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Assessing Attitudes on Policies Concerning the Non-Citizen Population

1.1 Introduction to Public Opinion

It well known and widely observed that policy preferences differ across racial groups in the United States (Kinder and Sanders, 1990; Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Gilens, 2000; Kinder and Winter, 2001; Griffin and Newman, 2008; Winter, 2008; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010). The literature on Black and White public opinion in particular highlights how these groups differ on general social and economic issues and especially on issues concerning race, such as affirmative action (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). More recently, scholars have considered new dividing lines in society, showing how ideology and opinions vary not only between Blacks and Whites, but also between these groups and other racial and ethnic groups most notably, Latinos (Griffin and Newman, 2008). In this chapter, I expand on existing studies of racial group opinions to consider how Whites, Blacks and Latinos view one particular dimension of policy: policy concerning non-citizen Latinos.

Because I explore a policy area that directly affects a subgroup of Latinos, I

also examine variation of opinion within the Latino community. Overall, it has been shown in the literature that Latino subpopulations differ considerably in their attitudes on both immigration and non-immigration related policies (de la Garza et al., 1992; Hood and Shirkey, 1997; Leal, 2007; Branton, 2007; Rouse, Wilkinson and Garand, 2010). For this reason, it is important to assess if and how preferences and priorities on policies concerning the non-citizen subpopulation vary across key Latino groups, particularly between non-citizen and citizen Latinos and across different generations within the Latino citizen population. By drawing such comparisons in this chapter, my goal is to determine whether lawmakers representing the interests of non-citizen Latinos are responding to the preferences of all constituents, just Latino constituents, or a subpopulation of the Latino community.

Results of my analysis show that while the Latino population is significantly more supportive of policies to benefit non-citizen Latinos when compared to other racial/ethnic groups, differences within the Latino population remain. Specifically, I find that attitudes vary across generational groups. While non-citizen and first-generation citizen Latinos are overwhelmingly in favor of policies to benefit the non-citizen population, second-plus generation Latinos are, in many cases, much less likely to favor these policies and are more likely to favor restrictionist measures. Tying to my theory of legislative ambition, these results suggest that lawmakers representing non-citizen Latinos are not working in the interest of all constituents, or even all Latino constituents but rather, are specifically working in line with the preferences of both first-generation Latino citizens and non-citizens themselves. My argument, which is tested in subsequent chapters, is that as the voting power (Griffin and Newman, 2013) of each of these subpopulations rises, i.e. as they make up larger proportions of either the short-term (in the case of first-generation citizen Latinos) or long-term (in the case of non-citizen Latinos) reelection constituency, lawmakers will be more likely to engage in activities to support non-citizen interests.

1.2 Non-Citizen Latino Interests

In this dissertation, my primary focus is on policies that concern the *specific* interests of non-citizen Latinos. In this case, it is important to draw a distinction between the *specific* and *general* interests of this group. I define specific interests as those policies and positions that concern one distinct group, in this case non-citizens Latinos, while general interests are those that are shared by more than one group. This distinction has been outlined most clearly for the Black and Latino population by Kathleen Bratton (2006). In analyzing the behavior of Latino lawmakers, Bratton considers how lawmakers respond to issues that specifically concern Latinos and those that are important to Latinos but are also relevant to other minorities. Issues such as education, health, welfare and policies concerning children are identified by Bratton as being important to Latinos, yet are also salient to other minority groups, including African Americans. On the other hand, there are also interests that Bratton identifies as specific to Latinos. These include "measures to decrease discrimination against Latinos or alleviate the effects of discrimination, measures designed to improve the economic status of Latinos, programs to address the specific needs of Latinos (including programs designed for LEP (Limited English Proficiency) students), programs designed to highlight Latinos contributions to American society, programs to address Latina pregnancy, and programs designed to protect the health, welfare and safety of migrant workers or new or illegal immigrants" (Bratton, 2006).

In this project, I further refine this categorization to consider the interests of a specific subset of the Latino population. In defining the interests of non-citizen Latinos, I consider both issues, policies, and programs that provide distinct benefits to non-citizen Latinos and those that produce distinct costs for this group. Measures to benefit non-citizen Latinos include: policies to provide non-citizens with access to benefits such as health care and education (including measures to grant non-citizens

in-state tuition rates), expand or institute new guest worker programs, allow the matricula consular[1] to be considered an acceptable form of identification, to remove citizenship requirements for access to children's benefits, prohibit the collection of immigration status information, programs to assist non-citizens in the naturalization process and programs to provide non-citizens who are victims of human trafficking access to protection and benefits. I also consider any programs designed to protect the health, welfare and safety of migrant workers or new or illegal immigrants a specific non-citizen Latino interest, although such measures were originally classified by Bratton as a "Latino interest" more broadly. Measures I examine that produce clear costs for non-citizen Latinos include policies that: increase border security measures, require proof of citizenship in order to obtain a driver's license or vehicle title, prohibit non-citizens from receiving certain public benefits (including welfare, health care, and child care), exclude non-citizens from access to worker's compensation programs, require law enforcement or public housing authorities to determine the immigration status of person, make it easier for law enforcement officials to arrest and transport unauthorized immigrants, ban the state from accepting consular identification, and require employers to use the E-verify database (a federally run employment verification program) to determine the immigration status and eligibility of their workers.

1.3   Data Sources: Attitudes on Non-Citizen Latino Interests

In the first part of this chapter, I examine White,[2] Black and Latino attitudes on issues that are classified as being in the specific interest of non-citizen Latinos. In order to examine the attitudes of these groups together, I rely on three primary

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[1] The Mexican Consular Identification Card

[2] In references White attitudes throughout this dissertation I am specifically referring to non-Hispanic Whites.

sources: the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES), the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (2006 CCES) and the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (2010 CCES). The 2008 ANES data is particularly useful for my purposes because the study contained an oversample of both Blacks and Latinos (Black; N=569, Latino; N=509). In the 2006 and 2010 CCES surveys, there are also large numbers of Black and Latino respondents (the 2006 CCES contained 3,389 Latino respondents and 3,693 Black respondents while the 2010 CCES contained 3,774 Latino respondents and 6,524 Black respondents).[3] While these three surveys do not cover the full range of specific non-citizen Latino interests, they do include a variety of questions that fall into this category, including those concerning opening a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, guest worker programs, and increasing immigration enforcement measures.

As a next step in my analysis, I examine variations in opinion *among* Latinos, assessing both citizen and non-citizen attitudes and attitudes across generational groups. I continue to rely on responses to the 2010 CCES survey mentioned above (as this survey contains large samples of both citizen and non-citizen Latinos), yet also draw on results from two additional surveys that only include self-identified Latino/Hispanic respondents: The 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS) and the 2007 National Survey of Latinos (NSL).[4] The LNS was conducted November 17, 2005 through August 4, 2006 and contains a sample of 8,634 Latinos. The NSL was conducted by telephone from October 3 through November 9, 2007 and contains a sample of 2,003 Hispanic adults. These surveys are particularly useful for this study because they include responses from a significant number of non-citizen and first-, and second-plus generation citizen Latinos[5] and they ask questions on more specific

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[3] However, some questions were only asked of a subset of people, thus reducing the sample White, Black and Latino respondents for these questions

[4] I do not use the 2008 ANES in this analysis because the survey only includes citizens respondents

[5] Non-citizens include both documented and undocumented non-citizens, first-generation Lati-

programs and policies that directly concern non-citizens including some questions that mirror those in the CCES and ANES, and additional questions on subjects such as immigrant identification and in-state tuition for undocumented college students.

1.4   Policy Preferences of Latinos, Whites, and Blacks

Many prior studies have found significant differences in opinion between Latinos, Blacks and Whites on a variety of policy issues and programs (Kinder and Sanders, 1990; Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Gilens, 2000; Kinder and Winter, 2001; Griffin and Newman, 2008; Winter, 2008; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010). In studies of Latino and White attitudes, scholars have found that in general, Whites tend to be more conservative on both broad social and economic policies and more race specific policies, including bilingual education and affirmative action (de la Garza et al., 1992; Uhlaner and Garcia, 2002; Leal, 2007; Griffin and Newman, 2008). On the issue of immigration in particular, scholars have shown that Latinos are typically more supportive of granting benefits to immigrants and are more likely to favor open immigration policies when compared to Non-Hispanic Whites. While Griffin and Newman (2008), find that approximately equal portions of Latinos and Whites believe that the rate of immigration to the United States is a serious problem, other scholars find that the attitudes of Whites on specific policies concerning immigration and the rights of non-citizens/undocumented immigrants are much more restrictive. Binder et al (1997) for example, compared the attitudes of Mexican Americans and Whites and found that Mexican Americans are far more likely to favor policies granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants and admission to public schools for children of undocumented immigrants. A more recent study conducted by Rocha et al (2011) concluded that Whites are generally more likely to believe that

nos are individuals who were born outside of the U.S. and became naturalized and second-plus generation Latinos are individuals who were born in the United States.

immigrants have a negative impact on the economy, that the U.S. should decrease levels of immigration, and that the U.S. should work to build a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border. However this study, along with others in field (Berg, 2009; Hopkins, 2010), suggest that these anti-immigrant sentiments of Whites are often conditional on the ethnic context in which they live. Other factors such as media exposure, acculturation fear, and immigrant skill level are also found to affect White attitudes (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Branton et al., 2011; Dunaway et al., 2011).

Several scholars assessing the attitudes of African Americans focus on the differences between this group and Whites. Such studies generally conclude that the mean opinions of Blacks and Whites differ considerably on issues directly related to race such as affirmative action, job discrimination, and civil rights, and somewhat less so on implicit racial issues such as education, health care and welfare spending (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Lubin, 1997; Canon, 1999). On the issue of immigration, results concerning the differences between Black and White attitudes have been mixed. Some scholars have found that while Black and White opinions on the issue of immigration are very similar, Blacks tend to be somewhat less supportive of restrictive immigration policies (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Canon, 1999). Newer studies have concluded that despite rising economic competition between Blacks and Latinos (McClain, 1993; Camarota, 1998; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson, 2006), African Americans continue to hold more liberal views on the immigration issue largely because they base their opinions on symbolic considerations rather than economic factors. Brader et al (2010), for instance, argue that because Blacks identify with oppressed groups, including immigrants, they tend to take less restrictive or punitive positions on immigration-related policies. In this study, it was found that in comparison to Whites, Blacks are less likely to support decreasing immigration levels overall and are less supportive of hunting down and deporting illegal immigrants. They are also more likely to favor providing benefits to illegal immigrants and more likely to

say that immigrants improve American culture (Brader et al., 2010). On the other hand, McClain et al (2009) find that economic tensions between Blacks and Latinos are becoming more prominent, especially in some southern states, and as a result, Blacks are beginning to feel threatened by the Latino immigrant presence. Such results imply that in certain contexts, Black attitudes on immigration may be more restrictive.

To date, no studies have directly compared the opinions of Blacks and Latinos on the issue of immigration. While existing research suggests that Black and Latino attitudes may be closer than White and Latino attitudes, direct comparisons have yet to be made. In this analysis, I assess the relation between Black, White *and* Latino attitudes on policies and issues that specifically concern the non-citizen portion of the immigrant population. In examining attitudes of all three of these groups, my goal is not only to determine whether attitudes vary by race, but also to evaluate whether Whites, Blacks, and Latinos align or diverge on these issues. By comparing Black and Latino attitudes and White and Latino attitudes directly, I will be able to determine which groups, if any, share opinions on policies affecting non-citizens. These results will have important implications for studies of coalition formation and policy development on the issue of immigration and the rights of non-citizens.

1.5   Measurements: Latino, White, and Black Attitudes

To examine attitudes on policies and programs directed at non-citizens, I rely on two questions from the 2008 ANES, two questions from the 2006 CCES, and one question from the 2010 CCES. To begin, I consider questions that address the issue of providing a path to citizenship or granting legal status to undocumented or illegal immigrants. Each of the three surveys asks some version of the 'path to citizenship' question, thus I find it appropriate to examine responses to these questions together. The 2008 ANES asks respondents whether they "favor, oppose, or neither favor nor

oppose the U.S. government making it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens."[6] The 2006 CCES includes a similar question, asking respondents whether they would support a Senate proposal that would "open a path to citizenship for current illegal immigrants" or a House proposal, which "contains stricter enforcement and deportations of undocumented aliens."[7] Finally, the 2010 CCES asks a question on what Congress and the President should do about immigration, giving respondents the option of selecting all responses that apply, one of which is to "grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least three years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes."[8] Although these three questions differ in structure and wording, because they all deal with the issue of providing a path to citizenship or legal status for *illegal* immigrants specifically, I am confident that they are tapping into the same dimension of the issue and therefore, that responses will be comparable. Given that the structure of these questions differ, there is also the added benefit of using these three surveys, as they provide additional robustness checks on attitude variation between racial/ethnic groups on this issue.

As a next step in my analysis, I consider questions on the issue of temporary or guest worker programs for non-citizen immigrants. The 2008 ANES asks respondents whether they "favor, oppose or neither favor nor oppose allowing illegal immigrants to work in the United States for up to three years, after which they would have

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[6] In generating a dependent variable using this question, I code those who favor making it possible for illegal immigrants to become citizens as "1", those who oppose as "-1" and those who neither favor nor oppose as "0."

[7] For my purposes, I code responses to this question as a "1" if the respondent favors the Senate policy (opening a path to citizenship) and a "0" if he/she favors the House policy (mandating stricter enforcement and deportations of illegal aliens)

[8] Using this question, I generate a variable that is coded as a "1" if the respondent selected the option of granting legal status to illegal immigrants and "0" if the respondent did not select this option. Other options given to respondents include: "fine businesses that hire illegal immigrants," "increase the number of guest workers allowed to come legally to the U.S.," "increase the number of border patrol on the U.S.-Mexican border," and "allow police to question anyone they think may be a in the country illegally."

to go back to their home country."[9] The second question I use to assess attitudes on guest worker programs is drawn from the 2010 CCES. Again, the question on the 2010 CCES asks respondents what Congress and the President should do about immigration, with one of the response options being "increase the number of guest workers allowed to come legally to the U.S."[10]

While I analyze these questions together (as they both address the acceptability of guest worker programs), unlike with the previous set of questions on providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, I do not claim that they are measuring the same attitude. To the contrary, I argue that they are actually tapping into different dimensions of the debate on guest worker programs. While the 2008 ANES asks about the acceptability of allowing *illegal immigrants* to work temporarily in the U.S., the 2010 CCES asks about increasing the number of *legal* guest workers to the U.S. Essentially, these two questions are priming different sides of the legality aspect of guest worker programs and for this reason, I except responses to differ across these questions and also between Whites, Blacks, and Latinos.

Finally, I examine two additional response options to the 2010 CCES question on immigration, both of which address immigration enforcement measures that produce clear costs for non-citizens. In response to the question "What do you think Congress and the President should do about immigration?" respondents are given the option of selecting "increase the number of border patrol on the U.S.-Mexican border" and "allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally." For each of these possible responses, I create a variable denoting whether the respondent selected that option (coded as "1") or whether they did not (coded as "0").

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[9] I code this question as I did the previous ANES question, with a "1" representing those who favor the policy, a "-1" representing those who oppose and a "0" representing those who neither favor nor oppose the policy.

[10] In my analysis, I generate a variable noting whether the respondent selected this option (coded as "1") or whether they did not (coded as "0").

For each of the dependent variables I create using these three surveys, I estimate either a logit model or an ordered logit model with race/ethnicity of the respondent serving as the key independent variable(s) of interest. I only include Latino, Black and non-Hispanic White survey respondents in my analysis, generating independent indicators for non-Hispanic Whites[11] and Black[12] while keeping Latino/Hispanics as my out group. I also include a number of controls in my models that have been shown to shape attitudes toward immigration policy. These include standard socioeconomic and demographic factors such as household income, gender, and education (Binder, 1997). I also include a measure of age and partisan identification (Democratic and Republican indicators) and a control for a respondent's religion, which I measure using an indicator of Roman Catholic religious affiliation. I include this measure because previous research has shown that Roman Catholics are more likely to feel empathy for, and are thus more supportive of, policies to benefit racial and ethnic minorities when compared to members of other religious denominations (Fetzer, 1998; Knoll, 2009).

The 2008 ANES also allows me to control for a variety of additional factors that have been seen to condition attitudes on immigration. Specifically, in the ANES models I include a Latino stereotype measure (generated using a question asking respondents to place Latinos on a 7-point scale ranging from "hardworking" to "lazy") and a Latino feeling thermometer.[13] Previous studies have shown that these group valuation measures have a significant effect on immigration attitudes, especially in recent years as the debate on immigration has become closely tied to the Latino community (Ayers et al., 2009; McClain, 2009; Branton et al., 2011). In addition, I include a Moral Tolerance measure, drawn from a scale developed by Conover and

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[11] 1:non-Hispanic White; 0:otherwise

[12] 1:Black; 0:otherwise

[13] Which is normalized to a "0" to "1" scale

Feldman (1999). This scale measures an individual's acceptance of cultural change and changing moral standards. The items used to compile this scale ask respondents about adjusting "our view of moral behavior"; the extent to which "newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society"; the degree to which we "should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are different from our own"; and the belief that the "country would have fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties." These items are Likert-scored and the resultant scale is coded from "0" to "1," with higher scores reflecting a higher level of moral tolerance and acceptance of change. Using a similar scale, Branton et al (2011) found that since 9/11, an individual's level of moral tolerance has come to have a significant effect on immigration attitudes. Specifically, these scholars discovered that individuals who are less morally tolerant, or in other words, those with higher levels of moral traditionalism, are much more likely to favor a decrease in immigration levels to the United States.

1.6 Results: Latino, White, and Black Attitudes

Beginning with the assessment of attitudes on providing a path to citizenship or granting legal status to undocumented or illegal immigrants, I find that significant differences exist across racial/ethnic groups. As shown in Table 1.1, Latinos are significantly more likely to support policies to grant legal status or provide a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants than Blacks or non-Hispanic Whites, even when controlling for key socioeconomic, demographic and even attitudinal factors.

Figure 1.1, which shows the predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals on these estimations,[14] demonstrates that while Black and White attitudes are often very close or even indistinguishable on these issues, Latino attitudes are significantly

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[14] I estimate these predicted probabilities for male, Democratic, non-Catholics with income, education and age set at the sample mean.

Table 1.1: Latino, White and Black Attitudes: Path to Citizenship

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
	ANES 2008	**2006 CCES**	**2010 CCES**
Non-His White	-0.729**	-1.039**	-1.094**
	(0.230)	(0.088)	(0.072)
Black	-0.928**	-1.252**	-0.863**
	(0.231)	(0.124)	(0.086)
Income	-0.027	0.005	0.020**
	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Education	0.200**	0.278**	0.159**
	(0.068)	(0.020)	(0.012)
Female	0.249	0.126*	0.169**
	(0.163)	(0.050)	(0.033)
Age	0.015	-0.446**	-0.161**
	(0.105)	(0.035)	(0.023)
Democrat	0.124	0.937**	0.611**
	(0.191)	(0.055)	(0.038)
Republican	0.100	-1.315**	-0.796**
	(0.230)	(0.070)	(0.044)
Catholic	0.036	-0.257**	-0.002
	(0.209)	(0.063)	(0.041)
Latino Stereotype	-0.012		
	(0.407)		
Moral tolerance	2.989**		
	(0.646)		
Latino Thermometer	1.477**		
	(0.433)		
Constant		-0.016	0.112
		(0.156)	(0.094)
Intercept (Cut 1)	2.019**		
	(0.588)		
Intercept (Cut 2)	2.786**		
	(0.594)		
N	944	12531	45694
Pseudo R^2	0.0590	0.1757	0.0806

$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$

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different in every case.[15] The probability that a Latino individual supports "the U.S. government making it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens" (ANES 2008), is approximately 0.70, while it is below 0.50 for both Black and non-Hispanic White individuals. Similarly, the probability that a Latino individual supports a policy to "open a path to citizenship for current illegal immigrants" (CCES 2006) is 0.72, while again, it is below 0.50 for both Black and non-Hispanic Whites. With the question wording changed slightly in the 2010 CCES to address granting *legal status* as opposed to a *path to citizenship*, both Whites and Blacks demonstrate higher levels of support. In line with existing literature, responses to this question actually show Blacks as being significantly more supportive of this policy than Whites (with predicted probabilities of support of 0.56 and 0.53 respectively). That said, the likelihood of Black and White individuals supporting such a policy is still significantly lower than that for Latinos.

Moving forward to assess attitudes on guest worker programs, as predicted, I find that the two questions asked by the 2008 ANES and 2010 CCES seem to be triggering different underlying preferences. Evaluating the ANES question on support for a policy "allowing illegal immigrants to work in the United States for up to three years, after which they would have to go back to their home country," I find significant differences between racial groups, with both non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks significantly less likely to favor this policy when compared to Latinos (see Table 1.2).[16] However, in evaluation of the question on the 2010 CCES on support for increasing "the number of guest workers allowed to come legally to the U.S," no significant differences between the three groups are revealed. What this suggests is that the legal status of non-citizen individuals in question substantively affects

[15] For descriptive statistics on these questions, see Table **??** in Appendix A.

[16] Generating predicted probabilities, it is found that, all else being equal, the probability that a Latino supports a three-year guest worker program for illegal immigrants is 0.41, while for non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks the probability of support is much lower (0.18 and 0.26 respectively).

FIGURE 1.1: Probability of Support: Path to Citizenship/Legal Status

group attitudes. The implication of this is that certain policies, particularly those concerning legal non-citizens or programs to recruit legal guest workers, may gain a wider range of support. If it is assumed that lawmakers are driven by the interests of their constituents, then we can expect that these high levels of support may in turn, factor into a lawmaker's decision calculus and perhaps result in policy development and implementation.

On questions concerning immigration enforcement measures, or measures that are seen as producing distinct costs for non-citizen Latinos, I find that of the three groups, Whites are the most likely to favor such policies. Of the 2010 CCES sample

Table 1.2: Latino, White and Black Attitudes: Guest Worker Programs

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
	2008 ANES	**2010 CCES**
Non-His White	-0.805**	-0.276
	(0.210)	(0.418)
Black	-0.455*	-0.588
	(0.231)	(0.512)
Income	-0.024	0.073*
	(0.023)	(0.029)
Education	0.040	0.241**
	(0.023)	(0.064)
Female	-0.125	-0.478**
	(0.161)	(0.170)
Age	0.255*	0.106
	(0.108)	(0.131)
Democrat	-0.202	-0.014
	(0.185)	(0.199)
Republican	-0.455*	-0.564**
	(0.232)	(0.208)
Catholic	0.392†	-0.219
	(0.218)	(0.225)
Latino Stereotype	-0.038	
	(0.378)	
Moral tolerance	2.744**	
	(0.592)	
Latino Thermometer	1.149**	
	(0.408)	
Constant		-1.900**
		(0.568)
Intercept (Cut 1)	2.398**	
	(0.583)	
Intercept (Cut 2)	3.368**	
	(0.591)	
N	940	2000
Pseudo R^2	0.0599	0.1757

$\dagger p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01$

of respondents, 65% of Whites said they support a policy to "increase the number of border patrol on the U.S.-Mexican border" while 49% of Blacks and only 41% of Latinos said the same. Upon statistical analysis of this question, I find that these differences across racial/ethnic groups are significant (see predicted probabilities presented in Figure 1.2). On the issue of whether to "allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally," support levels drop for all three groups, however, as seen in Figure 1.2, Whites remain the most supportive, with predicted probability of support at approximately 0.36. Overall, these results fall in line with those presented in existing literature. While Blacks are seen as less likely to favor restrictive immigration policies when compared to Whites, perhaps for symbolic reasons (Brader et al., 2010), their level of support for such measures continue to exceed that of Latinos.

Taken together, the results for all three surveys suggest that clear attitudinal differences exist across racial/ethnic groups on many policies concerning non-citizens. While available data does not allow for the assessment of attitudes across all "specific" non-citizen Latino interest policies, available sources show that this issue area is not one that sees a wide range of consensus. Although Whites, Blacks and Latinos seem to be in relative agreement on certain policies concerning legal non-citizens, the gap between these groups, and especially between Latinos and the rest of the population, on policies addressing the undocumented population is significant. Particularly on policies to restrict undocumented immigrants, it is found that Whites are the most supportive by far. On the other hand, in terms of policies to benefit non-citizens and especially undocumented non-citizens, Whites show the lowest levels of support with Blacks following as a close second.

When assessing the political representation of non-citizen Latino interests, these attitudinal differences become extremely important. In seeking to understand who is represented in American society, scholars work to establish who's preferences are

17

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Predicted Probability=1.0

0.56
0.48
0.29
0.36
0.20
0.13

Increase Border Security   Police Questioning

**Survey Question: CCES 2010**

⊠ Latino   ⊡ White   ☐ Black

FIGURE 1.2: Probability of Supporting Restrictive Enforcement Measures

being reflected in policy outputs (see Enns (2011) for a review of these works). In this instance, I find that lawmakers developing policy to address the interests of non-citizen Latinos are not working in line with the preferences of all racial/ethnic groups, but rather are, in many cases, working against the demands of certain subgroups.

1.7 Latino Policy Preferences: Citizens vs. Non-Citizens and Across Generations

While in the aggregate, Latino opinions on many policies concerning the non-citizen and especially the "illegal" or undocumented population in the United States diverge considerably from those of Whites and Blacks, it would be a mistake to assume that

Latino attitudes on these policies are simply uniform. Studies to date suggest that Latino opinion on a variety of policies, including immigration, vary by a number of factors including ethnicity, generational level and degree of cultural assimilation (Miller, Polinard and Wrinkle, 1984; Polinard and de la Garza, 1984; Binder, 1997; Hood and Shirkey, 1997; Branton, 2007; Rouse, Wilkinson and Garand, 2010). Citizenship status has also been seen to affect Latino attitudes, however, there are relatively few studies that have directly examined citizen and non-citizen opinions on specific aspects of the immigration debate, including issues that directly concern non-citizens. Michelson (2001) includes citizenship status in her analysis of the effect of national mood on Latino opinions, but she does not consider how citizenship status conditions support or opposition for certain policies. Similarly, Sanchez (2006) examines how citizenship status affects Latino opinion on issues such the death penalty, abortion, and immigration levels, however he does not test whether it conditions opinions on policies directly concerning non-citizens. Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand (2010) include a measure of citizenship in their model of Latino attitudes toward legal and illegal immigration, but only find it to have a significant affect on attitudes toward levels of legal immigration.

In an effort to expand on the existing literature and more closely examine the dynamics of both Latino citizen and non-citizen attitudes, I continue to reply on the 2010 CCES, yet also go further to assess responses to two additional surveys of Latinos specifically: the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS) and the 2007 National Survey of Latinos (NSL). I not only consider whether attitudes vary by citizenship, but also whether they vary across different generational groups within the Latino citizen population.

The primary argument driving this analysis is drawn from the literature on self-interest and policy preferences, which claims that individuals will make decisions based out of self-interest when the policy in question offers clear benefits or costs

(Sears and Funk, 1991; Citrin et al., 1997; Chong, Citrin and Conley, 2001). In the case of policies concerning non-citizen Latinos (including the undocumented population), I argue that those individuals who have dealt with immigration, i.e. they are or once were non-citizens, will be more likely to gain personal benefits from more relaxed or less restrictive immigration policies. In turn, it is these individuals that will be more likely to support policies to benefit non-citizens when compared to those who are further removed from the immigration experience.

In evaluating this claim, an important place to begin is by examining the effect of citizenship on attitude formation. In contrast to citizens, non-citizens are likely to have more personal experience with immigration and current immigration-related policies and thus, are the most likely Latino subgroup to benefit from pro-non-citizen related policies. In addition, because these individuals are not citizens, they may face direct personal costs as a result of harsh immigration enforcement measures. In making such predictions however, I do not assume that all Latino citizens are more likely to oppose more liberal immigration policies and policies to benefit non-citizens, nor do I assume that attitudes are uniform across the entire Latino citizen population. Rather, I continue to draw on existing literature to make the prediction that as Latino citizens become further removed from the process of immigration or experiences where they themselves lacked citizenship status, they will be less likely to see personal benefits from more relaxed immigration policies and policies that benefit non-citizens and therefore, will be less likely to support these policies. This prediction falls in line with existing studies of Latino public opinion which show that as generational status increases, Latinos become less inclined to support more liberal polices related to immigration and the immigrant population (Miller, Polinard and Wrinkle, 1984; Polinard and de la Garza, 1984; Binder, 1997; Hood and Shirkey, 1997; Branton, 2007; Rouse, Wilkinson and Garand, 2010).[17]

[17] In addition to finding that generational status affects Latino attitudes, many scholars have

By assessing policy preferences across the Latino population, my hope is to 1) expand on existing analyses of Latino public opinion and 2) consider how preference diversity is affecting policy outputs. My argument, which is developed more thoroughly in later chapters, is that attitudinal differences across generations matter to lawmakers and thus, the generational make-up of the Latino population across legislative districts has significant consequences for non-citizen political representation.

1.8 Measurements and Results: Latino Citizens and Non-Citizens Attitudes

In conducting my analysis of Latino attitudes, I begin by examining differences between citizens and non-citizens. As in the section above on Latino, White and Black attitudes, I focus on questions on issues such as opening a path to citizenship/legal status for illegal immigrants, guest worker programs, and increasing immigration enforcement measures. Given the nature of the LNS and the NSL, I am also able to include additional questions on measures classified as *benefiting* non-citizens specifically.

One of the key issues that was seen as dividing Latinos, Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites was the issue of providing a path to citizenship/legal status for undocumented immigrants. Using the 2010 CCES and the 2006 LNS, I have the ability to assess attitudes on this issue within the Latino community. Again, the 2010 CCES question on this issue asks what Congress and the President should do about immigration,

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determined that the process of acculturation, or acquiring "American" cultural traits, also influences policy attitudes. The argument is that as Latinos adopt American culture or become socialized in American traditions (i.e. they begin to speak English, identify as American and express support for American symbols), they begin to take up policy positions that mirror those of the majority population, which on the issue of immigration, are far more conservative and restrictive (Binder and Wrinkle, 1997; Branton, 2007). The underlying logic is that as a result of adopting American traits, Latinos become involved in social networks that provide uniquely "American" political information and as a result, they begin to adopt native political values that are different from values drawn from their country of origin (Tam Cho, 1999). While my primary concern is generational differences in attitudes, I consider this acculturation argument, using measures of cultural acquisition, specifically those assessing language dominance, in a variety of robustness checks.

giving respondents the option of selecting all responses that apply, one of which is to "grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least three years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes." Using the dependent variable generated using this question, I estimate a logit model with the key independent variable of interest being the citizenship status of the individual respondent, which is coded as a "1" for citizen Latinos and a "0" for non-citizen Latinos.[18]

Through my analysis, I find that even when controlling for key socioeconomic and demographic factors (income, education, gender, age, political partisanship, and religious affiliation), citizenship status remains a significant factor affecting preferences on this issue (for results, see Table ?? of the Appendix). As seen in Figure 1.3, it is clear that non-citizen Latinos are significantly more likely to support granting legal status to illegal immigrants than citizen Latinos, Blacks, and Whites.

Looking at a similar question in the 2006 Latino National Survey, I am able to further examine Latino citizen and non-citizen preferences on this topic.[19] On the LNS, respondents were asked about their "preferred policy on undocumented or illegal immigration" with one of four options being the "immediate legalization of current undocumented immigrants." Although this option is less detailed and perhaps more lenient than the one provided on the 2010 CCES, it remains comparable as it addresses the same issue of legalization. Unlike the CCES, however, the LNS does not allow respondents to choose all responses that apply. Instead, individuals can favor "immediate legalization of current undocumented immigrants," "a guest worker program leading to legalization eventually," "a guest worker program that permits immigrants to be in the country but only temporarily," *or* "an effort to seal

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[18] In the CCES sample, there are 3,586 citizen Latinos and 188 non-citizen Latinos.

[19] This survey included only Latino respondents. The sample of citizen Latinos was 4,260, while the sample of non-citizen Latinos was 3,474.

FIGURE 1.3: Probability of Support: Path to Citizenship/Legal Status (Including Non-Citizen Latinos)

or close the border to stop illegal immigration." Due to the nature of the question wording, I assess all responses to this question in one model, using a dependent variable coded from "0" (most restrictive, i.e. sealing the border) to "3" (least restrictive, i.e. immediate legalization).

Estimating an ordered logit model using this variable, I find, as in the previous model, that citizenship significantly affects attitudes. As seen in Figure 1.4, non-citizen Latinos are much more likely than citizen Latinos to favor the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants. Holding all else equal, being a citizen as opposed to a non-citizen decreases one's probability of support for immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants by 0.20 (from 0.52 for non-citizens to 0.31

FIGURE 1.4: Probability of Supporting Various Policies on Illegal Immigration (LNS 2006)

for citizens).[20]

Overall, non-citizen Latinos were more likely to select the legalization option while citizens were more likely to select the option to allow for a "a guest worker pro-

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[20] Other factors having a significant affect on responses to this question include income, education, gender, age, party identity (with Republicans being much more likely to favor more restrictive measures), ethnic identity (with Puerto Ricans being more likely to favor more restrictive measures) and a measure of linked fate (Dawson, 1994) The measure of linked fate, developed using a question on whether that respondent felt that their "doing well" depended on whether other Latinos/Hispanics were also "doing well," was positively associated with more liberal/less restrictive policy choices. This result falls in line with those found in the literature on African American policy attitudes, which shows that group interests are closely linked to both racial and economic policy preferences. For a table showing full results, see see Table **??** in the Appendix.

gram leading to legalization eventually."[21] On the whole, compared to non-citizens, citizens were also more likely to choose the option of creating a temporary guest worker program.[22] As noted above, when assessing attitudes across the different racial/ethnic groups, the issue of guest worker programs seems to trigger very different responses depending on whether the program in question addresses legal or illegal workers. However, using the LNS I am only able to gauge levels of support for guest worker programs for *illegal* immigrants and perhaps to a detriment, the choice to support such programs is made relative to other policy options. Unfortunately, this is the only question I am able to use to gauge Latino citizen and non-citizen attitudes on the issue of guest worker programs, as the sample of Latinos responding to the related question on the 2010 CCES is too small. That said, it is expected that response patterns on questions concerning legal guest worker programs would mirror those found across racial/ethnic groups, with citizen and non-citizen Latinos expressing equal levels of support for these programs. However, in order to make this claim with certainty, additional survey questions, with large Latino citizen and non-citizen responses, would need to be asked and examined.

The final issue area seen as dividing Latino, White and Black attitudes in the section above concerned immigration enforcement measures, such as increasing border security and allowing police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally. The question on preferred policies on undocumented immigration from the LNS gives respondents the option of selecting a policy to "seal or close the border to stop illegal immigration." As shown in Figure 1.4, although overall support for this response was quite low,[23] citizen Latinos are found to be significantly more likely to

[21] Of the sample, 32% (1,358) of citizen Latinos and 65% (2,245) of non-citizens selected the option of immediate legalization. 44% (1,880) of citizens and 24% (834) of non-citizens selected the option of work to legalization.

[22] 15% (651) of citizens and 10% (350) of non-citizens respondents in my sample selected this option.

[23] With 8.7% (371) of citizen respondents and 1.3% of non-citizen respondents in my sample

favor this option when compared to non-citizen Latinos (with predicted probabilities at 0.07 and 0.03 respectively). In contrast, my assessment of Latino responses on the 2010 CCES question on immigration enforcement policies reveals no significant differences between citizen and non-citizen Latino opinions, as both groups are equally likely to oppose both increasing border patrol and allowing police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally. One potential reason for this result may be the small sample size of non-citizen Latinos, as they only made up about 5% of the Latino respondents in the CCES. However, it is also possible that such policies are triggering equal levels of opposition because they are presenting costs to both citizen and non-citizen Latino individuals. Policies to allow "police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally," for instance, may result in a form of racial profiling in which all Latinos, regardless of their citizenship status, are more likely to be stopped and questioned by authorities. This has reportedly become a concern among all Latinos with the passage of recent state-level immigration policies, most notably, Arizona's SB 1070 (Barreto, Segura and Sanchez, 2012).

Confirmation of this shared level of opposition among both citizen and non-citizen Latinos to such policies is provided by the National Survey of Latinos (2007) which, like the 2010 CCES, includes a question on whether local police should work to identify undocumented immigrants.[24] A first cut analysis of Latino attitudes on this question again reveals no significant difference between citizens and non-citizen attitudes (see column 1 of Table 1.3).[25] Estimating a model with a binary dependent variable (with a "1" reflecting support for police taking an active role in identifying undocumented immigrants and a "0" reflecting support for "enforcement to be left

supporting this option.

[24] The exact question wording is: "Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?"

[25] Of the sample, 8.7% (65) of non-citizen Latinos and 18% (196) of citizen Latinos supported this policy.

up to federal authorities") and assessing the results, I find that among both groups, the probability of supporting this measure remains less than 0.14.

Factors that do distinguish individuals, as seen in Table 1.3, are party identity, as Republicans are significantly more likely to support this policy. I also find that feelings of discrimination against Latinos are significantly related to attitudes on this issue. I include this indicator of discrimination (measuring whether respondents feel discrimination against Latinos/Hispanics is a major problem, minor problem or not a problem at all) in an effort to tap into Latino group consciousness, which has been found to condition opinions on Latino salient issue areas (Sanchez, 2006).[26] In line with the existing literature (Sanchez, 2006; Rouse, Wilkinson and Garand, 2010), my results show that those who feel discrimination against Latinos is a major problem are more likely to oppose local police taking an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants.

While no differences between citizens and non-citizens were found on the issue of local police involvement in immigration enforcement, there are other enforcement measures, asked about on the NSL, that do trigger different responses from these groups. One question on the NSL asks respondents whether they approve or disapprove of "states checking for immigration status before issuing drivers licenses." Of the sample, almost half (49.2%) of the citizen Latinos stated that they approved of this policy, while only 25% of non-citizen Latinos said the same. Estimating a logit model using this question as a dependent variable (coded as "1" if the respondent approves of states checking for immigration status before issuing drivers licenses and "0" if they disapprove), it is clear that the differences between these two groups are in fact significant, even when accounting for other key controls (see column two of Table 1.3). On the whole, it is consequential that such a large portion of the citizen

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[26] Ideally, I would have also included a measure of linked fate (noted above), however, such questions were not asked on this particular survey.

Table 1.3: Citizen and Non-Citizen Latinos Attitudes: Enforcement Measures (NSL)

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
	Local Police	Driver's License	Workplace Raid
Citizen	0.355	0.741**	0.858**
	(0.243)	(0.124)	(0.228)
Income	0.162	0.203*	0.185
	(0.135)	(0.099)	(0.118)
Education	0.005	0.038	0.037
	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.045)
Female	-0.227	-0.356†	-0.297†
	(0.195)	(0.050)	(0.177)
Age	-0.204	-0.036	-0.069
	(0.144)	(0.103)	(0.124)
Democrat	0.162	-0.046	0.089
	(0.215)	(0.160)	(0.208)
Republican	1.521**	1.180**	1.063**
	(0.273)	(0.240)	(0.257)
Cuban	0.510	1.042**	0.033
	(0.436)	(0.303)	(0.364)
Puerto Rican	0.448	0.816**	0.577†
	(0.322)	(0.269)	(0.297)
Other Ethnic Group	0.005	0.625**	0.235
	(0.217)	(0.168)	(0.210)
Discrimination (Latinos)	-0.886**	-1.232**	-0.964**
	(0.332)	(0.241)	(0.271)
Constant	-1.571**	-0.554†	-1.779**
	(0.459)	(0.312)	(0.347)
N	1497	1510	1504
Pseudo R^2	0.1042	0.1421	0.1149

$^\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$

Latino population remains in favor of these driver's license checks. The implication of this is that in any policy debates on this issue, a sizable segment of this group may side with the non-Latino population (particularly Whites), perhaps encouraging lawmakers to pass more restrictive policy.

Another question on the NSL that concerns enforcement measures addresses the issue of workplace raids. The question asks respondents whether they approve or disapprove of "workplace raids to discourage employers from hiring undocumented or illegal immigrants." Analysis of this question again reveals significant differences between citizen and non-citizen individuals. Calculating predicted probabilities using the results of the logit analysis presented in column three of Table 1.3, I find that the probability of a citizen approving workplace raids is 0.23[27] while for non-citizens, it is only 0.10.[28] Overall while support levels remain low among both groups, there again is reason to expect that a significant portion of the citizen population would actually support this policy and perhaps even side with the non-Latino population to pressure lawmakers to pass it into law.

A final policy area, that I was not able to explore in my assessment of Latino, Black, and White attitudes, concerns issues which I define as specifically *benefiting* non-citizen Latinos. Above, I addressed policies to open a path to citizenship/legalization for undocumented immigrants and policies to expand guest worker programs, but with the aid of the Latino National Survey, I also have the ability to examine questions on other salient policies, including those addressing in-state tuition rates for undocumented students and the use of foreign identification cards. The design of each of these relevant questions on the LNS asks respondents whether they strongly oppose, oppose, support, or strongly support each policy. The first question asks for responses in regard to the follow statement: "undocumented im-

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[27] With 95% confidence intervals of 0.16-0.30

[28] With 95% confidence intervals of 0.06-0.15

migrants attending college should be charged a higher tuition rate at state colleges and universities, even if they grew up and graduated high-school in the state." Although this question asks about charging *higher* rates to undocumented students, I am able to use responses to gauge support for the implied alternative, which is equal tuition rates for these students (i.e. a benefit to non-citizen individuals). The second question asks for feelings on the "use of matricula consular- an ID issued by foreign countries-as an acceptable form of identification for immigrants in the US." This policy is seen as beneficial to non-citizens as use of these foreign IDs can help non-citizens set up bank accounts, rent homes, and prevent unnecessary deportations (Ekstrand, 2004).

Upon looking at the descriptive statistics for these questions, I find that large numbers of both citizen and non-citizen Latinos fall on the same side of these issues. On the question regrading in-state tuition rates, approximately 81% of citizen Latinos oppose or strongly oppose charging higher rates to undocumented immigrants while 89% of non-citizens feel the same. On the question concerning the use of matricula consular, there is more division between the two groups however, large majorities of each remain in favor of these more relaxed policies, with 66.5% of citizens either supporting or strongly supporting this policy and 88% of non-citizens doing the same. That said, in estimating ordered logit models using each of these questions, it is found that these differences between citizen and non-citizen Latinos, small as they may seem, remain significant. Breaking down support levels, I find that non-citizen Latinos are significantly more likely to say that they "strongly oppose" higher tuition rates for undocumented students than citizen Latinos. In this instance, the predicted probability of a citizen Latino strongly opposing this policy is approximately 0.56 while for non-citizens, it is significantly higher at 0.65. On the question concerning the use of the matricula consular, I find even greater differences, as the probability that a citizen Latino strongly supports this policy is approximately

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0.40, while the probability that non-citizens strongly support such policy is around 0.60. Overall, I would argue that these preference intensities may matter in terms of policy outputs, either because they are affecting lawmaker incentives directly,[29] or they are affecting political participation rates (Kiousis and McDevitt, 2008), which in turn spark legislative attention (Griffin and Newman, 2005; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006). This point will be considered further later on in this chapter.

1.9 Measurements and Results: The Effect of Generational Status on Latino Attitudes

From the results presented above, it is evident that in many cases, citizenship has a significant effect on Latino attitudes on policies related to non-citizen interests. Yet, as mentioned previously, it cannot be assumed that all citizens have the same attitudes on this set of policies. Instead, I argue that generational status within the citizen population will influence opinions and specifically, that those who are in later generational categories (in this instance, who are second-generation or higher), will be less likely to support policies to benefit non-citizen immigrants and more likely to favor restricting non-citizens or tightening immigration enforcement measures. It is these generational differences that I see as being key to understanding Latino attitudes and especially to understanding who in society supports non-citizen interests and who does not.

In my analysis of Latino attitudes across generations, I assess many of the questions discussed in the section above (excluding those from the 2010 CCES, as the sample size of first-generation immigrants in this survey in particular, is much too small). To reiterate, these questions are as follows:

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[29] This is an argument drawn out of the literature on public issue priorities and legislative activity (Jones and Baumgartner, 2004, 2005; Jones, Larsen-Pricea and Wilkerson, 2011). Such research suggests that what the public finds to be important is more likely influence legislative agenda-setting and decision-making.

- LNS: *What is your preferred policy on undocumented or illegal immigration?*

- NSL: *Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?*

- NSL: *Do you approve or disapprove of states checking for immigration status before issuing drivers licenses?*

- NSL: *Do you approve or disapprove of workplace raids to discourage employers from hiring undocumented or illegal immigrants?*

- LNS: *Do you strongly support, support, oppose or strongly oppose the following statement: Undocumented immigrants attending college should be charged a higher tuition rate at state colleges and universities, even if they grew up and graduated high-school in the state*

- LNS: *Do you strongly support, support, oppose or strongly oppose the use of matricula consular-as an ID issued by foreign countries-as an acceptable form of identification for immigrants in the US.*

Key to this portion of my analysis are measures of generational status. I generate three new independent variables: *non-citizen*, which takes the value of "1" if the respondent is not a citizen of the United States and a "0" if otherwise; *first-generation* citizen, which takes that value of "1" if the individual is a foreign-born Latino citizen and "0" if otherwise; and *second-plus generation* citizen, which takes the value of "1" if the individual is a native-born Latino citizen and a "0" if otherwise[30]

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[30] As an additional robustness check, I also examine whether acculturation, or the adoption of American culture, is influencing attitudes on these policies. To do so, I re-estimate all of my models with a measure of language preference (a key variable included in previous models of Latino policy attitudes). For analysis using the LNS, this variable is generated using a question asking respondents whether they rely more heavily on Spanish-language television, radio, and newspapers, or on English-language TV, radio, and newspapers for information about public affairs, with responses coded as "1" for English, "0" for both, and "-1" for Spanish. In my analysis of the NSL, the

Starting with responses to the question on one's preferred policy on illegal immigration (LNS), I immediately find clear differences across the three generational groups.[31] The largest difference concerns the selection of the option of "immediate legalization of current undocumented immigrants." As seen in Figure 1.5, there are significant differences between non-citizens, first-generation and second-plus generation citizens in the probability of selecting this option. While the probability of a non-citizen favoring this option is greater than 0.50, for second-plus generation Latinos, it falls under 0.25.

Overall, the most favored option among second-plus generation Latinos among those provided was "a guest worker program leading to legalization eventually," as more than half of these respondents (52%) selected this option. However, nearly 17% selected the option of establishing a temporary guest worker program and more than 11% said they favored "an effort to seal or close the border to stop illegal immigration." In comparison, only 1.2% of non-citizens selected this most restrictive option while 4.6% of first-generation Latinos did the same.[32]

In moving to look at additional restrictionist policies, I examine questions from the National Survey of Latinos on local police involvement in immigration enforcement, immigration status checks when issuing driver's licenses, and workplace raids. Together, analysis of these questions provides some intriguing results, which are shown in Table 1.4. What becomes immediately apparent upon looking at this table is that while significant differences exist on all three policies between second-plus

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measure is based on a combined response to a series of questions regarding language ability, including whether the respondent carries out conversations in English or Spanish and whether he reads newspapers or books in Spanish or English. This variable is coded as "1" for English dominant, "0" for Bilingual, and "-1" for Spanish dominant. While additional analyses show that these factors do have a significant affect on attitudes, their inclusion in the models does not alter my key results. For the most part, I find that these language measures are strongly correlated with generational status variables, and for this reason, I opted to exclude them from the presented results.

[31] For regression outputs, see Table **??** in Appendix A.

[32] All differences between groups are statistically significant.

FIGURE 1.5: Probabilities of Preferring "Legalization of Undocumented Immigrants"

generation Latinos and the non-citizen out-group, no significant differences exist between non-citizens and first-generation citizens. This means that while the preferences of first-generation and non-citizen Latinos align on these issues (with very low levels of support), the preferences of the later generational group remain distinct.[33]

In Figure 1.6, I clearly show these distinctions, focusing on the question concerning support for "states checking for immigration status before issuing drivers licenses." Here we see that while the probability of non-citizen and first-generation citizen Latinos supporting these status checks is very low (around 0.25), the probability of support among second-plus generation Latinos is much higher (close to

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[33] For descriptive statistics on these questions, see Table **??** in Appendix A.

Table 1.4: Latino Attitudes Across Generations: Enforcement Measures (NSL)

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
	Local Police	Driver's License	Workplace Raid
First-Gen	-0.058 (0.301)	0.194 (0.201)	0.255 (0.290)
Sec-plus Gen	0.578* (0.259)	1.098** (0.184)	1.184** (0.239)
Income	0.104 (0.137)	0.190† (0.099)	0.179 (0.122)
Education	-0.010 (0.049)	0.021 (0.037)	0.018 (0.047)
Female	-0.229 (0.197)	-0.362* (0.143)	-0.296† (0.178)
Age	-0.135 (0.145)	0.056 (0.106)	0.026 (0.124)
Democrat	0.153 (0.215)	-0.060 (0.162)	0.071 (0.213)
Republican	1.520** (0.277)	1.186** (0.238)	1.080** (0.253)
Cuban	0.707 (0.445)	1.277** (0.292)	0.285 (0.351)
Puerto Rican	0.282 (0.330)	0.816† (0.277)	0.339 (0.301)
Other Ethnic Group	0.098 (0.216)	0.742** (0.171)	0.374† (0.215)
Discrimination (Latinos)	-0.812* (0.337)	-1.159** (0.247)	-0.882** (0.272)
Constant	-1.732** (0.472)	-0.749* (0.323)	-2.000** (0.359)
N	1497	1510	1504
Pseudo R^2	0.1107	0.1565	0.1305

$\dagger p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01$

FIGURE 1.6: Latino Support for Immigration Status Checks: Issuing Driver's Licenses

0.50).

What these results demonstrate is that the difference between citizen and non-citizen Latino attitudes (described in the section above) are not so clear cut. While first-generation citizens would likely be highly opposed to legislative proposals to increase immigration enforcement (which provide disproportional costs to the non-citizen population), the second-plus generation cohort may show more support for these policies.

To conclude my analysis of attitudinal differences between non-citizen, first-generation, and second-plus generation Latinos, I assess responses to two questions

on the LNS concerning the provision of benefits to non-citizen Latinos; the first of which asks about in-state tuition rates for undocumented students and the second of which addresses the acceptability of using foreign identification cards. As mentioned above, support for charging higher tuition rates to undocumented students remains quite low among the broader Latino population, however significant differences across generational groups remain (for regression estimations, see Table **??** in Appendix A). Overall, non-citizens and first-generation Latino citizens are significantly more likely to oppose higher tuition rates for undocumented students than the second-plus generation population. Of the sample of second-plus generation Latinos, 23% actually said that they either support or strongly support *increasing* these tuition rates.

On the question of whether the matricula consular should qualify as an acceptable form of identification for immigrants in the US, I find even larger differences across the generational groups. Of the sample of second-plus generation Latinos, more than 40% stated that they either "opposed" or "strongly opposed" the use of these foreign IDs. Estimating an ordered logit model using the dependent variable generated from this question, I find that the differences between the second-plus generation population and non-citizens are in fact significant. Looking more carefully at degrees of support for this proposal, I find that while the probability that a non-citizen Latino "strongly supports" the use of these foreign IDs is 0.60 (with 95% confidence intervals of 0.54-0.66), the probability of strong support from a second-plus generation Latino is only 0.36 (with 95% confidence intervals of 0.30-0.42). First-generation citizens, like non-citizens, show higher levels of support for this policy, as the probability that a first-generation Latino strongly supports the use the matricula consular is 0.50.[34][35] As mentioned above, the intensity of preferences on these policies may be relevant,

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[34] 95% confidence interval: 0.43-0.57

[35] For regression for the question on the use of the matricula consular, see column 2 of Table **??** in Appendix A.

especially when considering how constituent attitudes translate into policy outputs.

1.10 Summary of Public Preferences and the Connection to Policy Outputs

Taken together, this analysis of public opinion on policies addressing the 'specific' interest of non-citizen Latinos provides some interesting results, all of which have important implications for the larger focus of this project. Comparing across racial groups in the United States, I find significant differences in policy preferences, with non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks being significantly less likely to support measures to benefit non-citizens (especially those who are undocumented) than Latinos. And while Latinos are highly unlikely to favor restrictionist immigration proposals, such as those to increase border security and allow local police to take an active role in immigration enforcement, in many cases, both Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites show much higher levels of support for these policies.

Further analysis reveals that while aggregate Latino preferences are often distinct from the rest of the population, significant differences remain within this population. First, I find that compared to non-citizens, citizens as a whole are less likely to favor certain policies to benefit non-citizens (including those to legalize undocumented immigrants), and are more likely to favor restrictionist measures. Looking across generational groups, however, I find that Latino citizen attitudes are not simply monolithic. In line with my predictions, results reveal that first-generation Latino citizens, or those who are closer to the immigration experience, hold attitudes that are often indistinguishable from those held by non-citizens themselves. While significant portions of the second-plus generation Latino population prefer policies that conflict with non-citizen interests, by in large, first-generation Latinos support policies to benefit non-citizens and oppose measures that produce particularized costs for this group. Importantly, these differences remain significant even when account-

ing for other key attitudinal predictors including income, education, party affiliation, ethnic identity, and measures of group consciousness and linked fate. Together, these group and subgroup differences suggest that when lawmakers generate or vote for policies to benefit non-citizens, they are not working in line with the preferences of all constituents but rather, are most distinctly working in line with the preferences of both non-citizens themselves and first-generation Latino citizens.

In connecting these policy preferences to policy outputs, however, there are a few additional points to consider. One factor, that was mentioned previously, centers on the intensity of preferences held by certain groups and how these intensities are affecting policy development. On questions that reveal preferences intensities, I found that non-citizen and first-generation citizen Latinos were more likely to be strongly in favor of policies to *benefit* non-citizen Latinos than the second-plus generation cohort. Although I am unable to determine exactly whether or how these preference intensities are translating into legislative behavior, it is at least probable that groups with stronger preferences will gain more attention from lawmakers in debate on these issues than groups with weaker preferences (Jones and Baumgartner, 2004, 2005; Jones, Larsen-Pricea and Wilkerson, 2011). Those with stronger preferences may be more likely to become politically involved, for example either by petitioning, lobbying etc., and thus may become increasingly important to reelection-minded officials. While non-citizens may be unlikely to participate in such activities (as described in further detail below), this is a way in which the first-generation Latino citizen population may become relevant.

Related to this discussion of preference intensity is the question of issue *priorities.* Along the same lines, it is expected that groups who view a certain issue as being more important will be more likely to influence legislative views on that issue, all else being equal. Unfortunately, available survey data makes it difficult to gauge group priorities on policies directed at the non-citizen Latino community. In an attempt

to examine variation in priorities across Latinos, Blacks and Whites, I am able to draw on some questions asked in the 2008 ANES and the 2006 CCES. On the ANES, in follow-ups to both the question on whether the "U.S. government should make it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens" and the question on whether we should allow "illegal immigrants to work in the United States for up to three years, after which they would have to go back to their home country," respondents were asked to rate the importance of these issues (with options ranging from "not at all important" (0) to "extremely important" (5)). Overall, while there are no significant differences in importance levels between Whites, Blacks, and Latinos on the question concerning temporary work programs for illegal workers, the issue of providing citizenship to illegal immigrants was seen as significantly more important to Latino respondents than respondents from all other groups. Of the ANES sample, 50.4% of Latino respondents ranked this issue as "very important" or "extremely important," while only 42.5% of Whites and 39.6% of Blacks did the same.

Another question, asked on the 2006 CCES, did not focus on the importance of specific policies to benefit/restrict non-citizens, but rather, asked about what respondents saw to be "the most important problem facing the country," with one option being "immigration." Looking at the breakdown of responses across racial/ethnic groups, I find that Blacks are significantly less likely to say that immigration is the most important problem when compared to Latinos, however between Latinos and Whites, no significant differences emerge. A similar 'most important problem' question also appears on the Latino National Survey, thus allowing for further analysis of priorities *within* the Latino community. In response to the question what is the "one most important problem facing the Latino/Hispanic community today?" I find that while 35.5% of non-citizen Latinos and 30% of first-generation citizens in the sample said immigration was the most important problem, significantly fewer, 22.6%,

of second-plus generation Latinos said the same.[36] Overall, while differences in issue priorities across the larger population remain slight in many cases, there is at least some evidence to suggest that Latinos find issues tied to non-citizens and immigration to be somewhat more important, with non-citizen and first-generation citizen Latinos being most likely to see these issues as priorities.[37]

Taken together, these preference intensities and priorities, slight as they may be, may suggest that on these issues (i.e. those related to immigration and non-citizen benefits and restrictions), non-citizen and first-generation Latino citizens would be seen as more important to the lawmaker. That said however, other factors continue to block these groups from having their voices heard in government. In working to understand whose policy preferences are represented by elected officials, scholars have discovered a number of factors that work against non-citizens and first-generation Latino citizens who share similar preferences. Many studies have found, for instance, that factors such as wealth (Weakliem, Shapiro and Jacobs, 2005; Gilens, 2005; Bartels, 2008) and organizational capacity (Truman, 1951; Schattschneider, 1960; Dahl, 1961; Olson, 1965; Walker, 1991; Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Lowery and Brasher, 2004) significantly affect representational outcomes. Given that Latinos as a whole have lower levels of income, particularly compared to non-Hispanic Whites[38] and, as a result of having inadequate political resources, including these financial resources, are more likely to lack organizational capacity, one would expect their political influence to be much lower than other racial/ethnic groups. Further, it is expected that those Latino groups showing the most support for non-citizen interests (non-citizens

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[36] Conducting an empirical analysis of this question, I find that these differences are in fact significant. For regression outputs, see Table **??** in Appendix A.

[37] It is also worth noting that the lack of variance across groups may also be due to the nature of the question wording, as scholars have found that these 'most important problem' questions often confuse different characteristics of issue salience (Wlezien, 2005).

[38] According to the 2010 Census, the median family income of non-Hispanic Whites is$56,466 while for Latinos it is $41,102.

and first-generation citizens) would have even less power, given that compared to later generational groups, these groups have even fewer resources (Fry and Gonzales, 2008; Passel and Cohn, 2009; Taylor, 2009).[39]

Coupled with, and perhaps related to the fact that Latinos lack resources, is the reality that they also tend to participate in politics at lower rates than non-Hispanic Whites (e.g. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995); McClain and Stewart (2010); Lopez, Motel and Patten (2012)). Given results from existing literature, this may also be contributing to lower levels of representation for this group as a whole (Verba and Nie, 1972; Bartels, 1998; Griffin and Newman, 2005, 2013). Among Latinos, however, participation rates have been known to vary and thus, may be influencing relative representation rates across this group. While DeSipio (1996) finds that first-generation and second-plus generation Latinos generally have comparable levels of political and organizational activity,[40] Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura (2001) find that in certain contexts, newly naturalized first-generation Latinos are actually *more* likely to turnout to vote than those who are native-born. This suggests that in some cases, the influence of first-generation Latinos on political activity may be greater than that of other citizen Latino subgroups.

Considering non-citizen participation and its relation to representation, it can be assumed that there is little overall effect, especially given that non-citizens do not vote and are found to be significantly less likely to engage in non-electoral political

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[39] According to recent Pew Hispanic Center reports, both legal and undocumented immigrant Latinos are more likely to be living below the poverty line when compared to U.S.-born Latinos. While the percent of U.S. born Latinos in poverty is around 10%, it is 13% for legal immigrants and 21% for undocumented immigrants (Passel and Cohn, 2009). In addition, second-plus generation Latinos are more likely than both first-generation and non-citizens to enroll in high school or college and are less likely to dropout of school. First generation and non-citizen Latinos are also more likely to be employed in lower-skilled occupations than those who are native born (Taylor, 2009).

[40] These results fall in line with results of my own analysis of Latino political activity, which was done using both the National Survey of Latinos and the Latino National Survey. Comparing first-generation and second-plus generation registration and voting rates, I find no significant differences between these two groups.

activities, such as signing petitions, wearing buttons and attending public meetings (Leal, 2002). That said, if first-generation and non-citizen Latinos share the same preferences, which they do on policies concerning non-citizens, then lawmakers may be indirectly reflecting the interests of non-citizens as they respond to their first-generation Latino voters. Beyond this, it is also possible that lawmakers are directly appealing to non-citizens due to their future voting potential. These are points I consider in much greater detail in subsequent chapters.

Taken together, there are many factors that are likely working against non-citizen representation. Excluding preference intensities and priorities, the low income and levels of political resources, coupled with low participation rates of first-generation citizen and non-citizen Latinos (particular in relation to non-Hispanic Whites), suggest that their representation, and specifically, non-citizen representation, may be unlikely. That said, there is reason to believe that these groups will remain relevant, especially in certain contexts. From the literature, it is expected that in districts with small Latino populations, relative to White and Black populations, representational outcomes for Latino subgroups groups will be lower. Further, findings on Latino wealth, resources, and participation rates, suggest that even in districts with relatively sizable Latino populations (which may be referred to as 'influence districts'), rates of representation will remain lower. However, given that Latinos as a whole have become a more prominent political force and have been seen as a key swing voting population (Taylor and Fry, 2007; Frey, 2008) and even a deciding factor in recent elections (Segura and Barreto, 2012), it is likely that in certain cases, lawmakers will begin to favor the preferences of this group. Recent work by Griffin and Newman (2013) suggests that the constituents with greater "voting power" or those who are "likely to vote, swing voters and are members of larger groups in a district" enjoy more political influence (52). Thus, if Latinos are categorized or perceived by a lawmaker as holding a considerable degree of voting power, then representation of

this group will be more likely.[41]

Overall, this argument on voting power suggests that Latino representation will be greater in districts where voting-age Latinos make up large portions of the population and have greater potential to affect electoral outcomes. Given the results on policy preferences specific to non-citizen Latinos however, it is likely that beyond the size of the voting-age Latino population mattering to a lawmaker, the generational make-up of this population will also be key. Directly tying to my research question, my argument, which is tested in subsequent chapters, is that as the proportion of the voting-age Latino population that is first-generation increases, a lawmaker will become more likely to represent non-citizen interests. In addition, I claim that as a potential future voting population, non-citizen Latinos themselves may also be influencing behavior. Specifically, I argue that as the size of the non-citizen Latino population in a district increases, a lawmaker will become more likely to engage in activities to benefit this population.

Given the importance of population distribution to my argument, I wish to first take a closer look at the Latino population and relevant subgroups across the nation and over time. This assessment, which follows in the next chapter, will provide an important foundation for my reelection argument and will lead into the reasons behind my state case selections, which are then used in the final empirical analyses on voting and sponsorship (presented in chapters 4 and 5).

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[41] This also ties into the argument made by (Miler, 2010) that lawmakers pay attention to the most visible constituents when making decisions on given issues.

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