between syntactic identity and semantic identity is broken (this is so despite identity in bare bones content to the extent that bare bones content is only part of the representational system’s semantics). In such a case an appeal to the observer’s recognitionally keyed concepts cannot explain the difference in the fleshed out content of the two pictures, to the extent that the same concepts apply to both. Obviously there are dimensions of information (some even external to the picture) that ground the contrasting ascriptions of fleshed out content; but what these dimensions of information are and how they are embedded in the system of pictorial representation (controlling to a great extent the system’s semantics) is something that a complete account of pictorial representation needs to explain.

Having said that, it was the primary aim of On Images to provide a plausible and coherent definition of pictorial representation, a definition that would, further, shed some light on the way in which pictures assume their content (rather than to provide an exhaustive analysis of the process of content ascription) and in this aim the author, I believe, succeeds. To this extent On Images covers significant theoretical ground in the explanation of pictorial representation, which makes this, without a doubt, one of the most valuable and important contributions to the topic.

KATERINA BANTINAKI

Philosophy

Arthur Lewis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
UK
doi:10.1093/mind/fzn064


Dominic Lopes’s Sight and Sensibility contributes, with originality and sharp argumentation, to a growing interest, within contemporary aesthetics, for questions of value, but with respect to a domain—the aesthetic value of pictures—that has so far received less attention. Lopes claims two major goals for his book: first, ‘to explain what it is for pictures to elicit experiences of the scenes they depict’ (p. 11); second, to defend ‘aesthetic interactionism’ about pictures, ‘a view about how aesthetic and non-aesthetic evaluations of pictures interact’ (p. 4). The book focuses, not on pictorial art but, more generally, on the evaluation of pictures as pictures, that is, as essentially mimetic. Indeed, throughout Sight and Sensibility, the question of the aesthetic evaluation of pictures and that of the interaction between such an evaluation and evaluations of other sorts are addressed in light of the specific visual experiences that pictures elicit in their viewers.
The first two chapters are dedicated to ‘the puzzle of mimesis’, for representational and for expressive properties respectively. What makes the experience of looking at a picture of some scene worth having, while looking at the same scene face to face would not be an equally worthy experience? The answer emerges gradually throughout the book and amounts, ultimately, to spelling out the complexities of what, from Richard Wollheim onwards, has been known as ‘seeing-in’ (in brief, the experience of seeing in a picture what it depics, combined with a visual awareness of the picture’s surface). In some of the most intriguing pages of this book, Lopes analyses the visual experience of looking at a picture with understanding. After distinguishing the visual awareness of a picture’s surface from the visual awareness of a picture’s design, he spells out the different ways in which seeing-in combines, in different pictures or parts of a picture, with the other dimensions of pictorial seeing, and especially with design seeing. The result is a helpful taxonomy of types of pictures that is often recalled throughout the text. The solution to the puzzle, then, needs full acknowledgment of seeing-in as a ‘multi-faceted phenomenon’ (p. 129), one never to be conflated with seeing face to face; and hence of the fact that looking at a picture always differs in important ways from merely looking at the scene the picture depicts.

The theoretical analysis is well supplemented by the use of examples. (Indeed, one of the many virtues of this book is that, rather than throwing at the reader a plethora of obscure examples, it concentrates on a few ones, which are revisited from chapter to chapter, enhancing the clarity and unity of the theoretical presentation.) In chapter two, for instance, the discussion of the puzzle of expressive mimesis (where does the value of seeing, say, frustration, in a painting come from, if looking at a scene of frustration face to face would typically not be valuable in the same way?) is conducted mostly by analyzing a drawing by Honoré Daumier, *Fatherly Discipline*, which depicts a man in the act of punishing his son. After defending a contour theory of pictorial expression (inspired by the contour theories proposed by Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies for musical expression), Lopes makes suggestions on how, in a picture like Daumier’s, the picture’s expressiveness results not just from the depicted figures and scene but also from the picture’s design, as well as from the combination of this with the depicted elements.

The discussion of the puzzle of mimesis is also an opportunity for Lopes to investigate how looking at a picture is also always similar to looking at the depicted scene face to face. The two forms of seeing, he contends, share the application of the same visual concept, one that endows the viewer with the capacity to identify the object. Like face to face seeing, ‘seeing an object in a picture depends upon and expresses knowledge of the object’s appearance’ (p. 46). Naturally, the difficult case for a thesis of this sort is the picture of an unfamiliar object, for which no visual concept is available to the viewer. Surprisingly, Lopes dismisses the problem in a few paragraphs. The visual concept of the depicted object, he contends, need not be had beforehand but may be...
'acquired as a result of seeing [the object] in the picture' (p. 47). Yet mere appeal to the fact that we can learn of the appearance of an object by looking at a picture of it is no explanation of such a fact. In general, the capacity of seeing an object (in a picture or face to face) may depend on something else, and something less, than the capacity of identifying the object. Perception of an object (in a picture or face to face) may be concept-dependent in a, so to speak, thinner way than assumed by Lopes: not always requiring a visual concept of the object seen, but rather some more generic conceptual apparatus, one compatible with alternative categorizations (‘it could be this, it could be that…’) and yet one sufficient to grant phenomenological continuity to the experience of seeing the object through the alternative categorizations.

Chapter three begins the transition to the question of the interaction between aesthetic value and other types of evaluations, by defining aesthetic value and providing a way to determine when values of other sorts may have aesthetic implications. Lopes defends ‘experience internalism’ (vs. ‘externalism’), the view that the experience elicited by an object of aesthetic evaluation is part of the evaluation, indeed may sometimes be an evaluation. Specifically, Lopes formulates what he calls the ‘internalist conjecture’: of an evaluation (R) of a picture (P), attributing to it a feature (F) deemed to be a merit or demerit, the evaluation is aesthetic ‘if and only if, were R accurate, (1) being F would be a (de)merit in P, all else being equal; (2) a suitable observer’s experience, E, of P as F is partly constitutive of (1); and (3) R is an experience with the same content as E or R is a representation [of (de)merit] warranted by E’ (p. 107). Lopes admits that such a definition is somewhat broad and that more fine-grained distinctions are needed to separate properly aesthetic evaluations from purely hedonic ones (such as the evaluation of something as painful). Yet, he thinks that the definition successfully discriminates between undisputed cases of aesthetic evaluation and undisputed cases of non-aesthetic evaluation (p. 110). Doubts arise, however, on whether the internalist conjecture is not too inclusive in some other, more damaging ways. Take a fisherman’s evaluation of a fishing rod (an experience or a representation of one) as, say, light (assuming that lightness is a merit in certain kinds of fishing rods). According to the conjecture, the fisherman’s evaluation would count as aesthetic in all those instances in which experiencing the rod’s lightness is part of what makes the rod’s lightness a merit in the rod. By contrast, this would seem an undisputed instance of a non-aesthetic evaluation. Examples involving vision could be found, too: the lenses of a pair of spectacles may be clear, the clearness being a merit in the lenses, and the experiencing of their clearness being in part constitutive of the fact that it is a merit in them.

The internalist conjecture provides Lopes with a ‘non-aesthetic–aesthetic conversion mechanism’ (p. 119) that allows him, in chapters four and five, to declare some cognitive evaluations and some moral evaluations, respectively, to be aesthetic as well. The overall strategy is ingenious. Roughly, it consists in spelling out the structure of certain species of cognitive and moral evaluations,
to then show how such a structure matches that of an aesthetic evaluation as per the internalist conjecture. Of course, Lopes continues, not every evaluation is like this. Not just any cognitive merit, for instance, can be converted into an aesthetic merit. A picture may be truthful, but truthfulness converts into an aesthetic merit only when its being a merit partly depends on the response of a suitable observer who sees the picture as truthful. In particular, Lopes claims that the cognitive value of pictures that may count aesthetically is that of fostering and reinforcing some intellectual virtue. One of such virtues is fine observation (some pictures promote delicacy of discrimination, accuracy in seeing, adaptability of seeing, and conceptual revision—they help us, that is, to see things in increasingly fine-grained ways, accurately, and under new and even surprising categories). By contrast, other pictures inhibit and weaken fine observation. Amongst the pictures fostering fine observation, some have a cognitive merit of a different, higher kind, although only for some viewers: they do not just foster fine observation, they are experienced as doing so. They have, then, ‘step-up’ cognitive merit (vs. mere ‘ground-level cognitive merit’). Since being experienced as promoting fine observation is in part what makes the picture’s promoting fine observation a merit in it, such a cognitive merit qualifies, as per the internalist conjecture, as not just cognitive but aesthetic as well.

The argument is subtle but, perhaps because of the aforementioned excessive inclusiveness of the internalist conjecture, it seems to grant odd consequences. Take a visual puzzle of the sort that can be found in entertainment magazines (e.g. ‘find the error in this picture’): a well-made visual puzzle of this kind fosters fine observation and its doing so is a cognitive merit of the puzzle; furthermore, part of the fact that the picture is cognitively meritorious is that a suitable observer (a visual puzzles lover) would see it as fostering fine observation. According to Lopes, so it seems, this would be an instance of step-up cognitive merit, hence one that has an aesthetic implication. Yet, such pictures are not better or worse aesthetically because of the degree to which they foster fine observation and are experienced as doing so—they simply are better or worse visual puzzles. Indeed, an analogous reasoning applies to all sorts of things that have cognitive merit partly because they are experienced as giving cognitively valuable contributions: crossword puzzles, for example, which are cognitively valuable in part because they enrich a person’s vocabulary and in part because they are experienced as doing so.

In spite of these difficulties, Lopes’s discussion of visual examples is quite convincing and it leaves future investigators with the challenge of showing how cognitive merits of pictures can be aesthetically relevant as well.

The argument, in chapter five, regarding moral evaluations is analogous to the one regarding cognitive evaluations, but applied to the moral merit of ‘boosting moral sensibility’. Incidentally, at one place, Lopes confuses the reader, as he appears to define step-up moral merit in a way that is different from that developed so far and from that needed for the internalist conjecture to apply: a moral merit is a step-up moral merit if ‘part of the boost to moral
sensibility comes from a suitable observer’s experience of the boost as a merit’ (p. 181, emphasis added). This is different from defining step-up merit as such that its being a merit partly depends on being experienced by a suitable observer as the feature it is.

The discussion is conducted by means of two relatively extended analyses, of illustrations of Dante’s *Inferno* and of Edgar Degas’s paintings of female nudes. The former is especially original in showing how some images may succeed ethically, by enhancing the viewer’s moral sensibility, in ways that are distinctively pictorial. The latter is a convincing and balanced defense of a moralist critique of the male gaze embodied in some pictures, and yet short of accepting the thesis that all pictorial seeing is a manifestation of the male gaze.

Since Lopes’s interest is in the aesthetic value of pictures, not on their value as art, the relationship between *Sight and Sensibility* and the contemporary debates on the relevance to art criticism of cognitive and moral value considerations is doomed to be complex. Yet, in general, there is no doubt that this book brings us closer to the truth regarding an interesting entanglement of questions regarding pictures, their experience, and their values.

Department of Philosophy  
Lafayette College  
Easton, PA 18042  
USA  
giovannelli@lafayette.edu  
doi:10.1093/mind/fzn065


This fascinating book is about propositional attitudes. In it, Robert Matthews pursues, with great rigour and tenacity, the question of how we should understand our practice of attributing propositional attitudes and, in particular, the specific question of how subjects must be built (given the best available accounts of the building materials) if they are to serve as proper targets for that practice.

Many philosophers have been struck by the thought that putative assignments of propositions to subjects’ attitudes are somehow akin to assignments of numbers to their weights. One of Matthews’s central aims is to develop that thought into a serious hypothesis. He seeks to use work on the theory of measurement proper as the basis for a (broadly) measurement theoretic (MT) account of our practice of attitude attribution and to provide reasons for thinking that the latter account is adequate to the practice. In so doing, he hopes to present a hypothesis able to challenge (what he thinks of as) the hegemony of (what he refers to as) the Received View (RV, his majusculation).