of the Russian workers’ movement that portrays all important impulses as coming from the top down” (180).

Melancon joins the major debate in Russian historiography over whether Russia was evolving along a Western European path after 1905 and could have avoided a revolution if not for World War I. A key question in this debate is how fragmented tsarist Russia was from 1908 to 1914. In analyzing the procompany as well as the prowoker discourses that followed the massacre, Melancon is struck by the extent of sympathy displayed, particularly in the press and within the Duma, to the workers’ plight and the mass strikes that followed the massacre. From the far Right to the far Left, within all layers of society, everyone not only attacked the government along similar lines; they raised similar questions. Melancon suggests that this social consensus, “utterly unnoticed by historians” (181), should replace notions of social fragmentation emphasized decades ago by Leopold Haimson and developed by many historians since. In Haimson’s most recent work, Russia’s Revolutionary Experience, 1905–1917 (New York, 2005), no doubt published after Melancon’s book went to press, the across-the-board disgust in the Duma with the government’s explanations of the massacre are closely examined, but Haimson emphasizes that conservatives focused their fire on the Jewish director of the company and international capitalists. While I think Melancon has overstated the significance of society’s universal outrage at the shooting of unarmed strikers, this is a valuable study of the Lena goldfields massacre.

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The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia. By William C. Fuller Jr.


As any decent publisher looking at sales figures for The Rule of Four or The Da Vinci Code could attest, there is something deeply attractive about detective stories about historical conspiracies, especially those that stir in espionage, corruption, adultery, and war as part of the mix. All of these elements were present in the sensational events surrounding the trials of Colonel S. N. Miasoedov (in 1915) and General V. A. Sukhomlinov (in 1917) for treason. Though most at the time believed the men were guilty, many observers and later historians were convinced of their innocence. As a result, these have remained open cases. Thankfully, William Fuller has not mishandled such rich and compelling material. He has written a vibrant and learned account of these scandals that attempts not only to answer the core question of whether the two men really were guilty but also to assess the context in which the trials occurred. I hope he has acquired the film rights.

Fuller portrays Miasoedov as a talented man with significant flaws and very bad luck. A gendarme on the Russian-German border, he quickly made important contacts and began engaging in shady business deals that traded on his position of authority. He consorted freely with Germans, Poles, and Jews (even marrying Klara Gol’dshtein, the daughter of a wealthy German-Jewish immigrant) and took sides in the vicious commercial and political struggles that occupied the daily lives of so many in the waning years of the empire. In the process, he acquired powerful friends such as Sukhomlinov (minister of war, 1908–15) and determined enemies such as P. A. Stolypin (minister of internal affairs, 1906–11) and A. I. Guchkov (a visible leader of the Duma).
In 1912, as factional infighting in the military high command reached a peak, Miasoedov encountered real trouble. He was sent to investigate an anonymous accusation of treason made against General A. A. Polivanov, Sukhomlinov’s deputy and dangerous opponent. Polivanov and his ally Guchkov played hardball by turning the tables and leaking a story to the press that Miasoedov was the real spy. Miasoedov lost his cool, caned the publisher who ran the story, and challenged Guchkov to a duel. Miasoedov missed his shot, Guchkov fired into the air, and Sukhomlinov was forced to cut his former friend and ally loose. Being a bribe-taking agent who married a Jew and hunted with Germans had not hindered Miasoedov’s career. Losing a high-stakes political mudslinging battle, however, had basically ended it.

The outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 seemed to give Miasoedov a second chance at a career, but in fact it doomed him, since the political upheaval of the conflict turned his life history into the biography of a traitor. Germans and Jews were widely treated as treasonous by virtue of their ethnicity, and any past contact with them was suspect. Miasoedov was therefore in real trouble when a former prisoner of war fingered him as the man German intelligence had sent him to find as a contact person in Petrograd. It was a dubious accusation from the start, not least because Miasoedov was at the front with the Tenth Army and not in Petrograd. Even this fact, however, turned against Miasoedov, as the German success in the winter battle of Masuria in February 1915 came largely on his sector of the line. The defeat spurred a new round of national soul-searching and scapegoating. Miasoedov was the perfect fall guy. His enemies had an accusation in hand, and he fit the profile. Miasoedov was interrogated, tried, and hanged within a month of the Masurian disaster.

Fuller’s verdict on the case is that Miasoedov was not guilty. There were “egregious procedural irregularities” (137), and the evidence against him was deeply suspect. Even the military field court couldn’t see its way to finding him guilty of treason during the war, hanging him instead for looting. The distinction was ignored at the time, however, and Miasoedov was reviled as a traitor despite the flimsy case mounted against him. Soon afterward his erstwhile protector Sukhomlinov fell, sacked from his post in 1915, arrested in 1916, and then finally tried for treason by the revolutionary Provisional Government in 1917. The key piece of evidence used in his trial was a big chart with lines drawn between Sukhomlinov’s name and the names of convicted spies. There was virtually no evidence of any substantive transfer of information. Mere association was enough. Fuller is quite convincing when arguing that the prosecution failed to make a coherent case against either Sukhomlinov or Miasoedov.

On the broader issue of the relationship between these two high-profile cases and public opinion, Fuller is not quite as strong. He argues that the Miasoedov case “ignited the spy-catching frenzy” in 1915 (150), but the work of several recent historians has suggested that spy mania was fully aflame within weeks of the outbreak of the war. In addition, he relies very heavily on a single collection of soldier letters published in Krasnyi arkhiv in 1934 but does not take advantage of the many other soldier letter excerpts available in the Military History Archive in Moscow, where much of his other research was conducted. More extensive research into these newer primary and secondary resources would likely have strengthened some of the key points Fuller wanted to make.

This is, finally, an angry book. At the outset, Fuller makes clear that he believes that the conduct of those who prosecuted Miasoedov and Sukhomlinov legally and those who persecuted them politically was “vile” and “morally depraved” (8). Perhaps these moral failings were central, but the weakening of judicial processes, the strengthening of the notion of guilt by association, and the knowing destruction of innocent people
are all, alas, common symptoms of war fever. Russia was especially vulnerable to such a sickness in 1914, with weakly developed liberal institutions and a deeply polarized political system. But even states with more liberal experience and political stability have succumbed to a similar disease. If Fuller shows us anything, it’s that “fantasies” of insecurity can quickly become frighteningly real.

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Without question, Revolution on My Mind is a book that has been eagerly awaited. After the publication in the mid-1990s of the first extracts from diaries dating from the Stalinist era, historians have been led to revise a number of certitudes contained in the totalitarian paradigm. The interpretation that the Soviet Union created a society in which subjectivity had no place has now been decisively disproved. Speaking of oneself was, in fact, a widespread practice under Stalin, and in certain forms it was even encouraged by the party-state. Jochen Hellbeck offered a significant example of the genre in 1996, when he published (in German) the dnevnik of Stepan Podlubny, the young son of a kulak who lived with his mother in Moscow in the 1930s. Insight into this inner life showed that the interpretation dear to the hearts of “revisionists” was too shortsighted. This young man did indeed have hopes for social promotion, even for a career, but he really aspired to one thing alone: to conform and become socially, politically, and morally integrated into the system. His efforts to adapt cannot be reduced to strategic or opportunistic aspirations.

Personal involvement in the “construction of socialism” was in reality an attitude widely shared by Soviet citizens, as illustrated by the many private diaries that Hellbeck has unearthed and exploited for this volume. New questions arise, however: What do these writers impart to their diaries? Above all, what urges them to reason about their personal existence and even about their “soul,” to use a term common in the age? What ends are they pursuing? These are the questions that Revolution on My Mind attempts to answer. Hellbeck adopts a historiographical position that takes both ideology and subjectivity into account, thus creating a synthesis that (I am tempted to say, in a dialectical move) reaches beyond totalitarian and revisionist approaches. He remarks, quite rightly, that the function of ideology lies in its appropriation by the individual and that private diaries give us an insight into precisely that phenomenon. In his first chapter, “Rearing Conscious Citizens,” he reviews the principal characteristics of the ideal Communist activist, imbued with the cult of the future and focused on the political aim of furthering the societal project and the formation of the new man. Hellbeck views “the extraordinary appeal to the self” (362) as a feature specific to the Soviet Communist state. The individual is pressed from all sides to participate in the great socialist enterprise by fusing his personal life with it in an act of political “consciousness.” Such a process of transformation of the self springs from the precept that personal value is directly proportional to a person’s value for society and the “collective,” which in turn results from involvement and political and social activity.

Although such norms date from the Bolshevik era, they underwent a transformation with the Stalinist regime, in which more stress was put on individual responsibility. Society could no longer blame for one’s own shortcomings once the system was defined as “socialist.” At that point, it was the citizen’s task to reflect the Communist