In addition to the account of Albanian diplomacy in the early 1990s, *The Myth of Greater Albania* provides particularly perceptive reports on Kosovo politics during the same time period (i.e., the Rugova-Bukoshi rift), as well on the origins and development of armed Albanian groups. As a former diplomat, Kola’s insight into contemporary Albanian issues is valuable and rarely heard. His future work might benefit from more open and developed first-person accounts, and I eagerly await his next book. A talented author, Kola has provided a valuable addition to the literature on nationalism and the Balkans.

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In 1877, in the heyday of imperial scrambles and national awakenings, Tsar Alexander II sent a multiethnic army to battle Ottoman forces on the ravaged Balkan peninsula. The violent collision of peoples that resulted deserves much greater attention than it has so far received. Russian monographs and articles on the war are rare, English ones are practically nonexistent. Though sections of broader monographs provide strong scholarly interpretations of this key event, a new book that focuses narrowly on the Russo-Turkish War is nevertheless most welcome.

The book under review is a revision of Teuvo Latila’s 2001 dissertation in anthropology at the University of Helsinki. Latila’s core primary sources are nine accounts of wartime experience written by Finns in the Russian army. Latila mines these sources in depth to address his own concerns about the experiences of ethnic minorities in the Russian imperial army, Finnish visions of the “orient,” and much else besides. He diligently addresses the broader theoretical literature and works hard (often too hard) to link his primary source material to that body of scholarship. The accounts of the war are interesting and rich in detail, and some of his interpretations are too. His investigation of the stylized war narrative as part of an evolving Finnish “public memory” is particularly convincing.

The primary problem with the book is that it is too patently a barely revised dissertation. Footnotes are often defensive rather than informative, and there is far too much discussion of various social theorists and the minor adjustments that Latila wants to make to their work. In addition, the structure leads to confusion rather than clarity. Seeking “to show the polyphony embedded in all historical narratives” (8), Latila chose to provide serial accounts of how each of his authors dealt with each of the chosen themes. In some of the nine core chapters of this type, he even runs through the sequence of authors for each subheading in the chapter. The result is a great deal of repetitiveness and very little coherence. Much that would be interesting is simply buried beneath this avalanche of loosely connected observations.

There is also real tension between the concerns that Latila wants to address, such as orientalism and the role of the war in Finnish nationalism, and the sources he uses. Latila clearly wants his soldiers to talk about “others” and “othering” but is forced to admit instead that “the guardsmen did not pay much attention to places or people they passed” (313) and that “very few guardsmen had a single consistent view of Turks, that is, the enemy” (226). Rather than a tension between Finnish nationalism and Russian imperialism, he finds instead remarkably consistent claims of loyalty to the emperor and a sense of purpose in their task. Latila’s response to this conflict between his sources and his research project is to repeatedly reinterpret what his sources said in ways that were more congenial to him or his dissertation committee. Thus, after one of his authors expresses a preference for highland Bulgarians over plains Bulgarians, Latila seeks answers in notions of civilization, urbanity, and Finnish disdain for the ethnic heterogeneity on the plains. His soldier had a rather different (and to my mind more convincing) explanation. The highland
village they quartered in happily offered them hospitality, while the plains villagers were rather grouchier about their homes and chickens being requisitioned.

In conclusion, though this book is on an important topic, it will reach only a very limited audience. Laitila brings together many different theories on soldiers, memory, culture, and narrative but does not develop one on his own. His work in the anthropological literature is stronger than his historical research. This is particularly true of Russian-language sources, which comprise only four of the hundreds of (mostly theoretical) entries in the bibliography. As noted above, the secondary literature is fairly small, so there seems to be little reason to ignore what has indeed been written by historians. For all of these reasons, I found myself wishing as I finished this book that Laitila had undertaken a more comprehensive revision of his dissertation. The book would have been much better if there had been a disciplined process of revision that focused the argument and cut the size in half. Better still would have been an expertly edited and introduced translation and republication of one or more of these memoirs, which highlight both the difficulties and attractions of Russian imperialism and military intervention.

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Karsten Brüggemann has produced a thorough and well-crafted study of the Petrograd front in the Russian civil war. Originally submitted as a doctoral dissertation at Hamburg University, it is the fruit of extensive research in Russian, Estonian, and German archives. Most histories of the war have tended to relegate Baltic events to the margins; but this was, as Brüggemann contends, an important theater of conflict. White forces under General Nikolai Judenich advanced from Estonia to the outskirts of Petrograd in October 1919; and among the principal outcomes of the fighting was the establishment of an independent Estonian Republic. Brüggemann presents the Petrograd front as a window into the kaleidoscopic complexity of the civil war. His book provides a finely woven analysis of how the conflicting agendas of Soviet communists, former imperial army officers, anti-Bolshevik Russian politicians, Estonian nationalists, elements of the Finnish army, British military forces, and others ultimately led to victory for both Estonians and Reds.

For Brüggemann the Petrograd front combined all the elements of the wider White failure. Paramount among these was the "paralyzing heterogeneity" (446) of a movement riven by clashes of ideology and personality. Steeped in the authoritarian atmosphere of the tsarist officer corps, the commanders of the White Northwest Army waged war to restore some semblance of the status quo ante 1917, perhaps in the form of a military dictatorship. They had little use for the democratic Russian politicians in the Northwest Government, an entity that had been forced on the generals as the price of British and Estonian collaboration. The Northwest Army was itself fractured by rivalry between Judenich and his field generals and by feuding between his personal staff and other elements in the command structure. Another fatal weakness was dependence on external support. The ragtag Whites could never have moved against Petrograd without British supplies and the direct assistance of better-led and organized Estonian forces. White political and military leaders, however, clung to the fading dream of a Russia restored to its prewar borders and were slow to appreciate the strength of the Estonian independence movement. Although postimperial realities ultimately forced Judenich to concede a grudging and conditional recognition of Estonian sovereignty, cooperation between these ill-matched allies was dogged by mutual mistrust. At the same time, Judenich’s concessions to the Estonians complicated his relations with White leaders in Paris and Siberia, none of whom endorsed the move, and even alienated some of his own officers, who began to entertain the hapless