these activities Russians approach the
new world around them with a sense of hope and optimism, a perspective that departs strikingly from many recent studies that continue to insist on the bleakness of Russian daily life.

Lindquist frames her analysis of magical healing around themes of signification, meaning-making, and subjectivity drawn from the fields of semiotics and medical anthropology. She is particularly interested in the performative powers of magical activities and their practitioners, and how the effectiveness of magical healing is constructed and interpreted by magi and clients. To explain how magi gain and maintain their reputations and powers, Lindquist draws on Weber’s ideas about charisma and authority. It is also important to point out that Lindquist uses the term “magic” carefully by situating it within established scholarship in anthropology and social theory that presents magic not as a set of irrational, superstitious beliefs and rituals opposed to formal religious institutions on the one hand, and “rational” systems of science, medicine, and technology on the other, but rather as a system of practices that accomplishes the same goals of coping, transformation, and meaning-making.

The greatest strengths of this book are its ethnographic richness and Lindquist’s stance as a compassionate but critically engaged ethnographer. Lindquist does an excellent job of detailing a wide variety of healing practices (including prayers, spells, physical massage, energy channeling, to name a few) and putting these practices into their larger social, cultural, economic, and historical contexts. Despite the visibility of alternative healing systems in postsocialist societies, they have largely remained outside the focus of scholarly inquiry or, even worse, have been treated as exotica. By contrast, Lindquist demonstrates convincingly that these practices are deeply embedded in Russian cultural traditions. One of the most compelling details of Lindquist’s discussion is the compatibility of magical healing with both the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian medical system. Lindquist’s magi routinely incorporate religious elements (icons, prayers, and even attendance at religious services) into their treatments, and many have received formal medical training and certification. What Lindquist shows is the effectiveness of magical healing as one of many mainstream treatments in Russia today.

Where Lindquist’s analysis is less successful is its presentation of abstract and dense semiotic theory in ways accessible to nonspecialists. Additionally, despite the centrality of Weber’s ideas about charisma in Lindquist’s discussion, the analysis does not engage other Weberian themes in similarly fruitful ways. Not only would Weber’s concepts of vocation and calling productively illuminate how magi describe their activities as meaningful work, but more explicit attention to how her informants grapple with mystification and disenchantment might offer a compelling counterpoint to concerns raised by Weber and others about the dangers of modern, rationalized societies. Nevertheless, these shortcomings are minor and do not detract from a fascinating and informative book.

This ethnography should be of great interest to anyone concerned with the social worlds of religion, health, and business in Russia today. It would also fit nicely into undergraduate and graduate courses focusing on daily life in postsocialist societies.

Melissa L. Caldwell, University of California, Santa Cruz


Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, which started in October 2004 and ended in January 2005, emerged as a critical turning point not only in the history of post-1991 Ukraine and Russia but
also in the history of post-Communist democratizations. In a field of twenty-four candidates during the first round of voting for president on October 31, Viktor Yushchenko—the opposition candidate—allegedly won 39.87 percent of the ballots against 39.32 percent for Viktor Yanukovych, the prime minister, President Leonid Kuchma’s designated political heir and an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the runoff election on November 21, Yanukovych allegedly received 49.5 percent of the vote and Yushchenko—46.6 percent.

Prominent Western election observers claimed that both rounds did not conform to international standards for democratic elections. They reported widespread and systemic tampering of the voting lists, multiple voting, and the blatant use of governmental resources to steal the election on behalf of Yanukovych.

In response to the government’s manipulation of the electoral process, millions of Yushchenko’s orange-clad supporters protested the official results. His allies crowded into Independence Square in Kyiv and surrounded government buildings, bringing all official work to a standstill. They also demonstrated nonviolently in the main squares of other cities. This mass support for democratization and the rule of law broke all records within the post-Communist world. In reaction to the widespread political paralysis, the Ukrainian Supreme Court cancelled November’s disputed polls on Friday, December 3, and ordered a rerun of the November election for Sunday, December 26. In the last round of elections, Yushchenko won 52 percent of the vote and Yanukovych—48 percent. Yushchenko finally took the official oath of office on January 23, 2005.

In order to evaluate why this democratic breakthrough succeeded in light of the authorities’ unlimited administrative resources, Anders Åslund (Institute of International Economics) and Michael McFaul (Carnegie Endowment, Hoover Institution, and Stanford University) produced an excellent collection of essays which placed the events in Ukraine in the context of Eurasia’s post-communist politics. Each essay provides a different, but well-argued perspective. Åslund analyzed the relationship between President Leonid Kuchma and the oligarchs; Adrian Karatnycky (Freedom House)—the political opposition in Ukraine; Taras Kuzio (George Washington University)—everyday Ukrainians and the Orange Revolution; Nadia Diuk (National Endowment for Democracy)—civil society; Pavel Demes and Joerg Forbrig (German Marshall Fund of the United States)—the radical student group, Pora; Olena Prytula (Ukrains'ka pravda)—the media rebellion; Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko (Center for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv)—the U.S. and European Union influences; Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov (Carnegie Moscow Center)—Russia’s role; and McFaul—the Orange Revolution in comparative perspective.

As one of the first histories and analyses of the Orange Revolution, this collection concentrates on the emergence of the oligarchs and a civil society in Ukraine and their struggle for power in a semi-authoritarian, post-Communist state, where the government controlled most of the television and radio stations, but not newspapers or the internet. Åslund and McFaul correctly claim that four processes comprise the Orange Revolution: (1) the popular protests; (2) the negotiations between the regime and opposition mediated by Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, the European Union’s High Representative Javier Solana, and Russian State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov; (3) the actions taken by the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and the courts, especially the Constitutional Court; and (4) the pact of December 8 between the incumbents and the opposition that amended the constitution and weakened the power of the presidency (pp. 2-3). But while the editors and the authors discuss the first two developments, they did not review the last two in as much detail.

The pact of December 8 brought the demonstrations to an end and prepared the incumbent Kuchma-Yanukovych regime for inevitable defeat in the December 26 vote. This compromise brought Yushchenko to power, but weakened him after January 2006, when his administration and parliament began to implement this agreement. A detailed investigation of this negotiated
settlement is important in understanding Yanukovych’s victory in the March 2006 parliamentary elections and his comeback as prime minister in August 2006.

The editors might have also commissioned an essay to discuss the divisions between Eastern, Central, Southern, and Western Ukraine and to examine why Ukraine, a pivotal state in East Central Europe, remains a cleft country. Regional, linguistic, and cultural differences divide the country. Nearly half of all citizens of Ukraine believe that their future lies with Russia and with an economy dominated by the state. The other half hopes that their newly independent country will move closer to the West with its open markets, democratic institutions, transparency, and rule of law. What are the roots of these differences? How did they evolve in the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods? To what extent are these dissimilarities a natural phenomenon and what extent are they a consequence of past political manipulations? Why do supporters of Yanukovych think the way they think? Is this polarization a permanent feature of Ukrainian politics? This book supplies a superb appraisal of the motivations of the supporters of the Orange Revolution, but not that of its opponents.

Despite these two issues, this volume of essays provides an excellent initial assessment of the Orange Revolution. Everyone who follows the post-communist wave of democratizations should read this book.

George O. Liber, University of Alabama at Birmingham


Anthropologist Laada Bilaniuk focuses on the coexistence of Ukrainian and Russian in independent Ukraine, both at the level of ideology and of everyday linguistic practices. Bilaniuk argues that Ukrainian laws, such as the 1989 language law that made Ukrainian the sole official language of Ukraine, brought about the collapse of the Soviet linguistic market. The new laws indeed undermined the model of diglossia, in which Russian stood as the prestigious and authoritative “high language,” and Ukrainian as the low, peasant language. The challenge faced by the Ukrainian authorities in the wake of Ukrainian independence was to make a language many Ukrainians still associated with backwardness and low prestige into a state language and the marker of a national community.

Bilaniuk argues that a language’s legitimacy as a discrete entity is often tied to linguistic correctness, or the perception of language as an “immutable essence.” Correctness may be defined as “purity, antiquity, culturedness, or adherence to a particular codified norm” (p. 26). But while correctness has been at the center of language ideology in independent Ukraine, the author makes the case that language unity and homogeneity can never be fait accompli. Correctness is a social construct that needs to be constantly reproduced through ideological means. The author draws on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to illustrate how everyday language practices may reproduce the ideology of correctness. However, she also shows that the forces of heteroglossia described by Bakhtin can undermine the ideology of correctness. Through ethnographic interviews and life histories that chronicle individual language use and attitudes, she demonstrates how this engagement with language ideologies works.

Bilaniuk is also concerned with showing how language is involved in negotiating social power and shaping social hierarchies in Ukraine. She argues that linguistic values often index social values (p. 2). For example, labeling someone’s Ukrainian as mixed or impure (whether or not it is so) may not only discredit the individual speaker but also put into question the
legitimacy of Ukrainian identity itself. Mixed language forms are often the object of linguistic correction. One of those mixed forms is the so-called surzhyk, a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian languages that may occur at different levels, including morphology, lexicon, and syntax. Bilaniuk argues that surzhyk has become the new “low language” in Ukraine. Not only is it widely perceived as a marker of low culture and lack of education, but it is also seen by many as the antithesis of language correctness in Ukrainian and, by extension, as a threat to Ukrainianness itself. The author presents us with a useful description of the different sets of social conditions leading to the emergence of surzhyk. For example, she distinguishes between the surzhyk of urbanized peasants during the Soviet period and the surzhyk produced by Ukrainianization, as Russophone Ukrainians attempted to speak Ukrainian to comply with the language laws put in place after Ukrainian independence. Importantly, while acknowledging surzhyk’s rootedness in a history of Russification and linguistic inequality, Bilaniuk goes beyond the model of domination to address surzhyk’s “carnivalesque power,” exploring how its use (in the media, by certain performers) may constitute a counterhegemonic discourse and a challenge to ideologies of linguistic and cultural purity.

The author also addresses a different level of mixing that emerged in Ukraine during the last few years: nonreciprocal bilingualism. In contrast to surzhyk, this kind of mixing reproduces the ideology of linguistic purity or correctness. Nonreciprocal bilingualism occurs when each interlocutor speaks his or her language of preference, and may result in the two speakers using different languages. According to Bilaniuk, this instance of linguistic nonaccommodation helps to depoliticize language and diffuse tensions by emphasizing the factor of choice and the equality (at least in principle) of the two languages. However, she states that the practice of nonreciprocal bilingualism also goes against the idea that cultural and linguistic correctness must necessarily be achieved through the process of Ukrainianization.

Overall, the book is a thorough and insightful account of the struggle over linguistic and social values brought to the fore by Ukrainian independence. The book is well grounded in the history of language policies and practices in the country, and it makes clear to the readers what is at stake in the differentiation or rapprochement of two related Slavic languages. One can rightly ask what course Ukrainianization has taken since 2002, when Bilaniuk last conducted her research. I suspect that this would reveal that both in the last years of Kuchma’s presidency, and under Yushchenko’s presidency, the Ukrainianization project has been seriously neglected. This has implications for Bilaniuk’s analysis of nonreciprocal bilingualism, which, according to her, results in Russian and Ukrainian competing for the status of dominant language. But has the Ukrainianization process so fundamentally challenged Soviet language ideology as to make this a “fair” competition? For example, during the Soviet period, Russian was the “international language” through which the Soviet republics could access the world. A question Bilaniuk could have addressed in her book is whether Ukrainians are now accessing the world, and particularly the West, through Ukrainian or through Russian. The dominance in Ukraine of Russian-language media, Russian translations of world classics, Russian-language versions of Western software, and Russian instructions for Western products suggests that Ukraine is (still) accessing and now consuming the world mostly through the Russian language. An investigation of such everyday practices of consumption would have added to Bilaniuk’s analysis of the reproduction of language power and prestige.

Anna Fournier, Johns Hopkins University

This is a very timely volume. All attempts at prognostication in the social sciences are a risky business indeed. However, communism in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union collapsed more than fifteen years ago. Thus, the time has come to stop perceiving the development in the region as transitional, and to tentatively sum up its results. Moreover, it should be interesting to compare the problems that post-Communist countries are confronted with in regard to their ethnic and national minorities, as well as the ways they are dealing with these problems, with situations existing in other parts of the world. One may expect that this approach will contribute to a general theory of nationalism and the nation-state, and may even elaborate some practical recommendations, although the latter, as often in such cases, may remain on paper.

This was the main goal of the editors and authors of the volume under review, and they accomplished it quite successfully. Many theoretical observations made by the authors, like Beissinger’s discussion of empires, or Barany’s analysis of conditions of ethnic mobilization and Moser’s study of the role of ethnicity in election politics, or Kymlicka’s criticism of international legislation and policy on minority rights, exceed the case studies on which they are based.

The length constraints of this review do not allow me to discuss individual papers as much as they deserve. Thus, I can briefly consider only a handful of questions. Chirot draws attention to a dangerous but still much neglected merger of ethnic and religious conflicts. So far, the political correctness of both academics and politicians tends to play it down. However, recent developments and events in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and other countries point to its growing saliency. The role of external factors in ethnic relations and their regulation in the post-Communist world is discussed in several papers, and I am in full agreement with the authors about its importance in the current situation. The desire to be admitted to NATO and to the European Union, and the corresponding pressure by these organizations, have certainly played a very positive role in persuading some governments to reevaluate their policies and to somewhat alleviate ethnic tensions. Unfortunately, much less attention is paid to neo-imperialistic tendencies in Russia and to the detrimental role that she is playing in some ethnic conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russia’s support of breakaway movements in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestr, as well as her arbitrary and sometimes even provocative attitude to the plight of the Russian minorities in the “near abroad,” not infrequently, only fuels the conflicts and ethnic strife. Considering the “Russian factor,” Laitin’s optimistic prediction about double integration of the Russians in Estonia into Estonia and Europe, just like his previous prediction that the Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics would evolve into new ethnic or national formations, seems premature.

Hopefully, these and many other issues will not be neglected in future research. Right now, however, I can only congratulate the editors and authors with their well-deserved success.

Anatoly M. Khazanov, University of Wisconsin-Madison


The message this book conveys is that the Islamic revival in Central Asia in the late-Soviet and post-Soviet eras is about radical politics and that violence is the primary means towards the political ends. After a perfunctory historical sketch, the book focuses on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb at-Tahrir al-Islami, and the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan.
There are serious problems with the book’s assertions and the evidence on which they are based. Time and time again, the author attributes controversial information to anonymous sources, people in Central Asian security organizations, or transcripts of trials of people charged with Islamic activism in the region, as if those could be taken at face value. Sometimes he misrepresents what a source says. For example, he suggests that Hizb at-Tahrir has become involved in drug trafficking and, since September 11, has tried to develop connections with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Here, as on a number of other occasions, he does not state this as a direct assertion but uses passive, impersonal wording to indicate that this is an increasingly common accusation leveled against Hizb at-Tahrir (p. 183). The British source he quotes in support of the allegation presents this only as a rumor which may or may not be true (T. Makarenko, “The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism,” originally in Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2002, available from Cornell Caspian Consulting, http://cornellcaspian.com/briefs/020201_CA_Terrorism.html). Another technique the author uses repeatedly is to quote at length from documents supposedly from Hizb ut-Tahrir or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to demonstrate those organizations’ views, even though, as he acknowledges, the documents may be forgeries designed to discredit those organizations.

Sometimes what the author does not say is as important as what he does. For example, his discussion of a demonstration in the capital of Tajikistan in February 1990 gives the impression that the motive for the demonstration was hostility toward Armenians. Furthermore, he speculates that foreign countries, such as Iran, might have been behind the demonstration (p. 213). He offers no evidence to support his speculation about Iranian involvement, something serious scholars of the events do not believe existed. Although there was some public dissatisfaction that Armenian refugees from the Caucasus were rumored to be receiving preferential access to housing—in a city with an acute housing problem—ethnic antagonism was not the demonstrators’ main concern. What the author does not mention is the importance to the demonstrators of Tajikistan’s low standard of living relative to the rest of the Soviet Union or the hard line of the republican leadership, which seemed barely to have been touched by the spirit of the Gorbachev reforms. He also does not mention that the republic’s leadership, instead of attempting to conciliate or outmaneuver the demonstrators, used Ministry of Internal Affairs forces to shoot demonstrators and innocent bystanders, touching off a riot.

Another example of selective and skewed narrative is the discussion of the case of Musharraf Usmanova, whose two-year sentence for involvement in Hizb at-Tahrir was suspended by a Tashkent court in 2002, which the author interprets as Uzbekistani authorities acting humanely toward this pregnant mother of six to stave off Western criticism over human rights (p. 150). What the author does not mention in that context is that her first husband had been tortured to death by the Uzbekistani authorities after being arrested for possessing one piece of Hizb ut-Tahrir propaganda. Furthermore, Usmanova’s trial did not meet minimal standards of due process. According to Human Rights Watch, the case against her was based on “rumor and statements that witnesses retracted in court, citing pressure by law enforcement agents” (World Report 2003: Uzbekistan, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/europe16.html). The author appears to take a dim view of international human rights organizations which criticize the regime in Uzbekistan. Shortly after his discussion of the regime’s putative leniency toward Usmanova, in a section titled “Simulated Mourning,” the author mentions the death in custody of Farhad Usmanov, without identifying him as Usmanova’s husband. He uses Usmanov’s fate to argue that Islamists exploit international human rights organizations’ publicity of torture deaths to make Muslims in Uzbekistan think that the regime is repressive and anti-Islamic (p. 151).

This book is informative, albeit inadvertently, about a certain kind of hostility toward Islam and Muslims. However, it is not a reliable treatment of its titular subject.

Muriel Atkin, George Washington University